ANNALS, *AAPSS*, **539**, May 1995

Crime and the Racial Fears of White Americans

By WESLEY G. SKOGAN

ABSTRACT: This article examines the linkages between fear of crime, residential integration, and racial prejudice among whites. Survey studies confirm that residential proximity to black people is related to whites' fear of crime. In addition, whites who are prejudiced (in this case, who disapprove of school and neighborhood integration) are more fearful. The fear-provoking effects of proximity and prejudice are independent and, in fact, whites currently living closer to blacks register lower levels of prejudice than do those who live farther away. This is probably due to their ability to use housing markets to distance themselves from minority neighborhoods. Despite the political salience of white fear, blacks are more fearful of crime, due in large measure to the concentration around them of factors that make everyone more fearful. These include neighborhood-level differences in victimization, social disorder, and physical decay. In a highly segregated society, these factors are highly associated with race, so it is difficult to specify which aspects of this bundle—including racial proximity—are affecting white fear as well.

Wesley G. Skogan is professor of political science and urban affairs at Northwestern University. His research focuses on victimization, fear of crime, and the relationship between the police and the public. His 1990 book, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Cities, *won an award from the American Sociological Association. He is the author of two recent reports for the British Home Office on encounters between police and the public in England and Wales and is currently evaluating a new community policing program in Chicago.*

Fear of black crime covers the streets like a sheet of ice.

Senator Bill Bradley[1]

It is widely assumed that expressions by many whites of concern about crime are rooted to a significant degree in their fear of black people. One popular news magazine states that many white people seem to be unduly troubled by black people, especially young black men; white people are often afraid of some danger that may exist solely in the imagination.[2] Of course, fear is not necessarily a bad thing; it can be a rational response to the conditions of one's life and guide purposeful action. As other articles in the present volume document, fear reflects people's individual vulnerability to crime and its harmful consequences, risks in their neighborhood, and their personal victimization experiences and those reported by their families and friends, However, it may also be that white Americans translate their unease about race relations into beliefs about crime, and vice versa, a linkage of potentially great divisiveness. This article reviews research on the nexus between them. It examines linkages between fear and white attitudes toward blacks and the anxiety created by close residential proximity between the two groups.

Focusing on the fears of whites should not obscure the fact that black Americans are even more fearful. Research documents that they are fearful mostly for the same reasons that whites are fearful, and their higher level of fear reflects the fact that those common causes afflict their communities more severely. This article focuses on white fear because it is one of the most compelling political constructs of our time. It is evoked as an explanation for white backlash against progressive social and economic policies, the declining prospects of the Democratic Party, and as a source of divisiveness that threatens the fabric of urban life. Concern about common crime—street mugging, sexual assault, and the like—is not the only outcropping of the racial fears of whites. Another is resistance to school busing.[3] In both instances, white fear partly is deliberately constructed by those who are in a position to profit from its divisiveness. Most prominently, they are politicians, among whom "playing the race card" is a time-tested political ploy. In 1988, presidential candidate George Bush horrified audiences with his story of a man convicted of murder who raped a Maryland woman while he was on furlough from a Massachusetts prison. The president personally made no reference to Willie Horton's race, but someone was quick to come up with his picture. In that campaign, Horton was a wedge issue.

There is only a limited amount of useful research on the nexus of race and fear, for several reasons. For one, so many aspects of American life are racially encoded that it is difficult to tease out statistically the separate consequences of factors such as crime, school quality, neighborhood

1. *Congressional Record*, 26 Mar. 1992, p. S4242.

2. Scott Minerbrook, "Commentary: A Different Reality for Us," *U.S. News & World Report*, 11 May 1992, p. 36.

3. D. Garth Taylor, *Public Opinion and Collective Action: The Boston School Desegregation Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 44-61.

satisfaction, property values, neighborhood racial change, and the like. In a segregated society, many things covary strongly with race. For another, what Senator Bradley termed a "cloak of silence and denial" surrounds the general race-crime nexus in many circles.[4] Prominent among them have been the federal agencies that pay for expensive research ventures involving large-sample surveys; they have been, in my experience, unwilling to fund investigations that touch too closely on controversial racial attitudes. Crime is also an issue area where the facts of the case as measured by arrests, reports by crime victims, and self-reports of offending all point to higher rates of criminality among black Americans, confounding prejudiced attitudes with doses of realism that make it difficult to interpret the pulse of white opinion.

Some research closely skirts the two issues. For example, there is a great deal of research on the social and economic determinants of how much cities spend on policing. These studies, which are summarized in a book by Pamela Irving Jackson,[5] find that police strength is politically determined by a complicated set of socially patterned interests and that the local level of crime plays only a limited role in the process. More straightforward seems to be the role played by indicators of racial economic inequality, inner-city riots, and the relative size of the minority population. More is spent on policing in cities where white interests appear to be threatened.

The present article reviews direct studies of the problem. A few are ethnographic reports by researchers who immersed themselves in the lives of residents of urban neighborhoods and emerged to tell their stories. The other studies are based on interviews with large samples of survey respondents who were quizzed about crime, fear, and the character of their neighborhoods. Some of these surveys also questioned white respondents concerning their racial attitudes, and those studies present the most complete—and complex—view of the topic.

THE STINCHCOMBE MODEL OF RACE AND FEAR

Perhaps the best-known statement of the problem was advanced in 1980 by Arthur Stinchcombe and his associates.[6] Their explanation of fear of crime, which is illustrated in Figure 1, hinges on the racial composition of people's neighborhoods. They examined the problem using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), a yearly national survey. The GSS measures fear by asking if there is a place within a mile of their home where respondents are afraid to walk alone at night. Stinchcombe and his colleagues began by equating the distribution of black people with the distribution of crime. They cited what they dubbed "well-known statistics" to argue that "the most fear-producing crimes are all 'ghetto crimes' " and

4. *Congressional Record*, 26 Mar. 1992, p. S4242.

5. Pamela Irving Jackson, *Minority Group Threat, Crime, and Policing* (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 1-46.

6. Arthur Stinchcombe et al., *Crime and Punishment: Changing Attitudes in America* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980), pp. 39-73.

FIGURE 1
STINCHCOMBE MODEL OF FEAR



that "crimes that make people afraid are more concentrated among black people."[7] For example, they showed that blacks were arrested for murder, robbery, and rape at a rate that is disproportionate to their numbers in the population and that blacks were more frequently victimized by violent crime. As part of the argument, they used the GSS to document that victimization of whites was disproportionately high when they lived closer to black people. Whites living in integrated neighborhoods were a little more than twice as likely as those living in segregated neighborhoods to be robbed and about 1.4 times as likely to be burglarized. They therefore felt justified in using reports by survey respondents of how close they live to concentrations of black people as a "measure of objective risk" of victimization by black people.[8] The latter construct is depicted in italics in Figure 1, for risk of victimization was not actually measured in the data that they used to test their explanation of fear.

It is important to note that this part of Stinchcombe's model is intended to explain fear of crime among all Americans, not just whites. In the data, blacks were more fearful than whites, a finding that is consistent from study to study. However, Stinchcombe did not directly examine the question of whether blacks living in

7. Ibid., pp. 43 and 47.

8. Ibid., p. 44.

black neighborhoods were more fearful than those living in integrated surroundings, because the number of blacks doing so is painfully small in a national survey. Because of the numbers involved, when he examined the data for "everyone," he was in practice examining the views of whites. He found that the proportion of people who were fearful was substantially higher in integrated areas even when controlling for other factors. These included living in big cities (more fear), sex (women are more fearful), age (fear is higher among old people), household composition (living alone magnifies fear), and individual victimization (fear provoking). Gun ownership was at first glance reassuring, for people who owned guns were less fearful. However, self-reports of gun ownership were lower than usual among whites (and blacks) living in big cities and among whites living near blacks. When these and the other factors just enumerated were controlled for, the effect of gun ownership disappeared.

The other part of Stinchcombe's model, what he dubbed the "irrational" part, applies only to whites. As illustrated in Figure 1, he also examined the statistical relationship between fear and a three-question measure of white views of black people. It combined responses to questions about laws against interracial marriage, objecting to someone in the family bringing a black person home to dinner, and whether or not anyone in the family had actually brought a black person home to dinner. As it was weighted heavily toward intimate social activity, it is not clear that this was the best possible indicator for a study of attitudes related to street crime. However, those falling at the prejudiced end of the scale were more fearful even when the racial composition of their neighborhoods was controlled for.

It is important to note that the link between prejudice and fear was not due to higher levels of prejudice among whites in close contact with blacks; in fact, quite the opposite was the case. Figure 2 presents the results of my own reanalysis of data from more recent years of the GSS (1988, 1989, and 1990). It uses a different indicator of racial prejudice, an index combining responses to two measures of whites' views of black participation in society's most public institutions. The first measure assesses their views of the acceptability of white and black children's going to school together under the circumstance of varying racial composition of the school. The most prejudiced whites (only 4 percent of the total) objected to white children's going to school with even a few blacks, while the most liberal (40 percent) did not object to their going to school mostly with blacks. The second component of the prejudice measure is based on responses to a question about "white people's right to a racially segregated neighborhood." At the most liberal end, 50 percent of respondents disagreed strongly that whites had such a right, while the polar group (8 percent of all whites) agreed strongly that they did. In combination, 28 percent of whites took the most liberal stance on both questions, while 2 percent of whites took the most prejudiced stance (the questions are presented in an appendix to this article).

FIGURE 2
RACIAL PREJUDICE AND FEAR AMONG WHITES



SOURCE: National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1988-90.

As before, fear was measured by the presence of a location nearby where respondents were afraid to go alone after dark. Whites' proximity to blacks was measured by a question asking if blacks lived nearby and a follow-up question determining "how far away" measured in city blocks, using the response categories presented in Figure 2.

As Figure 2 illustrates, on a national basis, racial prejudice was in fact somewhat lower among whites who reported living in close proximity to blacks. As the left side of the figure indicates, average prejudice scores dropped with increasing proximity. This was true of both the school segregation and the residential segregation subcomponents of the measure. The causes for this might run both ways. Certainly, many whites are financially and socially able to distance themselves from blacks to an extent appropriate to their racial attitudes; many of the more prejudiced just move away. At the same time, people living together may (the evidence is mixed) learn to get along, especially if they share cultural values or are not competitors for the same jobs or houses.[9] In either event,

9. Cf. Carolyn Adams et al., *Philadelphia: Neighborhoods, Division, and Conflict in a Postindustrial City* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), pp. 22-25; Elijah Anderson, *Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change in an Urban Community* (Chicago: University of

the decline in both measures of prejudice with increasing proximity is impressive in light of the fact that interracial proximity is not at all an abstract, far-away issue for whites who indicated that black people lived within eight blocks of their home.

On the other hand, Figure 2 indicates that whites who were fearful were also somewhat more prejudiced, so there may be a causal link between the two. Again, the relationship between the two could run in either direction. Stinchcombe argued that fear leads to prejudice, as whites rationally assessed official and media images of the extent of black crime and then generalized the results into beliefs about the appropriate place of blacks in society. The argument that fear of crime is a code word for racism takes the opposite view, that whites project their general attitudes toward black people onto resonant social issues such as crime. These data are not very suitable for deciding between the two views, but it is an important research question.

Figure 2 also documents that the whites' proximity to blacks was related to fear. Those who reported that no black people lived nearby were the least fearful, while those living closest to blacks were the most fearful. The gap between the two polar groups was 20 percentage points. Stinchcombe's rationality-of-fear argument was that it is simply riskier for whites to live near blacks, so proximity leads to fear.

TABLE 1
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FEAR AMONG WHITES

	Coefficient	Significance
Proximity	.2039	.0002
Prejudice	.1409	.0012
Live in south	.5134	.0002
Female	1.8375	.0000
City size (log)	.2298	.0000
Crime victim	.4991	.0416
Elderly	.2508	.2159
Have children	−.1150	.4656
Age and sex	.0042	.4870
Live alone	.0760	.6029
Education	.0278	.6523
Constant	3.4207	.0000

NOTE: Overall, 72.6 percent were correctly classed. Number of cases: 1396.

The tenacity of the link between racial prejudice, proximity to blacks, and fear of crime is illustrated in Table 1. It presents the results of a logistic regression analysis examining the impact of those factors on fear while simultaneously controlling for a host of other well-established correlates of fear. The list of control factors is longer than Stinchcombe's tabular analysis allowed. It includes age, gender, education, whether respondents lived alone, whether they had children living at home, region of the country, city size, and whether respondents had been the victim of a burglary or robbery. It also includes a control for being old and female in combination. However, when all of these factors are controlled for, both the residential proximity of blacks and prejudice (measured by whites' views of the appropriate role of black people in society) remained independently linked to fear.

Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 28-30; Sally Engle Merry, "Racial Integration in an Urban Neighborhood: The Social Organization of Strangers," *Human Organization*, 39(1):59-69 (Spring 1980); Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch, "The Contact Hypothesis Revisited," *Social Forces*, 71(3):781-95 (Mar. 1993).

FIGURE 3
LISKA MODEL OF RACE AND FEAR



THE LISKA MODEL
OF RACE AND FEAR

A second prominent statistical model of the determinants of fear of crime was advanced by Allen Liska and his associates.[10] It takes into account the objective risk of victimization, measured directly by citywide victim surveys, and the city-size factor that was so prominent in the results of the GSS. It does not include a direct measure of the racial attitudes of whites but takes into account several important features of their environment: the relative size of the black population in the city where they live, the extent of racial segregation in housing patterns there, and the likelihood that crimes against them will be interracial in character. Liska finds that residential segregation calms white fear, while interracial crime exacerbates it.

The factors comprising the Liska model are illustrated in Figure 3. Unlike Stinchcombe's, this model is cast at the city level rather than at the individual level. The data on crime and fear were drawn from official sources and large (10,000-respondent) surveys conducted by the Census Bureau in 26 large cities. The cities varied considerably in level of fear. In the surveys, respondents were asked how safe they felt out alone in their neighborhood at night. Only 27 percent of those interviewed in San Diego felt either unsafe or very unsafe; the comparable figure for residents of Newark, New Jersey, was 58 percent.

Liska's causal explanations for this large variation are illustrated in

10. Allen E. Liska, Joseph J. Lawrence, and Andrew Sanchirico, "Fear of Crime as a Social Fact," *Social Forces*, 60(3):760-70 (Mar. 1982).

Figure 3. Unlike Stinchcombe, he measured crime rates directly, using official statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He found that the robbery rate was a strong predictor of fear among whites and that it was much more potent than city size. However, the interesting parts of the model lie in the middle of the diagram. Whites were more fearful in cities with larger black populations, independent of the crime rate. A measure of residential segregation was included that indicated how separately blacks and whites lived their lives in each city, and there was also a direct effect of this on white fear. Where blacks and whites lived separately, whites were less fearful.

Furthermore, the extent of interracial crime in each city had an added effect on white fear; in fact, its effect was the strongest of all the elements in the model. Interracial victimization was measured in the city surveys by asking victims to describe their attackers. For statistical purposes, Liska used the percentage of robberies against whites in each city that were perpetrated by nonwhites as a general indicator of the extent of interracial crime. He and his colleagues note that "robbery . . . is the epitome of dangerous street crime in which the offender is a stranger whose racial identity is generally known to the victim."[11] As depicted in Figure 3, interracial crime was more common in cities with more nonwhites and in cities that were less segregated. In turn, the extent of interracial crime was the strongest determinant of white fear, followed by the robbery rate.

11. Ibid., p. 764.

In Liska's model, it is both risk of victimization and who is doing the victimizing that matters to white city residents. He and his colleagues interpret their data as suggesting that "cultural dissimilarity between whites and nonwhites makes interracial crime appear particularly uncertain, violent, and dangerous to whites."[12] Residential segregation was directly related to lower levels of white fear, perhaps by reducing the day-to-day visibility of blacks and the frequency with which whites came into contact with them. Segregation was also linked to lower levels of fear indirectly by dampening the rate of interracial crime. Statistically, the effects of segregation and the racial composition of the cities were felt most strongly via the extent of interracial crime.[13]

OTHER RESEARCH ON RACE AND FEAR

Beyond these studies, most research examining fear of crime and racial fears of white Americans puts the problem in simpler terms and does not include measures of whites' racial attitudes. Instead, these studies focus solely on the link between racial proximity and fear. For example, Gertrude Moeller conducted in-

12. Ibid., p. 767.

13. In otherwise unrelated research on the statistical correlates of police strength, Liska and his colleagues also find that the relative size of the black population is more strongly linked to city expenditures on policing in less segregated cities than it is in highly segregated cities. See Allen E. Liska, Joseph J. Lawrence, and Michael Benson, "Perspectives on the Legal Order: The Capacity for Social Control," *American Journal of Sociology*, 87:413-26 (1981).

terviews with 764 residents of Illinois during the early 1980s.[14] Based on questions in the survey, she classified respondents as living in neighborhoods that were virtually all black, of mixed composition, or virtually all white. Like other studies, hers found that blacks and whites lived in proximity primarily in big cities. She measured fear of crime using the same "is there a place where you would be afraid to walk alone" question used by the GSS. The survey found that blacks were generally more fearful than whites and that fear went up sharply with city size. When she statistically controlled for other correlates of fear, including age, gender, education, income, and size of place, she found that whites living in black or integrated neighborhoods were distinctly more fearful. Differences in fear associated with this condition were less than differences in fear due to gender or city size, but otherwise whites living in proximity to blacks were more fearful than anyone else, including the elderly.

Jeanette Covington and Ralph Taylor found roughly the same pattern in a survey of residents of Baltimore, Maryland.[15] Their "subcultural diversity" approach to the issue postulated that "fear of crime . . . results from living in proximity to others whose cultural background is different from one's own. The manners and behaviors of persons belonging to these different groups [are] difficult to interpret and thus fear-inspiring."[16] Their research controlled for an impressive list of factors that have been shown to be related to fear, including both personal factors (age, gender, education) and neighborhood factors (crime rate, various social disorders, racial composition). They measured fear by combining responses to questions asking how fearful respondents would feel being out alone in their neighborhood during the day and at night. Controlling for many other factors, they found that residents of mostly black neighborhoods were more fearful. Further, fear was higher than expected among people whose racial identity did not fit their context. They found that the more different people were from their neighbors in terms of the racial composition of their neighborhood, the more fearful they were. This effect was apparent for both blacks living in white areas and whites living in black areas, leading them to characterize it as the effect of "cultural diversity" rather than simply "white fear." This was an important conclusion and runs contrary to Stinchcombe's argument that proximity to whites makes all Americans feel safer. Black residents of white neighborhoods, sometimes facing threats or harassment and more often the targets of humiliation and contempt, would recognize the concept.

What about the benefits of living together? Sally Engle Merry studied the consequences of residential racial

Victimization: The Effect of Neighborhood Racial Composition," *Sociological Inquiry*, 59(2):208-21 (May 1989).

15. Jeanette Covington and Ralph B. Taylor, "Fear of Crime in Urban Residential Neighborhoods," *Sociological Quarterly*, 32(2):231-49 (1991).

16. Ibid., p. 232.

17. Merry, "Racial Integration," pp. 59-69.

integration in a small multiracial housing project in San Francisco.[17] She evaluated the proposition that integration leads to increased social contact between racial and ethnic groups, which in turn leads to increasing tolerance of one another among residents. I noted earlier that the evidence for this hypothesis is quite mixed, and Merry's contribution is a pessimistic one. She found that living together exacerbated tensions between the black, white, Hispanic, and Chinese residents of the project. Frictions between residents were all interpreted racially, and prejudice and hostility grew rather than diminished over time. Residents hung on because the housing was good and the price was right, but members of each ethnic group kept to themselves or found social ties outside the project. They did not trust other project residents enough to sustain anticrime efforts; in fact, they victimized each other with relative impunity because they remained strangers. No one could criticize or exercise control over children of another background. Chinese residents in particular lived in fear of black youths, who remained strangers even while living in their midst.

CONCLUSION

These studies suggest several conclusions. First, racial differences in fear usually are smaller than differences associated with gender or age, but often they are next on the list. Blacks are much more fearful of crime, and these studies document that there are good reasons for this. Blacks are more likely to be victimized and to live in neighborhoods where serious crime is more frequent. Some of this race-related difference is due to the concentration of black survey respondents in bigger cities, where everyone is more fearful. Another fraction of the racial difference in fear documented in surveys is due to neighborhood-level differences in social disorder, physical decay, and economic collapse. In a segregated society, race goes along with many other area-level factors that contribute to fear, and the more segregated that conditions are in any particular research environment, the more closely they covary and the more difficult it is to untangle their effects.

Second, among whites, residential proximity to black people is related to fear of crime. The link between the two is both direct and further exacerbated by the tie between residential integration and the extent of interracial crime. These links persist even in studies controlling for alternative explanations for fear. It is important to note in this regard that the bulk of whites reporting that black people live nearby live in larger cities. Cities are places where levels of victimization, social disorganization, and aspects of physical decay that are linked to fear of crime are more common.[18] In cities, whites also live closer to all of the other factors that cluster with race in our segregated society and that themselves have an impact on fear. The statistical con-

17. Merry, "Racial Integration," pp. 59-69.

18. Wesley G. Skogan, *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Cities* (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 21-50.

trols described previously doubtless do not account for all of the effects of these city and neighborhood factors. Race brings with it so many tightly coupled social and economic factors that these studies probably overestimate how much white fear is due to racial proximity and how much it is due to proximity to other factors that scare all Americans but cannot be statistically untangled from race.

Third, the link between residential proximity and fear persists despite the fact that whites living close to blacks register lower levels of prejudice than do those who are more distant. Whites living in close proximity to blacks voice fewer objections to sharing their schools and neighborhoods with them. This may be because they have learned to get along, but it is more likely because, through choices about where they live, many whites have sorted themselves into residential patterns that reflect their attitudes. Research generally suggests that close contact between blacks and whites breeds favorable attitudes only under unlikely circumstances: when they are of roughly equal status yet not in competition with one another for jobs, housing, or power. The statistical analysis described earlier indicated that this measure of prejudice was indeed related to fear of crime, but its effect was independent of the proximity of whites to black people.

In this regard, it is important that white society is becoming more tolerant and egalitarian with regard to selected racial attitudes. A 1942 national poll found that 72 percent of Americans thought black people should eat in separate restaurants, a response that is virtually unheard of today. The percentage of whites tolerant of abstract or personal issues like interracial marriage or bringing people of color home to dinner has climbed to near universality. Very few whites object to mingling with blacks at the workplace. In addition, whites' opinions about blacks have become more variegated; their views on one dimension do not necessarily correspond with their views on another, and views on racial matters have become linked to larger political and ideological views on issues such as individual responsibility, the role of the government, and compensatory public policies generally. This leads Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza to conclude that racism per se is a minor force in contemporary American politics, especially when defined in Gordon Allport's classic terms as outright hostility and rejection based solely on categorical criteria. Instead, racial cleavages are driven by bundles of social and economic issues that involve or have implications for race but are not—among whites—dominated by it.[19]

However, whites continue to be particularly resistant to proposals that involve school busing or close residential proximity to black people or more generally to policies that promise to interfere with their ability to act on their preferences via markets and, through them, to maintain

19. Paul M. Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, *The Scar of Race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 19-34. See also Mary R. Jackman, *The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class and Race Relations* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 33-43.

their dominant position.[20] These issues were raised by the school and neighborhood integration components of the racial-attitude measure employed earlier and they—not who is coming to dinner—lie near the problematic core of black-white relations at the end of the twentieth century. And the image of black lawlessness remains pervasive. In one 1991 national survey, the statement that "blacks are aggressive or violent" was the most frequently endorsed negative stereotype on a list of five, approved by 52 percent of whites.[21] As Andrew Hacker put it,

> The dread whites feel of black crime goes beyond actual risks or probabilities. The visage of Willie Horton stirred fears in parts of the country where black faces are seldom seen.... The feeling is not simply that crime is out of control. Far more troubling is the realization that white citizens can be held in thrall by a race meant to be subservient.[22]

The persistent links between fear, proximity, and whites' desire to retain their dominance of their most intimate institutions are not likely to wane anytime soon.

20. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 67-80.

21. Sniderman and Piazza, *Scar of Race*, p. 45. Interestingly, this view was also endorsed by 59 percent of black respondents; Sniderman and Piazza think this is because both views are "rooted in part in a common reality" and are also consistent with views of black violence represented by the mass media.

22. Andrew Hacker, *Two Nations* (New York: Scribner, 1992), p. 188.

APPENDIX: MEASURING RACIAL PREJUDICE

The GSS administered fear-of-crime, racial-proximity, and racial-prejudice measures to half of a national sample for the years 1988, 1989, and 1990. These and the list of demographic questions discussed in the text received responses from 1396 people in the sample. The racial-prejudice measure was created by combining responses to questions about school and neighborhood integration. The correlation between the two subcomponent measures was .42.

Attitude toward school integration

Score		Frequency (percentage)
0	Does not object to children going to school with mostly blacks	40
1	Objects to children going to school with mostly blacks but does not object to children going to school with half blacks	38
2	Objects to children going to school with half blacks but does not object to children going to school with a few blacks	18
3	Objects to children going to school with even a few blacks	4

Attitude toward neighborhood integration

Score		Frequency (percentage)
0	Disagrees strongly that whites have a right to live in a segregated neighborhood	50
1	Disagrees slightly that whites have a right to live in a segregated neighborhood	26
2	Agrees slightly that whites have a right to live in a segregated neighborhood	15
3	Agrees strongly that whites have a right to live in a segregated neighborhood	8