

REDUCING THE "SIGNS OF CRIME": THE NEWARK EXPERIENCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

by
**Antony M. Pate, Wesley G. Skogan,
Mary Ann Wycoff and Lawrence W. Sherman**

**Second Draft Report
to the
National Institute of Justice
The Honorable James K. Stewart, Director**

January 31, 1985



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page No.</u>
Findings in Brief	1
The "Signs of Crime": The Problem and a Possible Solution . . .	3
The Newark Program	4
Evaluation Design and Methodology	7
Findings	10
Discussion	15
References	20

This report summarizes the results of a field test conducted by the Newark Police Department and evaluated by the Police Foundation under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. The test, successfully carried out from the fall of 1983 through the summer of 1984, evaluated the theory that by attempting to reduce the social and physical "signs of crime," municipal police, working with other city agencies, can reduce the fear of crime.


Findings in Brief

The evaluation found that the effort to reduce the "signs of crime," although implemented as planned, had few statistically significant effects, either at the area level or among the same individuals over time. At the area level, residents of a program area, compared to those in a matched comparison area, experienced a significant increase in victimization, especially for personal crimes such as robbery and assault, and increased their use of household protection measures. As shown in Figure 1, no significant effect on fear of personal victimization was demonstrated. Representatives of non-residential establishments in the program area were more likely to have perceived an increased level of concern as expressed by employees and patrons.

Within a panel sample of persons interviewed both before and ten months after program implementation began, residents of the program area, compared to those of the comparison area, were more likely to have perceived an increase in physical deterioration in the neighborhood and to have taken more precautions to protect their households against crime.

The key to these generally disappointing results appears to reside in the fact that relatively few program area residents were aware of the program activity. Those persons who recall being exposed to the various components of the program generally demonstrated one or more positive effects.

Figure 1
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area
Area-Level Analysis
(All Respondents)



The "Signs of Crime": The Problem and a Possible Solution

Recent research has repeatedly shown that the fear of crime is more often related to the perceived level of social and physical disorder in a person's neighborhood than to that person's actual experiences as a victim of crime. Social disorder--such as teenagers hanging out on the streets, drug use, and public drinking--as well as physical disorder--abandoned buildings, vacant lots, and littered streets--serve as indicators of impending danger, even if no actual crime has been observed. Other research has shown that there is a dynamic quality to this relationship: neighborhood deterioration is followed by rising crime which is followed by further deterioration. As the deterioration continues, the composition of the neighborhood changes, leading to the development of a subculture tolerant of law violation.

The evidence that deterioration and disorder--the signs of crime--constitute an engine of neighborhood destabilization and decline is compelling. What is not clear, however, is what can be done to dismantle that engine. Given that the sources of the problem are broad and complex, it is unreasonable to think that any solutions which are not equally broad and complex could have much chance of being effective. A number of long-range proposals, from improved zoning, planning and building code enforcement to the provision of social and educational services, have been made to address this cycle of disorder, deterioration, fear and crime. In the short term, however, most suggestions have focused on the police in terms of their roles of enforcing the law and maintaining order. Both Wilson and Kelling (1982), and Kobrin and Schuerman (1982), for example, have suggested that the intensification of law enforcement and order maintenance, especially by foot patrol, in areas with noticeable, but

not unredeemable, levels of disorder and deterioration could contribute to reclaiming those areas for their law-abiding residents.

The Newark Program

In late 1982, the National Institute of Justice issued a request for competitive proposals to test strategies for reducing the fear of crime. The Police Foundation won the competition and was asked to plan and conduct such studies on an accelerated timetable. Two cities were selected in which to conduct the tests--Newark, New Jersey, an old, dense city with a declining population and a deteriorating revenue base, and Houston, Texas, a new city with low population density, rapid population growth and an expanding economy. In each city a Fear Reduction Task Force was created to consider possible strategies, select those that were most appropriate for the local conditions and plan and implement those strategies over a one-year period.

Early in its deliberations, the task force recognized the relevance of the research concerning the relationship between the "signs of crime," fear, crime and neighborhood decay to the circumstances in Newark. During the spring and summer of 1983, the group developed two separate but coordinated efforts to reduce social disorder and physical deterioration. The first effort, consisting of the random institution of intensified enforcement and order maintenance operations in the program area, was implemented by the Directed Patrol Task Force. The second effort was a clean-up program aimed at physical deterioration.

Patrol Task Force. A group of 24 patrol officers was selected by the precinct commanders as those best qualified to conduct the enforcement and order maintenance operations. The group received three days of training on the legal, tactical and community relations aspects of such operations. From April

through August 1983, several demonstration operations were carried out in areas of the city not involved in the test to refine the techniques required for conducting such activities without disrupting community relations.

In order to provide this group of officers with time away from their regular assignments, a pool of 157 non-patrol officers was established. Each one of these officers was expected to spend one eight-hour tour of duty per month in a patrol car as a replacement for one of the specialized enforcement officers.

This unit engaged exclusively in the following operations:

- o foot patrol, to enforce laws and maintain order on sidewalks and street corners,
- o radar checks, to enforce speeding laws on the streets,
- o bus checks, to enforce ordinances and maintain order aboard public buses,
- o enforcement of the state disorderly conduct laws, to reduce the amount of loitering and disruptive behavior on corners and sidewalks, and
- o road checks, to identify drivers without proper licenses or under the influence of alcohol, to detect stolen automobiles and to apprehend wanted offenders.

These operations were conducted at least three times per week, from Monday through Friday, based on a random assignment schedule to minimize their predictability. Although primary emphasis was given to the program area studied here (and another program area, which also tested this approach in the context of a broader effort), the Directed Patrol Task Force was also assigned periodically to other areas of the city where levels of disorder required it. However, these operations were not conducted in the comparison area.

Altogether, the task force spent slightly over 2,500 hours in this program area, during which time they conducted 188 different operations on 82 different days. Over 70 percent of these hours were spent on foot patrol, about 15 percent were spent conducting radar checks, 7.5 percent were spent on bus checks, four percent on the enforcement of disorderly behavior laws and three percent on conducting road checks.

Clean-Up. The second effort, directed at the reduction of physical disorder and deterioration, had two components: an intensification of city services and a revision of the juvenile judicial sentencing process to allow for community work to be performed in clean up activities. Under the first component, the city government committed itself to intensifying its demolition of abandoned and condemned buildings; cleaning up lots littered with trash and refuse; and enhancing its efforts to repair streets, improve lighting, and maintain garbage collection. The personnel necessary for this effort were to be city employees or private contractors hired by the city.

The second component of the clean-up program was based on the creation of a legal mechanism of assigning juveniles arrested for minor acts of delinquency or other minor offenses to appear before a Community Juvenile Conference Committee, where they were to be given the option of performing community service activities instead of appearing before a juvenile court judge for case adjudication. The committee was comprised of 15 representatives of the business community, the clergy, educational institutions and area residents. Members were selected by the police and probation departments and approved by the presiding judges of the Domestic Relations Court. Juveniles who accepted community service sentencing were expected to attend joint Police Department-Board of Education training sessions and perform general clean-up

activities, removing graffiti, cleaning streets or vacant lots, etc., in the designated program areas. Supervision of these youths was provided by a police officer.

Before the program began, a police coordinator compiled a list of 14 lots or buildings in the program area which needed to be cleaned up. During the course of the program, seven more locations were added to that list. Of the total of 19 locations which had been designated as needing attention, the city actually cleaned up eight. In addition, the residents of the community themselves organized to clean up three other lots. Youths cleaned up five additional lots through their community service work. There were no buildings which were designated as requiring demolition. Through the combined efforts of both components of the clean-up program, therefore, a total of 16 of the 20 locations designated as requiring attention actually received it.

Evaluation Design and Methodology

Five areas, closely matched in terms of their size, demographic characteristics, land use, level of disorder and other characteristics, were selected to be included in the overall Newark Fear Reduction Program. One of those areas was selected, by a random procedure, to be the program area exposed to the effort to reduce the signs of crime. The same selection procedure assigned another neighborhood to be a comparison area, in which no new police programs would be introduced. Any changes discerned in this area could be representative of prevailing trends in the city during the time of the study.

Demographic data from the 1980 Census concerning these two areas are presented below.

Table 1
Demographic Data for Signs of Crime Program and Comparison Areas

Area	Population						Housing Units			Occupied Units		
	Total	Ethnicity			Age		Total	% Single Family	% Occupied	Persons Per Unit	Total	% Owner Occupied
		% Black	% White	% Spanish Origin	% Below 18	% 65 and above						
Program Area S-1	4519	97	1	2	34	5	1460	13	96	3.2	1408	30
Comparison Area S-4	4300	98	1	1	36	7	1435	13	96	3.1	1372	25

Source: 1980 Census

Surveys were conducted in the program and comparison areas before, and ten months after, program implementation began. These surveys were highly successful, producing area response rates ranging from 76 to 83 percent, easily high enough to allow the results to be taken as representative of the persons living in these neighborhoods. Attempts to conduct interviews with a set of respondents both before and after the program began were also generally effective, producing completion rates of approximately 56 and 61 percent in the program and comparison areas respectively. Interviews were also conducted with owners and managers of non-residential establishments. The response rates for these interviews were consistently higher than 86 percent.

Tests for possible effects of the Newark effort to reduce the "signs of crime" were made at two different levels of analysis, as discussed below.

Area Level. At the area level, effects were examined by (1) an analysis of recorded crime data over time and (2) by comparing the results of surveys

conducted with random samples of residents and representatives of non-residential establishments before and after the introduction of the program, both in the program area and in the comparison area. The surveys were broadly representative of the residents and the non-residential establishments of the areas at those points in time, and are therefore indicative of any community-level effects which the program might have achieved. The disadvantage of such an approach is that, because different persons were interviewed at two points in time, it is impossible to apply many controls for other differences between the two areas not attributable to the program.

Individual Level. At the individual level, effects were examined by comparing the results of surveys conducted with the same persons (a "panel") before and after the program was implemented, both in the program area and in the comparison area. Interviewing the same people twice had the advantage of allowing for statistical controls which are not possible using two relatively independent surveys, as was done in the area-wide analysis. The disadvantage of such an approach is that inevitably only certain types of people may be reinterviewed the second time, making it inappropriate to generalize the results to the population of the area as a whole.

To further explore possible impacts at the individual level, the panel of persons interviewed in the program area before and after the program was implemented was asked whether they recalled being exposed to the particular components of the program. The results for those persons who recalled being exposed were compared to results of persons who said they were not. This approach attempts to identify respondents who actually encountered the program, and presumably provides the most favorable evaluation of its impact. It also permits statistical controls for other extraneous factors which might affect the

outcome measures. The major disadvantage of this approach is that people do not always accurately report their exposure to program activity.

Finally, possible subgroup-specific effects, involving the differential program impact of being a member of a particular age, sex, racial or other subgroup, and living in the program area, were examined using tests for statistical interaction. This analysis is designed to determine whether the program to reduce the "signs of crime" might have had an effect on certain types of people while having no effect at all--or a different type of effect--on other kinds of people. As with recalled program-exposure effects, these tests were made only on those persons in the panel sample. As a result, the tests have the same general advantages and disadvantages of panel data as discussed above.

Survey questionnaires were designed to measure each of the following:

- Recalled Program Exposure
- Perceived Area Social and Physical Disorder Problems
- Fear of Personal Victimization in Area
- Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area
- Perceived Area Crime Problems
- Victimization
- Evaluation of Police Services and Aggressiveness
- Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime
- Household Crime Prevention Efforts
- Satisfaction with Area

Findings

Area-Level Analysis

Recalled Exposure. Recalled exposure to these program components was relatively low, ranging from 10 percent for the clean-up activities, to 20 percent for road checks, to 24 percent for foot patrol, to 29 percent for the enforcement of disorderly conduct laws, to 42 percent for bus checks.

Impact. The results of the evaluation, at both the area and individual levels, are summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Residents of the program area, relative to those in the comparison area, were more likely, at a statistically significant level, to indicate:

Table 2

Changes in Areas

Residential Samples

Outcome Measures	Program Area Change	Statistically Significant?	Comparison Area Change	Statistically Significant?
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	Down	No	No change	No
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	Down	No	Down	Yes
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	No change	No	Down	No
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	No change	No	Up	Yes
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	Down	No	Down	Yes
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	Down	No	Up	No
Victimization by Any Crime	Up	Yes	Down	No
Victimization by Personal Crime	Up	Yes	No change	No
Victimization by Property Crime	Up	Yes	Up	Yes
Evaluation of Police Service	Up	Yes	Up	Yes
Police Aggressiveness	Up	No	Up	No
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime	Up	No	Up	No
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	Up	Yes	Down	No
Satisfaction with Area	Up	No	Up	Yes

Table 3

Changes in Areas

Non-Residential Establishment Samples

Outcome Measures	Program Area Change	Statistically Significant?	Comparison Area Change	Statistically Significant?
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	Up	No	Up	No
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	Down	No	Down	Yes
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	Up	No	Up	No
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	Up	No	Up	Yes
Perceived Concern About Crime Among Employees and Patrons	Up	Yes	Down	No
Victimization by Robbery or Attempted Robbery in Past Six Months	Down	No	Down	No
Victimization by Burglary or Attempted Burglary in Past Six Months	Down	No	Down	No
Victimization by Vandalism in Past Six Months	Down	No	Up	No
Evaluation of Police Service	Up	No	Up	No
Police Aggressiveness	Up	No	Up	No
Change in Business Environment	Up	No	Down	Yes
Satisfaction with Area	Up	No	Up	No

Table 4
Effects of Program on Individuals

Outcome Measures	Effect	Statistically Significant?
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	Down	Yes
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	Up	Yes
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	Down	No
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	Down	No
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	Up	No
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	Down	No
Victimization by Any Crime	Up	No
Victimization by Personal Crime	Down	No
Victimization by Property Crime	Up	No
Evaluation of Police Service	Up	No
Police Aggressiveness	Down	No
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime	Up	No
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	Up	Yes
Satisfaction with Area	No change	No

- o More improvement in perceived area social disorder,
- o Less improvement in perceived area physical deterioration,
- o Less increase in worry about property crime in the area,
- o More victimization by personal crimes in the area,
- o More household crime prevention efforts, and
- o Less increase in satisfaction with the area.

No other statistically significant differences between residents of the two areas were noted.

Representatives of non-residential establishments in the program area, relative to those in the comparison area, were more likely, at a statistically significant level, to have indicated:

- o Less improvement in perceived area physical deterioration,
- o Less increase in worry about property crime in the area,
- o More Increase in concern about crime expressed by employees and patrons, and
- o An improvement in the perceived business environment.

Recorded crime in the program area continued generally to decline as it had done during the preceding two years, although the decline was less than the previous trend would have suggested. Recorded crime, particularly property crime, increased in the comparison area. Time series analyses are being conducted to determine if the program had a differential effect on recorded crime in the program area.

Individual-Level Analysis

Recalled Exposure. As with the area-level analysis, recalled exposure to these program components was relatively low, ranging from 12 percent for the clean-up activities, to 22 percent for road checks, to 23 percent for foot patrol, to 32 percent for the enforcement of disorderly conduct laws, to 44 percent for bus checks.

Impact. Residents of the program area, relative to those in the comparison area, were more likely, at a statistically significant level, to have:

- o Perceived an increase in physical deterioration of the neighborhood, and
- o Taken more precautions to protect their households against crime.

Within the program area panel sample, an analysis of the effect of recalled exposure to various program components produced these statistically significant results:

- o Respondents who recalled exposure to foot patrol were more likely to have reduced their fear of personal victimization during the program period.
- o Respondents who recalled exposure to bus checks were more likely to have improved their evaluation of police service in the area.
- o Respondents who recalled exposure to disorderly conduct enforcement operations were more likely to have improved their evaluation of police service in the area and to have reduced their estimate of police aggressiveness.
- o Respondents who recalled exposure to road checks were more likely to have perceived an increase in area social disorder.
- o Respondents who recalled exposure to clean-up activities were more likely to have increased their satisfaction with the area and to have increased the extent to which they engaged in defensive behaviors to avoid crime.

Analyses of possible differential program effects on particular subgroups of respondents found no consistent trends, although certain positive program effects tended to be attenuated among previous victims of crime and accentuated among residents of single family homes.

Discussion

The Newark effort to reduce the fear of crime by reducing the "Signs of Crime," although successfully implemented as planned for ten months, generally was unsuccessful in achieving the outcomes hypothesized by Kobrin/Schuerman and Wilson/Kelling. There could be at least four possible explanations for the failure to find the expected results:

1. The measurement of program effects might have been inadequate.
2. The program might not have operationalized the theory appropriately.
3. The strength or length of implementation of the program could have been too limited to allow for effects to have been achieved.
4. The theory itself could be wrong.

It is necessary to consider each of these possible explanations in order to put these findings in perspective.

Measurement of program effects could have affected the results in several ways: the size of the samples selected could have been too small to show significant effects, the sampling procedures could have provided biased results, or the measurement and analysis procedures could have been invalid. In all cases, these potential problems appear incapable of explaining the failure to support the theory. With regard to sample size, the samples selected, although constrained by a finite budget, were chosen in order to be more than adequate to be representative of the populations under study and to allow for proper analytical techniques to be applied. Furthermore, although this study, as any other, would have benefited from larger sample sizes, the trends demonstrated by these data were not consistent enough to have supported the theory which prompted it, no matter how large the samples might have been. The sampling procedures were based on accepted sampling principles and were carried out with considerable, documented, success. Sophisticated measurement and analysis techniques were utilized in order to maximize the reliability and validity of the results.

The second possible explanation, that the program might not have operationalized the theory appropriately, also does not appear persuasive, since both the Kobrin/Schuerman and the Wilson/Kelling prescriptions place

heavy emphasis on the importance of foot patrol, the primary component of the Newark program. In addition, the Wilson/Kelling specifically argument called for the maintenance of standards on public transportation, the goal of the bus check component. All other components were similarly designed to maintain order.

Another aspect of the operationalization of the theory--the nature of the area--in which it was tested may have affected the effectiveness of the strategies applied. Both the Kobrin/Schuerman and the Wilson/Kelling formulations emphasize that reclamation efforts are extremely difficult, if not impossible, in areas which have deteriorated beyond a "tipping point." The location of such a hypothetical "point" is plagued with difficulties, but the levels of fear and victimization in the experimental area would not appear to be great enough to have put it beyond recovery. Another possible effect of the nature of the area--that police activity may be able to reduce fear only in areas with high levels of perceived risk--has also been suggested (Baumer, 1983). Based on this interpretation, the fear reduction efforts may not have succeeded because the experimental area residents were not fearful enough to begin with. Again, the data concerning fear and victimization in the area would not appear to support such an analysis.

The third possible explanation for the failure to find the expected results was the brevity or weakness of program implementation. This appears to be more plausible. It is not unlikely that, had the program been continued for a full year, as had originally been planned, instead of only for ten months, as was required to meet the evaluation schedule, a greater level of awareness could have been achieved. However, the fact that, even after ten months, awareness was quite low suggests that additional time would have made little difference--and points to the relatively weak "dosage level" of this program as an experimental treatment.

An insight into the relative strength of the program is provided by comparing this program, over 70 percent of which consisted of foot patrol, to the previous foot patrol study conducted in Newark five years earlier. In that earlier study, in which foot patrol was more widely perceived, significant reductions in the fear of crime were achieved. A key question, then, is why foot patrol succeeded in that case but not in this one.*

The most persuasive answer to that question is that the extent and nature of the foot patrol implemented in the earlier study were radically different from that effected here. In the earlier study, two officers patrolled six nights a week from the hours of 4 p.m. to midnight, resulting in an average of 392.5 officer hours in each program area per month. In this study, five to eight pairs of officers walked, at irregular hours, on a few nights per month, resulting in an average of 176 officer hours expended per month.

The two studies also differed in terms of the nature of the foot patrol strategies. In the first study, such patrol was conducted only along commercial strips in predictable and intensive fashion. In this study, foot patrol, although it was implemented primarily in commercial areas, also occurred on residential streets. Such patrols, however, occurred at unpredictable intervals, based on the principle that potential criminals and troublemakers should not know in advance when police would be present.

*Other studies (Trojanowicz, et al., 1982; Spickenheuer, 1983) have suggested that foot patrol may have positive effects. Unfortunately, however, these efforts were either combined with other program activities, were evaluated in problematic fashion, or both, thus making the inferences from those studies questionable.

While this may be appropriate to deter or apprehend criminals, a different, more consistent, pattern of activity may be more effective in producing general reassurance of citizens.

Finally, it is clearly premature to pronounce judgment on the validity of the theory underlying the Newark effort to reduce the "signs of crime." The results concerning bus checks, enforcement of disorderly conduct laws, road checks and physical clean-up activities were based on relatively meagre program efforts and showed no consistent results. It is quite plausible that each of these types of programs, if more strenuously implemented, could have different effects. Much more extensive research would be necessary, however, to discover those differences.

The results concerning foot patrol, based on these findings and those generated in the earlier Newark study, suggest that such activity, to be effective, should be implemented on an intensive, continuous and predictable basis, rather than sporadically and at random, and in places, and at times, where it is most likely to be seen by the general public. This is supported by the fact that those persons who recall having seen foot patrol officers in their area expressed a lower level of fear of victimization as a result. Similarly, those who were personally exposed to most other program components also experienced some positive effect. Unfortunately, too few people were exposed to the program for these effects to have become widespread.

More generally, then, these results suggest that fear reduction techniques, as opposed to "crime attack" techniques which focus on deterring or apprehending criminals, should focus on the broader community, providing

frequent, enduring assurances that positive steps are being taken to maintain order.

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Marshall Jones

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Signs of Crime
Table of Contents

	<u>Page No.</u>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	1
REDUCING THE SIGNS OF CRIME	
Introduction	5
Rationale	6
Hypothesized Effects	10
Summary	13
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM	
Introduction	14
Intensified Enforcement and Order Maintenance Program	14
Neighborhood Clean-Up Program	27
Summary	30
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY	
Introduction	32
Program and Comparison Areas	32
Sampling Procedures	39
Measures	44
Recorded Crime Data Collection	51
Summary	51
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS	
Introduction	53
Recalled Program Exposure and Contact	54
Descriptive Data Analysis	70
Survey Indicators of Program Impact	79
Summary	109
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION	
Introduction	114
Reducing the "Signs of Crime"	115
The Newark Program	116
Evaluation Design and Methodology	117
Analysis and Results	118
Discussion	123
REFERENCES	128

Table of Contents
page two

APPENDIX A	THE FEAR REDUCTION PROGRAM
APPENDIX B	SCALING THE RESIDENTIAL SURVEY DATA
APPENDIX C	SCALING THE NON-RESIDENTIAL SURVEY DATA
APPENDIX D	CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS IN PROGRAM AND COMPARISON AREAS AT WAVE ONE AND TWO
APPENDIX E	DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS: RESIDENTIAL SAMPLES
APPENDIX F	DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS: RESIDENTIAL PANEL SAMPLES
APPENDIX G	TYPES OF ESTABLISHMENTS AT WHICH INTERVIEWS WERE COMPLETED AT WAVES ONE AND TWO
APPENDIX H	DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS: NON-RESIDENTIAL SAMPLES
APPENDIX I	A COMPARISON OF INCLUDING ALL CASES VERSUS EXCLUDING MISSING VALUE CASES
APPENDIX J	RECALLED PROGRAM EXPOSURE EFFECT RESULTS
APPENDIX K	TREATMENT-COVARIATE INTERACTION ANALYSIS RESULTS
APPENDIX L	INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS

LIST OF TABLES

		<u>Page No.</u>
Table 1	Level of Enforcement and Order Maintenance Program Activity, by Month, in S-1 Program Area	16
Table 2	Number of Enforcement Operations, By Month and Strategy in S-1 Program Area	17
Table 3	Number of Enforcement Operations, by Month and Strategy in S-1 Program Area	17
Table 4	Program Outcomes Produced by the Enforcement and Order Maintenance Program, By Month, in the S-1 Program Area	18
Table 5	Program Outcomes Produced by the Foot Patrol Component, By Month in S-1 Program Area	19
Table 6	Program Outcomes Produced by the Radar Check Component, By Month, in S-1 Program Area	20
Table 7	Program Outcomes Produced by the Bus Check Component, By Month, in S-1 Program Area	22
Table 8	Program Outcomes Produced by the Disorderly Conduct Enforcement Component, By Month, in S-1 Program Area	24
Table 9	Program Outcomes Produced by the Road Check Component, By Month, in the S-1 Program Area	27
Table 10	Demographic Data for Signs of Crime Program and Comparison Areas	33
Table 11	Types of Non-Residential Establishments in Program and Comparison Areas	34
Table 12	Wave 1 Residential Response Rates, Wave 2 Residential Response Rates and Panel Residential Response Rates	44
Table 13	Wave 1 Non-Residential Response Rates and Wave 2 Non-Residential Response Rates	45
Table 14	Wave One-Wave Two Program Recalled Exposure Measures, All Residential Respondents	55
Table 15	Wave One-Wave Two Program Recalled Exposure Measures, All Residential Respondents	56
Table 16	Wave One-Wave Two Respondent Perceptions of Police Presence and Contact, All Residential Respondents . . .	59

LIST OF TABLES
(continued)

	<u>Page No.</u>
Table 17 Wave One-Wave Two Respondent Perceptions of Police Presence and Contact, Residential Panel Respondents	60
Table 18 Correlates of Program Contact, Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only, Seen or Heard of Foot Patrol, All Residential Respondents	62
Table 19 Correlates of Program Contact, Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only, Seen or Heard of Road Checks, All Residential Respondents	63
Table 20 Correlates of Program Contact, Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only, Seen or Heard of Bus Checks, All Residential Respondents	64
Table 21 Correlates of Program Contact, Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only, Aware of Police Enforcing Disorderly Conduct Laws, All Residential Respondents	65
Table 22 Correlates of Recalled Program Contact, Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only, Seen or Heard of Clean-Up Program, All Residential Respondents	66
Table 23 Wave One-Wave Two Program Exposure Measures, Non-Residential Establishment Respondents	68
Table 24 Wave One-Wave Two Perceptions of Police Presence and Contact, Non-Residential Establishment Respondents	69
Table 25 Wave One-Wave Two Outcome Measures, All Residential Respondents	71
Table 26 Wave One-Wave Two Outcome Measures, Non-Residential Establishment Respondents	75
Table 27 Covariates Used in Pooled Cross-Sectional Analyses . .	81
Table 28 Covariates Used in Panel Analyses	85
Table 29 Wave One-Wave Two Panel Attrition	88
Table 30 Regression Analysis Results	92
Table 31 Relationship Between Self-Reported Program Exposure and Outcome Measures Controlling for Sixteen Factors Including the Pretest, Panel Respondents in Program Area Only	96

LIST OF TABLES
(continued)

		<u>Page No.</u>
Table 32	Treatment-Covariate Interaction Analysis Results, Impact of Program Area Residence Upon Certain Panel Subgroups, Panel Respondents Only	100
Table 33	Means for Selected Outcome Measures by Pre-Test Victimization	102
Table 34	Means for Selected Outcome Measures by Type of Dwelling	103

LIST OF FIGURES

		<u>Page No.</u>
Figure 1	Map of Newark South District 1	37
Figure 2	Map of Newark South District 4	38
Figure 3	Total Verified Crimes, Program and Comparison Areas	105
Figure 4	Total Burglary Incidents, Program and Comparison Areas	106
Figure 5	Total Personal Crimes, Program and Comparison Areas	107
Figure 6	Total Outside Incidents, Program and Comparison Areas	108

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This technical report describes the attempt by the Newark Police Department and other Newark public and private agencies to reduce the social and physical "signs of crime;" in addition, the report presents the results of the evaluation conducted by the Police Foundation. As Appendix A describes, the program was developed by a task force of several persons working cooperatively. The members of the task force, listed on the following page, were actively involved in the planning and execution of the program. Without their creativity and cooperation there would have been no program to evaluate.

Once the program was designed, the responsibility for implementing the program was given to the specially constituted Directed Patrol Task Force, whose members are shown on the attached list. The dedicated work of this unit, and especially their supervisor, Lieutenant Harold Gibson, constituted the essence of this program.

We express our special appreciation to Hubert Williams, then the Newark Police Director and now the President of the Police Foundation, for his cooperation and assistance. His leadership set the stage for the success of the entire project. His willingness to experiment has, once again, set an example for other police administrators to follow.

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NEWARK FEAR REDUCTION TASK FORCE

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Frank Peake

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Douglas Irr, Research Assistant
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Paul J. Lavrakas Peter Rossi
George Kelling Jerome Skolnick

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The entire project, including the evaluation, was conducted under the direction of Lawrence Sherman, then the Vice President for Research of the Police Foundation. Patrick V. Murphy, then the President of the Police Foundation, was active in establishing the project and representing it to the policing community.

REDUCING THE SIGNS OF CRIME

Introduction

Recent research, much of it funded by the National Institute of Justice, (NIJ) has revealed that fear of crime has become a major problem in our society. Other research has revealed that this fear often derives from concern about various "signs of crime" than from direct or indirect experience with crime. For example, neighborhoods which suffer from such physical and social disorder as vandalism, loitering and public drinking or gambling convey the feeling of having been abandoned. As a result, law-abiding residents and merchants begin to flee. Houses and shops become vacant, making them vulnerable to more vandalism and social disorder. Those who choose to remain--or are unable to leave--look upon the streets with detachment, responding to the apparent lack of concern revealed by the neglect and disorder around them. As insidious cycle leads from fear of crime to crime to even more fear.

We have known this for some time--but little has been done about it. In 1982, however, N.I.J. decided to fund experiments in Houston and Newark that would be well-evaluated to determine the most effective ways that police, working with citizens, can dismantle the cycle of fear. Through a competitive bidding process, the Police Foundation was awarded a grant to plan and conduct the evaluations of those experiments.

One of those programs selected to be tested was designed to reduce social disorder and physical deterioration. The rationale behind that program, and the hypotheses to be tested by it, are presented below.

Rationale

It has long been recognized that the level of fear of crime is affected by many factors other than the actual incidence of crime. In their 1967 report to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement, Biderman and his colleagues concluded that

"... attitudes of citizens regarding crime are less affected by their past victimization than by their ideas about what is going on in their community--fears about a weakening of social controls on which they feel their safety and the broader fabric of social life is ultimately dependent... the highly visible signs of what they regard as disorderly or disreputable behavior in their community--insobriety, untidiness, boisterousness." (Biderman et al., 1967: 160).

Similarly, Wilson, in his study of Boston, concluded that the failure of the community to control violations of "standards of right and seemly conduct" was a major cause of the "sense of urban unease." (Wilson, 1968).

Although few people actually experience or witness crimes, they associate the possibility of crime with certain aspects of their environment. Hunter (1978) found that fear in the urban neighborhoods was, above all, fear of social disorder, suggested by "incivilities." By disorders, he meant violations of the local normative order which may or may not be regarded seriously by the criminal justice system, but which greatly

disturb the residents of areas which are plagued by them. Stinchcombe et al. (1978) speculated that these environmental cues came to serve as "signs of crime," early warning indicators of impending danger. Lewis and Maxfield (1980) found that concern about certain types of social and physical disorder--teenagers hanging out on the streets, drug use, abandoned or burned-out buildings, and vandalism--were closely related to concerns about crime. Lewis and Salem (1980) found that disorder signals a diminished capacity for local problem solving, gives residents a feeling of personal isolation and spreads the sense that no one will come to the rescue when they find themselves in trouble. Subsequent research has continued to show the relationship between disorder and fear (for a review see Skogan and Maxfield, 1981 and Greenberg et al., 1983).

A dynamic process has been shown to exist among social and physical disorder, crime and neighborhood change. At an individual level, Zimbardo and other social psychologists have shown that property left untended or unrepaired invites further destruction and physical disorder breeds social disorder and crime. At the neighborhood level, Kobrin and Schuerman (1982) have demonstrated a complex sequence in which neighborhood deterioration is followed by rising crime which in turn is followed by further deterioration. As the deterioration continues, the composition of the neighborhoods changes, drawing even larger numbers of low income renters, unattached individuals, single-parent families and high proportions of children and youth. As the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood declines so too does the capacity of the population to maintain control over the conduct of its residents, especially youths. As a result, a neighborhood subculture

tolerant of law violation develops. As this subculture grows, crime reaches a "saturation" point, leading to further deterioration. Those residents and merchants who can afford to do so move out of the area; those who remain are often prisoners in their own homes, immobilized by fear.

The evidence for the conclusion that "disorder is an engine of neighborhood destabilization and decline" (Skogan, 1983: 3) is compelling. What is not so clear, however, is what can be done to that engine. Kobrin and Schuerman reached the rather depressing conclusion that any neighborhood which has had a high level of crime over several years may be considered "lost" territory for purposes of effective crime reduction (Kobrin and Schuerman, 1982: 411). Wilson and Kelling, in a popular review of similar evidence, agree that crime prevention efforts should be focused on areas "at the tipping point--where the public order is deteriorating but not unreclaimable...." (Wilson and Kelling, 1982: 38).

Kobrin and Schuerman, although pointing out that the deterioration process is "linked to wider problems of policy and economy, whose solution transcends both the resources and the authority of local governments (pp. 416-417), nevertheless prescribe certain policy initiatives which might interrupt that process. Their first priority was the institution of "vigorous local political control of zoning, planning, and building code requirements," supplemented by a set of social and educational services to assist low income families and children. Combined with these broad policy

changes, however, were recommendations for law enforcement practices.

They argued:

It is likely that the emerging areas would have to be established as special police administrative districts with a higher than average ratio of police to population and an emphasis on foot patrolling. Needed would be relentless law enforcement by a police cadre devoted to developing the reality as well as the image of the "friendly neighborhood cop." (Kobrin and Schuerman, 1982: 415)

Based largely on a study of foot patrol conducted in Newark (Police Foundation, 1981), Wilson and Kelling reached a similar conclusion, arguing that police should emphasize their role in maintaining order by reinforcing the informal control mechanisms of the community itself, especially by means of foot patrol and the maintenance of standards on public transportation (Wilson and Kelling, 1982: 38).

Having made these recommendations, however, Kobrin and Schuerman added this sobering proviso:

There is little reason to assume that these policy initiatives can be readily implemented. There is even less reason to assume that, if implemented, they might have substantial pay off in crime reduction, since they would leave untouched the major sources of metropolitan crime in the enduring high crime neighborhoods. (Kobrin and Schuerman, 1982: 415)

After reviewing this research and discussing its ramifications, the Newark Fear Reduction Task Force decided that, given the seriousness of the problems of fear, disorder and crime, it would be desirable to test the effects of attempting to reduce the social and physical "signs of crime." The exact nature of that effort is described in the next section. The remainder of this section describes the basic hypotheses upon which the program, and its evaluation, were constructed.

Hypothesized Effects

As explained above, the underlying rationale behind the effort to reduce the "signs of crime" was that social disorder and physical deterioration and disrepair lead to fear and, perhaps, to future increases in victimization by crime. If the disorder and deterioration were to be diminished, therefore, the following hypothesized effects could be expected:

- o Reduce the perceived area social disorder and physical deterioration problems,
- o Reduce the fear of personal and property crime victimization in the area,
- o Reduce the level of perceived area crime problems,
- o Reduce the percentage of local residents and non-residential establishments victimized by crime,
- o Reduce recorded crime,
- o Increase the installation of household crime devices, without increasing the tendency to withdraw from all risks,
- o Improve the evaluation of police services, and
- o Improve satisfaction with the area.

Each of these hypotheses is discussed in greater detail below.

Perceived Area Social Disorder and Physical Deterioration Problems. The key link in the rationale behind the effort to reduce the "signs of crime," is that the program efforts will reduce levels of social disorder and physical deterioration, as reported by those residing in the area where the program is implemented. All other hypothesized effects are dependent upon the successful achievement of a reduction in levels of perceived disorder and deterioration.

Fear of Personal and Property Crime Victimization in the Area. The underlying rationale leads to the hypothesis that a reduction in the perceived social and physical disorder problems in the area should lead to a decreased fear of victimization, that is, a reduced sense of vulnerability to becoming a victim of either personal or property crime.

Perceived Area Crime Problems. As Furstenberg (1971) pointed out, there is a significant difference between the fear of crime, an individual's assessment of his or her own risks of victimization, how much he or she personally is endangered by crime, and concern about crime, an individual's perception of the seriousness of crime as a public problem. Subsequent research (Baumer and Rosenbaum, 1982; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) has supported the original conclusion that fear and concern are independent concepts.

The fear of crime, on the one hand, has a strong emotive content, is related to the local crime rate and personal victimization, is associated with anxiety and leads to the taking of steps to protect one's own safety. Concern about crime, on the other hand, is more of a cognitive issue, is related to media content as well as political and social attitudes, and can lead to both household and neighborhood anti-crime measures (Lavrakas 1981). It can still be expected, therefore, that the reduction of the "signs of crime" should lead to a reduction in perceived area crime problems, but this is a less tenable link than that hypothesized for fear of crime.

Victimization Experiences. To the extent that disorder and its attendant consequences are directly linked to levels of crime, the reduction of such "signs of crime" should, in turn, lead to the reduction of victimization. Note, however, that variations in crime rates in small areas can be affected

by outside events and persons, and that, in any event, crime rates may be slow to respond to changes in levels of disorder--perhaps too slow to be captured in a one-year evaluation.

Recorded Crime. Although it has been clearly demonstrated that many crimes are never reported to the police--and that many of those reported are not recorded, or not recorded accurately, in official records--it can nevertheless be hypothesized that the Newark effort to reduce the "signs of crime" would, by reducing crime, also reduce recorded crime. It should be noted, however, that "nuisance crimes" involving such offenses as littering, loitering and disturbance of the peace, are least likely to be reported or recorded and are therefore not appropriate for this type of analysis.

Crime Prevention Activity. Given the apparent relationship between the fear of crime and personal defensive behaviors (Lavrakas, et al, 1981) it is plausible to hypothesize that the reduction of disorder, by reducing fear and increasing the confidence with which people can use the streets and sidewalks of their neighborhood, can lead to a reduction in such defensive behaviors as staying home after dark, walking only with an escort or purposefully avoiding other people on the street. Given the tentative links between disorder, concern about crime and the installation of household protective devices which have been documented in past research, there is no basis for a clear hypothesized program effect on such things as installing window bars or extra lights.

Attitudes Toward the Police. It can be hypothesized that police efforts to reduce disorder, whether they actually succeed or not, would indicate to area residents a higher level of visibility, activity and availability of police in the neighborhood, thus leading to a perceived improvement in

police service. It is also possible, however, that the tactics used by the police to reduce social disorder could lead to an increase in the perceived over-aggressiveness of police actions.

Satisfaction with Area. Finally, if police efforts are successful in reducing levels of disorder, fear of crime and even victimization, then residents could be expected to become more satisfied with their neighborhood as a place to live, and more committed to remaining there.

Summary

Prior research has repeatedly demonstrated the link between social and physical disorder, fear of crime, crime, and neighborhood deterioration. The role that police or other agencies of government, like city building departments, might be able to assume in disentangling these linkages has not been examined. The Newark Fear Reduction Task Force, therefore, decided to directly attack the "signs of crime" which are associated with those outcomes. The Task Force sought to accomplish the following goals:

- o Reduce perceptions of area social disorder and physical deterioration problems
- o Reduce the fear of personal and property crime victimization in the area
- o Reduce perceptions of area crime problems
- o Reduce victimization by crime
- o Reduce unnecessary defensive behaviors, and perhaps affect the installation of household protection devices
- o Improve the evaluation of police services, while avoiding increasing the impression that the police are overly aggressive
- o Improve satisfaction with the area

The remainder of this report describes how the program to reduce the "signs of crime" was implemented, how the program was evaluated and what the results of that evaluation were.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM

Introduction

Two separate but coordinated efforts to reduce the "signs of crime" were developed. The first, designed to reduce social disorder, consisted of several components aimed at intensified enforcement of laws concerning conduct in public places and the maintenance of order. The second effort consisted of two components designed to reduce physical deterioration. The actual operations of those programs are described below.

Intensified Enforcement and Order Maintenance Program

Activities to intensify enforcement and order maintenance consisted of five components:

- o foot patrol, to enforce laws and maintain order on sidewalks and streets corners,
- o radar checks, to enforce speeding laws on the streets,
- o bus checks, to enforce ordinances and maintain order aboard public buses,
- o enforcement of the state disorderly conduct laws, to reduce the amount of loitering and disruptive behavior on corners and sidewalks, and
- o roadblocks, to identify drivers without proper licenses or under the influence of alcohol, to detect stolen automobiles and to apprehend wanted offenders.

One or more of these types of operations were conducted at least three times per week, from Monday through Friday, based on a random assignment schedule to minimize predictability. Almost all of these operations were conducted from 4 p.m. to midnight. Primary emphasis was given to the program area, called S-1, discussed here and another program area, W-1, which also tested this approach in the context of a broader effort, described in Pate and Skogan, 1985. In addition, the Directed Patrol Task Force also was assigned periodically to other areas of the city where levels of disorder required it. However, these operations were not conducted in the comparison area, S-4.

All of these operations were conducted by the Directed Patrol Task Force, a group of 24 patrol officers selected by the precinct commanders as the best qualified to assume such responsibility. The group received three days of training on the legal, tactical, and community relations aspect of such operations.*

* From April through August, several demonstration operations were carried out in areas of the city not involved in the experiment to refine the techniques required for conducting such activities without disrupting community relations.

In order to provide this group of officers with time away from their regular assignments, a pool of 157 non-patrol officers was established. Each one of these officers was expected to spend one eight-hour tour of duty per month in a patrol car as a replacement for one of the specialized enforcement officers. To accomplish this, a scheduling technique was developed to minimize inconveniences to the officers involved. Although some non-patrol officers expressed resentment at being assigned to patrol duty, this type of reaction never became a serious problem.

Another problem also arose as a result of the scheduling technique used by the special enforcement officers. Due to the structure of the program, schedule changes could be made only one week before they went into effect. This was in violation of contractual agreements established by the police union and the police administration, which require 30 days notice of schedule changes. However, because there was a belief among the officers assigned to the Directed Patrol Task Force that the program was of merit, they waived this requirement.

The level of total monthly program activity in the S-1 program area, as measured by the number of days, operations and officer-hours worked, is shown in Table 1 below. These data are compiled from official program records, based upon activity sheets completed by each officer. As a check on their reliability, a full-time monitor was hired to observe a random sample of program operations for which she collected independent data. The match between the two sets of data was almost perfect, suggesting that the official program records can be relied upon as quite accurate.

Table 1
Level of Enforcement and Order Maintenance Program Activity, By Month, in S-1 Program Area

Indicator of Activity	Month										Total
	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	
Number of Days	7	6	9	8	12	9	8	9	7	7	82
Number of Operations	8	7	9	17	32	31	25	29	17	13	188
Number of Officer Hours	314	168.5	110	245	315	241.5	285.5	278.5	276.5	272	2506.5

As Table 1 indicates, the Directed Patrol Task Force conducted 188 operations in program area S-1 on 82 days, expending a total of slightly over 2500 officer hours. The operations started with a high level of activity during September, the first program month, but declined sharply during October and November, when problems elsewhere in the city required their time. In December, however, the total level of activity rose once again and remained high thereafter.

In order to understand better the exact nature of the program activity, Tables 2 and 3 present the monthly number of operations and officer hours expended in the S-1 area, broken down by program component.

Table 2
Number of Enforcement Operations, By Month and Strategy in S-1 Program Area

Strategy	Month										Total (%)
	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	
Foot Patrol	8	7	8	2	14	16	14	16	8	7	100 (53.2)
Radar Checks	0	0	0	9	8	4	6	4	4	2	37 (19.7)
Bus Checks	0	0	1	6	5	5	3	2	1	2	25 (13.3)
Disorderly Behavior Enforcement	0	0	0	0	5	4	2	7	3	2	23 (12.2)
Road Checks	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	3 (0.0)
Total	8	7	9	17	32	31	25	29	17	13	188 (100.0)

Table 3
Number of Enforcement Officer Hours, By Month and Strategy, in S-1 Program Area

Strategy	Month										Total (%)
	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	
Foot Patrol	314	168.5	92	48.5	202	55.5	202.5	199	163	217	1762.0 (70.3)
Radar Checks	0	0	0	105.5	73.5	41	60	25	40.5	34	379.5 (15.3)
Bus Checks	0	0	18	91	21	10	18	17.5	2	10	187.5 (7.5)
Disorderly Behavior Enforcement	0	0	0	0	18.5	9	5	37	22	11	102.5 (4.0)
Road Checks	0	0	0	0	0	26	0	0	49	0	75.0 (3.0)
Total	314	168.5	110	245	315	241.5	285.5	278.5	276.5	272	2506.5 (100.0)

These tables reveal that over 53 percent of the operations and about 70 percent of the officer hours devoted to the program were expended on foot patrol, with the rest of the activities devoted to the other program components.

The outcomes achieved by the enforcement and order maintenance program are summarized in Table 4 below.

Table 4
Program Outcomes Produced by the Enforcement and Order Maintenance Program,
By Month, in the S-1 Program Area

Outcome	Month										Total
	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	
Summonses	22	8	5	65	41	63	45	59	59	31	398
Buses Inspected	4	4	7	69	63	16	25	9	28	12	237
Field Interrogations	22	10	3	17	14	5	17	23	17	14	142
Arrests	17	5	4	2	17	6	11	10	5	8	85
Evictions from Buses	0	2	2	31	7	9	11	0	4	2	68

The table indicates that the most frequent program outcome was the issuance of summonses, followed by the inspection of buses, field interrogations, arrests and evictions from buses. Component-specific descriptions of levels of activity and outcomes are discussed below.

Foot Patrol. On a typical evening, eight pairs of two officers would walk throughout the program area for one to four hours. During that time, the

The data indicate that a total of 149 were issued, 99 field interrogations conducted and 61 arrests were made by officers while engaged in foot patrol.

Radar Checks. These operations were conducted by two officers, sitting in a marked police vehicle equipped with a radar device, alongside a major thoroughfare. When a vehicle was found to be exceeding the legal speed limit, the police vehicle, with lights flashing, would quickly pursue the violator and require it to pull to the side of the road. The officers would then approach the vehicle, request the driver's license and vehicle registration, and, if no acceptable excuse for the excessive speed was provided, issue a ticket to the violator. In addition to issuing summonses to violators of speed laws, the officers checked the credentials of the drivers and determined if the driver had been driving while under the influence of alcohol, or whether the car has been reported stolen.

Table 2 indicates that radar checks began in December of 1983 and continued through June of 1984. The outcomes achieved by this component are presented in Table 6.

Table 6

Program Outcomes Produced by the Radar Check Component, By Month, in S-1 Program Area

Outcome	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	Total
Summonses	0	0	0	58	24	23	35	21	29	21	211
Field Interrogations	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
Arrests	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	6

A total of 211 summonses were issued over the ten-month program period, although this particular component did not begin until December.

Bus Checks. As a result of repeated complaints from citizens, the Directed Patrol Task Force began a program designed to reduce disorderly behavior on public buses. On a typical operation, two officers would signal a bus driver to pull to the side of the road. One officer would enter the bus by the rear exit, the other through the front door. The officer at the front would deliver this message:

Excuse me, ladies and gentlemen, this is a Newark Police Department bus inspection. We are here to remind you that there are certain city ordinances which apply when you ride public transportation in our city. There is no smoking, no drinking, no gambling and no loud music allowed. Anyone doing any of those things should cease immediately. Otherwise, we will ask you to get off the bus.

[After dealing with any problem cases.] These bus inspections are being conducted by the Newark Police Department for your safety and comfort. Thank you for your cooperation.

After the message was delivered and offenders were evicted, the officers answered questions from the passengers and requested the bus driver to sign a form indicating the time and place the inspection occurred. These forms were submitted to the supervisor of the Directed Patrol Task Force to document the unit's activities.

The vast majority of the bus operations adhered to these guidelines. However, on rare occasions, when the program was in its initial months, the officers failed to explain the reasons for conducting a bus inspection before actually proceeding with the operation. It is possible that, on these few occasions, failure to inform the passengers of the rationale until

after the inspection was completed may have unintentionally increased the level of fear and anxiety. In the vast majority of cases, however, the rules were adhered to scrupulously. These operations appeared to be well received by most passengers, even producing applause on some occasions.

Again referring to Table 2, it can be seen that bus checks began in November of 1983 and continued for the next seven months. Table 7 shows the outcomes achieved by these operations.

Table 7

Program Outcomes Produced by the Bus Check Component, By Month, in S-1 Program Area

Outcome	Month										Total
	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	
Buses Inspected	0	0	7	69	63	16	23	9	28	12	227
Evictions from Buses	0	0	2	31	7	9	11	0	4	2	66
Field Interrogations	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
Arrests	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	4

As the table indicates, this component resulted in the inspection of 227 buses during the ten-month program period, producing a total of 66 evictions.

Disorderly Conduct Enforcement. The disorderly conduct enforcement component was designed to reduce street disorder by the rigorous enforcement of the state disorderly conduct laws. Operations of this component were carried out in three stages. First, any group of four or more persons which "congregated to create a public hazard" (in the words of the State statute) were notified by officers in a marked police car that they were in violation of the law and required to disperse.* Second, a few minutes after this notice was given, officers in a police van appeared and, assisted by as many other officers as necessary, took to the local precinct station all persons who failed to heed the request to disperse. Finally, those persons detained were processed, screened for existing warrants and charged. It was expected that continual enforcement of this law would eventually lead to a reduction in the number of disorderly groups lingering in public places.

As Table 2 indicates, operations of this type started in January, and were used periodically throughout the rest of the program period.

*The notification is the legal descendent of the requirement that local magistrates "read the riot act" to bands of citizens bent upon disturbing the peace before their yeomanry could act to disperse the crowd. The magistrates, typically sitting on horseback (this was before patrol cars), literally read to the crowd the words of the act defining a riot and requiring dispersal. (See Silver, 1967.)

The outcomes produced by this component are summarized in Table 8.

Table 8
Program Outcomes Produced by the Disorderly Conduct Enforcement Component,
By Month, in S-1 Program Area

Outcome	Month										Total
	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	
Field Interrogations	0	0	0	0	4	2	4	6	5	7	28
Compliant Dispersals	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	4	2	0	12
Arrests	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	2	0	4	10
Summonses	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4

A total of 28 field interrogations were conducted, and ten arrests made, in the S-1 area as a result of these operations during the ten-month program period.

Road Checks. Road checks were established to identify drivers without licences or under the influence of alcohol, to determine if any of the automobiles stopped had been stolen and to ascertain if there were any outstanding arrest warrants for any of the persons stopped. In accordance with legal precedents, it was decided that, as a general rule, every fifth vehicle would be stopped. If traffic was sparse, the sampling interval was reduced; if the flow was heavy, the interval was increased.

The motorist would first become aware of such an operation by the presence of a sign indicating "Newark Police Road Check in Effect" and a police vehicle with flashing lights on its roof. Reflective cones would designate the paths through which traffic was to flow. At night, flares would also be used to illuminate the traffic lanes. To insure compliance to the selection procedure, an officer recorded the license number of every vehicle passing through the checkpoint, designating which ones were to be stopped and, in certain instances, notified the inspecting officers of suspicious behavior by the occupants of particular cars. At this point, selected drivers were requested to pull off the road; all others were allowed to proceed.

The selected motorists would then encounter another sign saying, "Have driver's license, registration and insurance card ready." Two officers would approach each selected car and request the required identification papers. If all was in order, the driver was allowed to drive on. In most instances, the delay required three to five minutes. In cases in which licenses had expired, registration or insurance certificates appeared not to be in order, or drivers acted suspiciously or appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, further inquiries were made. If record checks and further discussions with the driver could resolve all questions, the vehicle was allowed to pass through the checkpoint, requiring a total delay of perhaps ten minutes. In those cases where violations were found, summonses were issued or arrests were made.

In determining the feasibility of establishing a road check, many considerations had to be taken into account. First, road checks could not be conducted during inclement weather. One important reason for this was that the intense lighting apparatus used to illuminate the operation was so sensitive to moisture that it broke when it got wet. In addition, rain or snow during such operations would cause motorists' and their credentials to become wet, risking numerous complaints and citizen dissatisfaction.

Second, the physical configuration of the program area was not conducive to establishing road checks. The only street wide enough to allow such an operation was close to the city boundary; the backup of traffic which occurred during such an operation frequently caused congestion in the neighboring city of Irvington. As a courtesy to the residents of that city, the task force commander avoided implementing road checks when such congestion was likely.

Third, to insure that these operations were conducted effectively, a total of 16 officers and two supervisors were utilized in most cases. In cases of illness, vacation or other situations in which a full complement of officers were not available, at least ten officers and one supervisor were required. If the minimum number of officers was not available, such operations were not conducted.

Finally, the costs involved in such operations, especially for flares and replacement lights, made road checks a highly expensive strategy in light of the limited discretionary budget of the police department.

For all of these reasons, this was the least frequently utilized component of the intensified enforcement program. As Table 2 indicates, it was utilized only three times in ten months for a total of 75 officer hours. As would be expected with such a low level of activity, the outcomes produced by this component were also limited, as shown in Table 9.

Table 9
Program Outcomes Produced by the Road Check Component, By Month,
in S-1 Program Area

Outcome	Month										Total
	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	
Summonses	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	12	12	0	34
Arrests	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	4

Neighborhood Clean-Up Program

This program had two components: an intensification of city services, and a revision of the juvenile judicial sentencing process to allow for community work in the program area. Each of these is discussed below.

Intensification of City Services. The city government committed itself to intensifying its demolition of previously abandoned and condemned buildings; cleaning up lots designated to have high priority by the police department; and intensifying efforts to repair streets, improve lighting

and maintain garbage collection in the area. The personnel necessary for this effort were to be from either existing city agencies or private contractors hired by the city to accomplish the requisite tasks.

Before the program began, the component coordinator compiled a list of 14 lots or buildings in the S-1 area which needed to be cleaned up. During the course of the program, seven more locations were added to that list. Of the total of 21 locations which had been designated as needing attention, the city actually cleaned up eight. In addition, the residents of the community themselves organized to clean up an additional three lots. There were no buildings which were designated as requiring demolition. In addition, the city placed emphasis on the delivery of other services to the area.

Juvenile Judicial Sentencing. The second component of the clean-up program was the creation of a legal mechanism to assign juveniles arrested for minor acts of delinquency or other minor offenses to appear before a Juvenile Conference Committee (JCC), where they were given the option of performing community service activities or appearing before a juvenile court judge for case adjudication. The committee was comprised of 15 representatives of the business community, the clergy, educational institutions and area residents. Members were selected by the police and probation departments and approved by the presiding judge of the Domestic Relations Court.

At a typical meeting of the Juvenile Conference Committee, the accused youths, aged 13 to 18, were given an opportunity to respond to the charges against them--ranging from possession of marijuana to receiving stolen property to simple assault to shoplifting to burglary. In the company of at least one of their parents, each youth was given a chance to explain the circumstances of his/her arrest. If the youth accepted culpability and was willing, he/she was considered for inclusion in the community work service program. Depending on the seriousness of the offense, the JCC would assign the youth to serve a designated number of hours in such service.

On the first day of such service, the youths were given a physical examination by the police department surgeon to insure that each was able to participate in program activities without serious risk. All those who passed this exam were then given instructions by the program supervisor concerning the rules of their participation, physical fitness training and the necessity to work as a disciplined team. After this instruction, the youths were transported to the work site, where they were trained in the use of the necessary equipment, organized into work teams and supervised closely during the remainder of the eight-hour work day. During the half-hour lunch period, the youths were driven to a local fast food franchise where they were provided with a meal paid for by the local franchise.

The supervisor of these work teams evaluated the attitudes and performance of each youth and supplied these evaluations to the JCC for their review. Each youth was expected to appear for work on as many days as were required to complete the work sentence supplied to him/her. If a youth did not successfully complete that sentence, he/she would be referred again to the JCC, which would either administer an alternative sentence or refer the youth back to the court for trial.

A total of 16 youth worked in five locations in the S-1 area for seven Saturdays from October through June, performing a total of 113 person hours of labor. Nineteen youth who were scheduled to work did not appear.

Through the efforts of both components of the clean-up program, therefore, a total of 16 of the 21 locations designated as requiring attention actually received it.

Summary

The Newark effort to reduce the "signs of crime" was composed of two principal parts, each with multiple components. The first part, aimed at the reduction of social disorder, consisted of the intensification of law enforcement and order maintenance by police personnel assigned to a task force specifically created for this purpose. During the ten-month period of the program, these officers utilized the following tactics:

- o foot patrol, to enforce laws and maintain order on sidewalks and street corners,
- o radar checks, to enforce speeding laws on the streets,
- o bus checks, to enforce ordinances and maintain order aboard public buses,
- o enforcement of the state orderly conduct laws, to reduce the amount of loitering and disruptive behavior on corners and sidewalks, and
- o roadblocks, to identify drivers without proper licenses or under the influence of alcohol, to detect stolen automobiles and to apprehend wanted offenders.

These operations were conducted at least three times per week, from Monday through Friday, based on a random assignment schedule to minimize their predictability. A total of over 2500 officer hours was spent in the program area, over 70 percent of which were utilized for foot patrol in both the residential and commercial areas of the neighborhood.

The second part of the program, the attempt to clean up physically unsightly locations, managed to complete such efforts in 16 of the 21 locations determined to require it.

EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The fundamental evaluation design was based upon the comparison of attitudinal measures collected before and ten months after the introduction of the program. These measures were obtained by conducting interviews with random samples of residents and representatives of non-residential establishments in both a program area and in a comparison area in which no new fear reduction activities were undertaken. In addition, monthly recorded crime data were collected for both areas forty four months prior to, and 13 months during, the implementation of the program. The remainder of this section describes the process by which the program and comparison areas were selected, the sampling procedures, the measures used and the recorded crime data retrieval procedures.

Program and Comparison Areas

A multi-stage selection process was used to insure that the fear reduction programs were implemented in comparable areas--and in areas appropriate to the theories being tested. First, the crime analyst, the four precinct captains and other members of the Newark Police Department were asked to identify areas of approximately 20 square blocks, containing both residential and commercial units. Each area had to display conditions of social disorder and physical deterioration sufficient to be expected to be associated with the fear of crime but not so exaggerated as to be beyond effect within a one-year evaluation. A total of 34 such areas were selected. Data for each of these areas were compiled from the block statistics contained in the 1980 Census of Population and Housing concerning:

- population
- number of occupied units
- ethnic composition
- median housing value
- occupancy rate
- percentage of owner-occupied units
- average number of persons per occupied unit
- percentage of inhabitants over the age of 65
- percentage of inhabitants under the age of 18

Cluster analyses were performed on these data to determine the set of five noncontiguous areas which were most closely matched on the dimensions examined. These five areas were then randomly assigned to receive certain types of programs or, in the case of the comparison area, to receive no new programs.

Demographic data from the 1980 Census concerning the program area, S-1, which was exposed to the effort to reduce the signs of crime and the comparison area, S-4, are presented in Table 10 below.

Table 10
Demographic Data for Signs of Crime Program and Comparison Areas

Area	Population						Housing Units			Occupied Units		
	Total	Ethnicity			Age		Total	% Single Family	% Occupied	Persons Per Unit	Total	% Owner Occupied
		% Black	% White	% Spanish Origin	% Below 18	% 65 and above						
Program Area S-1	4519	97	1	2	34	5	1460	13	96	3.2	1408	30
Comparison Area S-4	4300	98	1	1	36	7	1435	13	96	3.1	1372	25

Source: 1980 Census

As the table indicates, the two areas, both of which are located in the southeast part of the city, were quite similar in most respects. Maps of the two areas are included as Figures 1 and 2. Based on the 1980 Census, the program area, S-1, had a population of 4,519 persons living in 1,408

Table 11
Types of Non-Residential Establishments
in Program and Comparison Areas

Type of Establishment	Program Area (S-1)		Comparison Area (S-4)	
	N	%	N	%
Construction	1	2.0	0	0.0
Manufacturing	0	0.0	1	1.9
Wholesale	0	0.0	1	1.9
Hardware & Garden Supply	2	3.7	1	1.9
Grocery and Food Services Stores	5	9.8	7	13.2
Restaurant/Fast Food	2	3.9	7	13.2
Liquor Stores/Bars/Lounges	7	13.7	3	5.7
Furniture & Clothing/ Department Stores	5	9.8	2	3.8
Speciality Shops/Book Stores/Drug Stores	0	0.0	1	1.9
Electronic & Video Sales	0	0.0	1	1.9
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	3	5.9	5	9.4
Auto Sales & Repair Shops	1	2.0	2	3.8
Electronics/Appliance Service	1	2.0	0	0.0
Personal and Medical Service	4	7.8	5	9.4
Cleaners	4	7.8	5	9.4
Hotel/Motel	1	2.0	0	0.0
Church	7	13.7	5	9.4
Public Association/Organization	5	9.8	6	11.3
Other	3	5.9	3	5.7
Total	51	100.0	53	100.0

housing units. Of that population, 97 percent was black, 34 percent under the age of 18 and only five percent aged 65 or over. Thirteen percent of the housing units were for single families; 96 percent of the units were occupied. Of those units that were occupied, 30 percent were inhabited by their owners. An average of 3.2 persons lived in each occupied unit. The houses were mostly two-story duplexes, often separated by fences, situated along tree-lined streets.

As Table 11 indicates, fifty-one non-residential establishments existed in the area, most of them along Clinton Avenue, some on Avon and Hawthorne Avenues and a few scattered among the other streets. Among these establishments were seven churches, two restaurants, seven liquor stores, and bars, five grocery stores, four medical offices, a public library and 21 other establishments.

The comparison area, termed S-4, had a population of 4,300 persons living in 1,372 housing units. Ninety-eight percent of the residents were black, 36 percent were under the age of 18 and only seven percent were aged 65 or over. Thirteen percent of the housing units were for single families; 96 percent were occupied. Among those, 25 percent were occupied by their owners. An average of 3.1 persons lived in each occupied unit. The houses were largely two-story complexes, situated along tree-lined streets.

As shown in Table 11, fifty-three non-residential establishments were located in the area, most of them located along Chancellor Avenue and a few along Lyons Avenue. Among those establishments were three liquor stores, and bars, seven restaurants, seven grocery stores, five churches, five medical offices and 33 other establishments.


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
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NEWARK SOUTH DISTRICT 1



NEWARK SOUTH DISTRICT 4



Sampling Procedures

Areal Listing and Household Selection. Once program and comparison areas were selected, Police Foundation staff employed updated 1980 census block maps to compile the sample frames for both the residential and non-residential samples. Area survey supervisors conducted an areal listing, walking the streets and recording all addresses within the defined boundaries on Listing Sheets. After being put onto computer-readable tape, these listings were subdivided into two sub-lists, one for residences and one for non-residential establishments such as businesses, churches, offices and other such places. Each address on both lists was assigned an identification number. Selection of sample addresses was accomplished by dividing the universe (the number of addresses listed) by the desired sample size to arrive at a sampling interval. Starting with a random number and selecting every Nth case (where N was equal to the sampling interval), this procedure was used to produce a random sample of addresses in the program and control areas. The number of non-residential establishments in the area was so small that they were all included in the sample.

Respondent Selection Within The Household. Once the samples of addresses were selected, the final step was the selection of a respondent within the households. This selection was accomplished during the first visit of an interviewer by listing all household members who were 19 years old or older and assigning them numbers, starting with the oldest male to the youngest female. The interviewer then referred to a random selection table assigned to that household to determine who should be the respondent. No substitution was

permitted for the selected respondent. (This is a standard "Kish-table" selection procedure.)

The plan for the Wave 2 survey was to contact all sample addresses (including those in which no interview was conducted at Wave 1), and interview the respondent from Wave 1 when possible, thus creating a panel sample. A replacement respondent was selected at sample address where the Wave 1 respondent was no longer a resident of the household. Those respondents, however, were excluded from the panel analysis, but were included in the pooled cross-sectional analysis. For an address at which no interview was completed during Wave 1, a respondent was selected on the initial contact, using the same selection table that was assigned to that address for Wave 1.

Respondent Selection Within an Establishment. In each nonresidential establishment, the goal was to interview the owner or the manager of the establishment. In a few cases, because the owner or manager was unavailable, the most knowledgeable staff member was selected as the actual respondent.

Supervisor/Interviewer Training. The interview operations for Wave 1 began with the recruitment of supervisors, who were given a two-day training session, followed by the recruitment and hiring process for interviewers. After general advertising for interviewers, several orientation sessions were held for screening and selection purposes. The selected interviewers were then invited to a three day training session, after passing a police record check to which they had agreed as part of the hiring process. The final hiring decisions were made by the Police Foundation's Survey Director and the Newark field supervisor after the training session.

The interviewers' training was conducted by the Survey Director with the assistance of the Project Director, a trainer and the site supervisor. Prior to attending the training sessions, an Interviewer Training Manual was sent to each interviewer. This manual was designed as a programmed learning text with questions which interviewers were to answer as they reviewed each section. The training agenda included general introductory remarks (including background on the study and the Foundation role); general and specific instructions on procedures for respondent selection; a complete review of the questionnaire with special attention to the victimization series; a practice review session; and role-playing sessions.

Contacting Sample Households and Non-Residential Establishments. About one week before interviewing began, an advance letter from the Mayor of Newark was mailed to the selected households and establishments. The letter, addressed to "resident," or "owner" informed them of the main objectives of the research effort in an attempt to give credibility to the study and encourage cooperation with it.

The Wave 1 interviewing began in both the program and comparison areas on June 3, 1983; interviewing was completed on August 20, 1983 in the program area and September 5, 1983 in the comparison area. In both areas, the post implementation survey (Wave 2) began on June 20, 1984 and continued until August 24, 1984.

All interviewing was conducted in person. Telephone contacts were made only after an initial household visit had been made, in order to arrange an appointment for an in-person interview with the selected respondent.

Call-Back Procedures. Interviewers made a minimum of five attempts to complete an in-person interview. Each attempt was recorded on a Call Record Sheet. The attempts were made at different times of the day and different days of the week to maximize the chances of finding the respondent at home. About 40 percent of the interviews were completed on the first and second visits.

A Non-Interview Report (NIR) was completed for each selected household in which an interview could not be completed. The supervisor reviewed each NIR to decide whether or not the case should be reassigned to another interviewer for conversion. Most refusal cases were reassigned and interviewers were successful in converting nearly 40 percent of the initial refusals to completed interviews.

In-Field Editing. Completed questionnaires were returned to the supervisor on a daily basis. The supervisor and her clerical staff were then responsible for the field editing of all completed questionnaires. This process enabled the supervisor to provide the interviewers with feedback concerning their performance and insure that they did not repeat the errors they had previously committed. It also permitted retrieval of missing information before sending the cases to the home office.

Validation. Validation procedures were designed to insure that 30 percent of the respondents were recontacted to verify that the interview was indeed completed with the selected respondent. The validation process also helped to provide feedback about the interviewer's work. Thirty percent of each interviewer's work was randomly chosen for validation as they were received by the site office. Validations were completed either by telephone or in-person.

If one of an interviewer's completed questionnaires could not be validated, the supervisor conducted a 100 percent validation of that interviewer's work. Cases that failed validation were either reassigned or dropped from the data base.

Towards the end of the field work period for Wave 1, the interviewers' mode of payment was changed from an hourly basis to a "per completed" basis. The validation was then changed to 100 percent validation of completed interviews. Even though this was more costly, it was felt that such validations were necessary because of the increased reward provided for completed interviews. To further guarantee reliability, these validations were conducted from the home office by telephone. Cases in which the telephone number was no longer working and cases without telephone numbers were sent back to the field for in-person validation. The per completed mode of payment for interviewers was continued for the Wave 2 survey; the validation rate was kept at 33 percent after the initial five completed interviews for each interviewer had been successfully validated.

Response Rates. As Table 12 indicates, response rates of 79.7 percent and 82.1 percent were achieved in the program and comparison areas during Wave 1 interviewing at the residential units. Similar response rates, 82.8 percent and 76.5 percent, were achieved during Wave 2. Panel response rates were 61.2 percent and 64.3 percent in the program and comparison area respectively.

TABLE 12

WAVE 1 RESIDENTIAL RESPONSE RATES
(Numbers in Parentheses are Percentages of Sample Size)

Area	Total Units	Sample Size 1	Completed	Refusals	Vacant	Bad Address	Maximum Calls	Ineligible, Duplicates	Other 2	Area Response Rate 3
Program Area (South 1)	1383	566	412 (72.8%)	32 (5.7%)	40 (7.1%)	6 (1.1%)	52 (9.2%)	3 (0.5%)	21 (3.7%)	79.7%
Comparison Area (South 4)	1129	611	449 (73.5%)	37 (6.1%)	53 (8.7%)	11 (1.8%)	40 (6.5%)	0 (0.0%)	21 (3.4%)	82.1%

WAVE 2 RESIDENTIAL RESPONSE RATES
(Numbers in Parentheses are Percentages of Sample Size)

Area	Total Units	Sample Size 1	Completed	Refusals	Vacant	Bad Address	Maximum Calls	Ineligible, Duplicates	Other 2	Area Response Rate 3
Program Area (South 1)	1110	566	415 (73.3%)	15 (2.7%)	47 (8.3%)	12 (2.1%)	47 (8.3%)	6 (1.0%)	24 (4.2%)	82.8%
Comparison Area (South 4)	975	611	435 (71.2%)	18 (2.9%)	33 (5.4%)	4 (0.7%)	69 (11.3%)	5 (0.8%)	47 (7.7%)	76.5%

PANEL RESIDENTIAL RESPONSE RATES
(Numbers in Parentheses are Percentages of Sample Size)

Area	Sample Size 4	Completed, Same Address, Same Respondent	Completed, Same Address, Different Respondent	Refusals	Vacant	Bad Address	Maximum Calls	Ineligible, Duplicates	Other 2	Panel Response Rate 6
Program Area (South 1)	412	233 (56.6%)	73 (17.7%)	5 (1.2%)	27 (6.5%)	0 (0.0%)	40 (9.7%)	4 (1.0%)	30 (7.3%)	61.2%
Control Area (South 4)	449	275 (61.2%)	58 (12.9%)	10 (2.2%)	18 (4.0%)	0 (0.0%)	49 (10.9%)	3 (0.7%)	36 (8.0%)	64.3%

1. The sample size was based on the assumption that the survey operations would produce completion rates of 75 percent for the area sample and 66 percent for the panel (reinterview) sample.
2. "Other" includes the number of respondents who were in hospital, ill, on vacation, or had a language problem, plus completed interviews which were invalidated during quality control checks.
3. "Area Response Rate" equals Number Completed + (Sample Size - (Number Vacant + Number with Bad Address + Number Ineligible))
4. The panel sample size consists of only those households in which an interview was completed during the Wave 1 survey.
5. Interviews that were completed with a different respondent in the panel households were excluded from the panel analysis but were included in the analysis of the pooled cross-sectional data.
6. "Panel Response Rate" equals Number Completed at Same Address with Same Respondent + (Desired Sample Size - (Number Vacant + Number with Bad Address + Number Ineligible))

Table 13

WAVE 1 NON-RESIDENTIAL RESPONSE RATES
(Numbers in Parentheses are Percentages of Sample Size)

Area	Total Units	Sample Size	Completed	Refusals	Vacant	Bad Address	Maximum Calls	Ineligible, Duplicates	Other1	Area Response Rate2
Program Area (South 1)	51	51	38 (74.5%)	3 (5.9%)	6 (11.8%)	1 (2.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (5.9%)	86.4%
Comparison Area (South 4)	53	53	37 (69.8%)	1 (1.9%)	8 (15.1%)	1 (1.9%)	3 (5.7%)	1 (1.9%)	2 (3.8%)	86.0%

WAVE 2 NON-RESIDENTIAL RESPONSE RATES
(Numbers in Parentheses are Percentages of Sample Size)

Area	Total Units	Sample Size	Completed	Refusals	Vacant	Bad Address	Maximum Calls	Ineligible, Duplicates	Other1	Area Response Rate2
Program Area (South 1)	50	50	47 (94.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (6.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.0%)	100.0%
Comparison Area (South 4)	51	51	35 (68.6%)	0 (0.0%)	9 (17.6%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (3.9%)	5 (9.8%)	0 (0.0%)	97.2%

1. "Other" includes language problem and establishment temporarily closed.

2. "Response Rate" equals Number Completed ÷ (Sample Size - (Number Vacant + Number with Bad Address + Number Ineligible))

Table 13 indicates that a response rate of approximately 86 percent was achieved in both the program and control areas during the Wave 1 non-residential surveys. During Wave 2, these response rates increased to 98 percent in the program area and 90 percent in the comparison area. In the program area, interviews were conducted in at least 75 percent of the total number of establishments at each wave; in the comparison area, interviews were completed in at least 66 percent of all establishments..

Measures

Survey questionnaires were designed to collect information about exposure to the program as well as to measure the effects on each of the dimensions on which the program was hypothesized to have some impact. One version was created for residents; another shorter version was created for use with owners and managers of non-residential establishments. Copies of both instruments are included in a separate methodology report. Appendix B describes in detail the measures used in the residential survey and how they were created. Appendix C presents the same information about the measures used in the non-residential survey. A brief summary of the measures used is presented below.

- o Recalled Program Exposure. Both before and after the program, respondents were asked whether they recalled having seen or heard about the tactics to be utilized--foot patrol, radar checks, bus checks, disorderly conduct enforcement and road checks. In addition, respondents were asked if they recalled being stopped by a road check or while walking during the past

months. Respondents also were asked to indicate when they last saw and had contact with a police officer, both for contacts initiated by the citizen and for those initiated by the police.

o Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems. To measure perceived social disorder problems, residential respondents were asked a series of questions about how much of a problem each of the following activities were:

- Groups hanging around on corners,
- People saying insulting things,
- Public drinking,
- People breaking windows,
- Writing or painting on walls,
- Gangs, and
- Sale or use of drugs in public.

The responses to each of these questions were combined to form one composite scale. A similar set of items was used among non-residential respondents.

o Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems. Perceived physical deterioration was measured among residential respondents by combining the responses to questions about how much of a problem each of the following were in the area:

- Dirty streets and sidewalks,
- Abandoned houses and buildings, and
- Vacant lots filled with trash and junk.

A similar set of items was utilized among non-residential respondents.

o Fear of Personal Victimization in Area. A composite scale was created combining the responses of residential respondents to four questions which asked about:

- Perceived safety while in area alone,
- Whether there was a place in the area where the respondent was afraid to go,
- Worry about being robbed in the area,
- Worry about being assaulted in the area.

Similar items were combined among non-residential respondents.

o Perceived Concern About Crime Among Employees and Patrons.

Responses to two questions were combined to form a measure of the concern expressed by the employees and patrons of the establishment:

- Frequency of hearing employees express concern about their personal security in the area, and
- Frequency of hearing patrons express concern about their personal safety in the area.

o Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area. A scale combined responses of residential respondents to two items asking about one extent of worry about:

- Burglary, and
- Auto theft.

Among non-residential respondents the responses to items concerning worrying about burglary and vandalism were combined.

o Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems. This scale combined responses to three questions which asked about the extent to which each of the following were perceived as problems in the area:

- People being attacked or beaten up by strangers in the area,
- People being robbed or having their money, purses or wallets taken, and
- Rape or other sexual attacks.

o Perceived Area Property Crime Problems. This scale combined responses to three questions which asked about the extent to which each of the following were perceived in the area:

- Burglary,
- Auto vandalism, and
- Auto theft.

o Victimization. Residents were asked whether they had been victims of various types of attempted and successful crimes during the six-month period prior to being interviewed. Because many individual types of victimization were relatively infrequent, respondents have been categorized for this analysis as to whether they were victims of:

- personal crimes, including actual and attempted robbery, pursesnatching and pocketpicking, actual and attempted or threatened assault, threats, and sexual assault;
- property crimes, including actual and attempted burglary, theft, mailbox and bicycle theft, as well as motor vehicle theft, vandalism of home and automobile.

Representatives of non-residential establishments were asked whether their establishment had been victimized by each of the following crimes during the six months prior to being interviewed:

- Robbery or attempted robbery,
- Burglary or attempted burglary, and
- Vandalism.

o Evaluations of Police Service and Aggressiveness. Two scales were created to measure respondents' evaluations of the police. The first scale, designed to indicate general attitudes toward police service, was composed of the responses to the following individual items:

- How good a job do the police in the area do at preventing crime,
- How good a job do the police in the area do in helping victims,
- How good a job do the police in the area do in keeping order on the street,
- How polite are police in the area in dealing with people,
- How helpful are police in the area in dealing with people, and
- How fair are police in the area in dealing with people.

The second measure, to serve as an indicator of perceived police aggressiveness, was created by combining the responses to questions concerning the extent to which each of the following were thought to be problems in the area.

- Police stopping too many people on the streets without good reason, and
- Police being too tough on people they stop.

The goal of the program was not to increase perceived aggressiveness.

o Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime. To measure the extent to which respondents take restrictive, defensive precautions to protect themselves against crime, the answers to the following questions were combined:

- Whether the respondent goes out with someone else after dark in order to avoid crime
- Whether the respondent avoids certain areas
- Whether the respondent avoids certain types of people
- Whether the respondent avoids going out after dark

These are used in this evaluation as behavioral measures of fear of crime.

o Household Crime Prevention Efforts. To measure the extent to which respondents had made efforts to prevent household crime, the responses to the following questions concerning whether the following household crime prevention efforts had been made:

- Install special locks,
- Install outdoor lights,
- Install timers,
- Install special windows or bars, and
- Is a neighbor asked to watch home when respondent is away for a day or two.

These are used in this evaluation as indicators of positive effects upon purposive crime prevention.

o Change in Business Environment. To measure the extent to which business conditions had changed in the recent past, the responses of non-residential representatives to the following two questions were combined:

- Change in the number of people who came in the establishment during the past year, and
- Change in the amount of business at the establishment during the past year.

o Satisfaction with Area. To ascertain the extent to which residential respondents were satisfied with the area, responses were combined for two items which explored:

- Their perception of the extent to which the area had become a better or worse place in the past year, and
- The extent to which they were satisfied with the area as a place to live.

The answers to the following two questions asked of non-residential respondents were combined:

- The extent to which the respondent was satisfied with the area as a place for the establishment, and
- The extent to which the area had become better or worse in the past year.

Recorded Crime Data Collection

Data concerning each incident of Part I crime recorded by the Newark Police Department from January 1980 through September 1984 were extracted from the department's computer tapes, with the assistance of the data processing coordinator. They were aggregated by month. A comparison between the actual offense reports and the incidents recorded on the data tape for three randomly-selected months showed less than two percent discrepancy between the two; in all but a few cases, the difference was due to update information which had been incorporated into the data tape but had not been added to the offense report. Part 2 and Part 3 crime data, concerning public disorder offenses and other less serious crimes, were found to be less reliably recorded and, therefore, were not collected.

Summary

The basic evaluation design compared attitudinal measures collected before and ten months after the introduction of the program. These measures were obtained by conducting interviews with random samples of residents and

representatives of non-residential establishments in both a program area and in a comparison area, similar to the program area in size and demographic characteristics, in which no new fear reduction activities were undertaken.

The surveys produced area response rates ranging from 76 to 82 percent. Attempts to conduct interviews with a subset of respondents both before and ten months after the program began produced panel response rates of approximately 61 and 64 percent, in the program and comparison areas respectively. Interviews were also conducted with owners, managers or employees of non-residential establishments. The response rates were consistently higher than 86 percent.

Survey questionnaires were designed to collect information about each of the following:

- Recalled Program Exposure
- Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems
- Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems
- Fear of Personal Victimization in Area
- Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area
- Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems
- Perceived Area Property Crime Problems
- Victimization
- Evaluations of Police Service and Aggressiveness
- Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime
- Household Crime Prevention Efforts
- Satisfaction with Area

Recorded crime data for Part I crimes were also collected, by month, for both areas from January 1980 through September 1984.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Introduction

This section presents the results of several different types of analysis:

1. Recalled program awareness and contact in both the program and comparison areas were examined to determine the extent to which respondents recalled different program components. In addition, differences in awareness across population subgroups were investigated.
2. To provide an indication of the general levels and changes demonstrated by the various survey measures in both the program and comparison areas, simple comparisons between certain means, percentages and distributions at Waves 1 and 2 were examined.
3. To provide indicators of the possible program impact on residential respondents, two different types of analysis were conducted:
 - a. An analysis of pooled cross-sectional data, to supply evidence of program impact at the broad area level, and
 - b. An analysis of panel data, collected from the subset of the same persons interviewed both before and after the program was implemented, to provide an indication of the program's impact on particular individuals.
4. Among members of the panel sample in the program area, comparisons of outcome measures were made between those persons who recalled being exposed to the program and those who did not.
5. To test for possible subgroup-specific program effects, the responses of members of the panel samples were subjected to treatment-covariate interaction analysis.
6. Recorded crime data were subjected to interrupted time series analysis to determine if trends or levels were affected by program implementation.

The results of each of these analysis are presented below:

Recalled Program Exposure and Contact

Residential Survey Results

The extent to which respondents said they recalled being exposed to the various program components is presented in Tables 14 and 15, for the cross-sectional and panel samples, respectively. The results indicate few differences between the recalled response levels in the two types of samples. Approximately 24 percent of the residents of the program area recalled seeing or hearing of foot patrol in their neighborhood during the program period. About thirteen percent of the respondents in the comparison area said they had seen or heard of neighborhood foot patrol.* Unfortunately, because foot patrol was added as a program component after the Wave 1 surveys were completed, no pretest data are available concerning earlier awareness of such patrols. The fact that the level of exposure to foot patrol was almost twice as high in the program area as in the comparison neighborhood suggests that the perceived "dosage" was indeed greater in the program area.

About forty-two percent of program area residents said they had seen or heard of bus checks, only slightly higher than the 36 percent who said they had been exposed to such a program in the comparison area. The relative high level of exposure in the latter area may have resulted from the fact that,

*This generally high level of awareness is not surprising. From 1973 until 1981, state funds had paid for the maintenance of foot patrols in Newark and other major New Jersey cities. Only recently, due to massive lay offs of personnel, has this program been discontinued in Newark. Given the success of the program in reducing the fear of crime (as shown by an evaluation conducted by the Police Foundation), the police department has instituted a "walk and ride" program to encourage patrol officers to park their vehicles and engage in foot patrol throughout the city.

Table 14
Wave One - Wave Two Program Recalled Exposure Measures
(All Residential Respondents)

	S-1 Program Area		S-4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Seen/heard of foot patrol?				
Percent yes	--	24	--	13
(N)		(411)		(435)
Seen/heard of bus checks?				
Percent yes	--	42	--	36
(N)		(399)		(425)
Seen/heard of road checks?				
Percent yes	5	20	6	11
(N)	(396)	(409)	(444)	(431)
Sigf.		$p < .001$		$p < .01$
Seen/heard of disorderly conduct enforcement?				
Percent yes	20	29	19	26
(N)	(381)	(404)	(433)	(428)
Sigf.		$p < .01$		$p < .05$
Seen/heard of clean-up efforts?				
Percent Yes	16	10	14	9
(N)	(394)	(408)	(443)	(427)
Sigf.		$p < .05$		$p < .05$
Stopped by road check?				
Percent yes	0	2	1	1
(N)	(405)	(415)	(449)	(433)
Sigf.		$p < .01$		$p < .50$
Stopped while walking?				
Percent Yes	2	2	4	3
(N)	(405)	(415)	(449)	(435)
Sigf.		$p < .50$		$p < .30$

Chi-square tests of significance

Table 15
Wave One - Wave Two Program Recalled Exposure Measures
(Residential Panel Respondents)

	S-1 Program Area Wave 1 Wave 2		S-4 Comparison Area Wave 1 Wave 2	
Seen/heard of foot patrol? Percent yes (N)	--	23 (230)	--	12 (275)
Seen/heard of bus checks? Percent yes (N)	--	44 (222)	--	36 (266)
Seen/heard of road checks? Percent yes (N) Sigf.	4 (227)	22 (227) $p < .001$	3 (272)	11 (272) $p < .001$
Seen/heard of disorderly conduct enforcement? Percent yes (N) Sigf.	19 (216)	32 (216) $p < .001$	17 (266)	25 (266) $p < .01$
Seen/heard of clean-up efforts? Percent Yes (N) Sigf.	19 (223)	12 (223) $p < .001$	12 (271)	10 (271) $p < .01$
Stopped while in a car in the area? Percent Yes (N) (Sigf.)	2 (231)	1 (231) $p < .36$	1 (275)	1 (275) $p < .33$
Stopped while on foot in the area? Percent Yes (N) Sigf.	1 (231)	0 (231) $p < .05$	2 (275)	2 (275) $p < .36$

Paired sample t-tests of the significance of proportions

although such bus checks were not conducted in the comparison area, they were carried out throughout much of the rest of the city and had been well publicized during the program period. It is quite plausible, therefore, that comparison area residents might have been exposed to or heard about such operations outside their own neighborhood. As with foot patrol, this component was added too late to allow for measurement of exposure at Wave 1.

The percent of program area respondents who had seen or heard of road checks increased from about five percent before the program began to 20 percent ten months after implementation; this increase was statistically significant at the .001 level. In the comparison area, the percent of residents aware of road checks in the area also increased, from six to 11 percent; this change was also statistically significant. As with bus checks, comparison area residents may have been exposed to road checks elsewhere in the city. The percent of respondents who said they had been stopped by a road check was relatively low in both areas, although the two percent indicating such contact in the program area was higher than that in the comparison area and significantly higher than the exposure level before the program began.

The percent of respondents who said they had seen or heard of the disorderly conduct enforcement program increased from 20 to 29 percent in the program area and from 19 to 26 percent in the comparison area. The program area increase was significant at the .01 level; the change in the comparison area was significant at the .05 level. The generally high level of program exposure in both areas is probably attributable to the fact that such tactics have periodically been employed by the Newark Police Department even before the fear reduction study began.

The percent of respondents who said they had seen or heard of area clean-up activities decreased in both the program and comparison areas, from 16 to 10 percent in the former and from 14 to 9 percent in the latter. Although neither of these changes were statistically significant, the fact that program awareness was reduced in both areas suggests that the effect of the clean-up activity on the perceptions of residents was minimal.

Regardless of the level of awareness, very few people said they had themselves been stopped by the police, either while walking or driving their automobile.

Results from more indirect measures of program exposure, dealing with police visibility and contacts, are presented in Tables 16 and 17 for the cross-sectional and panel samples respectively. The tables show few differences across the two types of samples. The only statistically significant changes were detected in the program area, where significantly more respondents indicated they had initiated contacts with the police at Wave 1 than said so at Wave 2. This finding is supported by the fact that the percent of respondents in the program area who believed that the number of police in the neighborhood was increasing was more than twice the percent expressing that opinion in the comparison area. This question was not asked at Wave 1 and, therefore, no change measures are possible. Arguably, this perceived increase in the number of police in the area could have been due to the frequent operations of the Directed Patrol Task Force; similarly, the increased number of citizen-initiated contacts could have been due to the increased availability of police officers due to the program activity.

Table 16

Wave One - Wave Two Respondent Perceptions of Police Presence and Contact
(All Residential Respondents)

	S-1 Program Area		S-4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Last time saw officer in the area?				
past 24 hours	30	30	.26	27
past week	37	44	36	40
neither	33	26	38	33
	(412)	(415)	(450)	(435)
	p < .10		p < .50	
Number of police working in the area has?				
decreased	—	12	—	21
about same	—	68	—	70
increased	—	20	—	9
		(381)		(391)
Do you think number of officers patrolling area is:				
need more	—	84	—	89
adequate	—	13	—	10
need less	—	3	—	1
		(403)		(425)
Citizen-initiated contacts with the police in the area:				
Count 0	78	69	76	80
1+	22	31	24	20
	(412)	(415)	(450)	(435)
	p < .01		p < .20	
Police-initiated contacts with the police in the area:				
Count 0	97	97	96	97
1+	3	3	4	3
	(412)	(415)	(450)	(435)
	p < .70		p < .50	

Chi-square tests of significance

Table 17

Wave One - Wave Two Respondent Perceptions of Police Presence and Contact
(Residential Panel Respondents)

	S-1 Program Area Wave 1 Wave 2		S-4 Comparison Area Wave 1 Wave 2	
Last time saw officer in the area?				
past 24 hours	28	29	23	26
past week	40	46	38	42
neither	32	25	39	32
	(231)	(231)	(275)	(275)
	p < .07		p < .04	
Number of police working in the area has?				
decreased	—	12	—	22
about same	—	67	—	69
increased	—	20	—	9
		(214)		(255)
Do you think number of officers patrolling area is:				
need more	—	80	—	90
adequate	—	16	—	9
need less	—	4	—	1
		(226)		(270)
Citizen-initiated contacts with the police in the area:				
Count 0	75	66	72	78
1+	25	34	28	22
	(231)	(231)	(275)	(275)
	p < .01		p < .06	
Police-initiated contacts with the police in the area:				
Count 0	97	99	97	98
1+	3	1	3	2
	(231)	(231)	(275)	(275)
	p < .32		p < .60	

Chi-square tests of significance

To understand better the types of people who were exposed to the program components, Tables 18 through 22 present the results of an analysis of the extent of subgroup differences, if any, in program exposure. The only significant difference in program awareness revealed in those tables was with respect to road checks. Specifically, persons aged 25-49 were significantly more likely to have seen or heard of road checks than were persons older or younger; in addition, persons living in households with three or more adults were more likely than others to have become aware of such operations. It is plausible that persons in the middle age category are more likely to drive than those younger or older, thus increasing their chance of having encountered road checks. It is also reasonable to suggest that the more adults there are in a household, the greater the chance that one of those adults would have a car and, therefore, could have encountered a road check. In any case, the greater the number of adults in a household, the greater the information base available to all of its members.

In summary, then, the most common program activity, foot patrol, was seen or heard of by 24 percent of program area respondents. The component with the highest level of awareness was the bus check operation, a finding arguably due to its widespread use elsewhere in the city. Twenty-nine percent of program area respondents had heard of the disorderly conduct enforcement operations; 20 percent knew about road checks. Only ten percent, however, indicated awareness of the clean-up efforts, a lower level than before the program began and only marginally higher than in the comparison area.

Table 18

Correlates of Program Contact
Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only

Seen or Heard of Foot Patrol

(All Residential Respondents)

Percentage Recalling Program Contact and Significance of Subgroup Difference					
Sex			Age Category		
Males	23	(159)	15-24	23	(64)
Females	24	(251)	25-49	23	(188)
	p < .79		50 plus	p < .98	
Income			Number of Adults in Household		
Under \$15,000	20	(199)	One	24	(117)
Over \$15,000	28	(178)	Two	24	(168)
	p < .09		Three +	23	(126)
Education				p < .98	
Not high school	24	(172)	Length of Residence		
HS graduate	23	(238)	0-2 years	16	(81)
	p < .85		3-5 years	23	(70)
Housing			6-9 years	35	(49)
Own	21	(173)	10 years +	24	(210)
Rent	25	(235)		p < .11	
	p < .51				

Chi-square tests of significance

Table 19

Correlates of Recalled Program Contact
Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only

Seen or Heard of Roadchecks

(All Residential Respondents)

Percentage Recalling Program Contact and Significance of Subgroup Difference				
Sex		Age Category		
Males	25	(158)	15-24	18 (61)
Females	18	(250)	25-49	27 (187)
p < .08			50 plus	13 (159)
Income		p < .001		
Under \$15,000	16	(200)	Number of Adults in Household	
Over \$15,000	24	(175)		
p < .07				
Education		One 17 (118)		
Not high school	20	(173)	Two	16 (168)
HS graduate	20	(235)	Three +	30 (123)
p < .96			p < .01	
Housing		Length of Residence		
Own Rent	21	(175)	0-2 years	11 (82)
Rent	19	(231)	3-5 years	26 (69)
p < .60			6-9 years	19 (47)
			10 years +	22 (210)
			p < .09	

Chi-square tests of significance

Table 20
Correlates of Program Contact
Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only
Seen or Heard of Bus Checks
(All Residential Respondents)

Percentage Recalling Program Contact and Significance of Subgroup Difference					
Sex			Age Category		
Males	39	(153)	15-24	52	(64)
Females	44	(245)	25-49	46	(182)
	p < .35		50 plus	35	(153)
				p < .03	
Income			Number of Adults in Household		
Under \$15,000	42	(197)	One	39	(117)
Over \$15,000	44	(169)	Two	40	(161)
	p < .74		Three +	49	(121)
				p < .23	
Education			Length of Residence		
Not high school	39	(171)	0-2 years	43	(76)
HS graduate	45	(227)	3-5 years	42	(67)
	p < .30		6-9 years	54	(48)
			10 years +	39	(207)
				p < .30	
Housing					
Own	39	(168)			
Rent	45	(228)			
	p < .24				

Chi-square tests of significance

Table 21

Correlates of Recalled Program Contact
Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only

Aware of Police Enforcing Disorderly Conduct Laws

(All Residential Respondents)

Percentage Recalling Program Contact and Significance of Subgroup Difference					
Sex			Age Category		
Males	34	(155)	15-24	33	(63)
Females	25	(248)	25-49	31	(186)
p < .08			50 plus	25	(153)
Income			p < .35		
Under \$15,000	30	(199)	Number of Adults in Household		
Over \$15,000	27	(172)			
p < .62					
Education					
Not high school	27	(169)	One	25	(117)
HS graduate	30	(234)	Two	30	(166)
p < .56			Three +	31	(121)
			p < .54		
Housing			Length of Residence		
Own	28	(169)	0-2 years	26	(82)
Rent	29	(232)	3-5 years	32	(69)
p < .74			6-9 years	33	(48)
			10 years +	28	(205)
			p < .73		

Chi-square tests of significance

Table 22
Correlates of Recalled Program Contact
Wave Two S-1 Program Area Only
Seen or Heard of Clean-Up Program
(All Residential Respondents)

Percentage Recalling Program Contact and Significance of Subgroup Difference					
Sex			Age Category		
Males	13	(159)	15-24	13	(63)
Females	9	(248)	25-49	9	(187)
	p < .29		50 plus	12	(156)
Income				p < .64	
Under \$15,000	11	(199)	Number of Adults in Household		
Over \$15,000	11	(176)			
	p < .80				
Education			One	8	(118)
Not high school	10	(171)	Two	10	(166)
HS graduate	11	(236)	Three +	14	(124)
	p < .73			p < .37	
Housing			Length of Residence		
Own	14	(171)	0-2 years	9	(81)
Rent	8	(234)	3-5 years	7	(69)
	p < .08		6-9 years	10	(49)
			10 years +	12	(208)
				p < .58	

Chi-square tests of significance

Non-Residential Establishment Survey Results

The extent to which representatives of non-residential establishments indicated they recalled being exposed to the components of the overall program to reduce the signs of crime is shown in Table 23. The results show that 38 percent of the non-residential establishment respondents had seen or heard of road checks during the program period, a statistically significant increase over the three percent who were aware of such operations before. This level of exposure is not only considerably higher than was found in the comparison area but is also almost twice as high as the level of exposure found among the residential sample respondents. This higher level of awareness may well be due to the fact that the few road checks conducted in the program area were located on the street on which most commercial establishments are situated.

A similar result was found with respect to awareness of disorderly conduct enforcement operations. Fully fifty-seven percent of the non-residential sample in the program area indicated awareness of such activity, a highly significant increase over the awareness level before the program started. This level of awareness was not only higher than that found among the comparison area non-residential sample, but was almost twice that found among the residential sample respondents. Again, this could be due to the fact that most disorderly conduct enforcement operations occurred on the principal business street in the program area.

Only about 11 percent of the program area respondents at Wave 2 had seen or heard of clean-up activities, about the same level of exposure as found among the residential respondents. This level of awareness was not only lower than before the program began but also much lower than the

Table 23

Wave One - Wave Two Program Exposure Measures
(Non-Residential Establishment Respondents)

	S-1 Program Area		S-4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Seen/heard of road checks?				
Percent yes	3	38	6	17
(sd)	(.16)	(.49)	(.23)	(.38)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[36]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .10	
Seen/heard of disorderly conduct enforcement?				
Percent yes	16	57	29	35
(sd)	(.37)	(.50)	(.46)	(.48)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[34]	[34]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .40	
Seen/heard of clean up efforts?				
Percent yes	27	11	30	21
(sd)	(.45)	(.31)	(.46)	(.41)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[34]
Sigf.	p < .05		p < .25	
Stopped by road check?				
Percent yes	0	2	0	0
(sd)	(.00)	(.15)	(.00)	(.00)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < NC	
Stopped on foot in area?				
Percent yes	0	2	0	0
(sd)	(.00)	(.15)	(.00)	(.00)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < NC	

Chi-square tests of significance for small samples

Table 24

Wave One - Wave Two Perceptions of Police Presence and Contact
(Non-Residential Establishment Respondents)

	S-1		S-4	
	Program Area		Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Last time saw officer in this area? Percent who said:				
past 24 hours	27	43	54	43
past week	35	28	24	29
neither	38	30	22	29
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
	p < .50		p < .70	
Police come to ask about problems-give information?				
Percent yes	14	30	42	30
[N]	[37]	[47]	[36]	[33]
	p < .10		p < .50	

Chi-square tests of significance for small samples

awareness of such efforts expressed in the comparison area. As with the residential sample, these results suggest that the clean-up activities in the program area had extremely low visibility.

As with the residential sample, only two percent of the program area respondents said they had themselves been stopped by the police, either while walking or driving.

Results from other, more indirect, measures of program exposure, as indicated by police visibility and contact, are presented in Table 24. No observed changes were statistically significant. It is interesting to observe, however, that the percent of respondents who indicated that an officer had come to the establishment increased from 14 to 30 percent in the program area, but declined from 42 to 30 percent in the comparison area. Similarly, the percent of respondents who had seen a police officer in the program area within the past week rose from 62 to 71 percent while declining from 78 to 72 percent in the comparison area. These results, although not statistically significant, suggest that some increase in police visibility may have occurred in the program area. It is not unlikely that, to the extent that such an increase may have occurred, it could be due to the increased level of police activity produced by the Directed Patrol Task Force.

Descriptive Data Analysis

Residential Sample Results

The mean responses of the Wave 1 and Wave 2 residential respondents in the program and comparison areas are presented in Table 25. These means are

Table 25

Wave One-Wave Two Outcome Measures
(All Residential Respondents)

Scale	S-1 Program Area		S-4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems				
Mean	2.04	1.98	2.04	2.04
(sd)	(.47)	(.59)	(.47)	(.49)
[N]	[411]	[415]	[449]	[434]
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems				
Mean	2.08	2.06	1.81	1.72
(sd)	(.56)	(.56)	(.50)	(.58)
[N]	[411]	[415]	[450]	[434]
Fear of Personal Victim- ization in Area				
Mean	2.00	2.00	2.01	1.96
(sd)	(.60)	(.62)	(.55)	(.61)
[N]	[412]	[415]	[450]	[435]
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area				
Mean	2.33	2.33	2.21	2.33
(sd)	(.66)	(.72)	(.64)	(.68)
[N]	[411]	[415]	[450]	[435]
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems				
Mean	1.89	1.86	1.91	1.74
(sd)	(.56)	(.66)	(.50)	(.53)
[N]	[405]	[411]	[443]	[432]

Table 25
(continued)

Wave One-Wave Two Outcome Measures

(All Residential Respondents)

Scale	S-1		S-4	
	Program Area Wave 1	Wave 2	Comparison Area Wave 1	Wave 2
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems				
Mean	2.23	2.20	2.13	2.18
(sd)	(.53)	(.61)	(.52)	(.57)
[N]	[411]	[415]	[450]	[435]
Victimized by Any Crime				
Percent Victims	43	49	46	43
Victimized by Personal Crime				
Percent Victims	15	23	24	24
Victimized by Property Crime				
Percent Victims	35	38	34	33
Evaluation of Police Service				
Mean	2.59	2.79	2.51	2.70
(sd)	(.74)	(.78)	(.67)	(.77)
[N]	[403]	[407]	[442]	[428]

Table 25
(continued)

Wave One-Wave Two Outcome Measures
(All Residential Respondents)

Scale	S-1 Program Area		S-4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Police Aggressiveness Mean	1.23	1.26	1.18	1.19
(sd)	(.50)	(.54)	(.46)	(.43)
[N]	[374]	[405]	[427]	[415]
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime Mean	.58	.59	.56	.57
(sd)	(.33)	(.35)	(.35)	(.35)
[N]	[410]	[415]	[448]	[434]
Household Crime Prevention Efforts Mean	1.44	1.73	1.57	1.42
(sd)	(1.42)	(1.37)	(1.40)	(1.18)
[N]	[412]	[415]	[450]	[435]
Satisfaction with Area Mean	2.06	2.13	1.85	2.10
(sd)	(.66)	(.72)	(.61)	(.70)
[N]	[409]	[414]	[449]	[435]

presented only in order to provide information about the general levels and trends in scale and item means. Because of differences in, and differential changes of the composition of the groups in the program and comparison areas, these results should not be used as indicators of program impact, which is examined later in this section.*

As Table 25 indicates, few sizable differences in mean scores were found across the program and comparison areas at Wave 1. Similarly, few notable differences in trends between the two waves were detected. Further analysis of these differences--with appropriate statistical controls--are presented in later sections of this report.

Non-Residential Establishment Samples

A summary of the non-residential survey results are presented in Table 26 and are discussed below.** Because more sophisticated analyses, with statistical controls applied, were not appropriate, the results for each indicator are discussed separately. Just as with the residential samples, however, differences, and differential changes, across the program and comparison areas makes inferences concerning program impact subject to rival interpretation.

*The demographic characteristics of the respondents during both waves are shown in Appendix D. Complete results, including means, standard deviations, sample sizes and significance levels for all scales and their individual items are presented in Appendix E. Appendix F contains similar information for the panel respondents.

**The types of establishments at which interviews were completed are shown in Appendix G. Complete results are presented in Appendix H.

Table 26
Wave One-Wave Two Outcome Measures
(Non-Residential Establishment Respondents)

Scale	S-1		S-4	
	Program Area Wave 1	Area Wave 2	Comparison Area Wave 1	Wave 2
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems				
Mean	1.92	1.94	1.68	1.73
(sd)	(.47)	(.63)	(.50)	(.49)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .50		p < .40	
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems				
Mean	2.11	1.87	2.16	1.74
(sd)	(.53)	(.73)	(.62)	(.61)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .005	
Fear of Personal Victim- ization in Area				
Mean	2.31	2.58	2.06	2.19
(sd)	(.73)	(.75)	(.70)	(.80)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .25	
Worry About Area Property Crime				
Mean	2.24	2.55	1.64	2.01
(sd)	(.68)	(.68)	(.76)	(.70)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .025	

Table 26
(continued)

Wave One-Wave Two Outcome Measures
(Non-Residential Establishment Respondents)

Scale	S-1		S-4	
	Program Area Wave 1	Wave 2	Comparison Area Wave 1	Wave 2
Perceived Concern About Crime Among Employees and Patrons				
Mean	2.44	3.42	2.43	2.24
(sd)	(1.05)	(.77)	(.97)	(1.02)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .25	
Victimization by Robbery or Attempted Robbery in Past Six Months				
Percent Victims	16	4	11	6
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .50	
Victimization by Burglary or Attempted Burglary in Past Six Months				
Percent Victims	54	38	30	26
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .20		p < .80	
Victimization by Vandalism in Past Six Months				
Percent Victims	40	38	32	40
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .90		p < .70	

Table 26
(continued)

Wave One-Wave Two Outcome Measures
(Non-Residential Establishment Respondents)

Scale	S-1 Program Area		S-4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Evaluation of Police Service				
Mean	2.69	3.03	2.81	3.01
(sd)	(.80)	(.83)	(.88)	(.87)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .05		p < .25	
Police Aggressiveness				
Mean	1.00	1.02	1.00	1.03
(sd)	(.00)	(.15)	(.00)	(.18)
[N]	[34]	[44]	[32]	[31]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .25	
Change in Business Environment				
Mean	2.03	2.34	2.43	2.06
(sd)	(.57)	(.66)	(.50)	(.70)
[N]	[35]	[47]	[37]	[34]
Sigf.	p < .025		p < .01	
Satisfaction with Area				
Mean	2.22	2.37	2.27	2.59
(sd)	(.73)	(.71)	(.80)	(.74)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .05	

One-tailed t-tests and Chi-square tests of significance for small samples

- o Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems. As Table 26 indicates, the perceived level of social disorder problems increased slightly, but not significantly, in both the program and the comparison areas.

- o Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems. Although perceived levels of physical disorder and deterioration declined in both the program and comparison areas, the decrease was statistically significant only in the comparison area.

- o Fear of Personal Victimization in Area. The fear of being personally victimized increased in both the program and comparison areas, although not at a statistically significant level.

- o Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area. Worry about area property crime increased in both areas; neither change was statistically significant.

- o Perceived Concern About Crime Among Employees and Patrons. As Table 26 reveals, the perceived level of concern about crime expressed by employees and patrons increased significantly in the program area but decreased, albeit not significantly, in the comparison area.

- o Victimization. Although the percent of program area non-residential establishments which were reported to have been victimized, either by robbery, burglary or vandalism, declined, none of these changes was statistically significant. In the comparison area, robbery and burglary

declined slightly, while vandalism increased; none of these changes was statistically significant.

o Evaluations of Police Service and Aggressiveness. Improvements in the evaluation of police services occurred in both the program and comparison areas, although neither of these changes reached the .01 level of statistical significance.

Although slight increases in the perceptions of police aggressiveness were indicated in both the program and comparison areas, neither of these changes were statistically significant.

o Changes in Business Environment. As Table 26 indicates, there was a significant decline in reported business conditions in the comparison area. By contrast, in the program area, business conditions were reported to have improved, although this change was just short of being significant at the .01 level.

o Satisfaction with Area. There was increased satisfaction expressed concerning both the program and comparison areas, although neither of these changes was statistically significant.

Survey Indicators of Program Impact

Pooled Cross-Sectional Data Analysis

For this analysis, two waves of surveys (pretest and posttest) were merged into one data set. They were then analyzed as a single set, with controls for wave, area, and covariates. The analysis model is:

$$Y = a + b*COVARIATES + b*WAVE + b*TREAT + b*INTER$$

Where:

Y = an outcome measure;

a = intercept;

COVARIATES = indicators modeling differences between residents of the program and comparison areas which potentially are related to the outcome measures (see below.).

WAVE = pretest (coded 0) or posttest (coded 1) wave;

TREAT = residence in comparison (coded 0) or program (coded 1) area;
and

INTER = interaction term coded 1 if respondent lives in the program area and it is a posttest interview, and a 0 otherwise.

The covariates are critical. One of the major design flaws of an area-level quasi-experiment is that residents are not randomly assigned to treatment or comparison status, but rather opt (or are forced, in one fashion or another) into one of the areas. The factors which lie behind their selection of, or assignment to, treatment or control areas potentially are confounded with the treatment. Program and comparison areas can never be perfectly matched. The goal of the analysis, therefore, is to model the selection process in order to statistically "control" the factors which led them to one neighborhood or the other and which are related to the outcome measures.

The covariates used in this analysis (listed in Table 27) include many of the known correlates of most of the outcome measures for the evaluation. They reflect the respondent's crime experiences and physical vulnerability, the anonymity of their immediate environment, cultural and ethnic

differences in experiences with the police, and social supports. Many factors which affect fear and assessments of the police also are linked to residential choice, including income, education, race, household organization, and employment status. Most of the covariates listed here are "demographic" because it is important that they be conceptually and temporally antecedent to the program, and not be affected by it. This is especially critical in the pooled cross-sectional analysis, for half of the respondents were interviewed after the program took place. If factors were included among the covariates which could have been affected by the program (like recent experiences with the police or victimization) controlling for them would "take out" variance also associated with the treatment, and could lead to an underestimate of program effect. Note, however, that their exclusion contributes to the specification bias in the structural models of fear and assessments of the police which guided the selection of the covariates, for the examples given above are important determinants of both outcomes. This problem is rectified in the analysis of panel data, where measures of victimization and assessments of the police taken before the onset of the program can be used as covariates.

Table 27
Covariates Used in Pooled Cross-Sectional Analyses

Race-black	Origin-hispanic	High school graduate
Age in years	Elderly-over 60	Income (dichotomy)
Gender-female	Married	Length of residence
Own home	Single family home	Work full-part time
Live alone	Household size	Single family head
Poor English	Apartment complex	Number of children

There were scattered missing data for most of the covariates. These were coded at median values or mid-ranges where appropriate. There was more missing data for income (8.5 percent), and those cases were coded midway between the low and high categories. Appendix I compares two analyses, one based on "complete cases" data sets and one on those excluding missing-data cases. These analyses suggest there is no systematic bias introduced by this procedure.

In addition to identifying the structural model of the selection process, it is important to understand how its components were measured. Unlike the outcome measures, which have known estimated reliabilities, are single factored, and are well distributed, the covariates analyzed here were all measured using single indicators. However, because the interviews were conducted in-person, some covariates (such as sex, observed building type) probably are usually accurate. Others, like race, are conceptually thorny, but at least self-identified categories, and most of the remainder ("working," "married") should be fairly reliably measured by the questionnaire. Income level doubtless is the worst-measured of the covariates, but there are no reliability estimates for any of them.

Because they are intended to model the selection process and adjust for unmatched differences between the treatment and control areas, in this analysis the covariates were forced in before an assessment was made of the significance of other components of the model.

The WAVE measure controls for the main effects of wave of interview. It identifies interviews conducted before and after the onset of the program, and its inclusion should take out the simple, linear effects of

history, maturation, and other general over-time changes in both program and comparison areas. It will not account for differences in the magnitude of general temporal shifts between the two areas, however.

The TREATment measure controls for the main effects of area of residence. This is an interesting factor in the model. If the covariates (which were entered first) adequately accounted for selection differences between the two areas which are related to the outcome measures, the regression coefficient for TREAT should approximate zero ("significance" is not the best criterion in this case); there should be no independent effect of area of residence. If the selection model were less adequate, the inclusion of TREAT will serve to take out further unmodeled (or ill-measured) differences between respondents from the two areas. However, as we shall see shortly, the problem of multicollinearity makes this a less desirable solution to the problem than is modeling differential area selection.

Treatment effect is estimated in this analysis by the size and significance of the unstandardized regression coefficient associated with the INTERaction indicator. INTER identifies interviews with (a) residents of the program area conducted (b) after the onset of the program.

One problem with this analysis model is that there inevitably will be a substantial amount of multicollinearity between the WAVE, TREAT, and INTER indicators. This makes it less likely that any significant program effects will be identified. However, because they perform important analytic functions, it clearly would be incorrect to leave out either of the main effect indicators--unless the coefficient associated with area of residence

(TREAT) approximates zero because of an adequate modeling of the selection process. Unfortunately, while the coefficients for area of residence frequently were insignificant in the multivariate analyses, they sometimes were significant and rarely were zero; thus, they were included in each analysis.

Note that, after all of this, INTER will continue to be a biased estimator of program affect due to unaccounted-for treatment-by-history and treatment-by-maturation threats to validity, if present.

Panel Data Analysis

The before-and-after surveys draw relatively representative sketches of area residents at two points in time, providing an indication of community-wide effects of a program. However, the absence of a pretest forces us to rely upon covariates which were measured in the surveys to factor out non-program differences between treatment and control individuals, and important differences between residents of the program and comparison areas may not have been included or may have been badly measured.

Unlike the data described above, respondents in this set were interviewed twice, yielding pretest measures of the outcomes for the evaluation. The analysis model is:

$$\text{POSTTEST} = a + b \cdot \text{PRETEST} + b \cdot \text{TREAT} + b \cdot \text{COVARIATES}$$

Where:

POSTTEST = scale scores for an outcome measure;
a = intercept;
COVARIATES = indicators modeling differences between residents of the program and comparison areas which potentially are related to the outcome measures.
PRETEST = scale scores for a pretest measure; and
TREAT = residence in comparison (coded 0) or program (coded 1) area.

Treatment effect is estimated by the significance levels associated with the b's for TREATment area of residence. The COVARIATES (listed in Table 28) control for a number of known correlates of the outcome measures which also may be related to area of residence. The PRETEST is a very important control for unmeasured covariates, and is the primary rationale for collecting panel data. The panel design also enables us to include as covariates pre-test measures of direct victimization (total, personal, and burglary) and vicarious victimization (knowing area crime victims), factors which in the cross-sectional analysis had to be excluded because they were potentially confounded with program effects.

Table 28
Covariates Used in Panel Analyses

Race-black	Origin-hispanic	High school graduate
Age in years	Elderly-over 60	Income (dichotomy)
Gender-female	Married	Length of residence
Own home	Single family home	Work full-part time
Live alone	Household size	Single family head
Poor English	Apartment complex	Number of children
Direct victimization (total, personal, burglary)		
Vicarious victimization		

The panel data provide important measures repeated over time among the same set of respondents. They present stronger evidence of true individual-level change than is possible from the pooled cross-sectional analyses.

One technical issue, however, that of differential reliability of measurement, intrudes into the otherwise straightforward process of

conducting this form of regression analysis. Both the pre-test and post-test measures of outcomes are, of necessity, fallible indicators of the true levels of the attributes and behaviors of the survey respondents. This results in two problems. The first is that any statistical tests conducted using multiple regression analysis will probably underestimate the true relationship between the pre-test and post-test scores which are controlled for. That is, the relationship would appear to be stronger, and the analysis would be able to control for more variation in the post-test score with the pre-test scores, if the measures were better. The second problem is that if pre-test and post-test scores for an outcome are prone to different levels of error, then using the pre-test to "adjust" the post-test for "how people stood before the program began" can produce biased results.

The first problem cannot be solved; all indicators are fallible measures of theoretical concepts. To address the second problem, it is necessary, first of all, to determine if there is indeed differential reliability of measurement in the two waves of outcome measures and, second, to statistically adjust the estimates of pre-test/post-test relationships based on those reliabilities. Appendices B and C present a tabulation of the scale reliabilities for each outcome measure, for both the pre- and post-intervention surveys, for each area. The results indicate that the reliabilities of the scales were approximately the same for both pre-test and post-test measures. The reliabilities themselves, although not as high as might be desired in lengthy psychometric scales, are within the acceptable range for social psychological scales.

Another problem is that panel surveys inevitably are biased against (a) persons who move out of the area and are lost, (b) recent in-movers who could not have participated in the first wave survey, and (c) those who refuse to be reinterviewed. Losses from a panel due to various forms of attrition usually bias the data in predictable ways, in favor of more affluent, older, home-owning, long-term residents. It is often the case that such residents are more likely than others to be aware of, if not affected by, area-level programs like those evaluated here. Thus, positive panel results may be difficult to generalize to the entire population of the treatment area.

To provide information concerning the nature of panel attrition in this study, Table 29 compares the social backgrounds of all respondents in the Wave 1 survey in each area to those of the subset of respondents who could be located and reinterviewed ten months later. If those two groups differ significantly, the ability to generalize from the panel to the areas as a whole is limited by the resulting attrition bias.

Note that while some of the social attributes described in Table 29 should not change over the course of the year (e.g. sex, race), others might change considerably. That is, the respondents will become older, and could get married, find a job, and make more money even if they were successfully reinterviewed. In order not to confuse such true changes in the panel with Wave 1-Wave 2 differences due to the fact that people were only selectively relocated, both columns for each area in Table 29 are based upon the Wave 1 survey results. For example, the "reinterview" income split is based upon the results obtained during the Wave 1 survey for those respondents who were

Table 29
Wave One - Wave Two Panel Attrition

	S-1 Program Area Wave 1 Reinterviewed		S-4 Comparison Area Wave 1 Reinterviewed	
Sex				
Males	43	42	32	32
Females	57	58	68	68
	(412)	(231)	(450)	(275)
	$p < .70$		$p < .90$	
Race				
Black	98	98	98	97
White	1	1	1	1
Hispanic	1	1	1	2
Other	-	0	-	-
	(412)	(231)	(450)	(275)
	$p < .90$		$p < .80$	
Housing				
Own	43	47	36	44
Rent	57	53	64	56
	(412)	(231)	(450)	(275)
	$p < .80$		$p < .90$	
Education				
Not High School	44	45	34	34
High School Graduate	56	55	66	66
	(401)	(225)	(445)	(272)
	$p < .80$		$p < .90$	
Income				
Under \$15,000	58	55	52	47
Over \$15,000	42	45	48	53
	(326)	(183)	(390)	(242)
	$p < .50$		$p < .20$	
Age Category				
15-24	17	13	16	9
25-49	47	45	59	62
50-98	36	41	25	28
	(412)	(231)	(441)	(272)
	$p < .50$		$p < .05$	

Table 29
(continued)

Wave One - Wave Two Panel Attrition

	S-1 Program Area Wave 1 Reinterviewed		S-4 Comparison Area Wave 1 Reinterviewed	
Children at Home				
None	53	51	38	39
One +	47	49	62	61
	(412)	(231)	(450)	(295)
	p < .70		p < .90	
Number of Adults in Household				
One	32	28	36	34
Two	38	40	42	42
Three+	31	32	22	24
	(412)	(231)	(450)	(275)
	p < .70		p < .90	
Marital Status				
Single	67	63	63	58
Married	33	37	37	42
	(412)	(231)	(450)	(275)
	p < .50		p < .20	
Employment				
Work full-part time	54	53	60	63
Other	46	47	40	37
	(412)	(231)	(450)	(275)
	p < .80		p < .70	
Length of Residence				
0-2 years	26	22	35	27
3-5 years	16	15	20	21
6-9 years	12	10	12	13
10 years +	46	53	33	39
	(406)	(229)	(446)	(273)
	p < .50		p < .20	

Chi-square tests of significance

Note: Both columns for each area are based upon Wave 1 responses. See text for discussion of this procedure

Table 29
(continued)

Wave One - Wave Two Panel Attrition

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
Not Victim Before Wave 1	%	[N]	%	[N]
Reinterviewed at Wave 2	70	[119]	86	[151]
Not found at Wave 2	30	[52]	14	[24]
	<u>100%</u>	<u>[171]</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>[175]</u>
Victims at Wave 1				
Reinterviewed at Wave 2	84	[112]	80	[124]
Not found at Wave 2	16	[22]	20	[30]
	<u>100%</u>	<u>[134]</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>[154]</u>

Note: All forms of victimization

later reinterviewed, thus discounting any actual change in income which might have occurred in the intervening period.

Table 29 indicates that the only attrition effect which approached statistical significance occurred in the control area with respect to the age of those persons who were successfully reinterviewed. During the Wave 1 interviews, 16 percent of the respondents were aged 15 to 24 whereas only nine percent of those reinterviewed were in this age category. The difference in the age distributions across the two waves was significant at the .05 level. The fact that no other differences came near to being significant suggests that these results can be taken not only as representative of the particular individuals in the panel sample but also, to a large extent, of the broader populations of the program and comparison areas as well.

Regression Analysis Results

Table 30 presents the results of both the pooled cross-sectional and the panel analyses described above. The first two columns in the table report the estimated sign and size of the unstandardized regression coefficient associated with the program effect, and the significance of that effect, after controlling for all other variables. The right-most two columns present comparable results from the analysis of the panel data. Because the tables present unstandardized regression coefficients, the size of program effects estimated by the two procedures can be compared across rows.

The results indicate that the program had consistently significant results in both types of analysis only with respect to household crime

Table 30
Regression Analysis Results

Outcome Measures	Impact (and Significance) of Program	
	Cross- Sectional Analysis b (Sigf.)	Panel Analysis b (Sigf.)
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	-.06 (.22)	-.08 (.07)
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	.06 (.26)	.23 (.01)*
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	.03 (.61)	-.02 (.62)
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	.15 (.01)*	.06 (.18)
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	-.11 (.08)	-.04 (.53)
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	-.04 (.47)	-.08 (.19)
Evaluations of Police Service	.00 (.96)	.01 (.84)
Perceived Police Aggressiveness	-.06 (.02)*	-.01 (.59)
Satisfaction with Area	-.17 (.01)*	-.01 (.88)
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime	-.02 (.48)	-.00 (.89)
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	.52 (.01)*	.33 (.01)*
Total Victimization	.08 (.08)	.02 (.69)
Property Victimization	.04 (.35)	.02 (.56)
Personal Victimization	.08 (.04)*	-.02 (.70)

[N]

[1711]

[506]

Note: Controls for 18 covariates; panel analysis also controls for pretest and pre-intervention victimization. Missing data coded to medians and mid-range values.

*Significance level less than or equal to .05.

prevention measures. In both the cross-sectional and the panel analyses, respondents living in the program area took significantly more steps to protect their homes from crime than did those in the comparison area. Both effects were quite large, although that found in the cross-sectional analysis was somewhat greater.

Four other effects were significant among the cross-sectional analyses. Specifically, residents of the program area:

- o Indicated higher levels of perceived area personal crime problems;
- o Demonstrated lower levels of satisfaction with the area;
- o Perceived lower levels of police aggressiveness, and
- o Indicated higher levels of victimization by personal crime.

The analyses of the panel data revealed only one significant effect other than that pertaining to household crime prevention efforts: Residents of the program area perceived more physical deterioration problems than did those living in the comparison area.

In general, then, the program appeared to produce none of the desired effects. The only positive result was that the program, at least among the cross-sectional sample respondents, reduced perceived levels of police aggressiveness. It is also important to note that the program was associated with increased efforts to prevent household crime.

Correlational Analysis of Possible Effects of Program Exposure. Both the pooled cross-sectional analyses and the analyses of panel respondent data used the fact that a respondent resided (or worked, in the case of the non-residential survey) in the program area, as opposed to the comparison

area, as the basis for including those respondents in a category of persons assumed to have received "treatment." The empirical results of the level of program exposure demonstrate, however, that a sizeable proportion of the respondents within the program area do not recall having been exposed to one or more of the program components. As a result, both the cross-sectional and the panel analyses provide a relatively weak test of the effect of the program. One way of attempting to compensate for this weakness is to compare panel members in the program area who recall being exposed to those in the panel who do not recall such exposure. Differences between those two groups, after statistical controls are applied, would suggest a program effect on those individuals who recall being exposed to it. Such comparisons can be made by performing a regression analysis in which recalled exposure, along with the pre-test score and several other variables, is entered as a predictor. A significant coefficient attached to this recall of exposure measure could then be taken as weak evidence of program effect, showing that those who recall being exposed differed significantly from those who do not. This section reports the results of such an analysis.

One difficulty with this analysis is that it confounds measurement error with program involvement. That is, we cannot be sure that respondents' answers to questions about program exposure truly reflect their contact with the program; respondents might forget, be confused, exaggerate, etc.

One threat is that if the recall error is random it will bias coefficients measuring the effect of the program downward, tending to

increase Type II statistical error, a falsely negative conclusion concerning program effect.

A second threat is that this recall error may be related to program contact; that is, people who were involved in some way with the program may provide a true "yes" response more often, while those who were not involved might be giving affirmative or negative responses for a variety of other reasons. If this were true, it would bias the findings in confusing ways.

A third threat is that recall itself may be related to impact; that is, people who are affected by the program may be more likely to truly recall contact, while those whose lives were untouched by the program might forget such a contact more easily, even if it occurred. This would bias the evaluation in the direction of inaccurately finding a program effect, a Type I statistical error.

The second and third threats to validity seem, in our experience, to be more likely than the first. As a result, correlational program exposure analyses probably tend toward Type I error, falsely supporting the hypothesis that the program had an effect.

Despite this danger, such an analysis provides one exploratory way of determining the effect of actual contact with the program. Furthermore, by examining differences between recalled contact and unrecalled contact with the program within the program area it is possible to control for some of the differences between the program and control areas which have presented problems for the earlier analyses.

Table 31 presents the results of regression analysis in which reported program exposure of program area residents was entered as an explanatory

Table 31

Relationship Between Self-Reported Program Exposure and Outcome Measures
Controlling for Sixteen Factors Including the Pretest*
(Panel Respondents in Program Area Only)

Outcome Measure	Foot Patrol		Bus Checks		Seen or Heard of: Disorderly Conduct Enforcement		Road Checks		Clean-up	
	Effect of Recall	Sigf. of Recall	Effect of Recall	Sigf. of Recall	Effect of Recall	Sigf. of Recall	Effect of Recall	Sigf. of Recall	Effect of Recall	Sigf. of Recall
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	-	.71	+	.88	+	.14	+	.05	-	.14
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	+	.97	+	.85	-	.19	+	.27	-	.16
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	-	.01	-	.14	-	.38	-	.31	-	.81
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	-	.01	-	.79	+	.63	+	.77	-	.08
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	+	.99	+	.65	+	.42	+	.12	-	.45
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	+	.42	+	.21	+	.17	+	.06	-	.29
Personal Crime Victimization	-	.40	-	.23	+	.62	-	.25	+	.07
Property Crime Victimization	-	.83	-	.11	+	.92	+	.02	+	.26
Evaluation of Police Service	+	.09	+	.04	+	.04	+	.82	+	.32
Police Aggressiveness	-	.07	+	.95	-	.01	-	.77	-	.14
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime	-	.33	-	.60	-	.75	-	.11	+	.05
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	-	.49	-	.53	-	.58	+	.93	+	.47
Satisfaction with Area	+	.14	+	.07	+	.34	+	.91	+	.04

* Including indicators of age, race, sex, income, education, length of residence, marital status, household organization and size, renter status, building size, personal victimization, knowledge of local crime victims, and the pretest.

variable along with the same factors entered as control variables in the regression analyses discussed above. The results of these analyses are discussed below, according to the type of program contact whose potential effects are being examined. Complete results appear in Appendix J.

o Effects of Recalled Exposure to Foot Patrol. The program area panel respondents who recalled having seen or heard of foot patrol in the area expressed a fear of personal victimization that was lower, to a statistically significant degree than that expressed by other program area residents.* This finding suggests that, although less than half of the panel said they had been exposed to foot patrol, those persons who saw such activities were much more likely to have a reduced fear of personal victimization. No other statistically significant effects were indicated.

o Effects of Recalled Exposure to Bus Checks. Program area respondents in the panel sample who recalled having seen or heard about bus checks expressed evaluations of police service in the area which were higher, to a statistically significant degree, than the evaluations given by those who did not recall such program exposure. This result indicates that such operations improved the attitudes towards police of those who experienced them. No other relationship reached the .05 level of statistical significance, although the tendency for those recalling exposure to bus checks to express greater satisfaction with the area barely missed meeting that criterion.

*Given the power of the pre-test as a statistical control, a criterion of .05 was applied as a decision rule for statistical significance.

o Effects of Recalled Exposure to Disorderly Conduct Enforcement.

Program area respondents who saw or heard of police operations to remove groups of loiterers from the streets were significantly more likely to have improved their evaluation of police services in the area. Even more significant was the reduction in the perceived level of police aggressiveness in the area expressed by those respondents who had been exposed to such operations. The most plausible explanation for this finding would appear to be that residents noted that the operations were conducted within strict legal guidelines. No other statistically significant effects of program exposure were found.

o Effects of Recalled Exposure to Road Checks. The only statistically significant relationship between exposure to road checks was that it was associated with a significant increase in the social disorder problems perceived by those who saw or heard of such operations. No clear interpretation of this finding suggests itself although it is at least possible that the presence of a road check in the neighborhood could have made residents suspect that the level of disorder in the area had encouraged such police tactics.

o Effects of Recalled Exposure to Clean-Up Activities. Although the number of panel respondents who said they had seen or heard about clean-up activities in the area was quite small, there was a statistically significant relationship between such exposure and satisfaction with the neighborhood. It seems reasonable to speculate that exposure to such activity could lead those seeing it to believe that their area was being better maintained, that it was cared about and, therefore, that it was a

better place to live. If such was the case, it is unfortunate that it was not possible to have had a great deal more such activity in the area.

Exposure to the clean-up program was also associated with respondents' engaging in more defensive behaviors to avoid crime. No clear reason why such an effect would have occurred seems apparent. No other statistically significant effects were found.

Analysis of Possible Differential Impact on Subgroups. The first three types of analysis have examined the impact of the program for the area and panel samples as a whole. However, it is possible that a program like this could have a special impact upon selected subgroups of the population, while having none--or different--consequences for others in the area. For example, this type of police operation might reduce the fear of people who generally are vulnerable to victimization and fear, or have had past experiences with crime, but not other groups. These are hypotheses about "treatment-covariate interaction." Such hypotheses imply that program contact (treatment) had special impact (an interaction effect) upon subgroups defined by particular factors (covariates).

Hypotheses about such special impacts can be tested by including interaction measures in multiple regression analyses. Table 32 presents a summary of such analyses for these subgroups:

- age (the differential impact of the program upon older people)
- sex (the differential impact of the program upon females)
- victimization (the differential impact of the program upon victims, as measured by the Wave 1 survey)
- housing (the differential impact of the program upon persons living in single family homes)

Table 32

Treatment-Covariate Interaction Analysis Results
(Impact of Program Area Residence Upon Certain Panel Subgroups)

Panel Respondents Only

Wave 2 Outcome	Effect (and Significance) of Subgroup Membership					
	Aged Subgroup	Female Subgroup	Wave 1 Victim***	Single Family Home Subgroup	Effect	Sigf.
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	-	.87	+	.42	+	.12
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	-	.39	+	.16	+	.02*
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	+	.80	+	.90	+	.24
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	+	.89	-	.83	+	.01*
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	-	.15	-	.93	+	.01*
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	-	.25	+	.13	+	.31
Total Victimization**	+	.39	-	.66	-----	-----
Personal Crime Victimization**	+	.53	-	.66	-----	-----
Property Crime Victimization**	+	.26	-	.45	-----	-----
Evaluations of Police Service	-	.60	-	.87	-	.22
Police Aggressiveness	+	.59	+	.04*	-	.40
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	+	.21	+	.25	+	.26
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	-	.24	-	.48	+	.55
Satisfaction With Area	-	.64	-	.60	+	.42

Note: "N" approximately 490 for all analyses.

**p < .05 of victim-victim or nonvictim.

***Victimization cannot be an outcome measure, as it is computationally linked to the covariate.

For each subgroup, the table indicates the direction of the effect of being in that group and living in the treatment area; in addition, the statistical significance of each effect is shown. (Complete results are presented in Appendix K.) The measures of effect take into account the pre-test score for each outcome listed at the heads of the columns, residence in the program or comparison area (the measure of program exposure), and the simple linear effect of being a group member. (Coefficients associated with those factors are not presented here, both to reduce the complexity of the table, and because they have little interpretive value). People who score high on the interaction measures described here were (a) in the group, and (b) in the program area.

The results indicate three statistically significant interaction effects associated with prior victimization and four such effects associated with residence in a single family home. To provide a clearer understanding of the substantive meaning of these effects, Tables 33 and 34 present the means for these outcome measures for respondents in the program and comparison areas. The results in Table 33 indicate that the significant interaction effects with respect to prior victimization derived from the fact that the relative changes in level of perceived area physical deterioration problems, worry about property crime victimization in the area and perceived area personal crime problems noted among previous victims in the program area, relative to non-victims, were less positive than the relative changes among comparison area residents. Thus, the program was less likely to have positive program effects on previous victims than on those who had not been victimized before.

Table 33

Means for Selected Outcome Measures by Pre-Test Victimization

Panel Respondents Only

Outcome Measures	South 1 Program Area			Sigf. p <	South 4 Comparison Area			Sigf. p <
	Wave 1	Wave 2	[N]		Wave 1	Wave 2	[N]	
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems								
Non Victims	2.01	1.97	[119]	.27	1.74	1.76	[151]	.36
Victims	2.12	2.09	[112]	.35	1.86	1.66	[124]	.01
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area								
Non Victims	2.13	2.12	[119]	.46	2.13	2.35	[151]	.01
Victims	2.49	2.46	[112]	.35	2.37	2.33	[124]	.29
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems								
Non Victims	1.83	1.67	[116]	.01	1.87	1.79	[148]	.06
Victims	2.00	1.94	[111]	.16	1.96	1.70	[123]	.01

One-tailed t-test of paired differences

Table 34

Means for Selected Outcome Measures by Type of Dwelling
Panel Respondents Only

Outcome Measures	South 1 Program Area			Sigf. p <	South 4 Comparison Area			Sigf. p <
	Wave 1	Wave 2	[N]		Wave 1	Wave 2	[N]	
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area								
Other home	2.29	2.32	[175]	.35	2.21	2.28	[225]	.09
Single family home	2.33	2.19	[56]	.08	2.39	2.59	[50]	.02
Evaluation of Police Service								
Other home	2.65	2.77	[168]	.05	2.50	2.60	[222]	.07
Single family home	2.54	2.81	[53]	.02	2.52	3.09	[50]	.01
Police Aggressiveness								
Other home	1.20	1.28	[159]	.06	1.15	1.20	[204]	.11
Single family home	1.26	1.13	[51]	.02	1.07	1.21	[47]	.03
Household Crime Prevention Efforts								
Other home	.91	1.67	[175]	.01	.94	1.41	[225]	.01
Single family home	1.30	2.05	[56]	.01	2.06	1.50	[50]	.02

One-tailed t-test of paired differences

The results with respect to residents of single family homes were somewhat more complicated. Specifically, as Table 33 indicates, respondents living in single family homes in the program area indicated a decrease in worry about property crime, while residents in other types of housing reported an increased level of worry. On the other hand, though, program area respondents in single family homes indicated a more improved evaluation of police service than did those program area respondents in other dwelling types, the relative improvement was not as great as that found among residents of single family homes in the comparison area. Respondents in single family homes in the program area indicated that they thought that police aggressiveness had decreased; program area respondents in other types of dwellings--and respondents in all types of housing units in the comparison area--perceived an increase in aggressiveness. Finally, single family home residents in the program area indicated an increase in efforts to prevent household crime; in the comparison area, however, such results indicated a decrease in such efforts.

Recorded Crime Data Analysis

Figures 3 through 6 present recorded crime data, by month, in four different categories:

- Total Part I Crimes
- Burglaries
- Personal crimes
- Outside incidents

These data were subjected to interrupted time series analysis to determine if, at month 45, there was a discernible change in either the level or trend

FIGURE 3

Total Verified Crimes

PROGRAM AND COMPARISON AREAS




FIGURE 4
Total Burglary Incidents




FIGURE 5

Total Personal Crimes

PROGRAM AND COMPARISON AREAS





FIGURE 6

Total Outside Incidents



displayed in these data. The results from those analyses of program area data indicate significant reductions in the level of (1) total Part 1 crimes, (2) personal crimes and (3) crimes which occurred outside. No significant effects were found in the comparison area. Complete results are presented in Appendix L.

Summary

This evaluation examined the effects of the Newark program to reduce the "signs of crime" in several ways:

1. Recalled program awareness and contact in both the program and comparison areas were examined to determine the extent to which respondents recalled different program components. In addition, differences in awareness across population subgroups were investigated.
2. To provide an indication of the general levels and trends demonstrated by the various survey measures in both the program and comparison areas, simple comparisons between certain means, percentages and distributions at Waves 1 and 2 were examined.
3. To provide indicators of the possible program impact on residential respondents, two different types of analysis were conducted:
 - a. An analysis of pooled cross-sectional data, to supply evidence of program impact at the broad area level, and
 - b. An analysis of panel data, collected from the subset of the persons interviewed both before and after the program was implemented, to provide an indication of the program's impact on particular individuals.
4. Among members of the panel sample in the program area, comparisons of outcome measures were made between those persons who recalled being exposed to the program and those who did not.
5. To test for possible subgroup-specific program effects, the responses of members of the panel samples were subjected to treatment-covariate interaction analysis.

6. Recorded crime data were subjected to interrupted time series analysis to determine if trends or levels were affected by program implementation.

The results of each of these analysis are presented below.

Recalled Program Awareness and Contact

Among program area residents, the component with the highest level of awareness was the bus check tactic, which 42 percent of those interviewed recalled. Twenty-nine percent said they were aware of the disorderly conduct enforcement operations; 24 percent recalled seeing foot patrol; 20 percent knew about road checks. Awareness of these components among representatives of non-residential establishments was consistently higher than among residents, probably due to the fact that much of the program activity was situated in active commercial areas. Very few persons said that they themselves had been stopped by the police in the area, either while walking or driving. Only about ten percent said they were aware of any local clean-up efforts.

Descriptive Data Analysis

Few sizable differences in mean scores were found across the program and comparison areas at Wave 1. Similarly, few notable differences in changes between the two waves were detected.

Survey Indicators of Program Impact

Two different types of analysis were conducted to measure possible program impact:

- o A pooled cross-section analysis was performed on the complete set of data obtained during both waves of surveys in both the program and comparison areas; and
- o A separate panel analysis was conducted on the data obtained from households where interviews were conducted both before and ten months after the program started.

The results indicate that the program had consistently significant results in both types of analysis only with respect to the installation of household crime prevention measures. In both the cross-sectional and the panel analyses, respondents living in the program area took significantly more steps to protect their homes from crime than did those in the comparison area. Both effects were quite large, although that found in the cross-sectional analysis was somewhat greater.

Four other effects were significant only among the cross-sectional analyses. Specifically, residents of the program area:

- o Indicated higher levels of perceived area personal crime problems;
- o Demonstrated lower levels of satisfaction with the area;
- o Perceived lower levels of police aggressiveness, and
- o Indicated higher levels of victimization by personal crime.

The analyses of the panel data revealed only one significant effect other than that pertaining to household crime prevention efforts: Residents of the program area perceived more physical deterioration problems than did those living in the comparison area.

In general, then, the program appeared to produce none of the desired effects. The only positive result was that the program, at least among the cross-sectional sample respondents, reduced perceived levels of police aggressiveness. It is also important to note that the program was associated with increased efforts to prevent household crime.

Recalled Program Exposure Effects

- o The program area panel respondents who recalled having seen or heard of foot patrol in the area expressed a fear of personal victimization that was lower, to a statistically significant degree than that expressed by other program area residents.
- o Program area panel respondents who recalled having seen or heard about bus checks expressed evaluations of police service in the area which were higher, to a statistically significant degree, than the evaluations given by those who did not recall such program exposure.
- o Program area panel respondents who saw or heard of police operations to remove groups of loiterers from the streets were significantly more likely to have improved their evaluation of police services in the area. In addition, they indicated a significant reduction in the level of police aggressiveness they perceived in the area.
- o The only statistically significant relationship between exposure to road checks was that it was associated with a significant increase in the social disorder problems perceived by those who saw or heard of such operations.
- o Those who recalled local clean-up activities were more likely to express satisfaction with the neighborhood. Recalled exposure to the clean-up program was also associated with respondents' engaging in more defensive behaviors to avoid crime.

Analysis of Subgroup-Specific Effects

The relative changes in level of perceived area physical deterioration problems, worry about property crime victimization in the area and perceived area personal crime problems noted among previous victims in the program area, relative to non-victims, were less positive than the relative changes among comparison area residents. Thus, the program was less likely to have positive program effects on previous victims than on those who had not been victimized before.

The results with respect to residents of single family homes were somewhat more complicated. Specifically, respondents living in single family homes in the program area indicated a decrease in worry about property crime, while residents in other types of housing reported an increased level of worry. On the other hand, program area respondents in single family homes indicated a more improved evaluation of police service than did those program area respondents in other dwelling types, the relative improvement was not as great as that found among residents of single family homes in the comparison area. Respondents in single family homes in the program area indicated that they thought that police aggressiveness had decreased; program area respondents in other types of dwellings--and respondents in all types of housing units in the comparison area--perceived an increase in aggressiveness. Finally, single family home residents in the program area indicated an increase in efforts to prevent household crime; in the comparison area, however, such results indicated a decrease in such efforts.

Recorded Crime Analysis

Interrupted time series analyses of recorded crime data from the program area indicate significant reductions in the level of (1) Part 1 crimes, (2) personal crimes and (3) crimes which occurred outside. No significant effects were found in the comparison area.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Introduction

Recent research, much of it funded by the National Institute of Justice, has revealed that fear of crime has become a major problem in our society. Other research has revealed that this fear often derives from concern about various "signs of crime," as well as from direct or indirect experience with crime. For example, neighborhoods which suffer from such physical and social disorder as vandalism, loitering and public drinking or gambling convey the feeling of having been abandoned. As a results, law-abiding residents and merchants begin to flee. Houses and shops become vacant, making them vulnerable to more vandalism and social disorder. Those who choose to remain--or are unable to leave--look upon the streets with detachment, responding to the apparent lack of concern revealed by the neglect and disorder around them. An insidious cycle leads from fear of crime to even more fear.

This has been known for some time--but little has been done about it. In 1982, however, N.I.J. decided to fund well-evaluated experiments in Houston and Newark to determine the most effective ways that police, working with citizens, can dismantle the cycle of fear. Through a competitive bidding process, the Police Foundation was awarded a grant to plan and conduct the evaluations of those experiments.

In each city, task forces were assembled to determine the most appropriate programs to be tested, given the local circumstances. In both cities, the programs agreed upon included door-to-door police visits, as

well as police community offices and newsletters. In Houston, the effectiveness of community organizing by police officers and a program to recontact victims were also tested. In Newark, a program to reduce the social and physical "signs of crime" was implemented; in addition, the police, working with other agencies, were to develop recreational alternatives to street corner loitering and to clean up deteriorated areas and buildings.

All of these strategies were to be implemented by the police department and evaluated by the Police Foundation using the best research designs possible.

Reducing the "Signs of Crime"

Prior research has repeatedly demonstrated the link between social and physical disorder, fear of crime, crime and neighborhood deterioration. The role that police might be able to assume in disentangling this link has received only tentative support however. The Newark Fear Reduction Task Force, therefore, decided to try to reduce the "signs of crime" which are associated with the fear of crime. By doing so, the Task Force sought to accomplish the following goals:

- o Reduce perceptions of area social and physical problems
- o Reduce fear of area personal and property crime victimization
- o Reduce perceptions of area crime problems
- o Reduce victimization by crime
- o Reduce unnecessary defensive behaviors to avoid personal crime and perhaps, affect the installation of household crime prevention devices
- o Improve the evaluation of police services, while avoiding increasing the impression that the police are overly aggressive
- o Improve satisfaction with the area

This evaluation was designed, therefore, to document the ways and extent to which the Newark program to reduce the "signs of crime" was implemented and what effects that program achieved those goals.

The Newark Program

The Newark effort to reduce the "signs of crime" was composed of two principal parts, each with multiple components. The first part, aimed at the reduction of social disorder, consisted of the intensification of law enforcement and order maintenance by police personnel assigned to a 24-officer task force specifically created for this purpose. During the ten-month period of the program, from september 1983 through June 1984, these officers utilized the following tactics:

- o Foot patrol,
- o Radar checks,
- o Bus checks,
- o Enforcement of disorderly conduct laws, and
- o Road checks.

Over 2500 officer hours were spent in the program area, about 70 percent of which were utilized for foot patrol in both the residential and commercial areas of the neighborhood. In addition, about 15 percent of their time was spent conducting radar checks, about 7.5 percent spent on bus checks, 4 percent on the enforcement of disorderly behavior laws and 3 percent conducting road checks.

The second part of the program, the attempt to clean up physically unsightly locations, managed to complete such efforts in 16 of the 20 locations determined to require it.

Evaluation Design and Methodology

The fundamental evaluation design was based upon the comparison of attitudinal measures collected before and ten months after the introduction of the program. These measures were obtained by conducting interviews with random samples of residents and representatives of non-residential establishments in both a program area and in a comparison area in which no new fear reduction activities were undertaken. In addition, monthly recorded crime data were collected for both areas forty-four months prior to, and 13 months during, the implementation of the program.

To facilitate this design, two areas were carefully selected to be as similar as possible. In one neighborhood, the program area, intensive efforts to reduce the social and physical indicators of disorder were implemented. The other neighborhood was maintained as the control area, in which no programs to reduce the fear of crime were implemented.

Interviews were conducted at randomly chosen addresses in these two areas before and ten months after program implementation began. The procedures produced response rates ranging from 76 to 82 percent. Attempts to conduct interviews with a subset of households both before and after the program began produced panel response rates of approximately 61 and 64 percent, in the program and comparison areas respectively. Interviews were also conducted with owners, managers or employees of non-residential establishments. The response rates were consistently higher than 86 percent.

Survey questionnaires were designed to collect information about each of the following:

- Recalled Program Exposure
- Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems
- Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems
- Fear of Personal Victimization in Area
- Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area
- Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems
- Perceived Area Property Crime Problems
- Victimization
- Evaluations of Police Service and Aggressiveness
- Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime
- Household Crime Prevention Efforts
- Satisfaction with Area

Recorded crime data for Part 1 crimes were also collected, by month, for both areas from January 1980 through September 1984.

Analysis and Results

This evaluation examined the effects of the Newark program to reduce the "signs of crime" in several ways:

1. Recalled program awareness and contact in both the program and comparison areas were examined to determine the extent to which respondents recalled different program components. In addition, differences in awareness across population subgroups were investigated.
2. To provide an indication of the general levels and changes demonstrated by the various survey measures in both the program and comparison areas, simple comparisons between certain means, percentages and distributions at Waves 1 and 2 were examined.
3. To provide indicators of the possible program impact on residential respondents, two different types of analysis were conducted:
 - a. An analysis of pooled cross-sectional data, to supply evidence of program impact at the broad area level, and
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Descriptive Data Analysis

Few sizable differences in mean scores were found across the program and comparison areas at Wave 1. Similarly, few notable differences in trends between the two waves were detected.

Survey Indicators of Program Impact

Two different types of analysis were conducted to measure possible program impact:

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The results indicate that the program had consistently significant results in both types of analysis only with respect to the installation of household crime prevention measures. In both the cross-sectional and the panel analyses, respondents living in the program area took significantly more steps to protect their homes from crime than did those in the comparison area. Both effects were quite large, although that found in the cross-sectional analysis was somewhat greater.

Four other effects were significant among the cross-sectional analyses. Specifically, residents of the program area:

- o Indicated higher levels of perceived area personal crime problems;
- o Demonstrated lower levels of satisfaction with the area;
- o Perceived lower levels of police aggressiveness, and
- o Indicated higher levels of victimization by personal crime.

The analyses of the panel data revealed only one significant effect other than that pertaining to household crime prevention efforts: Residents of the program area perceived more physical deterioration problems than did those living in the comparison area.

In general, then, the program appeared to produce none of the desired effects. The only positive result was that the program, at least among the cross-sectional sample respondents, reduced perceived levels of police aggressiveness. It is also important to note that the program was associated with increased efforts to prevent household crime.

Recalled Program Exposure Effects

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- o Program area panel respondents who recalled having seen or heard about bus checks expressed evaluations of police service in the area which were higher, to a statistically significant degree, than the evaluations given by those who did not recall such program exposure.
- o Program area panel respondents who saw or heard of police operations to remove groups of loiterers from the streets were significantly more likely to have improved their evaluation of police services in the area. In addition, they indicated a significant reduction in the level of police aggressiveness they perceived in the area.
- o The only statistically significant relationship between exposure to road checks was that it was associated with a significant increase in the social disorder problems perceived by those who saw or heard of such operations.
- o Those who recalled local clean-up activities were more likely to express satisfaction with the neighborhood. Recalled exposure to the clean-up program was also associated with respondents' engaging in more defensive behaviors to avoid crime.

Analysis of Subgroup-Specific Effects

The relative changes in level of perceived area physical deterioration problems, worry about property crime victimization in the area and perceived area personal crime problems noted among previous victims in the program

area, relative to non-victims, were less positive than the relative changes among comparison area residents. Thus, the program was less likely to have positive program effects on previous victims than on those who had not been victimized before.

The results with respect to residents of single family homes were somewhat more complicated. Specifically, respondents living in single family homes in the program area indicated a decrease in worry about property crime, while residents in other types of housing reported an increased level of worry. On the other hand, program area respondents in single family homes indicated a more improved evaluation of police service than did those program area respondents in other dwelling types, the relative improvement was not as great as that found among residents of single family homes in the comparison area. Respondents in single family homes in the program area indicated that they thought that police aggressiveness had decreased; program area respondents in other types of dwellings--and respondents in all types of housing units in the comparison area--perceived an increase in aggressiveness. Finally, single family home residents in the program area indicated an increase in efforts to prevent household crime; in the comparison area, however, such results indicated a decrease in such efforts.

Recorded Crime Analysis

Results from interrupted series time series analysis indicate significant reductions in the program area in the level of (1) total Part 1 crimes, (2) personal crimes and (3) crimes which occurred outside. No significant effects were found in the comparison area.

Discussion

The Newark effort to reduce the fear of crime by reducing the "Signs of Crime," although successfully implemented as planned for ten months, generally was unsuccessful in achieving the outcomes hypothesized by Kobrin/Schuerman and Wilson/Kelling. There could be at least four possible explanations for the failure to find the expected results:

1. The measurement of program effects might have been inadequate.
2. The program might not have operationalized the theory appropriately.
3. The strength or length of implementation could have been too limited to allow for effects to have been achieved.
4. The theory itself could be wrong.

It is necessary to consider each of these possible explanations in order to put these findings in perspective.

Measurement of program effects could have affected the results in several ways: the size of the samples selected could have been too small to show significant effects, the sampling procedures could have provided biased results, or the measurement and analysis procedures could have been invalid. In all cases, these potential problems appear incapable of explaining the failure to support the theory. With regard to sample size, the samples selected, although constrained by a finite budget, were chosen in order to be more than adequate to be representative of the populations under study and to allow for proper analytical techniques to be applied. Furthermore, although this study, as any other, would have benefited from larger sample sizes, the trends demonstrated by these data were not consistent enough to have supported the theory which prompted it, no matter how large the samples

might have been. The sampling procedures were based on accepted sampling principles and were carried out with considerable, documented, success. Sophisticated measurement and analysis techniques were utilized in order to maximize the reliability and validity of the results.

The second possible explanation, that the program might not have operationalized the theory appropriately, also does not appear persuasive, since both the Kobrin/Schuerman and the Wilson/Kelling prescriptions place heavy emphasis on the importance of foot patrol, the primary component of the Newark program. In addition, the Wilson/Kelling argument specifically called for the maintenance of standards on public transportation, the goal of the bus check component. All other components were similarly designed to maintain order.

Another aspect of the operationalization of the theory--the nature of the area in which it was tested--may have affected the effectiveness of the strategies applied. Both the Kobrin/Schuerman and the Wilson/Kelling formulations emphasize that reclamation efforts are extremely difficult, if not impossible, in areas which have deteriorated beyond a "tipping point." The location of such a hypothetical "point" is plagued with difficulties, but the levels of fear and victimization in the experimental area would not appear to be great enough to have put it beyond recovery. Another possible effect of the nature of the area--that police activity may be able to reduce fear only in areas with high levels of perceived risk--has also been suggested (Baumer, 1983). Based on this interpretation, the fear reduction efforts may not have succeeded because the experimental area residents were not fearful enough to begin with. Again, the data concerning fear and victimization in the area would not appear to support such an analysis.

The third possible explanation for the failure to find the expected results was the brevity or weakness of program implementation. This appears to be more plausible. It is not unlikely that, had the program been continued for a full year, as had originally been planned, instead of only for ten months, as was required to meet the evaluation schedule, a greater level of awareness could have been achieved. However, the fact that, even after ten months, awareness was quite low suggests that additional time would have made little difference--and points to the relatively weak "dosage level" of this program as an experimental treatment.

An insight into the relative strength of the program is provided by comparing this program, over 70 percent of which consisted of foot patrol, to the previous foot patrol study conducted in Newark five years earlier. In that earlier study, in which foot patrol was more widely perceived, significant reductions in the fear of crime were achieved. A key question, then, is why foot patrol succeeded in that case but not in this one.*

The most persuasive answer to that question is that the extent and nature of the foot patrol implemented in the earlier study were radically different from that effected here. In the earlier study, two officers patrolled six nights a week from the hours of 4 p.m. to midnight, resulting in an average of 392.5 officer hours in each program area per month. In this study, five to eight pairs of officers walked, at irregular hours, on a few nights per month, resulting in an average of 176 officer hours expended per month.

*Other studies (Trojanowicz, et al., 1982; Spickenheuer, 1983) have suggested that foot patrol may have positive effects. Unfortunately, however, these efforts were either combined with other program activities, were evaluated in problematic fashion, or both, thus making the inferences from those studies questionable.

The two studies also differed in terms of the nature of the foot patrol strategies. In the first study, such patrol was conducted only along commercial strips in predictable and intensive fashion. In this study, foot patrol, although it was implemented primarily in commercial areas, also occurred on residential streets. Such patrols, however, occurred at unpredictable intervals, based on the principle that potential criminals and troublemakers should not know in advance when police would be present. While this may be appropriate to deter or apprehend criminals, a different, more consistent, pattern of activity may be more effective in producing general reassurance of citizens.

Finally, it is clearly premature to pronounce judgment on the validity of the theory underlying the Newark effort to reduce the "signs of crime." The results concerning bus checks, enforcement of disorderly conduct laws, road checks and physical clean-up activities were based on relatively meagre program efforts and showed no consistent results. It is quite plausible that each of these types of programs, if more strenuously implemented, could have different effects. Much more extensive research would be necessary, however, to discover those differences.

The results concerning foot patrol, based on these findings and those generated in the earlier Newark study, suggest that such activity, to be effective, should be implemented on an intensive, continuous and predictable basis, rather than sporadically and at random, and in places, and at times, where it is most likely to be seen by the general public. This is supported by the fact that those persons who recall having seen foot patrol officers in their area expressed a lower level of fear of victimization as a result.

Similarly, those who were personally exposed to most other program components also experienced some positive effect. Unfortunately, too few people were exposed to the program for these effects to have become widespread.

More generally, then, these results suggest that fear reduction techniques, as opposed to "crime attack" techniques which focus on deterring or apprehending criminals, should focus on the broader community, providing frequent, enduring assurances that positive steps are being taken to maintain order.

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**REDUCING THE “SIGNS OF
CRIME”:
THE NEWARK EXPERIENCE**

APPENDICES



SIGNS OF CRIME

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:	THE FEAR REDUCTION PROGRAM
APPENDIX B:	SCALING THE RESIDENTIAL SURVEY DATA
APPENDIX C:	SCALING THE NON-RESIDENTIAL SURVEY DATA
APPENDIX D:	CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS IN PROGRAM AND COMPARISON AREAS AT WAVE ONE AND TWO
APPENDIX E:	DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS: RESIDENTIAL SAMPLES
APPENDIX F:	DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS: RESIDENTIAL PANEL SAMPLES
APPENDIX G:	TYPES OF ESTABLISHMENTS AT WHICH INTERVIEWS WERE COMPLETED AT WAVE ONE AND TWO
APPENDIX H:	DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS: NON-RESIDENTIAL SAMPLES
APPENDIX I:	A COMPARISON OF INCLUDING ALL CASES VERSUS EXCLUDING MISSING VALUE CASES
APPENDIX J:	RECALLED PROGRAM EXPOSURE EFFECT RESULTS
APPENDIX K:	TREATMENT-COVARIATE INTERACTION ANALYSIS RESULTS
APPENDIX L:	INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS

APPENDIX A
THE FEAR REDUCTION PROGRAM

THE FEAR REDUCTION PROGRAM

The program described in this report was one of several strategies tested as part of a Fear Reduction Program which was carried out in Houston, Texas, and Newark, New Jersey, in 1983 and 1984. The police departments in these two cities were invited to design and implement strategies to reduce fear of crime. The Police Foundation with funding provided by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) provided technical assistance to the departments during the planning phase of the program and conducted rigorous evaluations of the strategies which were developed. NIJ also supported a dissemination program, in which the National Conference of Mayors, the Police Executive Research Forum, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, and the National Sheriffs' Association sent representatives to observe the strategies in action and report on them to their members. The questions they asked and the written observations they shared with the Houston and Newark departments provided constructive criticism of the program implementation process.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

The overall goal of the program was to find new ways to help citizens gain a realistic picture of the crime problems facing their neighborhoods, reduce excessive fear of crime, encourage greater positive police-citizen cooperation in crime prevention, spark increased awareness among people of the steps which they could take to reduce crime, and help restore their confidence in the police and faith in the future of their communities.

In each city a number of different strategies were developed which addressed these issues. Previous research has found crime to be only one of the causes of fear and declining community morale, so those strategies addressed a broad spectrum of issues. Some focused upon reducing physical disorder, including trash and litter, abandoned buildings, graffiti, and deterioration. Others targeted social disorder, including loitering, harassment, disorderly street behavior, and violations of rules of conduct on mass transit. A number were designed to increase the two-way flow of information between citizens and the police. From the police side this included developing new mechanisms to gather information about community problems often of a seemingly "nonpolice" nature, assisting citizens in organizing to address such problems, and testing new mechanisms to "spread the word" about community programs and the things that individual citizens could do to prevent crime.

SITE SELECTION

Houston and Newark were selected as examples of two different types of American cities. Houston is a relatively young city, with low population density and a developing municipal infrastructure, while Newark is a mature city with high population density and no significant growth. Because they are so different, some of the strategies they developed for the Fear Reduction Project were unique, but most addressed the same underlying problems and many were surprisingly similar. The two cities were also selected because of the capacity of their police departments to design and manage a complex experimental program.

Within each city, "matched" neighborhoods were selected to serve as testing grounds for the strategies. Because Newark has a predominantly black population, five physically similar areas with a homogeneous racial composition were selected. The heterogeneous nature of Houston called for the selection of neighborhoods with a population mix more closely resembling that of the city as a whole. In both cities the selected areas were approximately one square mile in size, and physically separated from each other. Site selection was guided by the 1980 Census, observations of numerous potential sites, and extensive discussions with police crime analysts and district commanders in the cities.

THE TASK FORCE PLANNING PROCESS

In both cities, the program planning process had to design programs which met two constraints: they could be carried out within a one-year time limit imposed by the National Institute of Justice, and they could be supported entirely by the departments--there was no special funding available for these projects.

The planning processes themselves took different forms in the two cities. In Houston, one patrol officer from each of the four participating police districts was assigned full time for two months to a planning Task Force, which was headed by a sergeant from the Planning and Research Division. A civilian member of the Planning and Research Division also served on the Task Force. During the planning period the group met regularly with staff members of the Police Foundation to discuss past research related to the project. They also read studies of the fear of crime, and visited other cities to examine projects which appeared relevant

to fear reduction. By April, 1983, the group had formulated a set of strategies which they believed could be implemented effectively in Houston and had the potential to reduce citizen fear.

Then, during April and May the plan was reviewed and approved by Houston's Chief of Police, the department's Director of Planning and Research, by a panel of consultants assembled by the Police Foundation, and by the Director of the National Institute of Justice.

In Newark, the Task Force included several members of the police department as well as representatives of the Mayor's office, the Board of Education, the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts, the Essex County Courts, the Newark Municipal Courts, the Essex County Probation Department and the Graduate School of Criminal Justice of Rutgers University. The group met once or twice a week for a month to discuss the general problems of fear, then broke into several committees to consider specific program possibilities. In April, 1983 the committees submitted lists of proposed programs to the entire task force for approval. These programs were reviewed by the panel of consultants, assembled by the Police Foundation and by the Director of the National Institute of Justice.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY THE POLICE FOUNDATION

The Police Foundation provided the departments with technical assistance throughout the planning stages of the Fear Reduction Project. Its staff assisted the departments in locating potentially relevant projects operating in other cities, accumulated research on fear and its causes, arranged for members of the Task Forces to visit other departments, and identified consultants who assisted the departments in program planning and implementation. This activity was supported by the National Institute of Justice.

STRATEGIES DEVELOPED BY THE TASK FORCE

In Houston, strategies were developed to foster a sense that Houston police officers were available to the public and cared about individual and neighborhood problems. Some of the strategies also were intended to encourage citizen involvement with the police and to increase participation in community affairs. The strategies included community organizing, door-to-door police visits, a police- community newsletter, recontacts with crime victims, and a police-community storefront office.

The Newark strategies were directed at the exchange of information and the reduction of social and physical disorder. The police strategies included door-to-door visits, newsletters, police-community storefronts, and the intensified enforcement and order maintenance. In association with the Board of Education, recreational alternatives to street-corner loitering were to be provided. With the cooperation of the courts system, juveniles were to be given community work sentences to clean up deteriorated areas; with the assistance of the municipal government, abandoned or deteriorated buildings were to be demolished and delivery of city services intensified.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGIES

Responsibility for implementing the strategies in Houston was given to the planning Task Force, which then consisted of a sergeant, four patrol officers, and a civilian member of the department. Each of the patrol officers was directly responsible for the execution of one of the

strategies. They were joined by three additional officers; two from the Community Services Division were assigned to work on the community organizing strategy, and another was assigned to work on the door-to-door contact effort. During the implementation period, two more officers were assigned to the victim recontact program and another to the community organizing strategy.

During the nine-to-twelve month period that the strategies were operational, the original Task Force members assumed total responsibility for implementation. They conducted much of the operational work themselves and coordinated the few other officers from each patrol district who were involved in program implementation. When implementation problems required swift and unique solutions (a condition common during the start up period), the Task Force officers worked directly with the district captains and/or with the sergeant from Planning and Research who headed the Task Force. This sergeant would, in turn, take direct action or work with the Director of Planning and Research or with one of the Deputy Chiefs over the patrol districts and/or with the Assistant Chief in charge of Operations. The amount of responsibility placed on the task force members had some of the disadvantages which can exist when the traditional chain of command is circumvented, but it had the advantage that Task Force members felt ownership of, and pride in, the program they had designed.

In Newark, responsibility for implementing each program component was assigned to one or more officers, who in turn were monitored by the program coordinator and his assistant. Those officers working in particular patrol divisions--those in the community police center and those making door-to-

door contacts--reported formally to the division Captain and informally to the program coordinator, who, at the beginning of the program was still a Lieutenant. This somewhat ambiguous reporting structure created some delays, lack of coordination and misunderstanding during the early months of program implementation; these problems were largely overcome with the cooperative efforts of the parties involved. Officers who implemented the other programs reported directly to the program coordinator, a system which worked effectively throughout the program.

THE OVERALL EVALUATION DESIGN

All of the strategies tested in Houston and Newark were to be evaluated as rigorously as possible. Two of them--the victim recontact program in Houston and police-community newsletters in both cities--were evaluated using true experiments, in which randomly selected groups of citizens were either contacted by the program or assigned to a noncontacted control group. The other strategies, including the one reported here, were area-wide in focus, and were evaluated using pre- and post-program area surveys. Surveys were also conducted in a comparison area, in which no new programs were implemented, in each city.

APPENDIX B

SCALING THE RESIDENTIAL SURVEY DATA

SCALING THE RESIDENTIAL SURVEY DATA

This report describes how analytic scales were developed for the Fear Reduction Project Evaluation's panel sample surveys. These scales measure the central outcomes of interest in this project: perceptions and fear of crime, evaluations of the quality of police service, assessments of neighborhood problems, residential satisfaction, and crime related behaviors. Each measure is a composite of responses to two or more items which were included in the surveys to tap those dimensions. Such multiple-item scales yield more reliable, general, stable measurements of peoples attitudes and experiences than do responses to single survey questions.

CRITERIA

In each case the goal was to arrive at scales with the following properties:

1. Responses to each item should be consistent (all positively correlated). This was established by examining their intercorrelations, after some items were rescaled for directionality of scoring. A summary measure of the overall consistency of responses to a set of items is Cronbach's Alpha, which is an estimate of their joint reliability in producing a scale score for an individual.
2. Item responses should be homogeneous, or single-factored (indicating they all measure "the same thing"). This was established by a principle components factor analysis of the items hypothesized to represent a single dimension. The items were judged homogeneous when

they all loaded only on the first factor (their "principle component").

3. The items should share a substantial proportion of their variance with the hypothesized underlying dimension (perhaps precluding them from being significantly responsive to other conditions or events). This was demonstrated in two ways. Good items were those which evidenced a high correlation with others in the set. This was measured by their item-to-total correlation ("corrected" by excluding them from that particular total). Items were judged useful when, in a principal components factor analysis, the factor on which they fell accounted for a high proportion of their total variance (they had a high "communality").
4. The items on their face should seem related to a problem which is an object of one or more of the demonstration programs (suggesting they could be responsive to those interventions). Things which "scale together" based upon their naturally occurring covariation are not necessarily all useful, if they all should not be affected by the program of interest. The substantive utility of individual items cannot be statistically demonstrated; it is, rather, an argument.

The statistical analyses described above were done using SPSS-X. That system's RELIABILITY procedure generated inter-item correlations, calculated item-to-total correlations, and estimated a reliability coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha) for each set of item responses. FACTOR was used to extract the principal component from sets of items hypothesized to be unidimensional.

The scales were first developed using a random subset of the large Wave 1 survey data set. Then, all conclusions were confirmed and the scaling information presented below was calculated using the entire sample. The final scaling procedures then were duplicated separately for a number of subgroups, to examine whether or not things "went together" in the same fashion among those respondents. The scales were developed using unweighted data.

FEAR OF PERSONAL CRIME

Eight items were included in the survey to represent this general construct. Analysis of the first wave of the data indicated one should be dropped, and that the remaining set was two-factored.

The original items asked about the extent to which stranger assault, rape, and robbery were problems in the area, how worried the respondents were about being robbed, attacked, or being at home when someone broke in ("home invasion"), how safe they felt out alone in the area at night, and if there was a place nearby where they were afraid to walk.

An examination of correlations among these items indicated that worry about home invasion was only moderately correlated with the others, and excluding it from the group would improve the reliability of the resulting scale.

Excluding this item but using all of the others would yield an additive scale with a reliability of .78. However, a factor analysis of the remaining set suggested they were not unidimensional. Rather, three items asking about "how big a problem" specific personal crimes were in the area tapped a different dimension than those asking people how afraid they were and how worried they were about personally being victimized by the same types of crime. These

respondents seem to distinguish between personal risks and their general assessments of area problems. The two clusters of items loaded very distinctly on their unique factors, with high loadings.

Based upon this analysis, the following items were combined to form the "Fear of Personal Victimization in Area" measure:

Q34: How safe would you feel being outside alone in this area at night? (very safe to very unsafe)¹

Q35: Is there any place in this areas where you would be afraid to go alone either during the day or at night? (yes or no).

Q43: [How worried are you that] someone will try to rob you or steal something from you while you are outside in this area? (very worried to not worried at all)

Q44: [How worried are you that] someone will try to attack you or beat you up while you are outside in this area? (very worried to not worried at all)

These items were added together to form a scale with a reliability of .72. The average item-total correlation of its components was .54, and the first factor explained 56 percent of the total variation in response to the items. Responses to Q35 were dichotomous, and as a result the item had only about two-thirds of the variance of Q43 and Q44, and one-half that of Q34. If such disparities are extreme, the items making up a simple additive scale will have a differential impact upon its apparent content. However, in this case there was no meaningful difference between the simple additive alpha and the alpha for a standardized scale score which equated the variances of its component parts. As a result, a simple additive scale score will be employed. A high score on this scale indicates respondents are fearful.

1. A few people who responded to Q34 that they "never go out" were rescored as "very unsafe" (see below).

The remaining items were combined to form the "Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems" scale:

[...please tell me whether you think it is a big problem, some problem, or no problem here in this area?]

Q114: People being attacked or beaten up by strangers?

Q117: People being robbed or having their money, purses or wallets taken?

Q121: Rape or other sexual assaults?

Because responses to these items all were measured on the same three-position set of response categories, the scale scores were generated by simply adding them together. As they had about the same mean and standard deviation (the rape question was somewhat lower on both), the items all contribute about equally to the total score for each individual. The factor lying behind these items accounted for 65 percent of their total variance. The reliability of the scale is .73. A high score on this issue indicates that these personal crimes were seen as "big problems in the area."

WORRY AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT PROPERTY CRIME VICTIMIZATION IN AREA

There were five candidate items in this cluster. Three asked "how big a problem" burglary, auto theft, and auto vandalism were in the area, and two "how worried" respondents were about being victimized by burglary and auto theft or vandalism. Other research on concern about victimization or assessments of risk (see Baumer and Rosenbaum, 1981) indicates the distinction between personal and property crimes is a fundamental one, and that perceptions of the two are best gauged separately. (Auto vandalism was experimentally included among a set

of "disorder" items which included other vandalism activities, but empirically it belongs in this cluster of more serious crimes; (see below).

Although all five items clustered together, the following items were combined to form the "Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area" scales:

Q45: [How worried are you that] someone will try to break into your home while no one is there? (Not worried at all to very worried)

Q47: [How worried are you that] someone will try to steal or damage your car in this area? (Not worried at all to very worried)

These two items were combined to form a scale. They were intercorrelated .43 and formed an additive scale with an Alpha of .60. Because the items employed similar three-category responses and they had about the same means and standard deviations, they were scaled by adding them together. A high score on this scale identifies respondents who are very worried about property crime.

The remaining three items were combined to form another scale, "Perceived Area Property Crime Problems" which, although highly correlated with the previously discussed "Worry about Property Crime" scale, omits, for theoretical reasons, all emotive references such as "worry" or "fear." The average correlation among these items is .53; the Alpha was .77. The items were:

[...please tell me whether you think is a big problem, some problem, or no problem here in this area.]

Q68: People breaking in or sneaking into homes to steal things?

Q70: Cars being vandalized--things like windows or radio aeriels being broken?

Q71: Cars being stolen?

PERCEIVED AREA SOCIAL DISORDER PROBLEMS

This is a concept introduced by Hunter (1978) (as "incivility"), and elaborated by Lewis and Salem (1981) and Skogan and Maxfield (1981). Many of its measures were first developed by Fowler and Mangione (1974). It has great currency in the research literature on the fear of crime. Recently, Wilson and Kelling (1982) have expanded its theoretical significance by linking disorders explicitly to the generation of other serious crimes, and lent it some controversy by recommending that disorders become the direct object of aggressive, neighborhood-based policing. The level of disorder has been shown to have direct consequences for aggregate levels of fear, community cohesion, and residential stability, in urban residential neighborhoods and public housing projects (Skogan, 1983).

Seven candidate items were analyzed as part of the scale development process. They all focused upon deviant behaviors of varying illegality and seriousness, most of which take place in public locations. They were:

[...please tell me whether you think it is a big problem, some problem, or no problem at all.]

- Q18: Groups of people hanging around on corners or in streets.
- Q20: People saying insulting things or bothering people as they walk down the street?
- Q24: People drinking in public places like on corners or in streets?
- Q66: People breaking windows of buildings?
- Q67: Graffiti, that is writing or painting on walls or windows?
- Q113: Gangs?
- Q120: Sale or use of drugs in public places?

Responses to these eight items were all positively intercorrelated (mean $r=.40$), and they had roughly similar means and variances. A scale "Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems," was formed by adding together responses to them. The principal component factor for these items explained 48 percent of their total variance. This scale has a reliability of .85. A high score on this scale points to areas in which these are seen as "big problems."

An additional six items included in the survey could have been included in a disorder scale. They were:

Q23: Truancy, that is, kids not being in school when they should be?

Q72: The wrong kind of people moving into the neighborhood?

Q119: Pornographic movie theaters or bookshops, massage parlors, topless bars?

Q116: Prostitutes?

Q19: Beggars or panhandlers?

Q115: Children being bothered on their way to and from school?

Responses to these items were consistent with the others, but were excluded from the scale because they probed problems which were not explicit foci of any program.

SATISFACTION WITH AREA

Satisfaction with the area was probed by two questions:

Q5: In general, since July of 1982, would you say this area has become a better place to live, gotten worse, or stayed about the same? (better, worse, or about the same)

Q14: On the whole, how do you feel about this area as a place to live? Are you... (very satisfied to very dissatisfied?)

Responses to these two questions were correlated .36, and had similar variances. Added together they formed a scale, "Satisfaction with Area," with a reliability of .50, good for a two-item measure. A high score on this scale identifies respondents who think their area is a good place to live, and has been getting better.

EVALUATIONS OF POLICE SERVICE AND AGGRESSIVENESS

A number of questions in the survey elicited evaluations of police service. Some items focused upon recent, specific police-citizen encounters which were identified in the survey, while others were "generic" and referenced more global opinions. Ten generic items were included in the questionnaire, and they revealed two distinct clusters of opinion: one referring to proactive, aggressive police action, and the other to the quality of services provided citizens and anticipated police demeanor in police-citizen encounters. A question referring to the strictness of traffic law enforcement was inconsistently correlated with most of the items, and had a low (about .10) correlation with the other measures of police aggressiveness; it was excluded completely.

Two general items consistently factored together, evidencing response patterns which differed from others focusing upon the police. Added together, they form a "Police Aggressiveness" measure. They are:

[...please tell me whether you think it is a big problem, some problem, or no problem here in this area.]

Q21: Police stopping too many people on the streets without good reason in this area?

Q26: Police being too tough on people they stop?

These two items were correlated +.50, and when factor analyzed with the remaining set (see below) formed a significant second factor with loadings of .83 and .86, respectively. They had about the same mean and standard deviation, so they were scaled by adding them together. The scale has a reliability of .66, good for a two-item measure. A high score on this scale identifies people who think these are "big problems."

The remaining items also formed a distinct factor, and make up a second additive measure, "Evaluation of Police Service." They are:

- Q50: How good a job do you think [police] are doing to prevent crime? (very good to very poor job)
- Q51: How good a job do you think the police in this area are doing in helping people out after they have been victims of crime? (very good to very poor job)
- Q52: How good a job are the police in this area doing in keeping order on the streets and sidewalks? (very good to very poor job)
- Q57: In general, how polite are the police in this area when dealing with people? (very polite to very impolite)
- Q58: In general, how helpful are the police in this area when dealing with people around here? (very helpful to not helpful at all)
- Q59: In general, how fair are the police in this area in dealing with people around here? (very fair to very unfair)

The simple additive combination of these items has a reliability of .86, and they were correlated an average of .56. They were single factored, and their principal factor explained 60 percent of the total variation in the items. There was some variation in the response format for these items, but differences in the variances in the items were not great enough to preclude adding them together in simple fashion to form a scale. A high score on this measure points to a favorable evaluation of the police.

PERCEIVED AREA PHYSICAL DETERIORATION PROBLEMS

Items in this cluster refer to the prevalence of problems with trash, abandoned buildings, and dirty streets and sidewalks. These are interesting because their frequency presumably reflects the balance of two opposing forces: the pace at which people or businesses create these problems and the efficiency

with which the city deals with them. Identical conditions can result from differing mixes of either activity.

The questions were:

[...please tell me whether you think it is a big problem, some problem, or no problem here in this area?]

Q15: The first one is dirty streets and sidewalks in this area?

Q22: Abandoned houses or other empty buildings in this area?

Q65: Vacant lots filled with trash and junk?

Responses to these questions were moderately intercorrelated (an average of .36), but single-factored. That factor explained 57 percent of the variance in the items. They had similar means and standard deviations as well as sharing a response format, so they were scaled by adding them together. This measure has a reliability of .63. A high score on this scale indicates that physical deterioration is thought to be a problem in the area.

A related survey item (Q69) asking about problems with abandoned cars would scale with these, but that problem was not a target of the clean-up program in Newark.

CRIME PREVENTION EFFORTS

There are a series of anti-crime actions taken by city residents which might be relevant for this evaluation. Four questions in the surveys probed the extent to which respondents took defensive behaviors to protect themselves from personal victimization in public locations. They were asked:

The next questions are about some things people might do when they go out after dark. Now think about the last time you went out in this area after dark.

Q80: Did you go with someone else to avoid crime? (yes or no)

Q81: The last time you went out after dark in this area, did you stay away from certain streets or areas to avoid crime? (yes or no)

Q82: When you last went out after dark in this area, did you stay away from certain types of people to avoid crime? (yes or no)

Q86: In general, how often do you avoid going out after dark in this area because of crime? (never go out to never avoid)

In survey questions like these, a few respondents inevitably respond that they "never go out." With the exception of the disabled this is highly unlikely, and people who answer in this way frequently are fearful and score as high "avoiders" on the other measures. For analytic purposes it proves useful (see Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) to count them along with the others. The "message" they are communicating seems to be that "it's a dangerous place out there," so we have classed them as "precaution takers" and assigned them "yes" responses to these items.

Responses to these four items were very consistent. They were correlated an average of .41, and formed a simple additive scale "Defensive Behaviors" with a reliability of .74. The last item, Q86, was rescored so that its four response categories ranged in value between zero and one, like the others. The items then all had similar means and standard deviations. The resulting scale is a simple additive combination of the four.

A second set of behaviors measured in the survey referred to household crime prevention efforts. Several elements of the program were designed to increase the frequency with which people take such measures. Questions in the survey which tapped these activities included:

The next few questions are about things that some people might do for protection from crime.

Q74: Have any special locks been installed in this home for security reasons? (yes or no)

Q75: Have any special outdoor lights been installed here to make it easier to see what's going on outside your home? (yes or no)

Q76: Are there any timers for turning your lights on and off at night? (yes or no)

Q77: Have any valuables here been marked with your name or some number? (yes or no)

Q78: Have special windows or bars been installed for protection? (yes or no)

Q85: Think about the last time when no one was home for at least a day or two. Did you ask a neighbor to watch your home? (yes or no)

Responses to these questions all were positively intercorrelated. The correlations often were low, however, probably due to the extremely skewed marginal distributions of many of them. For example, less than 20 percent reported having timers, marking their property, and installing special security windows or bars. Nonparametric measures of association between these items--which are not affected by their skewed marginals--were more robust. Correlations between reports of the more normally distributed activities (39 percent have special locks, 30 percent outdoor lights, and 64 percent have neighbors watch their homes) were somewhat higher, averaging .20-.30. If added together, responses to these items would form a scale with a low reliability.

Also, a factor analysis of the entire set indicated they were not single-factored. Responses to Q75 and Q76, two questions about lighting, "went together" separately. So, in this evaluation analysis we simply added together the number of "yes" responses to the entire set of items, as a count of actions taken and, where relevant, analyzed the adoption of these measures separately.

DISTRIBUTION OF SCALE SCORES

Because they were to be used in multivariate regression analyses, it was important that the distribution of the scale scores described above meet the assumptions of regression. Also, one assumption in ANCOVA (carried out in this project using multiple regression) is that the relationship between pre- and post-test scores is linear, and this is also better determined if the scores themselves are fairly normally distributed. So, scale scores for both waves of each survey were examined for non-normality. Only one score for the Wave 1 panel survey was heavily skewed, (that for "Police Aggressiveness"), and it was logged for use in statistical analysis.

THE REPRODUCEABILITY OF SCALES AMONG SUBPOPULATIONS

Tables 1-3 summarize the reliability for the scales discussed above and present them for a variety of subgroups and area samples used in the evaluation. Table 1 presents the findings separately for Houston and Newark. Table 2 presents scale reliabilities for the major racial and ethnic groups surveyed in Houston--blacks, whites, and Hispanics. (In Newark, only largely black

neighborhoods were involved in the Fear Reduction Project.) Table 3 breaks the data down separately for the ten neighborhoods surveyed.

While the reliabilities presented here fluctuate from place-to-place and group-to-group, the generalizability of the scales used in the evaluation is evident. There is no evidence that special measures must be tailored for any particular group or area; rather, the various reports and analyses based upon these data can employ the same measures throughout.

A NOTE ON CALCULATING SCALE SCORES

There is a scattered amount of missing data for all of these items. There were substantially more missing data for questions dealing with the police than for generic questions about neighborhood conditions, probably reflecting many people's true ignorance of police affairs. Because a number of these scales summarize responses to several questions, if one missing element for a scale led to the complete exclusion of a respondent, the number of cases available for analysis would drop quite substantially. Because these items are single-factored and internally consistent, a better strategy is to let responses to components of a scale which are present "stand in" for occasional missing data. This was accomplished by basing each individual's calculated score on the sum of valid responses, standardized by the number of valid responses (scores = sum of response value/number of valid responses). Neither excluding respondents because of nonresponse nor fabricating data for them in the form of imputed values (such as means or "hot deck" values) is likely to be a superior strategy, in light of our scaling approach to measurement (cf. Kalton, 1983).

Table 1
Wave 1 Scale Reliabilities
All Respondents
Houston - Race Totals

Scale	Black	White	Hispanic
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	.71	.71	.64
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	.76	.82	.79
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	.63	.60	.69
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	.79	.76	.79
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	.81	.82	.84
Satisfaction with Area	.51	.44	.39
Police Aggressiveness	.69	.60	.68
Evaluation of Police Service	.83	.84	.78
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	.60	.63	.61
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime	.69	.71	.66
(Cases)	(578)	(1091)	(443)

Table 2
Wave 1 Scale Reliabilities
All Respondents
City Totals

Scale	Total	Houston	Newark
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	.72	.70	.74
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	.73	.80	.67
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	.61	.62	.55
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	.77	.77	.73
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	.84	.83	.77
Satisfaction with Area	.50	.44	.43
Police Aggressiveness	.66	.68	.64
Evaluation of Police Service	.86	.83	.84
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	.63	.62	.52
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime	.73	.69	.77
(Cases)	(4134)	(2178)	(1956)

Table 3

Wave 1 Scale Reliabilities

All Respondents

Area Totals

Scale	North line	Lang- wood	Wood Bayou	Golf Crest	Shady Acres	S-1	S-2	S-4	W-1	N-2
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	.71	.69	.71	.68	.70	.74	.75	.74	.73	.72
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	.79	.80	.78	.83	.74	.68	.66	.57	.66	.72
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	.65	.65	.56	.52	.67	.60	.69	.59	.63	.48
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	.81	.78	.80	.71	.76	.77	.76	.72	.72	.74
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	.81	.81	.83	.84	.85	.73	.77	.77	.80	.74
Satisfaction with Area	.45	.48	.51	.42	.42			.44	.45	.45
Police Aggressiveness	.74	.66	.70	.65	.61	.71	.62	.71	.52	.60
Evaluation of Police Service	.86	.79	.83	.84	.80	.85	.82	.82	.85	.84
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	.67	.58	.62	.59	.57	.64	.52	.36	.56	.39
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime (Cases)	.70 (398)	.67 (378)	.68 (506)	.71 (526)	.65 (370)	.73 (398)	.75 (340)	.78 (441)	.80 (402)	.76 (375)

APPENDIX C

SCALING THE NON-RESIDENTIAL SURVEY DATA

SCALING THE NONRESIDENTIAL SURVEY DATA

This appendix describes how analytic scales were developed for the Fear Reduction Project Evaluation's nonresidential sample surveys. These scales measure the central outcomes of interest in this project: perceptions and fear of crime, evaluations of the quality of police service, assessments of neighborhood problems, and satisfaction with business conditions in the area. As in other components of this evaluation, outcomes were measured by a composite of responses to two or more items which were included in the surveys to tap those dimensions. The item combination which was finally used to represent each outcome was determined by examining responses to the first, pre-test, surveys conducted in all areas of Houston and Newark. Scaling decisions were then verified on the post-test surveys. The pre-intervention survey with 414 business establishments was used to determine the empirical relationship between responses to survey items. They were intercorrelated and factor analyzed, and the results of those analyses informed our final scaling decisions. However, the scales also were formed based upon past research, to maintain consistency with other surveys conducted as part of the Fear Reduction evaluation, and to maintain their conceptual unity. Always, the programmatic relevance of each item played an important role in determining whether or not it would be included in the final scales.

FEAR OF PERSONAL VICTIMIZATION IN AREA

A number of items were included in the survey to represent this general construct. After examining the pre-intervention data, three measures of various forms of fear of crime were developed. The following items were combined to form a measure of "Fear of Personal Victimization in Area:

- Q26: How safe would you feel while working here alone during the day? (very safe to very unsafe)
- Q27: How about while working here after dark? How safe would you feel if you were to work here after dark? (very safe to very unsafe)
- Q28: How safe would you feel being outside alone in this area after dark? (very safe or very unsafe)
- Q42: How worried are you that someone will try to rob you or steal something from you here in this establishment? (very worried or not very worried at all)
- Q43: What about outside of this establishment? How worried are you that someone will try to rob you or steal something from you somewhere else in this area? (very worried or not very worried at all)

These items were added together to form a scale with a reliability of .84. The average item-total correlation of its components was .51, and the first factor explained 61 percent of the total variation in response to the items. There was no meaningful difference between the additive alpha and the alpha for a standardized scale score which equated the variances of its component parts (also .84). Therefore, a simple additive scale was employed. A high score on the measure indicates respondents were fearful of personal victimization in and around their establishments.

Two other items were combined to form a measure of the "Perceived Concern About Crime" expressed by employees and patrons of the establishments, as reported by our respondents. They were:

Q29: In the last month, how frequently have you heard employees express concern about their personal security in this area? (very frequently to never?)

Q30: In the last month, how frequently have you heard people who come here express concern about their personal security in this area? (very frequently to never)

Responses to these items all were measured on the same four-position set of response categories. As they had about the same mean and standard deviation, the items contribute about equally to the total score for each individual. The correlation between responses to the two items was .54, and the reliability of the resulting scale was .70. These items factored separately from the previous measure of personal fear.

Two survey questions were posed to measure "Worry About Property Crime in the Area;" they asked "how worried" respondents were about being victimized by burglary and vandalism. Other research on concern about victimization or assessments of risk (see Baumer and Rosenbaum, 1981) indicates the distinction between personal and property crimes is a fundamental one, and that perceptions of the two are best gauged separately.

Q44: [How worried are you that] someone will try to break into this place to steal something? (not worried at all to very worried)

Q45: [How worried are you that] someone will try to vandalize this place? (Not worried at all to very worried)

These two items were combined to form a multiple item scale; they were substantially intercorrelated (.72) and formed an additive scale with an Alpha of .84. A high score on this measure identifies respondents who are worried about area burglary and vandalism. Another question asked, "How big a problem"

burglary of business was in the area. Responses to this item are analyzed separately.

PERCEIVED AREA SOCIAL DISORDER PROBLEMS

Six candidate items for this cluster were analyzed as part of the scale development process. They all focused upon deviant behaviors of varying illegality and seriousness, most of which takes place in public locations.

They were:

[...please tell me whether you think it is a big problem, some problem, or no problem at all.]

Q15: People saying insulting things or bothering people as they walk down the street?

Q18: People drinking in public places, like on corners or in streets?

Q19: People breaking windows of buildings?

Q16: Graffiti, that is, writing or painting on walls or windows?

Q14: Gangs?

Q25: Sale or use of drugs in public places?

Responses to these items were all positively intercorrelated (mean $r=.39$). They had roughly similar means and variances, so the scale was formed by adding together responses to them. The principal component factor for these items explained 50 percent of their total variance. This scale has a reliability of .80. A high score on this measure points to areas in which these are seen as "big problems."

In addition, several items included in the survey could have been included in a disorder scale. They were:

Q17: Truancy, that is, kids no being in school when they should be?

Q24: Prostitutes?

Q13: Beggars or panhandlers?

Responses to these items were consistent with the others, but were excluded from the scale because they probed problems which were not the explicit focus of any of the Fear Reduction programs.

Two items were combined to form a measure of "Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems." They were:

Q20: [How big a problem here in this area?] Abandoned stores or other empty buildings? (No problem to big problem)

Q23: [How big a problem here in this area?] Dirty streets and sidewalks? (no problem to big problem)

Responses to these two items were correlated .44, and combined they formed an additive scale with a reliability of .61, good for a two-item measure. A high score on this measure identifies respondents who thought that these forms of physical decay were "big problems" in their area.

SATISFACTION WITH AREA

Two measures of satisfaction with neighborhood conditions were developed.

The first probed general satisfaction with the area:

Q7: On the whole, how do you feel about this area as a place for this establishment? Are you (very satisfied to very dissatisfied)

Q8: Since July of 1982, would you say this area has generally become a better place to be located, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?

Responses to these two questions were correlated .34, and had similar variances. Added together they formed a scale with a reliability of .48, only marginally acceptable. A high score on this measure identifies respondents who think their area is a good place to work, and has been getting to be a better place to be located.

A second measure points directly to perceived changes in the business environment in the recent past. Respondents were asked if, "since July of 1982" (the onset of the program):

Q9: ...has the number of people who come here increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

Q12: What about the amount of business done here? Compared to last year, has that increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

Responses to these items were correlated .58, and formed an additive scale with a reliability of .73, very high for a 2-item scale. These two items factored separately from the previous set measuring general perceptions of the area.

EVALUATION OF POLICE SERVICE

A number of questions in the survey gathered evaluations of police service. Some items focused upon recent, specific encounters between the police and those interviewed in the nonresidential survey, while others were "generic" and referenced more global opinions. Six generic items were included in the questionnaire, and they revealed one distinct cluster of opinion concerning the quality of services provided citizens and anticipated police demeanor in police-citizen encounters.

- Q46: How good a job are the police in this area doing to prevent crime to businesses and other establishments? (very good to very poor job)
- Q47: How good a job do you think the police are doing in helping businesses and other establishments out after they have been victims of crime? (very good to very poor job)
- Q50: How good a job are the police in this area doing in keeping order on the streets and sidewalks? (very good to very poor job)
- Q53: In general, how polite are the police in this area when dealing with people in businesses and other establishments? (very polite to very impolite)
- Q54: In general, how helpful are the police in this area when dealing with people in business and other establishments? (very helpful to not helpful at all)
- Q55: In general, how fair are the police in this area in dealing with people in business and other establishments? (very fair to very unfair)

The simple additive combination of these items has a reliability of .89, and they were correlated an average of .57. They were single factored. There was some variation in the wording of the response format for these items, but differences in the variances in the items were not great enough to preclude adding them together in simple fashion. A high score on this measure points to a favorable evaluation of the police.

THE REPRODUCEABILITY OF SCALES AMONG AREAS

Table 1 summarizes the reliabilities for the scales discussed above, and presents them for the area samples used in the evaluation. The non-residential survey samples for individual areas were quite small, so the reliabilities presented there fluctuate from place-to-place. However, the generalizability of the scales used in the evaluation is evident. The only notable exception is the general area satisfaction measure for the Langwood area in Houston, and the

two items which go into it will be analyzed separately for that area. There is no evidence in Table 1 that other special measures must be tailored for any particular area; rather, the various reports and analyses based upon this data can employ the same measures throughout.

A NOTE ON CALCULATING SCALE SCORES

There is a scattered amount of missing data for all of these items. There were substantially more missing data for questions dealing with the police than for generic questions about neighborhood conditions, probably reflecting many people's true ignorance of police affairs. Because a number of these scales summarize responses to several questions, if one missing element for a scale led to the complete exclusion of a respondent, the number of cases available for analysis would drop quite substantially. Because these items are single-factored and internally consistent, a better strategy is to let responses to components of a scale which are present "stand in" for occasional missing data. This was accomplished by basing each individual's calculated score on the sum of valid responses, standardized by the number of valid responses (score = sum of responses values/number of valid responses). Neither excluding respondents, because of nonresponse nor fabricating data for them in the form of imputed values (such as means or "hot deck" values) is likely to be a superior strategy, in light of our scaling approach to measurement (cf, Kalton, 1983).

SCALE RELIABILITY SUMMARY

Non-Residential Survey

	All Areas		South 1		West 1		South 4		Northline		Langwood		Golfcrest		Shady Acres	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale																
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	.84	.84	.83	.79	.80	.85	.86	.90	.81	.82	.80	.74	.84	.87	.85	.86
Evaluation of Police Service	.89	.86	.90	.86	.88	.87	.92	.91	.86	.89	.84	.80	.87	.84	.63	.86
Perceived Social Disorder Problems	.80	.79	.64	.78	.71	.79	.74	.65	.76	.55	.81	.51	.85	.83	.65	.71
Business Change	.73	.78	.61	.82	.68	.65	.33	.85	.80	.77	.76	.76	.82	.83	.54	.62
Satisfaction With Area	.48	.54	.57	.43	.69	.31	.67	.72	.54	.57	.00	.68	.44	.53	.35	.44
Worry About Property Crime	.84	.80	.97	.93	.88	.72	.92	.78	.76	.84	.86	.94	.84	.66	.90	.77
Employee-Patrol Concern	.70	.81	.82	.99	.66	.57	.84	.82	.68	.78	.54	.82	.67	.79	.56	.40
(N)*	(414)	(283)	(34)	(47)	(26)	(28)	(35)	(32)	(44)	(41)	(37)	(27)	(67)	(66)	(39)	(42)

* Ns vary slightly from scale to scale; figure here is for fear scale

APPENDIX D

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS IN PROGRAM AND COMPARISON AREAS AT WAVES ONE AND TWO

Table D-1

Characteristics of Respondents in Program and Comparison Areas
at Waves One and Two

(All Respondents)

Percent who are:	S-1 Program Area		S-4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Sex				
Males	44	39	32	33
Females	56	61	68	67
	(412)	(414)	(450)	(435)
	p < .20		p < .90	
Race				
Black	98	97	98	98
White	1	1	1	1
Hispanic	1	1	-	1
Other	1	1	-	1
	(409)	(415)	(448)	(435)
	p < .90		p < .98	
Housing				
Own	43	43	36	36
Rent	57	57	64	64
	(409)	(412)	(445)	(425)
	p < .95		p < .90	
Education				
Not High School	44	42	34	33
High School Graduate	56	58	66	67
	(401)	(414)	(445)	(431)
	p < .70		p < .80	
Income				
Under \$15,000	58	53	52	53
Over \$15,000	42	47	48	47
	(326)	(381)	(390)	(430)
	p < .30		p < .90	
Age Category				
15-24	17	16	16	14
25-49	47	46	59	62
50-98	36	39	25	25
	(412)	(413)	(441)	(427)
	p < .70		p < .70	

continued

Table D-1
(continued)

Characteristics of Respondents in Program and Comparison Area
at Waves One and Two

(All Respondents)

Percent who are:	S-1		S-4	
	Program Area Wave 1	Wave 2	Comparison Area Wave 1	Wave 2
Children at Home				
None	51	45	38	39
One	13	15	26	24
Two +	36	40	36	36
	(402)	(413)	(449)	(434)
	p < .30		p < .80	
Number of Adults in Household				
One	32	29	36	33
Two	38	41	42	45
Three+	30	30	22	22
	(412)	(415)	(450)	(435)
	p < .70		p < .70	
Marital Status				
Single	61	60	57	52
Married*	39	40	43	48
	(387)	(413)	(440)	(430)
	p < .80		p < .20	
Employment				
Work full-part time	56	58	62	66
Other	44	42	38	34
	(396)	(411)	(438)	(432)
	p < .70		p < .30	
Length of Residence				
0-2 years	26	20	35	30
3-5 years	16	17	20	23
6-9 years	12	12	12	13
10 years +	46	51	33	34
	(406)	(414)	(446)	(432)
	p < .20		p < .50	

Chi-square tests of significance

* Includes "Living with someone as partners"

APPENDIX E

DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS:
RESIDENTIAL SAMPLES

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Fear of Personal Victimization in Area

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.00	2.00	2.01	1.96
(sd)	(.60)	(.62)	(.55)	(.61)
[N]	[412]	[415]	[450]	[435]
Sigf.	p < .50		p < .25	
Q34 Unsafe Alone*				
Mean	3.01	3.01	3.11	2.83
(sd)	(1.04)	(1.07)	(.92)	(1.03)
[N]	[412]	[415]	[449]	[435]
Sigf.	p < .50		p < .001	
Q35 Place Fear to Go				
Mean	.61	.68	.67	.66
(sd)	(.49)	(.47)	(.47)	(.47)
[N]	[399]	[412]	[444]	[433]
Sigf.	p < .025		p < .40	
Q43 Worry robbery				
Mean	2.22	2.20	2.22	2.21
(sd)	(.75)	(.78)	(.72)	(.73)
[N]	[411]	[412]	[449]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .50	
Q44 Worry assault				
Mean	2.10	2.11	2.02	2.14
(sd)	(.79)	(.80)	(.74)	(.76)
[N]	[411]	[411]	[449]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .50		p < .01	

Note: One-tailed t-test

*rescored so high score indicates fear

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	1.89	1.86	1.91	1.74
(sd)	(.56)	(.66)	(.50)	(.53)
[N]	[405]	[411]	[443]	[432]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .001	
Q114 Stranger Assault a big problem				
Mean	1.98	1.99	2.00	1.86
(sd)	(.70)	(.79)	(.68)	(.70)
[N]	[390]	[402]	[425]	[411]
Sigf.	p < .50		p = < .005	
Q117 Robbery a big problem				
Mean	2.24	2.12	2.28	2.04
(sd)	(.70)	(.81)	(.66)	(.70)
[N]	[394]	[408]	[428]	[418]
Sigf.	p < .025		p < .001	
Q121 Rape a big problem				
Mean	1.33	1.39	1.38	1.24
(sd)	(.59)	(.70)	(.58)	(.55)
[N]	[324]	[370]	[375]	[388]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .001	

Note: One-tailed t-test

*Rescored so high score indicates fear

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.33	2.33	2.21	2.33
(sd)	(.66)	(.72)	(.64)	(.68)
[N]	[411]	[415]	[450]	[435]
Sigf.	p < .50		p < .005	
Q45 Burglary worry				
Mean	2.40	2.36	2.32	2.37
(sd)	(.71)	(.79)	(.71)	(.75)
[N]	[411]	[415]	[448]	[432]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .25	
Q47 Auto theft worry				
Mean	2.22	2.29	2.07	2.32
(sd)	(.80)	(.80)	(.78)	(.78)
[N]	[300]	[324]	[359]	[336]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .001	

Note: One-tailed t-test

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Perceived Area Property Crime Problems

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.17	2.13	2.09	2.10
(sd)	(.61)	(.71)	(.60)	(.65)
[N]	[403]	[414]	[446]	[430]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .50	
Q68 Burglary problem				
Mean	2.27	1.99	2.31	2.10
(sd)	(.73)	(.84)	(.70)	(.75)
[N]	[392]	[401]	[433]	[418]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .001	
Q70 Auto vandalism problem				
Mean	2.07	2.17	1.93	2.02
(sd)	(.77)	(.80)	(.74)	(.78)
[N]	[375]	[397]	[423]	[417]
Sigf.	p < .05		p < .05	
Q71 Auto theft problem				
Mean	2.21	2.26	2.04	2.22
(sd)	(.76)	(.82)	(.77)	(.79)
[N]	[370]	[393]	[423]	[415]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .001	

Note: One-tailed t-test

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.04	1.98	2.04	2.04
(sd)	(.47)	(.59)	(.47)	(.49)
[N]	[411]	[415]	[449]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .50	
Q18 Groups hanging around on corners				
Mean	2.56	2.44	2.60	2.57
(sd)	(.68)	(.78)	(.65)	(.69)
[N]	[402]	[412]	[443]	[431]
Sigf.	p < .01		p < .40	
Q20 People saying insulting things				
Mean	1.68	1.60	1.50	1.55
(sd)	(.78)	(.81)	(.67)	(.73)
[N]	[392]	[409]	[432]	[424]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .25	
Q24 Drinking in public place				
Mean	2.38	2.23	2.28	2.35
(sd)	(.76)	(.86)	(.77)	(.78)
[N]	[402]	[406]	[435]	[427]
Sigf.	p < .005		p < .10	
Q66 Breaking Windows				
Mean	1.81	1.75	1.99	1.75
(sd)	(.78)	(.83)	(.83)	(.80)
[N]	[398]	[412]	[439]	[426]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .001	

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems
(continued)

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Q67 Graffiti				
Mean	1.81	1.74	1.99	1.99
(sd)	(.78)	(.83)	(.83)	(.85)
[N]	[398]	[413]	[439]	[431]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .50	
Q118 Gang				
Mean	1.80	2.00	1.70	1.74
(sd)	(.81)	(.88)	(.78)	(.79)
[N]	[370]	[396]	[410]	[417]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .25	
Q120 Sale or use of drugs in public places				
Mean	2.28	2.16	2.35	2.30
(sd)	(.81)	(.86)	(.72)	(.80)
[N]	[354]	[388]	[404]	[416]
Sigf.	p < .05		p < .25	

Note: One-tailed t-test

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Satisfaction With Area

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.06	2.13	1.85	2.10
(sd)	(.66)	(.72)	(.61)	(.70)
[N]	[409]	[414]	[449]	[435]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .001	
Q5 Area getting better				
Mean	1.56	1.72	1.37	1.61
(sd)	(.64)	(.71)	(.54)	(.62)
[N]	[392]	[402]	[436]	[412]
Sigf.	p < .001		p = < .001	
Q14 Satisfied with the area				
Mean	2.50	2.53	2.30	2.54
(sd)	(.92)	(1.02)	(.87)	(.98)
[N]	[407]	[412]	[447]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .001	

Note: One-tailed t-test

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Evaluation of Police Service

		South-1 Program Area		South-4 Control Area	
		Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale	Score				
	Mean	2.59	2.79	2.51	2.70
	(sd)	(.74)	(.78)	(.67)	(.77)
	[N]	[403]	[407]	[442]	[428]
	Sigf.	p < .001		p < .001	
Q50	Good job at preventing crime				
	Mean	2.46	2.70	2.42	2.67
	(sd)	(.98)	(1.07)	(.94)	(1.06)
	[N]	[388]	[392]	[428]	[410]
	Sigf.	p < .001		p = < .001	
Q51	Good job of helping victims				
	Mean	2.55	2.66	2.42	2.69
	(sd)	(.99)	(1.09)	(.88)	(1.09)
	[N]	[341]	[359]	[391]	[396]
	Sigf.	p < .10		p < .001	
Q52	Good job keeping order on street				
	Mean	2.48	2.75	2.33	2.66
	(sd)	(.99)	(1.08)	(.92)	(1.10)
	[N]	[380]	[390]	[430]	[418]
	Sigf.	p < .001		p < .001	

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Evaluation of Police Service - continued

	South-1 Program Area		South-4 Control Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Q57 Polite in dealing with people				
Mean	2.90	2.96	2.85	2.90
(sd)	(.85)	(.82)	(.73)	(.75)
[N]	[328]	[339]	[352]	[341]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .25	
Q58 Helpful in dealing with people				
Mean	2.58	2.81	2.53	2.66
(sd)	(.87)	(.88)	(.86)	(.84)
[N]	[352]	[351]	[385]	[374]
Sigf.	p < .001		p = < .025	
Q59 Fair in dealing with people				
Mean	2.78	2.92	2.73	2.78
(sd)	(.75)	(.73)	(.79)	(.76)
[N]	[325]	[342]	[362]	[362]
Sigf.	p < .01		p < .25	

Note: One-tailed t-test

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Perceived Police Aggressiveness

		South-1 Program Area		South-4 Control Area	
		Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale	Score				
	Mean	1.23	1.26	1.18	1.19
	(sd)	(.50)	(.54)	(.46)	(.43)
	[N]	[374]	[405]	[427]	[415]
	Sigf.	p < .25		p < .40	
Q21	Stop too many without good reason				
	Mean	1.23	1.27	1.20	1.19
	(sd)	(.56)	(.62)	(.53)	(.49)
	[N]	[356]	[390]	[412]	[404]
	Sigf.	p < .25		p = < .40	
Q26	Too tough on people they stop				
	Mean	1.26	1.27	1.16	1.19
	(sd)	(.58)	(.60)	(.49)	(.49)
	[N]	[340]	[375]	[379]	[390]
	Sigf.	p < .50		p < .25	

Note: One-tailed t-test

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	.58	.59	.56	.57
(sd)	(.33)	(.35)	(.35)	(.35)
[N]	[410]	[415]	[448]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .40	
Q80 Go with escort*				
Mean	.52	.56	.49	.51
(sd)	(.50)	(.50)	(.50)	(.50)
[N]	[406]	[415]	[448]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .40	
Q81 Avoid certain areas*				
Mean	.65	.67	.63	.65
(sd)	(.48)	(.47)	(.48)	(.48)
[N]	*[407]	[415]	[446]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .40	
Q82 Avoid types of people				
Mean	.73	.72	.69	.72
(sd)	(.44)	(.45)	(.46)	(.45)
[N]	[406]	[414]	[446]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .25	
Q86 Avoid going out after dark				
Mean	2.17	2.18	2.17	2.24
(sd)	(.81)	(1.02)	(.81)	(.92)
[N]	[409]	[411]	[447]	[428]
Sigf.	p < .50		p < .25	

Note: One-tailed t-test

*Rescored so high score indicates taking precaution

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

All Respondents

Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.08	2.06	1.81	1.72
(sd)	(.56)	(.63)	(.50)	(.58)
[N]	[411]	[415]	[450]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .01	
Q15 Dirty streets and sidewalks a problem				
Mean	2.06	2.04	2.04	1.92
(sd)	(.72)	(.80)	(.75)	(.77)
[N]	[408]	[413]	[449]	[433]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .01	
Q22 Abandoned houses and buildings a problem				
Mean	2.15	2.05	1.74	1.67
(sd)	(.73)	(.82)	(.78)	(.80)
[N]	[402]	[409]	[438]	[429]
Sigf.	p < .05		p < .10	
Q65 Vacant lots filled with trash and junk a problem				
Mean	2.03	2.10	1.64	1.57
(sd)	(.75)	(.80)	(.73)	(.76)
[N]	[401]	[414]	[446]	[432]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .10	

Signs of Crime
Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
All Respondents
Household Crime Prevention Efforts

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Total Count				
Mean	1.44	1.73	1.57	1.42
(sd)	(1.42)	(1.37)	(1.40)	(1.18)
[N]	[412]	[415]	[450]	[435]
Sigf.	p < .005		p < .05	
Q74 Special locks				
Mean	.33	.32	.48	.24
(sd)	(.47)	(.47)	(.50)	(.43)
[N]	[410]	[415]	[448]	[435]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .001	
Q75 Outdoor lights				
Mean	.20	.23	.22	.16
(sd)	(.40)	(.42)	(.41)	(.36)
[N]	[409]	[412]	[445]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .025	
Q76 Timers for lights				
Mean	.09	.11	.11	.07
(sd)	(.30)	(.31)	(.31)	(.26)
[N]	[407]	[415]	[447]	[434]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .025	
Q77 Valuables marked				
Mean	.14	.16	.14	.10
(sd)	(.34)	(.37)	(.35)	(.30)
[N]	[407]	[415]	[447]	[435]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .005	
Q78 Windows or bars				
Mean	.12	.13	.15	.09
(sd)	(.32)	(.34)	(.35)	(.29)
[N]	[409]	[415]	[448]	[435]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .005	
Q85 Ask Neighbors watch home				
Mean	.57	.78	.49	.77
(sd)	(.49)	(.41)	(.50)	(.42)
[N]	[402]	[412]	[445]	[430]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .001	

Victimization by Crimes in the Area

All Respondents

Percent Victimized in Past Six Months	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
All Incidents				
Percent Victims	43	49	46	43
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .50	
Personal Crimes (1)				
Percent Victims	15	23	24	24
Sigf.	p < .01		p < .95	
Property Crimes (2)				
Percent Victims	35	38	34	33
Sigf.	p < .30		p < .80	
Included Above:				
Burglary: (3)				
Percent Victims	11	17	11	14
Sigf.	p < .01		p < .20	
Motor Vehicle Crime: (4)				
Percent Victims	15	19	10	13
Sigf.	p < .20		p < .10	
Other Theft: (5)				
Percent Victims	13	18	12	12
Sigf.	p < .05		p < .80	
Number of cases	(412)	(415)	(450)	(435)

Note: 1 includes V13-V19
 2 includes V1-V6, V8-V10, V12
 3 includes V1 and V2
 4 includes V8-V10
 5 includes V3-V5, V12

APPENDIX E:
DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS: RESIDENTIAL SAMPLES

APPENDIX F:
DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS: RESIDENTIAL PANEL SAMPLES

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

Panel Respondents Only

Changes in Panel Respondents Over Time

Scale Score	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area				
Mean	2.01	1.93	2.03	1.96
(sd)	(.62)	(.62)	(.55)	(.61)
[N]	[231]		[275]	
Sigf.	p < .02		p < .04	
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems				
Mean	1.91	1.80	1.91	1.75
(sd)	(.58)	(.58)	(.47)	(.49)
[N]	[227]		[271]	
Sigf.	p < .005		p < .001	
Worry About Area Property Crime Problems				
Mean	2.30	2.29	2.24	2.34
(sd)	(.68)	(.72)	(.61)	(.66)
[N]	[231]		[275]	
Sigf.	p < .37		p < .025	
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems				
Mean	2.14	2.10	2.11	2.17
(sd)	(.64)	(.68)	(.59)	(.62)
[N]	[226]		[272]	
Sigf.	p < .22		p < .11	

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
(continued)

Panel Respondents Only

Changes in Panel Respondents Over Time

Scale Score	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems				
Mean	2.03	1.94	2.05	2.04
(sd)	(.48)	(.57)	(.48)	(.46)
[N]	[231]		[275]	
Sigf.	p < .005		p < .50	
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems				
Mean	2.06	2.03	1.80	1.72
(sd)	(.56)	(.63)	(.49)	(.56)
[N]	[231]		[275]	
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .025	
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime				
Mean	.59	.58	.55	.59
(sd)	(.33)	(.36)	(.35)	(.34)
[N]	[230]		[273]	
Sigf.	p < .35		p < .04	
Household Crime Prevention Efforts				
Mean	1.00	1.77	1.14	1.43
(sd)	(1.23)	(1.40)	(1.22)	(1.19)
[N]	[230]		[275]	
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .001	

Note: One-tailed significance test based on paired-sample t-test.

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
(continued)

Panel Respondents Only

Changes in Panel Respondents Over Time

Scale Score	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Evaluation of Police Service				
Mean	2.63	2.78	2.50	2.69
(sd)	(.79)	(.76)	(.70)	(.80)
[N]	[221]		[272]	
Sigf.	p < .005		p < .001	
Police Aggressiveness Scale				
Mean	1.21	1.24	1.14	1.20
(sd)	(.48)	(.49)	(.38)	(.42)
[N]	[210]		[251]	
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .025	
Satisfaction with Area				
Mean	2.03	2.14	1.87	2.06
(sd)	(.68)	(.67)	(.62)	(.67)
[N]	[231]		[275]	
Sigf.	p < .005		p < .001	

APPENDIX G

TYPES OF ESTABLISHMENTS IN PROGRAM AND COMPARISON AREAS
AT WAVES ONE AND TWO

(NON-RESIDENTIAL ESTABLISHMENTS)

Table G

Types of Establishments in Program and Comparison Areas at Which Interviews Were Completed At Waves One and Two

(Non-Residential Establishments)

Type of Establishment	Program Area (S-1)						Comparison Area (S-4)					
	Establishments Where Interviews Completed			Establishments Where Reinterviews Occurred			Establishments Where Interviews Completed			Establishments Where Reinterviews Occurred		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Construction	1	2.6	1	2.1	1	2.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Manufacturing	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.9	0	0.0
Wholesale	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.9	1	3.9
Hardware & Garden Supply	1	2.6	1	2.1	1	2.9	1	2.8	0	0.0	0	0.0
Grocery and Food Services Stores	4	10.5	7	14.9	3	8.6	6	16.2	6	17.1	6	23.1
Restaurant/Fast Food	1	2.6	2	4.3	1	2.9	5	13.5	3	8.6	2	7.7
Liquor Stores/Bars/Lounges	7	18.4	6	12.8	6	17.1	3	8.1	2	5.7	2	7.7
Furniture & Clothing/Department Stores	4	10.5	5	10.6	4	11.4	2	5.4	5	14.3	3	11.5
Specialty Shops/Book Stores/Drug Stores	0	0.0	1	2.1	1	2.9	1	2.8	0	0.0	0	0.0
Electronic & Video Sales	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.8	1	2.9	1	3.8
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	0	0.0	4	2.1	3	8.6	4	10.8	5	4.3	5	19.2
Auto Sales & Repair Shops	1	2.6	1	2.1	1	2.9	1	2.8	1	2.9	0	0.0
Electronic/Appliance Service	0	0.0	1	2.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Personal and Medical Service	5	13.2	6	12.8	1	2.9	5	13.5	3	8.6	3	11.5
Cleaners	3	7.9	4	8.5	3	8.6	2	5.4	2	5.7	2	7.7
Hotel/Motel	1	2.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Public Association/Organization	10	26.3	11	23.4	10	28.6	5	13.5	3	8.6	1	3.8
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.8	2	5.7	0	0.0
Total	38	100.0	47	100.0	35	100.0	37	100.0	35	100.0	26	100.0

APPENDIX H

DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS: NON-RESIDENTIAL SAMPLES

Signs of Crime

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

Non-Residential Establishments

Evaluation of Police Service

		South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
		Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score					
Mean		2.69	3.03	2.81	3.01
(sd)		(.80)	(.83)	(.88)	(.87)
[N]		[37]	[47]	[36]	[35]
Sigf.		p < .05		p < .25	
Q46	Good job at preventing crime to business/ establishments				
Mean		2.37	2.57	2.53	2.80
(sd)		(1.09)	(1.37)	(1.06)	(1.16)
[N]		[35]	[44]	[36]	[30]
Sigf.		p < .25		p = < .25	
Q47	Good job of helping business/ establishment victims				
Mean		2.62	2.58	2.92	2.97
(sd)		(1.02)	(1.37)	(1.14)	(1.11)
[N]		[34]	[45]	[33]	[29]
Sigf.		p < .50		p < .50	
Q50	Good job keeping order on street				
Mean		2.53	2.91	2.76	3.18
(sd)		(1.13)	(1.09)	(1.16)	(1.06)
[N]		[36]	[45]	[34]	[34]
Sigf.		p < .05		p < .10	

Signs of Crime
Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
Non-Residential Establishments
Evaluation of Police Service
(continued)

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Q53 Polite in dealing with establishments				
Mean	3.15	3.52	3.30	3.15
(sd)	(.78)	(.53)	(.53)	(.77)
[N]	[34]	[44]	[33]	[27]
Sigf.	p < .01		p < .25	
Q54 Helpful in dealing with establishments				
Mean	2.67	3.30	2.65	2.97
(sd)	(.99)	(.88)	(1.01)	(.93)
[N]	[33]	[44]	[34]	[30]
Sigf.	p < .005		p = < .25	
Q55 Fair in dealing with establishments				
Mean	2.76	3.46	2.87	3.15
(sd)	(.89)	(.66)	(.88)	(.77)
[N]	[34]	[44]	[31]	[27]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .25	

Note: One-tailed t-test for small samples

Signs of Crime

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

Non-Residential Establishments

Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	1.92	1.94	1.68	1.73
(sd)	(.47)	(.63)	(.50)	(.49)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .50		p < .40	
Q15 People saying insulting things				
Mean	1.35	1.64	1.26	1.41
(sd)	(.68)	(.89)	(.51)	(.66)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[34]	[32]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .25	
Q18 Drinking in public place				
Mean	2.23	2.32	2.00	1/94
(sd)	(.77)	(.91)	(.77)	(.85)
[N]	[35]	[47]	[35]	[34]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .40	
Q19 Breaking Windows				
Mean	2.05	1.94	1.81	1.62
(sd)	(.74)	(.94)	(.75)	(.79)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[32]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .25	

Signs of Crime
Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
Non-Residential Establishments
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems
(continued)

		South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
		Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Q16	Graffiti				
	Mean	2.06	1.85	1.78	1.89
	(sd)	(.63)	(.96)	(.83)	(.90)
	[N]	[36]	[46]	[36]	[35]
	Sigf.	p < .25		p < .40	
Q14	Gangs				
	Mean	1.84	2.08	1.31	1.61
	(sd)	(.76)	(.90)	(.69)	(.79)
	[N]	[37]	[47]	[32]	[33]
	Sigf.	p < .25		p < .10	
Q25	Sale or use of drugs in public places				
	Mean	2.16	1.80	2.00	1.94
	(sd)	(.86)	(.88)	(.88)	(.88)
	[N]	[31]	[46]	[24]	[32]
	Sigf.	p < .05		p < .50	

Note: One-tailed t-test for small samples

Signs of Crime

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

Non-Residential Establishments

Perceived Police Aggressiveness

		South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
		Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Q22	Stop too many without good reason				
	Mean	1.00	1.02	1.00	1.03
	(sd)	(.00)	(.15)	(.00)	(.18)
	[N]	[34]	[44]	[32]	[31]
	Sigf.	p < .25		p = < .25	

Signs of Crime
Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
Non-Residential Survey
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Q21 Burglary of establishments a problem				
Mean	2.30	2.06	2.17	1.85
(sd)	(.74)	(.92)	(.85)	(.70)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[36]	[34]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .05	

Signs of Crime
Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
Non-Residential Survey
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.11	1.87	2.16	1.74
(sd)	(.53)	(.73)	(.62)	(.61)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .005	
Q20 Abandoned buildings a problem				
Mean	1.86	1.55	1.94	1.44
(sd)	(.68)	(.85)	(.80)	(.56)
[N]	[36]	[47]	[35]	[32]
Sigf.	p < .05		p < .005	
Q23 Dirty streets and sidewalks a problem				
Mean	2.38	2.19	2.38	1.97
(sd)	(.68)	(.88)	(.68)	(.86)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .025	

Note: One-tailed t-test

Signs of Crime
Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
Non-Residential Survey
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.31	2.58	2.06	2.19
(sd)	(.73)	(.75)	(.70)	(.80)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .25	
Q26 Fear working during the day				
Mean	2.00	2.08	1.92	2.06
(sd)	(.99)	(1.10)	(.80)	(.87)
[N]	[36]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .40		p < .25	
Q27 Fear Working at night				
Mean	2.51	3.13	2.36	2.69
(sd)	(1.01)	(1.08)	(.99)	(1.06)
[N]	[35]	[47]	[36]	[32]
Sigf.	p < .01		p < .10	
Q28 Fear outside after dark				
Mean	2.89	3.15	2.54	2.74
(sd)	(.78)	(1.16)	(.99)	(1.11)
[N]	[36]	[47]	[37]	[34]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .25	
Q42 Worry about robbery in establishment				
Mean	2.03	2.17	1.78	1.74
(sd)	(.87)	(.89)	(.83)	(.74)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[36]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .50	
Q43 Worry about robbery outside in area				
Mean	2.16	2.38	1.75	1.89
(sd)	(.80)	(.82)	(.77)	(.77)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[36]	[35]
	p < .25		p < .25	

Signs of Crime
Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
Non-Residential Survey
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.24	2.55	1.64	2.01
(sd)	(.68)	(.68)	(.76)	(.70)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .025		p < .025	
Q44 Worry about burglary of establishment				
Mean	2.35	2.53	1.65	2.00
(sd)	(.75)	(.72)	(.82)	(.84)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .05	
Q45 Worry about vandalism of establishment				
Mean	2.14	2.57	1.62	2.03
(sd)	(.75)	(.68)	(.76)	(.71)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .005		p < .025	

Signs of Crime

Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures

Non-Residential Survey

Employee and Patrons Concern About Crime

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.44	3.42	2.43	2.24
(sd)	(1.05)	(.77)	(.97)	(1.02)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .25	
Q29 Frequency employees express concern				
Mean	2.31	3.42	2.26	2.26
(sd)	(1.18)	(.77)	(1.09)	(1.09)
[N]	[32]	[47]	[35]	[31]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .50	
Q30 Frequency patrons express concern				
Mean	2.59	3.43	2.56	2.20
(sd)	(1.12)	(.77)	(1.03)	(1.16)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[36]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .001		p < .10	

Signs of Crime
Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
Non-Residential Survey
Changes in Business Conditions

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.03	2.34	2.43	2.06
(sd)	(.57)	(.66)	(.50)	(.70)
[N]	[35]	[47]	[37]	[34]
Sigf.	p < .025		p < .01	
Q9 Number of people coming is increasing				
Mean	1.88	2.30	2.43	2.00
(sd)	(.59)	(.72)	(.65)	(.78)
[N]	[34]	[47]	[35]	[34]
Sigf.	p < .005		p < .01	
Q8 Amounts of business done here increasing				
Mean	2.19	2.37	2.38	2.12
(sd)	(.70)	(.71)	(.60)	(.74)
[N]	[31]	[46]	[34]	[33]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .10	

Signs of Crime
Wave One - Wave Two Outcome Measures
Non-Residential Survey
Satisfaction with Area

	South 1 Program Area		South 4 Comparison Area	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Scale Score				
Mean	2.22	2.37	2.27	2.59
(sd)	(.73)	(.71)	(.80)	(.74)
[N]	[37]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .05	
Q7 Satisfaction with area				
Mean	2.83	3.17	2.92	3.11
(sd)	(1.03)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(.96)
[N]	[36]	[47]	[37]	[35]
Sigf.	p < .10		p < .25	
Q8 Area getting better in last year				
Mean	1.61	1.49	1.48	2.00
(sd)	(.60)	(.63)	(.56)	(.72)
[N]	[36]	[45]	[35]	[32]
Sigf.	p < .25		p < .001	

APPENDIX I

A COMPARISON OF INCLUDING ALL CASES VERSUS EXCLUDING MISSING VALUE CASES

APPENDIX I

A COMPARISON OF INCLUDING ALL CASES VERSUS
EXCLUDING MISSING VALUE CASES

SIGNS OF CRIME

A Comparison of Including All Cases Versus
Excluding Missing Value Cases

b (and sigf.) For Area-Treatment Interaction

	<u>All Cases</u> <u>b</u>	<u>Sigf.</u>	<u>Exclude</u> <u>Missing Value</u> <u>b</u>	<u>Sigf.</u>
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	.03	.61	-.01	.91
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	.15	.01+	.12	.05
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	-.11	.08	-.12	.09
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	-.04	.47	-.04	.51
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	-.06	.22	-.05	.35
Satisfaction with Area	-.17	.01+	-.20	.01+
Evaluation of Police Service	.00	.96	.01	.87
Police Aggressiveness	-.06	.92	-.04	.09
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	.06	.27	.04	.51
Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime	-.02	.48	-.04	.20
Household Crime Prevention Measures	.52	.01+	.45	.01+
Total Victimization	.08	.08	.07	.19
Property Victimization	.04	.35	.05	.32
Personal Victimization	.08	.04	.07	.10
[N]	[1711]		[1457]	

Note: Controls for 18 covariates; panel analysis also controls for pretest and pre-intervention victimization. Missing data coded to medians and mid-range values.

APPENDIX J

RECALLED PROGRAM EXPOSURE EFFECT RESULTS

Signs of Crime

Relationship Between Self-Reported Program Exposure and Outcome Measures

Q28: Seen or Heard of Clean Up Program?
Panel Respondents in Program Area Only

Correlation (and significance level) between recall exposure measure and outcome scores controlling for other factors					
Scale Score Outcome	Simple correlation only		Partial correlation controlling for pretest		Significance controlling for sixteen factors** [N]
	r	(sigf)	r	(sigf)	
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	.00	.99	.00	.99	.81 [218]
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	-.07	.31	-.09	.18	.45 [217]
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	-.07	.31	-.08	.21	.29 [217]
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	-.16	.02	-.12	.07	.07 [218]
Satisfaction With Area	.14	.03	.13	.05	.05 [218]
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	-.04	.52	-.08	.27	.13 [218]
Evaluation of Police Service	.10	.12	.11	.11	.32 [214]
Police Aggressiveness (cog)	-.06	.35	-.06	.34	.11 [215]
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	-.09	.09	-.07	.29	.16 [218]
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	.08	.27	.05	.45	.04 [218]
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	.04	.58	.03	.66	.44 [218]

**includes indications of age, race, sex, income education, length of residence, marital status, household organization and size, renter status, building size, personal victimization, knowledge of local crime victims, and the pretest.

Signs of Crime

Relationship Between Self-Reported Program Exposure and Outcome Measures

QNI8: Seen or Heard of Foot Patrol?
Panel Respondents in Program Area Only

Scale Score Outcome	Correlation (and significance level) between recall exposure measure and outcome scores controlling for other factors					
	Simple correlation only		Partial correlation controlling for pretest		Significance controlling for sixteen factors**	
	r	(sigf)	r	(sigf)	r	(sigf) [N]
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	-.09	.16	-.13	.06	-.18	.01 [222]
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	.08	.23	.04	.61	-.00	.99 [221]
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	.08	.21	.06	.38	-.06	.42 [221]
Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area	-.17	.02	-.21	.01	-.27	.01 [218]
Satisfaction With Area	.08	.24	.08	.24	.11	.12 [222]
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	.07	.32	-.00	.97	-.02	.74 [222]
Evaluation of Police Service	.11	.12	.10	.14	.12	.09 [215]
Police Aggressiveness (Log)	-.11	.10	-.14	.05	-.13	.08 [204]
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	.05	.24	.02	.71	.01	.97 [222]
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	-.02	.71	-.04	.53	-.08	.28 [211]
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	-.01	.89	-.03	.62	-.05	.44 [222]

**includes indications of age, race, sex, income education, length of residence, marital status, household organization and size, renter status, building size, personal victimization, knowledge of local crime victims, and the pretest.

Signs of Crime

Relationship Between Self-Reported Program Exposure and Outcome Measures

Q8: Seen or Heard of Bus Checks?
Panel Respondents in Program Area Only

Correlation (and significance level) between recall exposure measure and outcome scores controlling for other factors					
Scale Score Outcome	Simple correlation only		Partial correlation controlling for pretest		Significance controlling for sixteen factors** [N]
	r	(sigf)	r	(sigf)	
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	-.07	.35	-.04	.51	.15 [215]
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	.09	.14	.09	.16	.65 [213]
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	.13	.06	.11	.10	.21 [214]
Worry About Area Property Crime Problems	.01	.93	.00	.97	.53 [218]
Satisfaction With Area	.12	.11	.09	.20	.06 [215]
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	.10	.13	.09	.18	.87 [215]
Evaluation of Police Service	.05	.52	.05	.45	.04 [208]
Police Aggressiveness (Log)	-.09	.20	-.02	.80	.90 [197]
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	.04	.28	.05	.43	.85 [215]
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	-.04	.54	-.04	.60	.57 [214]
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	-.01	.89	.00	.93	.49 [215]

**includes indications of age, race, sex, income education, length of residence, marital status, household organization and size, renter status, building size, personal victimization, knowledge of local crime victims, and the pretest.

Signs of Crime

Relationship Between Self-Reported Program Exposure and Outcome Measures

Q55: Aware of Police Clearing Streets?

Panel Respondents in Program Area Only

Scale Score Outcome	Correlation (and significance level) between recall exposure measure and outcome scores controlling for other factors					
	Simple correlation only		Partial correlation controlling for pretest		Significance controlling for sixteen factors**	
	r	(sigf)	r	(sigf)	r	(sigf) [N]
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	-.07	.29	-.07	.29	-.06	.38 [217]
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	.09	.20	.05	.46	.06	.42 [215]
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	.10	.16	.06	.41	.10	.17 [217]
Worry About Area Property Crime Victimization	.03	.63	.05	.46	.03	.68 [216]
Satisfaction With Area	.07	.28	.06	.34	.06	.37 [217]
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	.14	.03	.09	.19	.10	.15 [217]
Evaluation of Police Service	.08	.12	.15	.03	.15	.04 [219]
Police Aggressiveness (Log)	-.20	.01	-.19	.01	-.24	.001 [209]
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	.05	.24	-.08	.27	-.12	.19 [217]
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	-.04	.52	-.06	.38	-.02	.82 [216]
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	-.01	.81	-.02	.71	-.03	.63 [217]

**includes indications of age, race, sex, income education, length of residence, marital status, household organization and size, renter status, building size, personal victimization, knowledge of local crime victims, and the pretest.

Signs of Crime

Relationship Between Self-Reported Program Exposure and Outcome Measures

Q54: Seen or Heard of Police Road Checks?

Panel Respondents in Program Area Only

Correlation (and significance level) between recall exposure measure and outcome scores controlling for other factors					
Scale Score Outcome	Simple correlation only		Partial correlation controlling for pretest		Significance controlling for sixteen factors** [N]
	r	(sigf)	r	(sigf)	
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	-.04	.51	-.12	.08	.31 [219]
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	.19	.01	.12	.09	.11 [218]
Perceived Area Property Crime Problems	.17	.01	.12	.09	.13 [218]
Worry About Area Property Crime Victimization	.07	.31	.04	.58	.02 [219]
Satisfaction With Area	-.02	.74	.01	.93	.01 [219]
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	.17	.01	.11	.10	.14 [219]
Evaluation of Police Service	-.03	.63	-.03	.62	.02 [215]
Police Aggressiveness (Log)	-.04	.52	-.02	.78	-.02 [216]
Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems	.13	.03	.08	.25	.05 [219]
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	-.12	.07	-.14	.04	-.11 [219]
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	.09	.19	.03	.68	-.01 [219]

**includes indications of age, race, sex, income education, length of residence, marital status, household organization and size, renter status, building size, personal victimization, knowledge of local crime victims, and the pretest.

APPENDIX K

TREATMENT-COVARIATE INTERACTION ANALYSIS RESULTS

Signs of Crime

Subgroup Analysis

Regression Analysis of the Impact of Program Area Residence Upon Subgroups

Panel Respondents Only

Wave 2 Outcome	Aged Subgroup Variable	Subgroup Beta	Impact (Sigf)	Female Variable	Subgroup Beta	Impact (Sigf)
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	Interaction	.03	(.80)	Interaction	.01	(.90)
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	Interaction	-.20	(.15)	Interaction	.01	(.93)
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	Interaction	-.02	(.87)	Interaction	.06	(.42)
Satisfaction with Area	Interaction	-.07	(.64)	Interaction	-.04	(.60)
Evaluations of Police Service and Aggressiveness	Interaction	-.07	(.60)	Interaction	-.01	(.87)
Total Victimization	Interaction	.05	(.75)	Interaction	-.02	(.82)

Note: "N" approximately 490 for all analyses

Signs of Crimes

Subgroup Analysis

Regression Analysis of the Impact of Program Area Residence Upon Subgroups

Panel Respondents Only

Wave 2 Outcome	Wave 1 Victim Impact Variable Beta (Sigf)	Black Subgroup Variable Beta (Sigf)
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	Interaction .08 (.24)	Interaction -.01 (.88)
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	Interaction .22 (.01)	Interaction .02 (.81)
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	Interaction .07 (.27)	Interaction -.07 (.34)
Satisfaction with Area	Interaction .07 (.31)	Interaction -.01 (.83)
Evaluations of Police Service and Aggressiveness	Interaction -.08 (.27)	Interaction -.07 (.34)
Total Victimization	Interaction .18 (.01)	Interaction -.06 (.39)

Note: "N" approximately 490 for all analyses

Signs of Crime

Subgroup Analysis

Regression Analysis of the Impact of Program Area Residence Upon Subgroups

Panel Respondents Only

Wave 2 Outcome	Single Family Home Variable	Beta	Subgroup Impact (Sigf)
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	Interaction	-.07	(.40)
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	Interaction	-.04	(.61)
Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems	Interaction	.04	(.59)
Satisfaction with Area	Interaction	-.17	(.04)
Evaluations of Police Service and Aggressiveness	Interaction	-.01	(.95)
Total Victimization	Interaction	.07	(.43)

Note: "N" approximately 490 for all analyses

APPENDIX L

INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS

Univariate analyses were conducted using this general model:

$$Y_t = \omega I_t + N_t$$

where Y_t is the number of crimes reported in an area in the t^{th} month; where I_t is a dummy variable equal to zero prior to September, 1983 and equal to one thereafter; and where N_t is a statistically "best Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) error term. With the model defined in this way, the parameter ω is interpreted as the causal effect (in crimes per month) of the experimental program. The null hypothesis of no effect,

$$H_0: \omega = 0$$

is rejected if the estimate of ω is not statistically different than zero. To the extent that the experimental programs had any impact on officially recorded crimes, it can be expected that the null hypotheses will be rejected for time series from the South-1 and West-1 districts. Since South-4 had no program, time series from this area serve as quasi-experimental controls. Since no effect is expected in South-4, if the null hypothesis is rejected for any South-4 time series, effects in the South-1 and West-1 must be suspected of being attributable to external factors other than the program. The rationale for such a quasi-experimental approach is discussed in Cook and Campbell (1979, Chapter 5) and Glass, Willson, and Gottman (1975).

Monthly recorded crime data for each of the three areas were available for the 59 months from January, 1980 to September, 1984. The length of these time series makes analysis difficult, since they are only a few months longer than the absolute minimum required for analysis; this presents interpretational problems which we address shortly. Nevertheless, analysis proceeded in the standard procedure recommended by Box and Jenkins (1976; see also, McCleary and Hay, 1980: Chapter 2.11); that is, ARIMA noise components were identified for each series, parameters were estimated with an appropriate nonlinear software

package (Liu and Hudak, 1983), and residuals were diagnosed. The statistically "best" models for each series are presented in an appendix. The effect estimates derived from the analyses are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 - Effect Estimates: Univariate Analyses

	South-1		West-1		South-4	
	Mean	Change	Mean	Change	Mean	Change
Total	32.9	-6.8*	27.6	-6.7*	22.9	-4.1
Person	12.1	-2.9*	7.3	-2.0*	8.5	-2.4*
Burglary	9.0	-3.9*	8.4	- .9	7.2	-2.5
Larceny	5.6	- .1	4.7	- .2	3.5	-1.0
Auto theft	5.1	+1.8*	6.4	-2.1*	3.9	+.4
Outside	17.0	- .5*	14.9	-6.1*	10.4	+.2

*Statistically significant at $p \leq .05$

Overall, the results of the analyses support the conclusion that the two experimental programs had a significant salutary impact on officially recorded crime. As Table 1 shows, the effects range as high as 40 percent (e.g., South-1 Burglaries) and, generally, are statistically significant in the South-1 and West-1 areas but not in the South-4 area. But a caveat is in order here. New programs often have "placebo" effects and we suspect that these series reflect this phenomenon. Note, for example, that the program impact estimates in South-4, though statistically insignificant, are reductions. McCleary and Riggs (1982) have developed statistical models for controlling "placebo" effects but these time series, unfortunately, are too short for correction. While the statistics in Table 1 suggest that the experimental programs had real impacts on crime in the South-1 and West-1 areas, reliable estimates of their magnitude must wait until longer time series are available.

Magnitude notwithstanding, the effect estimates in Table 1 illustrate several problems attributable to the (short) length of these time series. A three percent impact in South-1 (Outside Crimes) is statistically significant, for example, while an 18 percent impact in South-4 (Total Crimes) is not. This

reflects the range of variability in these series. As a rule, it is easier to (statistically) detect a small impact in a "smooth" time series than to detect a large impact in a "rough" time series. Series level (or mean) presents a similar problem. The Total Crime impacts for South-1 and West-1 are nearly identical, for example, yet because the series levels are unequal (32.9 versus 27.6 Total Crimes per month), the two effects have drastically different power characteristics. Finally, the levels of some of these series are so small (e.g., South-4 Larcenies) that our analyses have to overcome "floor effects." McCleary and Musheno (1980) have developed a method for controlling "floor effects" but, again, due to the short lengths of these series, the method is unfeasible.

But the most serious shortcoming of the analysis is posed by the sheer number of series analyzed. First, the series are not independent; all of the other crime categories, for instance, are components of Total Part 1 crime; in addition, several of the types of crimes are combined to create the "outside crimes" category. Thus, the appearance of a systematic pattern of effects in Table 1 may be only an appearance. Second, however, even if all eighteen series were independent, our nominal .05 significance level would have to be adjusted to reflect sequential hypothesis testing. Cook and Campbell (1979: Chapter 4) call this threat to statistical conclusion validity the "fishing rate error." Put simply, this threat means that we are not really testing the null hypothesis of no program impact at the nominal .05 significance level but, rather, at a much lower level.

To control this threat, we replicated our analysis with the multivariate ARIMA model:

$$Y_t = \Phi^{-1} \Theta \alpha_t$$

Here Y_t is a column vector whose elements are the crime times series and dummy variable; α is a column vector of white noise shocks; and Φ and Θ are matrices of autoregressive and moving average polynomials. See McCleary and McDowall (1985) for an introduction to multivariate ARIMA time series analysis. By partitioning Φ and constraining the column corresponding to the dummy variable, we are able to test all effects simultaneously, thereby controlling the threat to statistical conclusion validity.

But the multivariate ARIMA model controls an implied threat to external validity as well: Displacement. In theory, the experimental programs in South-1 and West-1 reduce crime in an absolute sense; that is, a proportion of the crimes that "would have occurred" are prevented. But suppose instead that the experimental programs only displace crimes. Note, for example, that auto thefts in South-1 actually increased after September, 1983. Is it possible that South-1 burglars have simply shifted to auto theft? More to the point, is it possible that South-1 and West-1 criminals have simply moved to South-4?

To test this (perhaps implausible) hypothesis, the series must be given a common metric. To accomplish this, we subtracted means and divided by standard deviations to transform the series into Z-scores. With this transformation, each series has a zero-mean and unit variance and, hence, effects can be compared across series. The first analysis estimated the (standardized) impact of the experimental programs under the assumption that the impact was identical across series. If the program reduced burglaries by, say, .5 (standardized) units, that is, it would also reduce auto thefts (and every other series) by .5

Table 2 - Multivariate Analyses: Effect Estimates

		South-1	West	South-4
Constrained		- .140*	- .082*	- .021
Total		- .868*	-1.014*	- .561
Person		- .827*	- .847*	- .539
Burglary		- .722*	- .216	- .435
Larceny		- .085	- .137	- .088
Autotheft		.238	- .711*	.236
Outside		- .563	-1.122*	.045
Total	Mean	31.246	25.947	21.579
	S.D.	7.996	6.059	5.965
Person	Mean	11.368	6.772	7.860
	S.D.	4.029	3.239	3.436
Burglary	Mean	8.070	6.228	8.228
	S.D.	4.336	3.765	3.319
Larceny	Mean	5.526	3.316	4.667
	S.D.	2.630	1.957	2.139
Autotheft	Mean	5.597	3.947	5.860
	S.D.	3.066	2.123	2.994
Outside	Mean	16.825	10.526	13.351
	S.D.	4.589	3.234	4.651

* Statistically significant at $p \leq .05$

units. As shown in Table 2, the impacts estimated under this constraint amount to statistically significant reductions in South-1 and West-1 but not in South-4. We conclude from this result, again, that the experimental programs had a significant salutary impact on officially recorded crime.

Of course, the assumption of a constrained impact is unrealistic. For theoretical reasons, we expect the experimental programs to have differential impacts on the various series. But the constrained analyses rule out the "displacement" hypothesis with a high degree of confidence. If the experimental programs were simply displacing crimes from one category to another (e.g., from Burglary to Autotheft), we would expect statistically insignificant impacts for South-1 and West-1. Instead, the impacts are statistically significant. For the same reason, if the experimental programs were simply displacing crimes from one district to another, we would expect an increase in South-1. Instead, we find a (statistically insignificant) decrease.

The next six rows of effects in Table 2 are estimated without constraints. That is, we allow the experimental programs to have different effects on different series. In the common Z-score metric, the effects can be directly compared across series and across district. Outside Crimes in South-1 South-4 drop by approximately $-.56$ (standardized) units, for example, so these effects --- though in different districts and on different series --- are of more or less the same magnitude; neither is statistically different than zero. Finally, in the standardized Z-score metric, we see that the program's impact was significantly larger in West-1 than in South-1; and that the impact on Outside Crimes was statistically significant in West-1 but not in South-1.

To translate these effects from the Z-score metric to the raw metric, we simply multiply the standardized effect by the standard deviation; means and standard deviations are given at the bottom of Table 2. The total Crime effect

in West-1, for example, is equal to -1.014×6.059 or a reduction of 6.144 Total Crimes per month; this raw effect in turn can be divided by the series mean (25.947) to give an approximate percent effect, 23.7 percent in this case. Raw or percentage effects are generally more understandable; but for purposes of comparing effects across series or districts, the Z-score effects are more useful.

All in all, the effects in Table 2 are the "final, best" estimates of the experimental program impact. Adding a cross-sectional dimension to the analysis --- analyzing the series in a multivariate model, i.e. --- compensates to some extent for the shortness of the series. Nevertheless, we must honestly recognize that our analyses are based on short time series and, hence, that the generality of our findings are subject to reinterpretation. The relative size of the (putative) "placebo" effect is especially germane here. It would be tempting to use the South-4 effects as estimate of the "placebo" effect and this can be done informally. Formally, however, we must wait until the post-intervention series is longer. A year from now, when more data are available these analyses should be replicated. Until then, on the basis of the best available data, our analyses demonstrate a substantial impact. We have found no statistical evidence to the contrary.

RECORDED CRIME DATA (South-1 Area)

MONTH	TOTAL	PERSON	BURGL.	LARCENY	AUTO	OUTSIDE
1	26	11	9	4	2	11
2	32	14	5	4	8	19
3	25	7	5	7	4	13
4	23	6	7	4	5	14
5	22	10	5	3	4	9
6	29	10	12	3	4	13
7	27	10	5	2	9	15
8	27	14	7	5	1	13
9	37	10	15	5	6	18
10	37	14	9	5	8	21
11	33	12	11	4	5	18
12	33	10	10	2	10	18
13	40	14	13	7	5	21
14	42	13	17	3	5	13
15	33	12	11	8	2	14
16	32	10	8	9	5	16
17	31	7	7	5	9	20
18	43	16	9	12	5	25
19	42	19	12	7	3	20
20	31	8	9	7	5	15
21	39	16	13	7	3	18
22	35	7	8	2	17	21
23	44	21	17	2	2	17
24	41	8	19	6	7	16
25	18	8	4	1	5	11
26	35	13	13	2	6	17
27	47	20	14	7	5	21
28	46	22	10	7	6	22
29	50	16	18	8	5	23
30	37	12	12	4	9	24
31	30	9	8	8	4	18
32	23	9	5	5	3	11
33	33	13	8	8	4	15
34	43	14	10	13	4	25
35	26	12	2	8	3	17
36	27	7	7	6	6	17
37	24	10	4	5	4	14
38	36	17	11	5	2	18
39	32	17	8	3	4	18
40	28	11	9	5	3	13
41	33	9	8	10	2	15
42	30	13	2	8	5	19
43	20	9	2	3	6	13
44	28	9	4	8	7	20
45	32	14	6	4	8	20
46	40	12	6	9	13	28
47	21	6	7	2	6	11
48	24	9	2	5	8	18
49	17	8	1	2	6	12
50	26	5	7	8	5	9
51	28	16	1	6	5	21
52	32	12	2	6	10	22
53	19	4	8	3	4	10
54	31	11	5	9	6	18
55	19	5	5	6	3	7
56	18	10	3	2	3	10
57	24	7	5	6	15	24

RECORDED CRIME DATA (South-4 Area)

MONTH	TOTAL	PERSON	BURGL.	LARCENY	AUTO	OUTSIDE
1	25	7	11	3	4	10
2	27	11	7	5	4	9
3	33	7	13	7	5	12
4	22	2	11	5	4	10
5	21	4	9	5	3	6
6	26	4	13	3	6	10
7	33	12	9	9	3	16
8	22	11	4	3	4	10
9	33	11	11	4	6	15
10	25	11	10	2	2	8
11	28	9	14	2	3	10
12	36	6	20	6	4	9
13	20	3	11	3	3	6
14	24	8	8	4	4	11
15	24	9	8	3	4	9
16	19	5	2	3	9	14
17	25	8	5	3	9	16
18	24	6	10	3	5	11
19	17	11	2	1	3	10
20	17	9	4	0	4	8
21	30	17	7	2	4	17
22	24	11	4	1	8	16
23	17	7	3	6	1	8
24	33	10	7	10	4	15
25	23	17	2	2	2	11
26	26	8	10	3	5	11
27	28	12	8	2	6	18
28	18	7	4	3	3	8
29	24	9	4	7	4	13
30	18	3	6	4	4	6
31	21	12	5	2	2	9
32	33	15	9	6	3	16
33	15	11	2	1	1	10
34	20	11	7	2	0	7
35	25	9	7	6	0	8
36	18	4	4	1	8	11
37	16	7	4	2	2	10
38	10	4	2	3	1	7
39	19	8	4	3	4	13
40	16	5	6	2	3	5
41	16	6	3	3	4	12
42	15	6	1	2	6	7
43	15	5	5	3	2	6
44	12	7	1	0	4	9
45	18	6	8	3	1	8
46	25	5	7	3	9	14
47	18	6	7	1	4	10
48	18	4	5	2	7	12
49	15	5	3	3	4	8
50	18	7	4	5	2	9
51	18	8	3	2	5	11
52	23	10	5	3	4	13
53	17	6	1	3	7	13
54	18	7	4	3	3	12
55	16	5	3	3	5	10
56	11	1	5	4	1	3
57	22	13	3	4	3	14

RECORDED CRIME DATA (West-1 Area)

MONTH	TOTAL	PERSON	BURGL.	LARCENY	AUTO	OUTSIDE
1	33	8	13	6	5	15
2	29	11	7	2	9	19
3	19	5	6	1	7	12
4	22	8	8	3	3	11
5	45	14	13	5	12	24
6	29	6	12	3	8	15
7	34	7	11	5	10	18
8	35	13	10	8	4	19
9	23	7	7	2	6	11
10	33	11	6	9	6	18
11	24	9	6	6	3	14
12	35	11	5	9	10	24
13	29	12	5	4	8	21
14	26	9	4	4	8	18
15	24	8	4	0	12	16
16	28	8	6	8	5	15
17	29	13	5	6	4	19
18	33	6	15	7	4	13
19	34	6	10	7	10	18
20	27	4	8	8	7	15
21	24	9	8	3	3	13
22	23	8	9	2	3	9
23	35	8	10	7	10	20
24	27	11	7	5	4	15
25	31	6	7	1	16	19
26	21	7	6	2	6	12
27	27	6	15	3	2	6
28	24	2	7	5	9	14
29	21	6	8	3	4	7
30	26	6	6	8	5	11
31	23	5	5	5	8	15
32	29	9	11	4	5	15
33	22	8	5	4	2	10
34	12	2	1	4	4	8
35	23	4	9	5	5	10
36	28	8	14	3	3	10
37	24	5	9	5	5	12
38	35	15	6	7	7	23
39	30	4	17	5	4	10
40	25	1	13	5	6	11
41	34	3	13	6	12	17
42	25	5	11	4	5	14
43	27	8	10	4	5	14
44	15	5	2	4	3	8
45	20	4	7	2	6	7
46	24	4	11	6	3	9
47	21	5	7	6	3	8
48	24	7	8	2	7	11
49	21	4	7	5	5	8
50	27	9	10	4	4	13
51	20	3	6	6	5	10
52	15	2	6	2	5	7
53	27	7	8	4	7	14
54	17	7	4	5	1	6
55	19	4	11	2	1	5
56	17	1	5	7	4	10
57	25	2	9	8	6	15

Time Series Models Results

Univariate Models

South-1, Total Crimes
South-1, Person Crimes
South-1, Burglaries
South-1, Larcenies
South-1, Autothefts
South-1, Outside Crimes

West, Total Crimes
West, Person Crimes
West, Burglaries
West, Larcenies
West, Autothefts
West, Outside Crimes

South-4, Total Crimes
South-4, Person Crimes
South-4, Burglaries
South-4, Larcenies
South-4, Autothefts
South-4, Outside Crimes

Multivariate Models

South-1: All Six Series
West: All Six Series
South-4: All Six Series

South-1: Total Crimes

$$S_{11} = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_1 B)a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	32.8547	1.3908	23.62
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-6.7955	2.7687	-2.45
3 THETA1	S11	MA	1	1	-.3026	.1252	-2.42

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.364456D+04
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.277136D+04
 R-SQUARE 0.760
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.486204D+02
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.697283D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.02	.03	-.11	.07	.16	.13	-.02	.07	-.23	.14	-.08	.08
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15	.15	.15
Q	.0	.1	.9	1.2	2.9	4.0	4.0	4.3	8.1	9.6	10.1	10.5

13- 24	-.10	-.14	.01	-.04	.05	.07	-.13	-.04	-.13	-.12	-.05	-.04
ST.E.	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16
Q	11.3	12.8	12.8	12.9	13.1	13.4	15.0	15.1	16.7	18.0	18.3	18.4

South-1: Person Crimes

$$S_{12} = \theta_0 + a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	12.0930	.5831	20.74
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-2.9502	1.1766	-2.51

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.925263D+03
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.833342D+03
 R-SQUARE 0.901
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.146200D+02
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.382362D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.03	-.11	-.19	-.07	.14	.06	-.01	-.03	-.03	.07	.06	.03
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.1	.8	3.1	3.4	4.7	4.9	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.4	5.6	5.7
13- 24	-.01	-.12	-.07	.02	.04	.02	.07	-.08	.00	-.12	-.04	-.05
ST.E.	.14	.14	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15
Q	5.7	6.9	7.3	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.9	8.5	8.5	9.9	10.1	10.3

South-1: Burglaries

$$S_{13} = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_1 B - \theta_{13} B^{13}) a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	8.9729	.8667	10.35
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-3.8786	1.6903	-2.29
3 THETA1	S13	MA	1	1	-.3446	.1187	-2.90
4 THETA3	S13	MA	1	3	-.2877	.1209	-2.38

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.107172D+04
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.726544D+03
 R-SQUARE 0.678
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.127464D+02
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.357021D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	-.06	.00	-.02	-.06	.25	.02	-.00	-.02	.00	.21	-.15	-.05
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15	.15
Q	.2	.2	.2	.4	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	7.8	9.5	9.7
13- 24	-.10	-.02	.22	-.14	.13	-.08	-.15	-.01	-.08	-.21	-.00	-.02
ST.E.	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.17	.17
Q	10.4	10.4	14.4	16.1	17.5	18.1	19.9	19.9	20.6	24.9	24.9	25.0

South-1: Larcenies

$$S_{14} = \theta_0 + a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	5.5581	.4010	13.86
2 WO	D	NUM.	1	0	-.1296	.8090	-.16

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.394210D+03
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.394033D+03
 R-SQUARE 1.000
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.691286D+01
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.262923D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.09	.14	.06	-.04	-.07	-.08	-.10	-.07	-.16	.00	-.10	-.12
ST.E.	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.5	1.7	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.5	3.8	5.7	5.7	6.5	7.5
13- 24	.16	-.03	.03	.12	.13	.10	-.02	-.00	.02	-.14	.04	-.01
ST.E.	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16
Q	9.4	9.5	9.5	10.7	12.1	12.9	12.9	12.9	13.0	14.9	15.1	15.1

South-1: Autothefts

$$S_{15} = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_1 B)a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	5.1270	.3401	15.08
2 WO	D	NUM.	1	0	1.8323	.6982	2.62
3 THETA1	S15	MA	1	1	.2290	.1337	1.71

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.535719D+03
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.471289D+03
 R-SQUARE 0.880
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.826823D+01
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.287545D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	-.01	.05	-.03	-.06	.15	-.01	-.14	-.04	-.14	.02	-.06	.04
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.0	.1	.2	.4	1.9	1.9	3.2	3.2	4.7	4.7	5.0	5.1
13- 24	-.02	-.03	.13	-.06	-.03	.06	-.09	.07	-.05	.00	-.01	.11
ST.E.	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15
Q	5.1	5.2	6.6	6.8	6.9	7.2	7.9	8.3	8.5	8.5	8.5	9.8

South-1: Outside Crimes

$$S_{16} = \theta_0 + a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	16.9535	.6989	24.26
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-.5249	1.4103	-.37

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.120025D+04
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.119734D+04
 R-SQUARE 0.998
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.210059D+02
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR 0.458322D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.11	-.06	-.06	-.15	.00	.16	-.03	.06	-.07	-.04	.06	.11
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.8	1.0	1.3	2.8	2.8	4.6	4.6	4.9	5.3	5.4	5.6	6.6
13- 24	-.10	-.21	.01	.09	.12	.16	-.10	-.09	-.13	-.10	.01	.05
ST.E.	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16
Q	7.3	10.8	10.8	11.5	12.7	15.0	15.8	16.6	18.3	19.3	19.3	19.6

West: Total Crimes

$$W_1 = \theta_0 + a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	27.6046	.8110	34.04
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-6.7473	1.6364	-4.12

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.209284D+04
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.161199D+04
R-SQUARE 0.770
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.282806D+02
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR 0.531795D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.01	.02	.03	-.07	.14	.01	.14	.00	-.04	-.08	.09	.05
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.0	.0	.1	.4	1.6	1.6	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.5	4.0	4.2
13- 24	.06	-.08	-.07	-.19	-.09	.18	-.08	.01	-.16	-.02	-.01	-.16
ST.E.	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16
Q	4.5	5.1	5.5	8.3	9.0	11.9	12.4	12.4	14.7	14.8	14.8	17.4

West: Person Crimes

$$W_2 = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_6 B^6 - \theta_{12} B^{12} - \theta_{18} B^{18}) a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	7.3159	.5565	13.15
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-2.0452	.9638	-2.12
3 THETA6	W2	MA	1	6	-.3096	.1380	-2.24
4 THETA12	W2	MA	1	12	-.5445	.1299	-4.19
5 THETA18	W2	MA	1	18	.2343	.1541	1.52

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.598035D+03
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.364130D+03
R-SQUARE 0.609
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.638824D+01
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.252750D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.07	.00	.10	-.05	.17	.01	.06	.06	-.01	-.01	.05	-.00
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.3	.3	1.0	1.2	2.9	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.6
13- 24	-.07	-.03	.06	.08	-.01	-.06	-.09	-.07	.09	.04	-.08	-.03
ST.E.	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15
Q	3.9	4.0	4.3	4.7	4.7	5.1	5.8	6.2	6.9	7.1	7.8	7.9

West: Burglaries

$$w_3 = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_6 B^6) a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	8.4234	.3797	22.18
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-.8716	.8785	-.99
3 THETA6	W3	MA	1	6	.2544	.1357	1.87

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.628035D+03
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.575660D+03
R-SQUARE 0.917
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.100993D+02
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.317794D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.15	-.03	.08	.08	-.05	-.00	-.05	-.24	.01	-.00	-.11	-.02
ST.E.	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15
Q	1.3	1.4	1.7	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.5	6.3	6.3	6.3	7.2	7.2
13- 24	.01	.07	-.16	-.05	.02	.14	.07	.02	.08	.03	.03	-.13
ST.E.	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15
Q	7.2	7.6	9.8	10.0	10.1	11.6	12.1	12.1	12.7	12.8	12.9	14.5

West: Larcenies

$$W_4 = \theta_0 + a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	4.7209	.3258	14.49
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-.2209	.6574	-.34

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.260667D+03
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.260151D+03
R-SQUARE 0.998
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.456406D+01
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR 0.213637D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.01	.00	-.06	-.00	-.24	-.02	.05	-.04	-.13	.07	.13	.08
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15
Q	.0	.0	.2	.2	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.4	5.5	5.8	7.1	7.7
13- 24	-.10	-.22	-.20	-.05	-.17	.09	.17	.05	-.02	.07	.15	-.06
ST.E.	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16	.17	.17	.17	.17	.17
Q	8.4	12.2	15.4	15.7	18.0	18.7	21.2	21.4	21.4	21.9	24.1	24.5

West: Autothefts

$$W_5 = \theta_0 + a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	6.3720	.4355	14.63
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-2.0863	.8788	-2.37

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.510877D+03
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.464904D+03
 R-SQUARE 0.910
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.815620D+01
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.285591D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	-.10	-.12	.08	-.11	.02	.03	.02	-.07	-.07	.21	-.07	.02
ST.E.	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15
Q	.6	1.6	1.9	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.8	3.2	3.5	6.6	7.0	7.0

13- 24	.17	-.24	-.11	.16	-.11	.13	-.09	.04	-.11	.01	.10	-.19
ST.E.	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.17	.17	.17
Q	9.2	13.9	14.9	17.1	18.1	19.6	20.4	20.5	21.6	21.6	22.6	26.3

West: Outside Crimes

$$W_6 = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_7 B^7) a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	14.8834	.8080	18.42
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-6.0679	1.4812	-4.10
4 THETA7	W6	MA	1	7	-.4952	.1246	-3.98

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.123298D+04
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.768236D+03
R-SQUARE 0.623
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.134778D+02
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.367122D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.00	.00	.17	-.08	.17	.09	-.02	.02	.03	.06	-.03	.04
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.0	.0	1.7	2.1	4.0	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.2
13- 24	.10	-.16	.11	-.18	-.22	.12	-.11	-.15	-.11	-.22	-.03	-.14
ST.E.	.14	.14	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.17	.17
Q	6.0	7.9	8.8	11.4	15.6	16.8	17.8	19.8	20.8	25.6	25.7	27.6

South-4: Total Crimes

$$S_{41} = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_3 B^3 - \theta_5 B^5) a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	22.8638	1.1742	19.47
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-4.1459	2.2191	-1.87
3 THETA3	S41	MA	1	3	-.3418	.1190	-2.87
4 THETA5	S41	MA	1	5	-.3233	.1201	-2.69

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.202789D+04
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.140220D+04
 R-SQUARE 0.691
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.246000D+02
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.495983D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.13	.05	.05	.00	-.00	.12	.03	.04	-.05	.01	.02	-.03
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.3	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.7
13- 24	-.07	.13	.15	-.19	-.06	.06	-.03	.07	.06	.10	.09	-.03
ST.E.	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15
Q	3.1	4.5	6.2	9.1	9.4	9.7	9.8	10.3	10.6	11.5	12.3	12.3

South-4: Person Crimes

$$S_{42} = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_9 B^9) a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	8.4757	.4671	18.15
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-2.3656	1.1185	-2.11
3 THETA1	S42	MA	1	1	-.2759	.1293	-2.13
4 THETA9	S42	MA	1	9	.3610	.1398	2.58

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.672877D+03
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.535441D+03
 R-SQUARE 0.796
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.939371D+01
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.306492D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.02	.13	-.10	-.07	-.10	-.03	.11	.04	-.03	.12	-.07	.00
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.0	1.0	1.7	2.0	2.6	2.7	3.5	3.6	3.6	4.6	5.0	5.0
13- 24	.01	-.05	-.18	-.10	-.09	.05	-.17	-.03	-.25	-.10	.11	-.01
ST.E.	.14	.14	.14	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16
Q	5.0	5.2	7.7	8.6	9.2	9.4	12.0	12.0	17.7	18.6	19.9	19.9

South-4: Burglaries

$$S_{43} = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_1 B - \theta_2 B^2 - \theta_6 B^6) a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	7.2277	.8925	8.10
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-2.4981	1.5865	-1.57
3 THETA1	S43	MA	1	1	-.5166	.0983	-5.25
4 THETA2	S43	MA	1	2	-.3235	.0919	-3.52
5 THETA6	S43	MA	1	6	-.6266	.0864	-7.25

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.808035D+03
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.426660D+03
R-SQUARE 0.528
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.748527D+01
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.273592D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.00	.11	.21	-.24	.01	-.01	-.15	.16	.12	-.08	.10	.02
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.14	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16
Q	.0	.7	3.4	7.1	7.2	7.2	8.7	10.5	11.6	12.1	12.9	12.9
13- 24	-.07	.03	.04	-.14	.03	-.05	-.06	.09	.02	.01	.08	-.09
ST.E.	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16
Q	13.3	13.4	13.5	15.2	15.2	15.4	15.8	16.5	16.6	16.6	17.2	18.0

South-4: Larcenies

$$S_{44} = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_{13} B^{13}) a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	3.5036	.2242	15.63
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	-.9965	.6043	-1.65
3 THETA13	S44	MA	1	13	.3287	.1443	2.28

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.218316D+03
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.192902D+03
 R-SQUARE 0.884
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.338425D+01
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.183963D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	.05	-.02	-.00	-.10	.16	.09	-.04	.06	-.05	-.15	.12	-.05
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.1	.1	.1	.8	2.5	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.6	5.3	6.4	6.6
13- 24	-.01	-.05	-.13	-.10	.09	-.09	-.04	.02	.16	.11	-.06	-.09
ST.E.	.14	.14	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16
Q	6.6	6.9	8.3	9.0	9.8	10.5	10.7	10.7	13.2	14.3	14.7	15.5

South-4: Autothefts

$$S_{45} = \theta_0 + a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	3.8605	.3229	11.96
2 WO	D	NUM.	1	0	.3538	.6515	.54

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.256842D+03
 TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
 RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES. 0.255520D+03
 R-SQUARE 0.995
 RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.448281D+01
 RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR. 0.211726D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	-.01	.08	-.10	-.00	.16	.07	-.00	-.18	-.03	.17	-.05	.02
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15	.15
Q	.0	.4	1.0	1.0	2.8	3.1	3.1	5.4	5.5	7.6	7.7	7.7
13- 24	-.09	-.03	-.07	-.10	-.17	-.16	.04	.06	-.06	.03	-.09	.14
ST.E.	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16
Q	8.4	8.4	8.9	9.8	12.2	14.3	14.4	14.7	15.1	15.1	16.0	18.0

South-4: Outside Crimes

$$S_{46} = \theta_0 + (1 - \theta_5 B^5) a_t$$

PARAMETER LABEL	VARIABLE NAME	NUM./ DENOM.	FACTOR	ORDER	VALUE	STD ERROR	T VALUE
1 C		CNST	1	0	10.3851	.6046	17.18
2 W0	D	NUM.	1	0	.2131	1.1279	.19
3 THETA5	S46	MA	1	5	-.3519	.1308	-2.69

TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.596210D+03
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 57
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES 0.531557D+03
R-SQUARE 0.892
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE 0.932557D+01
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR 0.305378D+01

AUTOCORRELATIONS

1- 12	-.05	-.02	-.02	-.12	.02	-.02	.14	.04	-.06	.09	-.03	-.02
ST.E.	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.13	.14	.14	.14	.14	.14
Q	.1	.2	.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	2.4	2.5	2.7	3.4	3.4	3.4
13- 24	-.16	.02	.08	-.14	-.12	.12	-.12	.00	-.02	-.01	-.13	-.05
ST.E.	.14	.14	.14	.14	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15
Q	5.4	5.5	6.0	7.5	8.8	9.9	11.2	11.2	11.2	11.2	12.9	13.1

South-1: Multivariate Model

$$\hat{\Phi}_1 S1_t = \theta_0 + (I - \theta_1 B - \theta_4 B^4 - \theta_5 B^5) \alpha_t$$

CONSTANT VECTOR

PHI(1) VECTOR

CONSTRAINED

UNCONSTRAINED

-0.078	(0.168)	-0.140	(0.070)	-0.868	(0.335)
-0.075	(0.158)	-0.140	(0.070)	-0.827	(0.342)
-0.092	(0.169)	-0.140	(0.070)	-0.722	(0.351)
-0.035	(0.119)	-0.140	(0.070)	-0.085	(0.298)
-0.007	(0.113)	-0.140	(0.070)	0.238	(0.281)
-0.027	(0.133)	-0.140	(0.070)	-0.563	(0.313)
0.214	(0.055)	--	---	---	---

ESTIMATES OF THETA(1) MATRIX

.239	-.290	-.200	--	--	--	--
-.150	.038	--	--	--	--	--
.572	-.530	-.330	--	--	-.078	--
--	--	--	.108	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	.142	--	--
-.043	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

ESTIMATES OF THETA(4) MATRIX

--	--	-.306	--	--	--	--
--	--	-.407	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	-.385	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	-.374	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

ESTIMATES OF THETA(5) MATRIX

--	--	-.330	--	--	--	--
-.220	--	.053	--	--	--	--
--	--	-.330	--	--	--	--
--	--	-.072	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

West: Multivariate Model

$$\Phi_1 W1_t = \theta_0 + (I - \theta_1 B - \theta_5 B^5) \alpha_t$$

CONSTANT VECTOR

PHI(1) VECTOR

CONSTRAINED

UNCONSTRAINED

-0.021	(0.153)	-0.082	(0.037)	-1.014	(0.304)
-0.021	(0.160)	-0.082	(0.037)	-0.847	(0.319)
-0.027	(0.133)	-0.082	(0.037)	-0.216	(0.310)
-0.025	(0.135)	-0.082	(0.037)	-0.137	(0.317)
-0.004	(0.143)	-0.082	(0.037)	-0.711	(0.319)
-0.012	(0.166)	-0.082	(0.037)	-1.122	(0.332)
0.250	(0.058)	--	---	--	---

ESTIMATES OF THETA(1) MATRIX

--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	-.032	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	-.022	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	-.052	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	-.162	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

ESTIMATES OF THETA(5) MATRIX

-.147	--	--	--	--	-.074	--
-.330	-.054	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	-.058	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
-.212	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

South-4: Multivariate Model

$$\hat{\Phi}_1 S1_t = \theta_0 + (I - \theta_1 B - \theta_3 B^3 - \theta_5 B^5) \alpha_t$$

CONSTANT VECTOR

PHI(1) VECTOR

CONSTRAINED

UNCONSTRAINED

0.009	(0.168)	-0.021	(0.037)	-0.561	(0.348)
0.016	(0.130)	-0.021	(0.037)	-0.539	(0.286)
-0.005	(0.159)	-0.021	(0.037)	-0.435	(0.340)
0.028	(0.159)	-0.021	(0.037)	-0.088	(0.356)
-0.033	(0.147)	-0.021	(0.037)	0.236	(0.328)
-0.002	(0.146)	-0.021	(0.037)	0.045	(0.321)
0.250	(0.058)	--	---	--	---

ESTIMATES OF THETA(1) MATRIX

-.084	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	-.060	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	-.103	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	-.096	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	-.098	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

ESTIMATES OF THETA(3) MATRIX

-.363	--	--	.020	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
-.390	--	.024	--	--	--	--
-.211	--	-.109	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

ESTIMATES OF THETA(5) MATRIX

.005	--	.009	--	-.177	.035	--
--	--	--	--	-.296	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--
.046	--	--	--	-.350	.022	--
--	--	--	--	--	--	--