

Reflections on Declining Crime in Chicago **by Wesley G. Skogan**


This report examines recent crime trends in Chicago. It describes what happened in the city, and addresses the issue of why crime has declined so precipitously. The drop in crime in the United States was one of the most important social facts of the late 20th Century, and, in many places, this decline has continued unabated in the 21st Century. However, the post-1991 drop in crime remains one of the least understood social facts of our time. Many studies of crime decline focus only on easily available measures, and none encompass the full range of explanations that have been advanced to explain it. Research conducted during the 1990s sometimes identified factors that could not explain the continued drop in crime in the 2000s. Studies of the “national” decline overlook the fact that violent crime is extremely concentrated in a few big cities, and that changing conditions there have extraordinary leverage over the crime rate for the nation as a whole.¹

The report draws upon the conclusions of this research plus well-established theories about the causes of crime. Where possible, it matches them up with data from Chicago for the 14-year period 1991-2005. The findings challenge some popular explanations for declining crime – for example, that it was due to the state’s growing prison population, an increase in the number of police, or the city’s improving economic fortunes. The data indicate these cannot account for much of the decline in crime in Chicago. Other explanations hew more closely to the facts, but in many instances there simply is not enough information to adequately test potentially important explanations for the decline of crime in Chicago. The potential influence of both an improvement in the quality (as opposed to quantity) of policing and the mobilization of communities around community policing and crime prevention fall in this category. Where appropriate, I have therefore added my own judgment about these matters to the mix of data and research, and in the conclusion I advance a scenario which might account for the post-1991 drop in crime in Chicago. There is also a discussion of what this review tells us about priorities for future research.

Crime Trends in Chicago

Crime peaked in Chicago in 1991, then began its long decline. By 2005, violent crime (which includes murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) declined by 59 percent. Property crime (burglary, property theft and auto theft) dropped by 43 percent. Figure 1 describes these trends. It presents crime totals rather than yearly crime rates, because the city’s population changed hardly at all during the 1990s.² As the Figure illustrates, the largest decline was in robbery, which went down by 64 percent. Robbery is seen by many as a bellwether indicator of urban trends, because it combines theft, risk to life and limb (a gun is often involved) and predatory intent. Homicide and sexual assault, the least frequent of the offenses presented here, are graphed on a separate scale so their trends are visible.³ Murder dropped by 52 percent, a decline that was magnified by a 2003-2004 dip of 25 percent.⁴ Sexual assault dropped 55 percent. The assault category encompasses many kinds of offenses, including domestic violence, gang battles, bar brawls, and outbursts of violence on school grounds, as well as disputes between neighbors. Aggravated assault (the most serious offenses in this category) dropped by 54 percent.

Figure 1: Crime Trends in Chicago, 1991-2005




In the property-crime category, auto theft was down by 52 percent. This offense is accurately reported by victims and recorded by police, due to the high value of the average loss and the fact that most cars and trucks are insured against theft. Stolen vehicles are also sometimes recovered, another reason to make accurate reports. Burglary also went down by 52, and burglaries just of residences and garages dropped by 50 percent.

There are other ways of classifying the same offenses, and some important alternate crime categories also registered substantial declines.⁵ An offense of special significance is gun crime, for in many ways it is gun use that differentiates American violence from that of other nations.⁶ Combining all offenses in which a firearm was used in some way, there was a 64 percent drop in the level of gun crime in Chicago. Another offense category that resonates with the public is “street crime.” To create a street-crime index, violent incidents of all kinds were classified by their location, to identify crimes that took place on the street or sidewalks, in alleys and parks, along the lakefront, or in parking lots and driveways. Crimes in this category declined by 55 percent between 1991 and 2004.

An important feature of the decline in crime in Chicago is that it was extremely widespread. Virtually every neighborhood in the city benefitted. The smallest geographical unit used by Chicago Police Department is the police beat. To gauge the breadth of the drop in crime, I calculated whether crime went up or down between 1991 and 2005 in each of the city’s 279 beats.⁷ Property crime went up in five beats and down in 274 beats. Violent crime went up in 16 beats (5.4 percent of the total) and declined in 263 beats. The only community areas with substantial percentage increases in violent crime over this period were Hegewisch, West Elsdon, West Lawn and Ashburn. Among the city’s 77 community areas, property crime went up (by 5 percent) only in Clearing.

Figure 2: Trends in Crime by Race, 1991-2005



Another way to describe the breadth of crime decline in Chicago is to group the city's police beats by their racial composition, based on the 1990 census.⁸ The resulting areas differ in size, so Figure 2 reports yearly rates of crime per 100,000 persons living in each. As it illustrates, crime declined most dramatically in African-American communities, where robbery dropped by 65 percent and homicide by 49 percent. Other trends there included a 53 percent drop in rape and a 38 percent decline in assault.

Robbery in principally white areas (where it was already quite low) dropped by 51 percent, while for Latinos the decline was 64 percent. Gun crime dropped by 65 percent in predominantly African-American areas, and it was down by 60 percent in heavily Latino beats. Burglary fell by 48 percent in largely African-American beats; for whites the comparable figure was also 48 percent, and for Latinos it was also 57 percent. On the other hand, motor vehicle theft (which is not shown here) dropped the most in predominantly white areas, by 63 percent, while it was down 38 percent in African-American beats and 58 percent in largely Latino areas. By the mid-2000s, Chicagoans in most neighborhoods had seen tremendous improvement in the quality of their lives, due to the broad-based nature of the drop in crime in the city. That said, the leveling off and even slightly increasing rate of crime in predominately African American beats evident in Figure 2 bears watching.

Finally, the magnitude of this decline can be further illustrated by calculating "what if?" numbers. These forecast what crime would have looked like if it had not dropped over the 1991 period and, instead, had remained at its 1991 level. For example, in the real world 10,803 persons were murdered during 1991-2005. However, if homicide had continued at its 1991 pace, by the end of 2005 the total would have been just over 13,900; another 3,100 people would have died. Other "what if" numbers are even greater. In that hypothetical world there would have been about 656,750 robbery victims rather than 382,200 robbery victims. There would have been 16,000 more sexual assaults, 250,000 more burglaries, and 222,000 more auto thefts, if crime had not dropped as it did. The decline in crime registered in Chicago over this 15-year period has had tremendous consequences for its residents.

But why did crime drop so precipitously? There has been a great deal of debate about this question, for Chicago is not the only city experiencing a substantial drop in crime during the

same period. Explanations for the decline in crime range from “a” (alcohol use, which is down) to “z” (zero tolerance policing, which is up). Some of these claims have been tested with data; other claims are based on relevant research but there are no data on them over time; and some reflect who has the microphone. The sections below examine most of the serious claims. Like all studies of this issue, the data to test some is more adequate than for others. Moreover, there is not always a correspondence between the quantity or quality of the data and the potential significance of the findings. Sometimes there is no data at all, but this is not evidence of the importance of the claim, but merely of what research has been funded and published. In each case, when I address a claim I will draw upon what we know from research on crime around the country as well as upon the data for Chicago. This may tell us something about the general effects of forces at work in Chicago, and this research will also be a source of the specific statistical estimates of the impact of well-researched causal factors on violent and property crime.

Demography

One of the most fundamental features of the kinds of crimes considered in this report is that offending is disproportionately concentrated among the young. Youths age 15-24 or so are by far the most likely to be arrested and to admit high levels of involvement in crime when they are interviewed by researchers. Because of the general aging of the American population during the 1990s – a result of the greying of the large post-WWII baby-boom generation – many have speculated the national drop in crime was due to a declining number of youths in high-risk age categories. This was particularly true during the early years of declining crime, when the size of the youth cohort was declining.⁹ However, toward the end of the 20th Century the 15-24 age group began to grow again, as the grandchildren of the boomers (the so-called “second echo” of the original baby boom) aged into higher-risk categories. During this period the growth of the 15-24 age cohort was touted by forecasters as putting new upward pressure on crime rates.¹⁰

Table 1: Trends in Age 1990-2000¹¹

age category	percent of the city's population		percent male	
	1990	2000	1990	2000
10-14	6.8% 190,488	6.9% 200,802	50.3	50.7
15-19	7.2 200,988	6.9 200,962	50.8	51.3
20-24	8.4 235,616	8.3 239,252	50.1	50.0
25-39	10.0 278,694	9.7 280,588	49.9	49.8
total age 15-24	15.6 436,604	15.1 440,214	50.4	50.1

Table 1 presents an age profile of Chicagoans in 1990 and again in 2000, a time period which brackets two-thirds of the decline in crime to date. As the Table indicates, the age

structure of the city's population changed only slightly during this span. There were proportionally fewer people in the highest-risk age category by 2000, but the difference was small. In absolute terms (remember that the city's population grew by 0.6 percent) the number of residents age 15-24 actually increased slightly. Of course, it is more accurately the number of young males in the population that is most significant, for they are far more likely to get in trouble. Table 1 illustrates that the city's gender distribution remained almost completely unchanged between 1990 and 2000.

None of the very small changes in the city's population described in Table 1 could account for a large drop in crime. But unlike the country as a whole, there was no significant increase in the number of young people beginning in the late 1990s, so this factor also did not place any upward pressure on the local crime rate. Note, too, the risk of females being arrested in Chicago has been on the increase, especially for violence. In 1991, 12 percent of arrestees for violent crimes were females, a figure that rose to over 20 percent by 2004. This matches closely a national trend.¹² Because of their numbers, any changes in offending rates among women are of great significance for the criminal justice system as well as for society.

Economic Conditions

Many have attributed the decline in crime to the vigor of the American economy, which grew steadily between 1993 and 2001. During that period unemployment fell nationwide by almost a third and real incomes rose for many groups. Declining unemployment plus an increase in the minimum wage during the 1990s contributed to increasing affluence at the low-income end of the economic spectrum. Research indicates both wages and employment possibilities primarily have their effect on crime in this end of the labor market. One study concluded that together they explained almost one-third of the national decline in crime during the 1990s.¹³ There may also be an effect of income inequality on crime, but this moved in the opposite direction during the 1990s, toward an increase in wealth at the upper end of the economic spectrum.¹⁴

Table 2: Citywide Trends in Poverty and Prosperity 1990-2000

	1990	2000		1990	2000
persons in poverty ¹⁵	21.6%	19.6%	female-headed	10.7%	10.0%
	592,298	556,791	households ¹⁶	109,821	105,705
families in poverty ¹⁷	18.3	16.6	high school	66.0	71.8
	116,641	105,752	graduates ¹⁸	1,153,871	1,304,122
owner-occupied	41.5	43.8	college graduates ²⁰	19.5	25.5
households ¹⁹	425,259	464,865	(age 25 and older)	339,862	462,783
median household			households below	25.6	26.6
income (adjusted to	\$34,433	\$38,625	\$20,000 (1999 dollars)	261,966	282,907
1999 dollars)					

However, the economic changes registered in Chicago over this period were a disappointing response to a near-decade of national good times, and they could not explain large decreases in crime. Chicagoans became better off, but not by much. Table 2 presents measures of

the extent of poverty and prosperity in Chicago 1990 and 2000, years that bracket much of the decline in crime.

As Table 2 indicates, poverty declined fractionally between 1990 and 2000. The percentage of all Chicagoans living below the poverty line dropped by two percentage points, so about 35,500 people were better off in 2000 than in 1990. The number of families in poverty dropped by only 1.7 percent. The proportion of households consisting of children living with single mothers (an important poverty measure) only went down 0.7 percent, and there were only 4,100 fewer of these extremely vulnerable families in 2000 than in 1990. Overall unemployment (which is not shown in Table 2) was also down a bit, from 11.3 percent in 1990 to 10.1 percent in 2000.²¹ In 1990, 1,207,000 Chicagoans were employed; in 2000 the total was 1,220,000, a gain of about 13,000 in the labor force. Adjusted for inflation, median household income (the point that splits the number of households in half) rose 12 percent, from just over \$34,000 to more than \$38,000 per year. This was a healthy 12 percent increase. However, in 2000 slightly more Chicagoans fell at or below a low-income cutoff of \$20,000 per year. Most of the economic improvement seen in the city was concentrated nearer the top of the income distribution. Over this period income inequality rose, because much of the growing affluence of the city was concentrated in the above-\$100,000 category.²²

Two prosperity-related measures are also included in Table 2: home ownership and education. Home ownership went up by only 2.3 percent over this period. On the other hand, between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of Chicagoans with a high school diploma rose from 66 percent to almost 72 percent, and the percentage of college graduates rose an impressive six percentage points. By 2000, the number of Chicagoans who were not high school graduates had declined by more than 81,000. However, these slight-to-modest changes for the better in the economic health of the city were unlikely to have accounted for the tremendous decline in crime registered in Chicago.

But criminologists know that it is more important to look at the economic condition of youths. As noted above, crime is a young persons' game, and crime rates are likely to be most sensitive to changes in opportunities in the legitimate labor market for young people.²³ Staying in school is also important. Compared to school leavers, students who remain in school get into much less trouble with the law, and they are much more likely to succeed in the job market as young adults. Most of the crime considered in this report is committed by young men with little education, few skills, and a checkered job history. The left-hand panel of Table 3 examines trends for a key group of youths, those age 16-19. Persons in this age group are in the midst of choosing between remaining in school and searching for a job. The latter may have already found a job or dropped out of the labor force in discouragement. Between 1990 and 2000 there were only very tiny changes in the economic condition of youths age 16-19. In 2000 they were a little more likely to still be in school or working, and they were slightly less likely to be unemployed or to have dropped out of the labor force. These changes were positive, but they were very small in magnitude.

Table 3: Economic Trends Among Youths, 1990-2000

percent of civilian labor force*, age 16-19 ²⁴	1990	2000	percent of persons in poverty, by age ²⁵	1990	2000
in school	72.6%	73.4%	age 12-17	31.0%	26.6%
	118,408	119,239		70,234	61,332
working	10.4	10.8	age 18-24	24.4	24.0
	17,042	17,577		73,510	73,394
unemployed but	5.3	5.0			
looking for a job	8,594	8,090			
labor force drop-out	11.5	10.8			
	18,688	17,513			

*Note: this table does not include a very small number of armed forces members. In principle this table includes locally incarcerated youths in the “not in labor force” category, but they may not be represented with much accuracy.


The right-hand panel of Table 3 examines changes in youth poverty during the 1990s. In 2000, Chicagoans age 12-17 were less likely to be living in poverty; in fact, there were almost 9,000 fewer poor children in this category. However, among youths 18-24 (the age group at highest risk of serious offending) there was no progress at all. There is no evidence of shifts in prosperity among youths that were large enough to account for declining crime in Chicago during the 1990s.²⁶ To the contrary, the real news is the high level of youth poverty in both decades, among both age groups. Even in 2000 about one-quarter of all the city’s young people were poor.

Incarceration

One of the liveliest debates concerning crime policy is over the impact of mounting national incarceration rates. In June 2005, 2.9 million people were locked up nationally, three-quarters of them in prisons and the remainder in city and county jails. Analysts differ in their methodologies, but in the main, they attribute somewhere between one quarter and one third of the decline in crime to prisons alone.²⁷

Prison and jail populations grew locally as well. Figure 3 illustrates trends in the number of Illinois’ prisoners from Chicago, and the population of the county jail.²⁸ The former is an estimate, based on county prisoner counts and arrests. Between 1991 and 2005 the number of state prisoners from Cook County grew by 35 percent, and the average yearly jail population expanded by 38 percent. Projecting the effect of these incarceration figures requires an estimate of the number of state prisoners who are sent from Chicago itself. I based this estimate on yearly city-county arrest ratios for serious crimes.²⁹ For example, in recent years this ratio has been about 2/3 from the city versus 1/3 from the remainder of the county. Second, I used the findings of research on the extent to which imprisoning offenders impacts crime. Prisons (and to a lesser extent jails; see below) influence crime rates through the reduction in crime that occurs because inmates cannot commit offenses while behind bars. The deterrent effect of fear of going to prison also keeps people from offending in the first place, or from re-offending in the future. There has been some research on the impact of yearly changes in incarceration rates on crime which can be applied to Chicago’s prison population, to see how that could affect the next year’s crime rate.

Figure 3: Prisoners and Jail Inmates, 1991-2005




Estimates of the prison incarceration effect vary from place to place, crime to crime, and study to study. However, the consensus figure is about 20 percent of the increase or decrease in prison populations is translated to subsequent changes in the property crime rate.³⁰ For violent crime, the most commonly-discussed figures are 15 percent and 20 percent. Both estimates will be used here.³¹

Figure 4 summarizes crime trends predicted using these formulas. It presents both the actual violent crime figures and the level of crime predicted by changes in estimated prison incarceration rates for the city, using crime in 1991 as the starting point. As the Figure illustrates, by any account changes in the size of the prison population in Illinois could explain only a fraction of the decline in crime registered in Chicago. The number of prisoners in Illinois increased by 64 percent between 1991 and 2005. However, in part because crime in Chicago was dropping faster than elsewhere in the state and in the remainder of Cook County, Chicago's estimated prisoner count grew by only 35 percent between 1991 and 2005. Relying on past research, this change in incarceration levels probably translated into a 5 percent drop in property crime during the period, and to a 5 percent to 7 percent decline in violent crime. Projections in the Figure that are based on these assumptions are the "minimum impact" estimate and the "maximum impact estimate" of the effect of incarceration on violent crime in Chicago.³² The disjuncture between estimates of the impact of incarceration and the 60 percent decrease in recorded violence between 1991 and 2005 is apparent.

What estimates of the impact of prison could have accounted for the actual drop in crime? Because the best minimum and maximum estimates of the impact of prison on Chicago crime incorporate assumptions about the impact of prison, the Figure also presents the implications of making an assumption that would closely fit the decline in crime during the first part of the period considered here. With 1991 as a starting point, the "maxi" forecast presented there assumes that 100 percent of yearly changes in the city's prison head count were translated into crime reduction. However, even this maximal estimate, which lies far outside the bounds of what data and theory indicates is likely, fails to track Chicago's declining violent crime rate after the late 1990s. It further illustrates that changing levels of incarceration could not account for the continued drop in Chicago crime during the 2000s, because Illinois' prisons stopped growing and the city's share of the now-stagnant inmate population kept dropping. The State's head count

Figure 4: Violent Crime Forecast From Prison Population, 1992-2005



peaked in 2001 at 45,630, dropped to 43,140 in 2002, and stood at just over 44,700 in 2005. All of the statewide growth in prisons since 1991 had occurred by the year 2000. Chicago's (estimated) prisoner count peaked in 1999 at 18,400, after which the city's share of state prisoners began to decline even more sharply. None of these trends line up with the continued drop in crime in the city, which has persisted for at least another half-decade. Incarceration was a widely trumpeted solution to the crime problem during a period when prisons were

expanding and crime was dropping, but crime in Chicago continued to drop sharply even after the State's enthusiasm for incarceration waned.


Growth in the county's jail population also could not account for the decline in crime. Research on crime reduction has focused on prisons, but many of those arrested by the police serve at most a short jail sentence. Jails are places of short-term confinement, and inmates come and go rapidly.³³ In the course of a year the Cook County jail admits as many as nine times the number of people it holds at any one time. Some admittees go on to prison. However, most are either quickly released on bail, diverted to an electronic monitoring or day reporting program, returned to community programs, or are fairly promptly sentenced to the time they have already served. There has been no applicable research on the preventive effects of jail on city crime rates. However, during the 1990s and 2000s there was a considerable increase in Cook County's inmate population; the numbers were presented in Figure 4 above. During virtually the entire period the jail population has been space driven, expanding as new facilities are opened but perennially crowded beyond its designed capacity. Inmates have been sleeping on the floor at the jail on a continuous basis since 1988. Between 1991 and 2005 successive expansions of the jail plus systematic overcrowding led to a 38 percent increase in its average daily population, from 7,590 to 10,572 inmates.³⁴ Because the number of persons arrested for personal and property offenses in Chicago was declining during the same period, in the aggregate the jail was receiving an increasing percentage of those arrested, which could have increased its deterrent effectiveness. However, even using a generous estimate of the deterrent impact of a spell in jail, the rise in the county's inmate population could not explain much of the decline in crime in the city, predicting at most a 2.6 percent drop in violence and a 3 percent decline in property offenses.³⁵

There are issues about prisons that need to be watched carefully. The first is the adverse impact of the removal of large numbers of men from already fragile communities. While their (temporary) disappearance may lend some degree of safety to the community, it is not without cost. Their stigma gets transferred to family, friends, and to the community as a whole. Breadwinners are lost; and many families have to reorganize and build new care networks if they are to survive. Children go fatherless, spousal relationships become unglued, and everyone may suffer a loss of self-worth and self-esteem.³⁶ The return of large numbers of ex-offenders in turn further undermines the community, increasing the concentration of poverty, alienation from legal institutions, cynicism regarding conventional authority, and the stigma associated with “reentry recycling.”³⁷ The fate of those who are released from prison is also a critical issue. As the prison population has stabilized, the number of inmates being released each year now approximates the number admitted. The numbers are large: in the year ending June 2002, 38,000 adults were released, and in 2005 it was 39,200.³⁸ How many have returned to Chicago over time is unknown, but a 2004 study found that 54 percent of a sample of adult releasees (or almost 20,000 of them) were returning to Chicago.³⁹ Their fate could exercise a great deal of influence on trends in crime. Generally the fate of recently released inmates is strongly tied to the well-being of the communities to which they return. In Chicago, this has disproportionally been to some of the city’s most disadvantaged neighborhoods.⁴⁰ There are only limited programs for recent returnees, yet they have to succeed on the job market fairly quickly if they are to avoid getting into trouble again. However, their employment prospects are poor, and many do not succeed. The three-year recidivism rate for releasees from Illinois’ prisons is about 40 percent, and the five-year rate is 54 percent.⁴¹

Policing


Increasing incarceration rates are not the only widely-touted explanation for declining crime. Beginning in the 1990s, police leaders joined politicians in stepping forward to claim a share of the credit. Many cities tried to hire more police, facilitated by the Crime Act of 1994, which set aside federal funds to support police salaries. Police chiefs also claimed credit because, they argued, they were policing “smarter.” They were focusing their efforts on crime hot spots, using computer technology to identify crime trends, and adopting community policing programs that brought them more cooperation from the neighborhoods they served.

A claim which can be evaluated is that increasing the size of the police force helped account for declining crime during the 1990s and 2000s. Figure 5 traces the growth of the Chicago Police Department over this period. The number of police officers in Chicago increased from 12,132 to 13,423, or 10.6 percent. Most of the increase was during the 1990s. The number of police in the city peaked in 1999 (at this point it was up by 13 percent) and then declined a bit. In light of the cost of adding officers to the force, this represented a significant financial commitment by the city.



How much of a decrease in crime could we expect from an increase in the number of police officers of this magnitude? There is not a clear consensus on the point, but I will use prominently recommended estimates of 43 percent for violent crime and 50 percent for property crime.⁴² Figure 6 compares trends in reported violent and property crime with the levels predicted by these formulae.⁴³ As the Figure indicates, a 10 percent increase in the size of the police force, when half or less of that change is translated into a reduction in

crime, cannot explain the overall trend in crime in the city during the 1990s and 2000s. Based on these calculations, growth in the number of police could account for only about 4.4 percent of the decline in violent crime and 5.1 percent of the drop in property crime. This was far from the dip Chicagoans actually enjoyed over this period. Furthermore, the number of police serving Chicago peaked in 1999 and was essentially stable after that. Crime, on the other hand, dropped just as quickly in the 2000s as it had in the 1990s.



Presumably, increased and perhaps more effective policing have much of their effect on crime through the ability of the police to apprehend offenders. Some fraction of the deterrent effect of policing is through the experience – or fear – of being arrested and possibly spending some time in behind bars. The principal determinant of how many people are arrested in Chicago is the amount of crime. As a result, as crime declined so did violent and property crime arrests. To account for this, Figure 5

(presented earlier) accounted for declining crime by presenting trends in the ratio of arrests to crimes. For example, in 1991 Chicago police arrested about 55,200 property crime offenders, while in the same year that they recorded just over 231,000 property crimes, for a ratio of .24. By this measure, property crime offenders were at about the same risk of being arrested throughout the course of the 1990s. But in the 2000s that risk diminished somewhat. Police kept even with violent crime during the 1990s as well, but then did a bit better during the 2000s, as the ratio of arrests to crimes in that category went up noticeably. Because of the virtually automatic connection between the number of crimes and some large fraction of arrests, there are no consensus estimates of how arrests independently affect the crime rate. It is notable that violent crime had leveled off in the years prior to 2003, then began to drop again at the same time as this measure of arrest effectiveness went up. However, police arrest effectiveness remained relatively unchanged for most of this period. In the violent crime category the arrests-to-crime ratio rose only recently, after years of declining crime, so arrest effectiveness probably could not account for much of the steady drop in crime over the entire period.

Did crime go down because police were policing more intelligently? The world of policing was in ferment throughout the period considered here. It was a time during which both new policing strategies and refinements on tried-and-true tactics promised more effectiveness. Some of the tactical refinements included focused hot spot policing and increasing sophistication in the timing and management of traditional crackdowns on street drug markets. Focused patrols and traffic stops aimed specifically at reducing gun carrying became more prominent. Targeted “quality of life policing,” which calls for aggressive arrest policies to counter seemingly minor crimes such as public drinking, graffiti writing and panhandling, was credited by some as a theory-driven approach to reducing more serious crime.⁴⁴ Even aggressive traffic enforcement has been shown to deter crime across large samples of cities.⁴⁵ Identifying and taking action at locations that are the source of repeat calls for police assistance became routine. Problem solving policing became more popular, especially projects linking police with health, safety, housing and other service and regulatory agencies, for this provided them with new tools for addressing chronic concentrations of crime. Around the country, all of these efforts were increasingly guided by sophisticated police information systems that helped managers discover and respond more nimbly to opportunities to prevent crime. Information technology was increasingly employed by managerial accountability systems (such as New York City’s famous “CompStat” process) that put new pressure on police leaders to perform effectively. Collectively, these strategic initiatives were characterized as the “smarter policing” of the 1990s and later. Many attribute the drop in crime to increasing police effectiveness during this era. Community policing, which had its roots in the 1980s, also rose to prominence during the 1990s; its possible role in reducing crime will be considered in a later section of this report, under community factors.⁴⁶

These programs and others were adopted in Chicago. By the early 2000s, Chicago police had developed a managerial system and computer resources that could support a focus on crime hot spots and make better use of gang intelligence. District and unit commanders are held responsible for identifying and responding effectively to emerging crime patterns, including at review sessions held weekly at police headquarters. The plan is to “put cops on the dots” identified using the department’s information technology and gang intelligence. Beginning in

2004, more than 500 officers are assigned to two special squads that are deployed from headquarters on a short-term basis to anticipated trouble spots, in order to interrupt violence before it breaks out or spreads further. Other units aggressively arrest and question offenders in the vicinity of recent shootings, pressing them to identify the shooters and the sources for guns. Officially designated gang and drug hot spots (there are currently about 90) are a special focus; in 2004 police dispersed more than 53,000 individuals and made 314 arrests in these areas.⁴⁷ Roadside safety checks and saturation patrols routinely flood areas identified as crime hot spots. Each year police gather information during several hundred thousand traffic stops that do not result in an arrest or citation, for use as an investigative database. Most recently, remotely controlled cameras have been placed on more than a hundred utility poles around the city in order to monitor street drug markets. Narcotics teams have shifted their focus to building complex cases against networks of dealers and wholesale distributors, using criminal conspiracy charges. Earlier Chicago made a great deal of progress in focusing city health and safety inspections and the delivery of municipal services on problem buildings and neighborhoods. Police officers also participate in multi-agency teams to conduct strategically targeted code violation inspections. In the second half of the 1990s, an aggressive campaign was launched against trouble-making establishments that sell liquor. “Vote dry” campaigns at election time, aggressive inspections, and successful strategies to revoke the licenses of offending merchants have increased the orderliness of the liquor distribution business. As early as 1993, the patrol division began to fundamentally reorganize how officers went about their daily business. Hundreds of teams of officers were formed and assigned particular beats. The 911 dispatching system was reconfigured to keep teams working in their own areas. Officers, and later thousands of neighborhood residents, were trained in problem solving techniques during the mid-1990s. Over much of the period there was increasing coordination between Chicago police and other state and federal enforcement agencies. A 2005 report by the University of Illinois details many of these innovations.⁴⁸

The difficulty is finding ways to measure the breadth and depth of these diverse efforts over the post-1990 era, in order to capture their contribution to the local drop in crime. Broadly-focused national or multi-city studies do not even attempt to do this because there are no convenient over-time data on the quality, as opposed to quantity, of policing.⁴⁹ A recent review of research on policing finds evidence supporting the effectiveness of many of the highly focused policing efforts described here, but those conclusions are based on the findings of city-by-city experiments and evaluations.⁵⁰ Research on the drop in crime focuses on the number of police, but it is surely what police do, rather than how many are on the payroll, that has an impact on the street. As the review above suggested, there is no reason to think what police do has stayed the same over time. But even a single-city focus does not yield the right information for making a statistical estimate of the impact of the quality of policing. As I indicated, the upward shift in “arrest effectiveness” illustrated in Figure 5 is consistent with my description of changing police strategies, but it is far from definitive evidence that those innovations were effective. And, there are other difficulties. The drop in crime in Chicago began well before the innovations described above, and it began three years before the citywide implementation of the city’s community policing program. This does not mean that these efforts could not have helped later. Chicago crime continued to drop well into the 2000s, while the decline faltered in some larger cities after


2000. (For example, Detroit, Philadelphia, Dallas and Phoenix are cities where homicide began to trend the wrong direction in the new millennium.) In the conclusion I will consider the possibility that different factors could come into play at different points during the fairly long time period considered here, and policing strategies could be among them. But the bottom line is that there is an absence of evidence concerning the aggregate, over-time impact of innovations in policing in Chicago.

Drugs, Guns and Gangs

This section examines the impact of three highly interrelated features of crime in America: drugs, guns and gangs. There is good reason to consider them together, for they are interrelated and together lie at the core of big-city crime problems.

Drugs. A popular explanation for the decline in crime which began in the early 1990s was an apparent waning of interest in crack cocaine. It is argued that a crack cocaine epidemic during the late 1980s fueled an expansion of street drug markets. This in turn precipitated wars among gangs over control of these markets, with a subsequent widespread diffusion of guns for both offensive and defensive purposes. Young men in big cities were in particular drawn into the drugs-gangs-guns nexus. Killings by them (and of them) accounted for much of the upsurge in violence that characterized the late 1980s. Then, it is argued, the crack market changed. What supposedly happened remains vague: crack markets are variously described as “maturing,” “stabilizing,” “waning,” “ebbing,” “becoming less lucrative,” and facing “diminished demand.” However, broad multi-city studies typically do not have much independent information on drugs at all. Their conclusions may draw more on the observed drop in crime and the changing profile of homicide victims and offenders they are explaining, rather than on information about real

Figure 7: Trends in Drug Arrests, 1991-2005




changes in drug markets.⁵¹ Changes in drug markets may also affect crime through their impact on individual consumers. Drug abuse certainly remains at high levels among those arrested for violent and property crimes. In 2000, 76 percent of arrestees for non-drug offenses in Chicago tested positive for one or more of five major illicit drug groups. This was the highest percentage among the 35 cities studied.⁵² Research on temporary police crackdowns on drug markets indicates one of their effects is to increase

the frequency of robberies and burglaries nearby, presumably because a sharply constricted supply leads to upward spikes in drug prices.⁵³ Long-term studies have also documented that expanding heroin use leads to higher robbery rates.⁵⁴

One difficulty with assessing the waning crack market argument is that the character and extent of drug markets is difficult to measure. The police primarily work with the data presented here on drug arrests. This is an enforcement measure, reflecting where and how police conduct their investigations, but there is some evidence that drug arrests broadly mirror the distribution of drug markets.⁵⁵ Figure 7 charts trends in drug markets in Chicago, based on drug arrests.⁵⁶ The findings do not neatly conform to the contention that violence dropped in response to waning interest in crack cocaine. Rather, the ability of police to find crack dealers peaked in 1998, years after crime began its precipitous decline. It also did not decline very much. In 2004 there were still five times as many crack cocaine arrests as in 1991, and the situation probably still deserved the label “epidemic.” Heroin arrests also rose rather than fell during much of the 1990s. They peaked in 1998 and 2000, but the trend in heroin arrests was essentially flat after 1996. Arrests for marijuana soared through the entire period. By 2005, marijuana accounted for 45 percent of all drug arrests. Powder cocaine arrests dropped in parallel with crime through 1997, but then leveled off at a low ebb for the remainder of the period. In short, during this 14-year decline in property and violent crime, crack cocaine seemingly increased rather than decreased in popularity, and trends in the other components of the drug market mix in Chicago also did not neatly fit the “receding epidemic” theory of drug-related violence that has been advanced to explain national crime trends.

Figure 8: Trends in Drug Treatment Episodes, 1992-2004



When measuring trends in drug crime, the major alternative to police arrest reports is data on emergency room treatments and drug-related deaths. The figures are assembled by a federal office which orchestrates reports by a network of local health agencies.⁵⁷ Data for the Chicago area include all of Cook County. Similarly to urine tests of arrestees, emergency drug treatment data point to comparatively high levels of drug use in and around Chicago. In 2001, for example, Cook County ranked second among 21 large metropolitan areas in the rate

at which individuals were admitted for heroin-related health emergencies, and it ranked at the

very top for cocaine-related admissions. Cocaine admissions were almost 9 times as frequent in Chicago as in San Diego; they were four times as frequent as in Washington, DC, and 1.7 times as frequent as in New York City.⁵⁸


Like police arrests, trends in emergency room treatment do not neatly fit the “receding epidemic” theory of drug abuse. The data are presented in Figure 8. Unlike arrests, cocaine-related emergency room episodes declined substantially – by more than 65 percent – between 1991 and 1997. Incidents involving combinations of drugs and alcohol followed a parallel track. However, after 1997 both measures of drug abuse turned sharply upward, and by 2004 emergency room episodes involving cocaine and drug-alcohol combinations were as frequent as they had been in 1991. Over the same period, marijuana and heroin-related health emergencies skyrocketed, rising 520 percent and 157 percent, respectively. Treatment episodes for methamphetamine abuse also rose dramatically, by 260 percent. Because this trend began at a low base, the figures for 2004 were still relatively low, but they deserve careful attention in the future. Overall, trends in emergency room treatment do not paint a picture that corresponds to trends in personal and violent crime, which dropped continuously over the entire period.⁵⁹

What is certain is that there was a tremendous over-all increase in the number of drug-related arrests over this period. Between 1991 and 1998 the number of drug arrests in the city rose from 21,450 to 58,500, a 173 percent increase. After stabilizing, the drug arrest total rose a bit more, exceeding 59,000 by 2004. This growing number of arrests is particularly startling in light of the declining number of arrests in many other categories, reflecting the drop in crime. In 1991, drugs accounted for 9 percent of all the non-traffic arrests made by Chicago police; by 2004 drug offenses accounted for 30 percent of all non-traffic arrests in Chicago. An important reason why Illinois’ inmate population shrunk as little as it did in the face of steadily declining violent and property crime was this new source of prisoners. Another feature of this shift in crime control was that virtually all of these new arrests targeted African-Americans. In 2004, 79 percent of all drug arrestees were African Americans. Between 1991 and 2004, the number of Latino drug arrestees rose from 4,000 to 7,600, while the number of white arrestees rose from 3,150 to 4,780. For African Americans the total rose from less than 28,000 to more than 46,000.⁶⁰ When multiplied by the racially disproportionate prosecution, sentencing and incarceration that takes place further downstream in the criminal justice system, this shifting enforcement pattern has helped give Illinois one of the most racially disproportionate prison systems in the nation.⁶¹

Guns. Gun availability and use also plays an independent role in increasing the severity – and perhaps the rate – of violent crime. Guns intensify the consequences of violent encounters, because they increase the likelihood of death.⁶² They may also increase the overall frequency of crime somewhat, because some crimes – high-payoff commercial, cargo and bank robberies come first to mind – simply are not practical to carry out without a gun. However, the statistical evidence is that it is the severity of injury and risk of death, not the general frequency of offenses, that is driven by the availability of firearms.⁶³ Increasing semiautomatic handgun use was the most important component driving overall homicide rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Locally, “... the proportion of all firearm homicides in Chicago that were committed with semiautomatic pistols rose from 23 percent in 1985 to 60 percent in 1993.”⁶⁴

As noted earlier, between 1991 and 2004 there was a 64 percent decline in the number of gun crimes Chicago. It is impossible to tell whether this reflects a decline in the availability of guns to criminals, but I doubt that. Rather, it is more likely that the readiness of Chicagoans to carry guns declined. This is signaled by two related trends of the 1990s and 2000s. First, the number of guns seized by Chicago police dropped by 54 percent. Guns are seized under a variety of circumstances that empower police to make lawful searches. These range from traffic and pedestrian stops to arrests for committing other crimes, so seizures reflect what police were finding among the substantial segment of the population that came under suspicion during this period. A second trend was a 64 percent decline in arrests for weapons violations recorded in Chicago between 1991 and 2005. Suspects are charged this way when they are found in possession of a gun but other more significant criminal charges cannot be laid against them, including robbery, rape or assault. This is another measure of gun carrying, and it too evidenced a remarkable decline during the period considered here.

Figure 9: Trends in Gun and Non-Gun Crime, 1991-2005



However, the decline in violent crime in Chicago was not simply a story about decreased carrying of guns. The decline in gun crime was generally matched by trends in other forms of violence. This is illustrated in Figure 9, which charts trends in gun-related and non-gun crimes. As it indicates, gun and non-gun robbery dropped at roughly the same pace over this period, by 68 percent and 61 percent respectively. Assaults with a gun dropped more rapidly than mayhem inflicted with fists or other weapons, but non-gun murder


(down 61 percent) declined much further than gun-related homicides (down 47 percent). The latter is due to the very heavy involvement of gangs in gun-related killings, and gang-related crime has proven less tractable than other forms of violence.⁶⁵

Gangs. Gangs are certainly another important cause of crime. We used to call them “youth gangs,” but they have changed in character. During the 1980s, massive adult joblessness among African-Americans extended the age profile of active gang members, because burgeoning drug markets provided them with a new way to make a living. Since then, members returning from prison have begun to rely on their old gangs for employment in the trade.⁶⁶ Currently, perhaps one quarter of those released from Illinois’ prisons are gang members, and their risk of recidivism is higher than others.⁶⁷ Compared to gangs in other cities, Chicago’s are very large and stable, highly structured with clear vertical lines of authority, and maintain tight internal

discipline. There are pipelines for moving their profits into the legitimate economy, to help fend off the tax authorities. They have strong ties to the city's political organizations as well.⁶⁸

One of the functions of gangs is to recruit new members and steer them into the organization's criminal enterprises. Chicago powerful street gangs are deeply implicated in drugs, gambling, extortion, theft, gun smuggling, re-marketing valuable parts from stolen cars, financing gypsy cabs, selling "protection" from rival gangs, and other businesses requiring staff. Another role of gangs is to recruit replacements for members who have been arrested and incarcerated. This contributes to a sad spiral of increasing overall criminality as a consequence of law enforcement efforts, particularly in the drug business. Third, they cause crime to the extent to which they foster inter-gang and intra-gang violence, for on occasion they also make war on one another. Estimates of the number of gangs and gang members vary. By one account, in 2003 the city was home to 68 gangs split among 600 factions, with a total of perhaps 68,000 members.⁶⁹ A 1990 study set the number at 40 serious street gangs with 36,000 members.⁷⁰

Figure 10: Trends in Gang and Non-Gang Homicide, 1991-2005



Like drug offenses, evidence of the rise and fall of gang crime comes primarily through the investigative efforts of the police. When they are able to identify "whodunnit" in murders and assaults, Chicago police have a well developed and conservative scheme for classifying crimes as gang related. Trends in gang and non-gang homicides are presented in Figure 10. In 1991, gangs were linked to 16 percent of homicides, and overall only 2 percent of all crimes involving a gun that year were classified as gang

related. Since, trends in gang crime have only sometimes matched those for non-gang crimes. Murders that did not involve a gang dropped steadily during the 1990s; by 1999, non-gang murders were down by more than 62 percent and all non-gang gun crimes by 59 percent. Gang-related violence beat a different path. Gang killings rose 260 percent between 1991 and 1994, slid back to their 1991 level by 2000, and then spiked again in 2001 and 2002. By 2005, gang-related homicide had subsided to its 1991 level, which was progress given their roller coaster course during that period. But because non-gang homicide had fallen more precipitously, the gang-related fraction became more visible. By 2005, gang killings made up 35 percent of all homicides, more than double their proportion a decade-and-a-half earlier.⁷¹

As these findings suggest, gang homicide is different, and so probably are its solutions. While the many social and economic factors discussed here may have played a role in steadily declining levels of non-gang crime, a significant fraction of crimes are rooted specifically in the organizational dynamics and business environment of the city's violent street gangs. In the first three months of 2006, for example, more than 60 percent of all homicides were gang-related. In this world, disputes over honor and status have violent outcomes. One attack leads to another. Killings lead to retaliatory killings, and violence ripples through the community, ricocheting among organizations. Within gangs, violence is exercised in order to impose discipline, collect street taxes, and maintain the standing of power-holders (as when former kingpins return from prison demanding their share). Between gangs, violence is a tool for settling disputes over drug markets and control of other illicit enterprises, and those too can escalate into retaliatory spirals.⁷² It was because of the resulting spike in gang homicide in the early 2000s that Chicago named a police chief who emphasizes targeting the seemingly intractable drugs-guns-gangs nexus at the heart of the city crime problem.

Community Factors

A significant fraction of all criminological research focuses on the role of community factors in controlling crime. They range from the strength of informal bonds of trust among neighbors to organized crime prevention efforts by community groups. Communities struggle to control crime on several different levels. At the most private, neighborhoods vary in the strength of family values and the ability of parents to socialize and control youths. At another level lies shared norms and trust among neighbors, and a willingness in the community to intervene when things go wrong. Together, widespread trust and willingness to intervene make up what is known as "collective efficacy," which is a community factor strongly linked to levels of crime. High crime communities suffer from disrupted networks of friendship, kinship and acquaintanceship, which limits their capacity for mutual informal coordination and cooperation. Informal "pro-social" interventions and effective sanctioning behaviors are much weaker in these areas. Structural disadvantages, such as concentrated poverty and residential turnover, hurt communities in particular at the private and informal levels of cooperation. At another level of social control lies the groups and organizations which make up civil society. There is some evidence a strong infrastructure of organizations can sustain a community's capacity for self-healing social action. Controlling for other things, residents of these communities are seen as more likely to take action and intervene, compensating somewhat for weakened informal ties among neighbors in areas where organizations are still strong.⁷³

Decades of research have demonstrated how community factors are powerful determinants of levels of crime. However, little is known about whether community factors waxed or waned during the 1990s and 2000s, nor the extent to which changes in community factors are linked to changes in levels of officially recorded crime. In the main, collective efficacy is strongest in stable, white home-owning neighborhoods in Chicago,⁷⁴ but the size of that population shrank rather than expanded during the 1990s.⁷⁵ Research on community factors typically stresses their complex and multifaceted character, and much of this research relies on specially-collected local data. None of the prominent studies of recent crime trends have taken

any notice at all of community factors. This void is certainly due in large measure to the absence of any national, over-time data on them. For example, there is vigorous debate over whether organizational involvement by Americans has gone up or down.⁷⁶ Community has not figured in studies of the decline in crime because this large body of research does not lend itself to one or two index numbers which can be included in statistical models testing their role relative to other potentially important determinants of crime trends.

On the other hand, Chicago has been home to a mammoth social experiment in regenerating the capacity of communities to act locally against crime. One of the goals of its community policing program has been to foster civic involvement by residents. Through its community meetings, rallies, and problem-solving projects, police have tried to serve as a catalyst for restoring the public's ownership over public space and activating the very informal control mechanisms that have been the focus of criminological research.

One intervention was the inauguration of monthly gatherings of small groups of residents and police officers. These began on an experimental basis in 20 percent of the city in 1993. By early 1995 police were holding neighborhood meetings in church basements and park buildings all over Chicago. In the city's plan, beat meetings are the principal mechanism for building and sustaining closer coordination between police and the general public. The meetings provide a forum for exchanging information, and a venue for identifying, analyzing and prioritizing problems in an area. They are a very convenient place to distribute announcements about upcoming community events, circulate petitions, and call for volunteers to participate in action projects. As they have evolved, beat meetings have also become a venue for regular reports by police to the community on what they had done since the last meeting about the problems they had discussed.




Figure 11 charts trends in beat meeting participation between 1995 and 2003. The left axis reports monthly attendance counts, while the right axis presents the cumulative total of attendees since community policing became a citywide program. Chicagoans attended beat meetings 59,200 times during 1995 and on nearly 61,120 occasions during 1996. In 1999, it was 67,100, and in 2000, 66,260 turned out for beat meetings. In 2003, 60,000 people attended a total of 2,888 beat meetings, and by the end of

that year city residents had cumulatively attended beat meetings on more than 582,000 occasions. Importantly, beat meeting attendance rates have proven to be highest in the poorest, highest-crime areas of town, in places where many other mechanisms for tackling neighborhood problems do not work very effectively.⁷⁷

The city's community policing plan is also meant to involve the public directly in neighborhood problem solving efforts. During the mid-1990s, thousands of civilians were trained in problems solving, in parallel with the new training that was delivered to more than 9,000 patrol division officers. A civilian agency was created to generate support for problem solving projects, start block clubs, and turn people out for monthly beat meetings. More than 40 percent of residents surveyed at beat meetings reported getting involved in fairly aggressive activities, including marches, prayer vigils, neighborhood patrols, and stand-ups and smoke-outs in troubled areas. Even more popular is attending assemblies and forums, working to organize neighborhood groups, and contacting public officials to get action on local problems; 64 percent of beat meeting participants got involved in these activities. Just as important, like beat meeting attendance, public involvement in problem solving has been most frequent where it is needed the most, in high-crime, drug-ridden neighborhoods.⁷⁸ During the 1990s, Chicagoans of all races regularly reported more positive views of the police, which may have also increased police effectiveness.⁷⁹

Have the neighborhood mobilization components of Chicago's community policing program had an effect on crime? There is only very limited over-time data on the strength of community factors. When the findings of surveys conducted in 1995 and in 2003 are compared, the intervention capacity of Chicago's neighborhoods rose very modestly. The perception that residents of their neighborhood would intervene pro-socially to break up a fight rose from 20 to 28 percent; and that they would intervene to prevent vandalism rose from 33 to 45 percent. Survey reports of block club membership rose by about five percentage points, to 19 percent.⁸⁰ These survey results varied from area to area within the city, so they could be compared with changes in recorded crime over the same period. Depending on the type of crime, increases in the intervention capacity of beats were correlated -.2 to -.4 with declining crime; the same was true of variations in the extent to which the organizational involvement of residents grew over time. Crime also declined more than most in areas with higher beat meeting turnout rates; the correlation between beat meeting turnout and changes in violence and burglary rates ranged -.3 to -.4. These findings are far from definitive, but they directly measure changes in community factors over time, and they are among the best evidence that changes in community mobilization sparked by the city's community policing program have contributed – modestly – to the decline in crime.⁸¹

Other Programs

Hope VI and Public Housing. In a social experiment of even greater magnitude, Chicago has also been knocking down much of its public housing. Between 1999 and 2005 the number of occupied units in family housing complexes dropped by 45 percent. This put the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) at the mid-point in a planned \$1.6 billion program of demolition and rebuilding. Of course, the residents have not gone away; demolition has redistributed them somewhat, but most former residents appear to have stayed in the city. The extent to which their lives have taken a turn for the better is variable; however, there is room for optimism. Chicago residents leaving family high-rise projects with housing vouchers have succeeded in moving to safer and somewhat better off areas with better-performing schools.⁸² There is broad agreement the concentration of poverty created by massive public housing developments in itself had bad consequences which were independent of the characteristics of the families living there. Gangs, drugs and guns were an everyday feature of the lives of many residents, and there were few places to hide.⁸³ Now many of those developments are gone. Crime in and around Chicago Housing Authority buildings is in rapid retreat. There has been significant new construction and appreciating house prices in the neighborhoods of all of the major projects that were demolished.⁸⁴




Figure 12 presents trends in crimes taking place in CHA apartments, hallways, stairwells, elevators, parking lots, and on the grounds of the developments. The top panels report the total number of CHA-related violent and property crimes each year. The lower panels detail trends in violent crime: murder, rape, assault, and all crimes involving a gun. As they report, crime was down by a substantial margin, in percentage terms by substantially more than citywide totals. By 2005,

there were 82 percent fewer violent crimes and 84 percent fewer property crimes than in 1991. Rape declined the most, by 89 percent.

Obviously, crime was down in CHA complexes for at least two reasons: In addition to the general forces pushing down crime in Chicago, the resident population plummeted. What can be found to account for the steady decline in the number of CHA residents is the number of

remaining occupied housing units, which is available for the 1999-2005 period during which the CHA's Plan for Transformation began to become a reality. As noted above, between 1999 and 2005 the number of occupied units dropped by 45 percent. However, even taking this decline into account, CHA crime still dropped considerably. To illustrate this, Figure 12 also presents trends in personal and property crime rates (per 1,000 occupied units) for the period in which unit counts are available (trends for the detailed types of crime presented in the bottom panels followed the same pattern.). During this brief period the CHA personal crime rate declined by 32 percent, and the property crime rate by 42 percent. Citywide, the decline over this period was actually less; personal crime was down 22 percent and property crime 24 percent. By 2005, offenses in and around CHA properties constituted only 0.5 percent of the property crimes in the city, and 2.5 percent of violent crimes.⁸⁵ However, in 1991 they only contributed 1.5 percent of the property crime and 5 percent of the property crime in the city, so CHA crime never accounted for enough of the total to explain the 50-60 percent declines we have seen citywide.

School Safety

Schools should be natural partners in any community safety program. They certainly can be loci for problems. Rambunctious youths are corseted there all day, and they surge through the surrounding neighborhood during their journey to and from school. National surveys of students indicate fear and victimization can be high in schools. In addition, student surveys find it is reportedly easy to find drugs and even weapons in and around many schools. In Illinois, a 1990 statewide survey of public high schools found that one in four students feared violence in school and one in five feared the journey to and from school. One in three Illinois students reported they knew someone who had dropped out of school due to gangs, and half of them indicated it was easy to get marijuana in their school.

During the period considered here, Chicago's schools put new disciplinary and safety initiatives in place.⁸⁶ Between 1990 and 1995 the number of school security guards rose by 1,275. High schools began to install walkthrough metal detectors and even hand-held scanning devices. Beginning in 1990, the police contributed a special school patrol unit that by 2000 had grown to about 200 officers, and security cameras were installed in lunchrooms and hallways. The pace of change picked up following a shakeup in school financing and administration in mid-1995. Many new disciplinary and security programs were instituted; some involved the school bureaucracy and others were partnerships with police and the city's community policing implementation office. Beginning in 1996, schools became more aggressive about expelling troublemakers, after alternative schools run by private contractors were set up to receive them. The state's 1995 Gun-Free Schools Act – which was later expanded to cover knives, alcohol and drugs – provided an additional legal incentive to expel students found with weapons. A change in the school system's disciplinary code called for the mandatory expulsion of students carrying firearms. School board policies allowed pat-downs and personal searches of students based upon suspicion by teachers or administrators, as well as wholesale locker and desk searches using dogs, looking for weapons and drugs. In 1998, Chicago launched a peer mediation program and conflict resolution initiative that trained youth to deal with their anger before it escalates into violence.

There is community involvement in school safety as well. Beginning in 1990, parents were recruited to stand guard on school grounds; later, this program was greatly expanded. In 1999 the city's CAPS Implementation Office began organizing students and parents living along various routes to a school into convoys which pick up and drops off members as they move through the neighborhood. By 2000 there were parent patrols around 450 schools, and about 100 of these "walking school buses."

Of course, efforts that are not on their face "security measures" can also have an impact on school climate and student performance. These, in turn, have consequences for school safety. In addition to the security projects described above, post-1995 there was a sea-change in school management and performance assessment in Chicago. Drastic revisions were instituted in the curriculum; selected schools began to remain open until 6:00 p.m. for optional math and reading programs; many thousands of failing students were held in school during the summer months; and a massive construction program replaced or renovated a host of school buildings. In addition, dress codes drafted by parent groups were instituted in many schools beginning in 1996, as was a requirement for daily homework assignments for every class.

Figure 13: Trends in School Crime, 1991-2005




Figure 13 presents trends in several measures of the extent of school crime. The left-hand panel charts changes in robbery and all gun crimes within schools and on school grounds. The right-hand panel examines all property crimes, vandalism, and assaults. Chicago public school enrollment increased

by almost 7 percent between 1991 and 2005, so the Figure presents rates of crime that take this enrollment growth into account. It is apparent that there was a substantial increase in the rate of assaults reported in and around the city's schools during the 2000s, but by every other measure of crime declined noticeably. Robbery was down 36 percent, while gun crime dropped by 82 percent. Property crime declined by 36 percent and vandalism by 32 percent. However, even the positive trends could not account for much of the citywide drop between 1991 and 2005, because school crime makes up only a tiny fraction of the crime that takes place in the city each year. In 1991, school-based gun crime was 1 percent of the city's total, while in 2005 it was 0.7 percent.

The opposite is true in the assault category, on the other hand, for by 2005 assaults in schools rose from 2 percent to 11 percent of all of the assault in the city, a troublesome trend indeed. But even so, Chicago's schools are still relatively safe places. Based on crimes reported to police (a very important caveat) even after its rise, the school aggravated assault rate (per 100,000 students) stood at 80 percent of the city wide figure (570 versus 718). When it comes to gun crimes, schools are even safer; in 2005, the city gun-crime rate was 493 but the school-based rate was only 17.

Interim Summary

The following is what we have seen thus far concerning the decline in crime in Chicago:

- ☞ The decline in crime was not due to demographic changes, nor to improving economic conditions for families or young people.
- ☞ Not much of the decline in crime could be attributed to prisons. Trends in incarceration cannot explain the magnitude of crime decline during the 1990s; crime continued to drop after Illinois' prisons stopped growing after 2001; and after 1999 Chicago's incarceration rate declined along with crime.
- ☞ The decline in crime was not due to the deterrent effects of going to jail. The Cook County jail also expanded during the 1990s – and for several years after prisons stopped growing – but not enough in light of the probably limited deterrent impact of short spells behind bars.
- ☞ Not much of the decline in crime could be attributed to the sheer number of police officers. Police are expensive, and their numbers did not grow fast enough or long enough.
- ☞ Declining crime was not due to the decreased frequency with which Chicagoans carry guns; non-gun crime declined just as fast and far.
- ☞ The decline in crime was not linked to any reduction in the influence of the city's large and violent street gangs. Non-gang crime declined consistently, while gang crime traced an up and down course in response to volatile intra-gang dynamics and a shifting business environment.
- ☞ The decline in crime was not due to a declining crack cocaine market. Cocaine-related arrests went up rather than down, while emergency-room treatment for cocaine-related episodes were as frequent in 2005 as they were in 1991. Except for powder cocaine, drug markets continued to flourish even as crime dropped. Homicide associated with the drug trade went up and down, but it was a very small proportion of all violence and it was non-drug violence that dropped consistently.
- ☞ Crime did not drop city-wide because of the demolition of public housing. Crime rates in and around CHA properties dropped faster than they did in the remainder of the city. Those rates always constituted a small percentage of all crime in the city, however, and could not account for its sweeping downturn.
- ☞ Improving security in the schools could not explain the city-wide decline in crime. School-based assault did not decline; rather, it skyrocketed in the 2000s. By 2005, aggravated assault in and around schools made up almost 11 percent of the city's total. Other kinds of school crime – which are down – constitute just a small percentage of the city total, and could not account for the dramatic decline in crime.

Other important claims are consistent with the findings of research and evaluation projects around the county, but research and the available data are not strong enough to make any conclusions about the extent of their impact in Chicago.

☞ While there is evidence that “smarter” policing impacts crime, there is no evidence that police in Chicago “got smarter” at a pace matching the decline in crime. Any effects of community policing could not have been felt until the second half of the 1990s, and the police department’s information-driven crackdowns on drugs and guns did not begin until the 2000s.

☞ Strengthening community factors were linked to more rapid declines in beat-level crime, but it has not been clearly demonstrated that, over all, enough communities in Chicago have grown strong enough to account for generally declining crime.

Observations

This report does not systematically assess every significant claim about the decline in crime, because there were not always data for Chicago. What follows is a review of the most important of these claims. The report also addresses the likelihood that the decline in crime was due to a combination of factors, or to changes in the impact of these factors over time.


Alcohol. One of the most intriguing alternative explanations for declining crime is alcohol consumption, which has been on a nationwide decline on a per capita basis at the same time that violent crime has subsided. Research on alcohol use and its effects is very strong. It finds the availability and volume of alcohol consumed is related to levels and trends in crime at the block, neighborhood, city, county, state and national level. When it becomes harder for young people to acquire alcohol, youth violence (like traffic fatalities) subsides.⁸⁷ Physical testing of both offenders and victims documents that alcohol is frequently associated with violence. However, the best local figures I could assemble (scattered reports of the volume of beer, wine and spirits distributed per capita for Cook County) do not point to a noticeable drop in consumption over this period.

Culture Change. I also could not address in any fashion claims that violence declined because of changes in culture. Some urban ethnographers report “the younger generation” (a group growing more expansive with each passing year that crime declines) looked at the violence of the late 1980s, then decided in large numbers to turn away from a culture of death.⁸⁸ However, I have no way of assessing whether offending-related cultural values underlying crimes of many types actually changed in Chicago. The relatively short time frame considered in this report itself argues against cultural shifts, because important values are unlikely to change so rapidly. Cultural critics linked spiraling crime during the 1970s and 1980s to the hedonism, self-indulgence, heedless consumerism, reckless individualism, unbridled self-expression, and standardless relativism they claimed characterized our disintegrating liberal culture. However, I have no reason to believe that any such trends reversed their course dramatically following 1990. I also did not consider the impact on abortion on crime in Chicago. Analysis of that issue has been

based on state data, which are too coarse for me to apply to the local scene, and there is controversy over the statistical claims that have been made.⁸⁹

Crime Reporting. Perhaps the crime drop of the 1990s and 2000 was due to a growing unwillingness of victims to call the police, or to growing reluctance on the part of police to make an official record of crime reports that came their way. The latter was a serious concern in the 1980s, and it is one reason why this review did not extend further back in time. During the mid-1980s, Chicago police were “killing crime” by refusing to write up official reports of huge numbers of offenses. The big run-up in crime at the end of the 1980s was certainly due in substantial part to improvements in recording wrought by internal crime audits, which were instituted after the media became aware that detectives were cheating on their statistics. The breadth of this scandal makes it impossible to do meaningful statistical analyses of crime trends in Chicago that include the 1980s.⁹⁰ I have found that the city’s recent, Spanish-speaking immigrants are significantly under-reporting problems of all sorts to the police, as part of an effort to remain out of sight.⁹¹ However, their numbers are not large enough to account for the decline in recorded crime, which anyway was heavily concentrated in predominately African-American neighborhoods. As Figure 2 illustrated, trends in heavily Latino areas generally paralleled those elsewhere.⁹²

Revitalization. I could not consider in detail the aggregate impact of housing and neighborhood revitalization programs underway in many city neighborhoods. While we usually do not think of them as “crime prevention” programs, housing programs can have that impact. Development groups stress tenant screening and improved property management. They put pressure on owners of existing buildings to upgrade security. They sponsor tenant patrols and coordinate those efforts with police. And they tackle the disorderly blight associated with vacant and abandoned buildings.



There is certainly evidence of a quickening pace of neighborhood economic vitality during the 1990s and 2000s. Figure 14 presents three measures of this for Chicago: the per capita number of building permits issued for residential and business projects, and the number of conventional residential mortgages registered each year.⁹³ All three indicators highlight the fact that the city is far from moribund, and that new investments are being made in its future as a place to live.

Between 1993 and 2003, two dramatic changes occurred: the number of building permits issued for residential projects rose 125 percent, and the number of conventional mortgage loans issued in the city rose by 189 percent. Housing and commercial investments are doubly important because they are cumulative, adding up over time. What is unclear is whether this evident vitality is a cause of declining crime, or if it is a consequence of the drop in crime. Perhaps one reason for this quickening economic activity during the 1990s and early 2000s was the new sense of safety and security evident in neighborhoods all over the city. During this period, crime went down in most neighborhoods, and – based on surveys – fear of crime declined in every major demographic category.⁹⁴ Some of the best research on the relationship between crime and real estate activity has been done in New York City. This research suggests the decline in crime in that city sparked a real estate boom during the 1990s, and accounted for about one-third of rising real estate prices after 1994.⁹⁵ That declining crime can spark neighborhood revitalization is further evidence of the importance of the post-1990 decline in Chicago, but it does not help us understand why crime went down.

Community Programs. I also could not assess the role of community-based efforts to prevent crime and reintegrate offenders on trends over the 1991-2005 period. The city is home to hundreds of these projects, including such prominent programs as CeaseFire (violence prevention), the Safer Foundation (job training and offender reentry), and TASC and Gateway (drug treatment). Evaluations have been conducted of many of them individually, but there is no straightforward way of scaling up their preventive effects to the city as a whole over a 15-year period. Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a federal gun crime prevention program that combines enforcement with outreach to newly released felons and a civic education program has claimed strong results. Compared to comparison areas and the city as a whole, homicide dropped more sharply in PSN areas. They were down the most in beats where large numbers of ex-offenders participated in programs, more guns were seized, and cases were prosecuted.⁹⁶ However, the program began only in 2003.

Tipping Points. I also did not consider the view that reaching a “tipping point” brought crime back down. This is a “what goes up must come down” theory of crime that is no theory at all in the absence of explanatory variables that determine the turn-arounds. Otherwise, it is just a description of what happened. More promising are concepts like “diffusion” and “contagion.” I argued that crime is contagious in the context of gang violence. That is a world in which bands of young men are ensnared in networks of power, status and business relationships which propel them into episodes of tit-for-tat violence of the worst kind. Arms races followed by wars that later subside due to the exhaustion of the combatants could look like tipping points, except they tip upward again when everyone recovers. This happened twice during the brief period considered in this report. However, a key point was that gang-related contagion of violence was unrelated to the general, unpunctuated decline in non-gang crime, which continued apace on a much more massive scale throughout the period considered here. Outside of the insular world of street gangs, the idea that marshaling the bravado to commit crimes can be affected by the perception that “everyone is doing it,” and that there may be some “safety in numbers” when a lot of people are doing it, points toward a “critical mass” theory of crime causation. However, there

has been no clear explication of the factors that dampen group-think and bring offending down, but that is what we have been observing in Chicago for 14 years.

Combinations. It is likely that the roots of the crime drop in Chicago and elsewhere lie in a mixture of the factors described here. Some or all of the social and economic trends and local policies listed in this report may have been working in concert to reduce crime, each contributing something to the end result. As the length of the great post-1991 decline in crime extends – we are now talking about a half-generation – it is likely that combinations and reinforcing mixes of factors are at work, rather than One Big Thing. Much of the research on which this report is based controls for multiple factors in order to isolate the effects of variables of particular interest. Unfortunately, the data that are available for one city, and for this statistically short span of time, do not lend themselves to teasing out overlapping components of change, dividing them among various causes.

It is also quite possible that the effects of the components of an explanatory mix of factors may have waxed and waned in significance during this substantial period of time. Some factors may have contributed to the drop in crime early on, and others later. Analysts examining city-level trends and pronouncing that a program could not have caused the decline in crime because crime dropped before the intervention was underway are certainly too mono-causal in their view. Crime could have dropped early in this lengthening period for one set of reasons, and later for another. A program may have contributed to the continuing decline in crime even if it came on-stream later. The effects of some factors may even subside over time.

A Plausible Scenario. In my view, the most plausible crime-drop scenario for Chicago involves a mix of law enforcement and community factors. Earlier I argued that, overall, trends in the rate at which Chicago sent people to prison did not track drops in crime, especially after Illinois' prisons stopped growing. However, the leap in incarceration rates during the early 1990s could have played a role in crime decline, if prison had larger-than-average effects during its early expansion phase. Recent research has indeed documented that there are diminishing deterrent effects of prison as states push up their rates of incarceration.⁹⁷ This is probably due to lower payoffs from digging deeper into a pool of less chronic, lower-rate offenders and individuals caught up in simple drug-possession cases, in order to continue to push up incarceration rates in the face of a significant drop in serious violent and property crime.⁹⁸ Averaging the over-all deterrent effect of prison over time, which is the way that most research has been conducted, appears to disguise larger effects early on. As my “maxi forecast” in Figure 4 suggested, larger effects of early-phase incarceration, plus the 50 percent growth in Chicago's prisoner count between 1991 and 1999, could have played a significant role in declining crime during the early 1990s. In addition, the county's jail population grew a bit more and for a few years longer than my prisoner estimates. Even though the effect of a spell in jail is doubtless much weaker than that of a longer stay in prison, this may have also contributed to the mix.

The effects of community mobilization around community policing could have been felt by the latter half of the 1990s. Extrapolating from the correlations presented earlier, this might have accounted for 9-15 percent declines in crime. Community factors known to be linked to

crime appear (the evidence is painfully sparse) to have expanded somewhat in scope in Chicago between the mid-1990s and early 2000s. CAPS-related mobilization may have accounted for 4-12 percent of the decline in crime. A very important feature of both beat meeting turnout and participation in CAPS-related problem solving projects and neighborhood activism this is that these efforts were over-concentrated in the very areas of the city where crime declined the most, in higher-crime and predominately African-American police beats. Driven by crime, people turned out and cooperated with police there in relatively large numbers, over a long period of time.

In my judgment, the police department became visibly “smarter” and well managed early in the 2000s. As I noted, beginning in about 2000 they police adopted a number of proven anti-violence strategies and a focused approach to crime reduction that is consistent with research on crime control theory. Measures of the implementation of these initiatives over time and at the beat and district level are correlated with substantial declines in the targeted crimes, post-2000.⁹⁹ I noted above that the ratio of violent crime arrests to crimes of violence jumped sharply after 2002, a pattern that is consistent with these initiatives. Along this 14-year timeline, the effects of these initiatives would have come into play just as Chicago’s prisoner count began to decline perhaps backfilling for declining incarceration rates and any diminishing marginal effects of locking up lower-rate, less chronic offenders.

Further Research. Of the factors considered in this report, more research and sheer information gathering is most needed in the community domain. As I pointed out, many decades of criminological research have established the importance of community factors in controlling crime. Strong families, deep informal bonds among neighbors, and a willingness of residents to intervene to maintain order are linked to lower levels of crime. Even in the face of concentrated poverty and residential turnover, there is some evidence that a strong infrastructure of organizations can help sustain a community's capacity for self-healing as well. But little is known about whether these factors waxed or waned during the 1990s and 2000s, nor how they might have been affected by community policing programs that emerged across the country. I stressed that there is an “absence of evidence” concerning their importance in explaining declining levels of crime, due in large measure to the absence of systematic, over-time data on community factors. Community mobilization generally speaking is a strategic component of many private, non-profit, and volunteer efforts at neighborhood revitalization, so understanding the costs and benefits of those interventions is of broad importance.

Cost. Importantly, this review has said nothing about what the various approaches to crime control it has considered cost. Some of the factors claimed to have reduced crime are quite expensive. Adding police to the force costs Chicago taxpayers perhaps \$100,000 per officer per year, when all of the real expenses associated with doing so are factored in. The total cost of operating the police department is more than \$1 billion each year. Prisons are also very expensive. In Illinois, it costs almost \$56,000 per bed to build a new medium security prison, and the direct cost of housing a prisoner for a year is about \$22,600.¹⁰⁰ Worse, the true annual cost of locking someone up that takes into account all of the expenses involved is much higher; nationally, the real cost is estimated to be about \$48,000.¹⁰¹ One reason Illinois has new prisons

sitting empty is that there is no money to operate them. If analysts' estimates are right, the prison population would have to double to obtain another 15-20 percent decline in crime through incarceration. This experiment would be a vastly expensive enterprise, and certainly would not be worth the benefit.¹⁰² The rules of thumb regarding costs are clear: 1) many alternatives to incarceration are cheaper than jail; 2) intermediate sanctions are cheaper than prison; and 3) treatment is cheaper than locking someone up. Outside the domain of the criminal justice system, a long list of social interventions have proven to be practical, effective, and much cheaper per crime deterred than virtually anything the criminal justice system has to offer.¹⁰³ A comprehensive policy review collecting new and better data probing the origins of the post-1990 decline in crime would also have to factor in what we know about the cost of instituting new efforts to further speed the drop in crime.

Notes

1. For example, in 1991 (the starting year for this report) the nation's ten largest cities (home to 9 percent of the population) experienced almost 40 percent of all the robbery in the country, and between 1991 and 2004 the decline in just those ten cities accounted for 58 percent of the total national drop in robbery. Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report, various years. The "national" drop in crime has been highly dependent on trends in a relatively small number of big cities.
2. Between 1990 and 2000 the over-all population of the city changed only slightly, rising by 0.6%. This discussion and many of the charts and tables generally will report the number of crimes and arrests rather than rates, which will help illuminate the magnitude of many of the over-time changes described here.
3. These data are drawn from reports issued by the Chicago Police Department. It and other Figures present trends in UCR-compatible aggravated assaults. For internal purposes Chicago police use a different categorization of assaults, distinguishing between aggravated battery and aggravated assault. Chicago's accounting of criminal sexual assault does not match the FBI's definition of rape, and is flagged each year in the Uniform Crime Report for non-compatibility. What I call "auto theft" here is strictly speaking motor vehicle theft (which includes trucks and motorcycles), and the term "murder" and homicide" are used interchangeably.
4. But in 2004 homicide was still the leading cause of death among all Chicagoans age 15-34. Harper, D. M. and Thomas, S. D. 2004. Leading Causes of Death in Chicago 2002. Chicago Department of Public Health Epidemiology Program.
5. Analyses of gun crime, residential burglary, street crime, and other specialized categories of offenses extends from 1991 to 2005. These are incident data drawn from the Chicago Police Department's CHRIS data base, and they are not compatible with reports filed with the FBI for inclusion in the yearly Uniform Crime Report because they are not based on UCR's elaborate counting rules.
6. Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins. 1999. Crime Is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence in America. Oxford University Press.
7. After mid-2002 Chicago had 280 beats, and beat boundaries had been significantly redrawn all over the city in 1992. For statistical purposes this report reclassifies all crime incidents so that throughout the time series their locations are consistent with 1993-2001 beat boundaries. Calculated from crime incident data 1991-2005 extracted from the CPD's CHRIS database, supplemented by homicides files from the detective division. The same data and approach was used to document over-time changes in Chicago's community areas.
8. The analysis of crime decline by race excludes nine essentially non-residential beats for which population-based crime rates have little meaning. Based on the 1990 Census, there were 71 predominantly white beats, 121 heavily African-American areas, 32 areas of concentrated Latino residence, and 46 racially diverse beats that were impossible to classify in simple fashion.
9. The percentage of the US population age 18 bottomed out in 1995; high-risk 18-24 year olds as a group bottomed out in 1997.
10. Fox, James Alan and Alex R. Piquero. 2003. "Deadly Demographics: Population Characteristics and Forecasting Homicide Trends." *Crime & Delinquency*, 49 (No. 3, July), 339-359.
11. Calculated from U. S. Bureau of the Census STF1, Table P12 (2000); STF 1, Table QT-P1A (1990).

12. Between 1992 and 2004, the percentage nationwide of violent crime arrestees who were women increased from 13 percent to 18 percent. Calculated from yearly editions of the Uniform Crime Report, arrest tables. Over the same period, the percentage of women who were arrested for property crimes in Chicago rose much less, from 20 to 23 percent.
13. Eric D. Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg, and David B. Mustard. 2002. "Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the United States: 1979–1997. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84 (February, No. 1), 45–61. Note, however, that the national crime drop began before the labor market tightened (the nation was just coming out of a stiff recession during the 1991-1992 period) and improving economic conditions at the bottom of the labor market may not have played a role in crime reduction during the early 1990s.
14. Imrohoroglu, Ayse, Antonio Merlo and Peter Rupert. 2004. "What Accounts for the Decline in Crime." *International Economic Review*, 45 (No. 3, August), 707-729.
15. U. S. Census Bureau STF 3, Table P117 (1990); STF 3, Table P87 (2000).
16. U. S. Census Bureau, STF 3, Table P122 (1990); STF 3, Table P90 (2000).
17. U. S. Census Bureau, STF 3, Table P123 (1990); STF 3, Table P90 (2000).
18. U. S. Census Bureau, STF 3, Table P057 (1990); STF 3, Table P37 (2000). Educational attainment is reported for persons age 25 and older.
19. U. S. Census Bureau, STF 3, Table H7 (2000); STF 1, Table H003 (1990).
20. U. S. Census Bureau, STF 3, Table P057 (1990); STF 3, Table P37 (2000)
21. Based on Levitt's consensus figure, an elasticity of crime on the unemployment rate of 1.0, economic changes in Chicago would predict a 1.2 percent decline in property crime, but little or no decline in violent crime. Levitt, Steven D. 2004. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18 (No. 1, Winter), 163-190.
22. Income data from the 1990 and 2000 censuses. Median incomes and dollar income categories for 1989 were adjusted to 1999 values using the urban consumers price index for the Chicago area available at "<http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm>". On a base of 1982-84=100, this index stood at 125 in 1989 and 168.4 for 1999.
23. For example, Grogger reports a very large offending elasticity among young men in low-skill labor markets. He finds that a 10 percent increase in real wages among this group leads to a 10 percent decrease in economically motivated crime. Grogger, Jeff. 1998. "Market Wages and Youth Crime." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 16 (No. 4), 756-791.
24. U. S. Census Bureau STF 3, Table 38, with the sample findings applied to the total population ages 16-19 count in Table 3 (2000); STF 3, Table P061 (1990).
25. U. S. Census Bureau STF3, Tables P117 (1990); STF 4, Table P142 and the race (2000).
26. Levitt's review yields a elasticity of 1.0 for unemployment, which is quite large, but he notes too that national level changes in this factor are relatively small and cannot account for declining property crime. Levitt, Steven D. 2004. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18 (No. 1, Winter), 163-190.

27. Levitt's estimate is one third; Spelman uses different methods, and comes up with 27 percent. Levitt, Steven D. 2004. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18 (No. 1, Winter), 163-190; Spelman, William. 2000. "The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion." In Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman (Eds.), *The Crime Drop in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 97-129.

28. Data on Illinois' prison population on June 30th of each year can be found in yearly statistical reports from the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). Reports since 1999 are available on IDOC's web site; for data for the period 1991 to 1998 I am grateful to the Planning and Research Department of IDOC. The analyses here focus on the state's adult prisoners; a relatively small number of juveniles (in 2000, 1/22 the number of adults) are held in Illinois' prisons.

29. City Part I crime counts versus those for the remainder of Cook county can be found on the Illinois State Police website.

30. This estimate of the elasticity of property crime with respect to prison is suggested by Levitt, Steven D. 2004. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18 (No. 1, Winter), 163-190. Many studies report property crimes to be somewhat more elastic than violent crimes in response to changes in incarceration rates, and to shifts in levels of policing. The "rational" elasticity of violence is probably undercut by offenses such as "crimes of passion," "going postal," violence fueled by alcohol, and a significant fraction of domestic crimes. Spelman's estimates of the elasticity of crimes of various types range from .16 to .31: Spelman, William. 2000. "What Recent Studies Do (and Don't) Tell Us About Imprisonment and Crime," in Michael Tonry (ed.), *Crime and Justice: An Annual Review*, 27, 419-494.

31. The estimate that the elasticity of violent crime with respect to prison is 20 percent is offered by Levitt, Steven D. 2004. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18 (No. 1, Winter), 163-190; the 15 percent figure is a "consensus" estimate in a summary of research by Donohue, John J. and Peter Siegelman. 1998. "Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime." *Journal of Legal Studies*, 27 (January), 1-43. A 2006 overview illustrates how widely these estimates vary, however; see Weatherburn, Don, Jiuzhao Hua and Steve Moffatt. 2006. "How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The Incapacitation Effect of Prison on Burglary." *New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Crime and Justice Bulletin*, 93 (January).

32. Calculations for this and other estimates presented here use 1991 crime totals as the start values, then discount the estimated crime rate in each subsequent year based on the previous year's percentage change in the estimated number of prisoners from Chicago and the elasticity estimates discussed in text. After 1991, the estimated value for violent crime in each year provides the base for the forecast for the next year.

33. A report for 2005 found that about 35 percent of Cook County Jail inmates remained there less than 31 days, another 23 percent less than 90 days, and an additional 15 percent less than 180 days. This accumulates to 73 percent of inmates serving less than six months, with most serving appreciably less than that. John Howard Association. 2005. Executive Summary: Court Monitoring Report for *Duran v. Sheahan et al.* Submitted to the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

34. John Howard Association. Executive Summary: Court Monitoring Report for *Duran v. Sheahan et al.* Submitted to the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Table 1.1.

35. This generous estimate involved (a) assigning all of the county's jail population to the City of Chicago, plus (b) assuming that the effect of a spell in jail is one half that of a prison stay on personal crime (for an elasticity of 8.8 percent) and property crime (an elasticity of 10 percent). Like the other forecasts, this takes the crime count for 1991 and discounts it for future years by the percentage change in the jail population multiplied by the elasticity estimate.

36. See Clear, Todd R., Dina R. Rose and Judith A. Ryder. 2001. "Incarceration and the Community: The Problem of Removing and Returning Offenders." *Crime and Delinquency*, 47, 335-351; Rose, Dina R. and Todd R. Clear. 1998. 'Incarceration, Social Capital and Crime: Implications for Social Disorganization Theory.' *Criminology*, 36, 441-479. John Hagan and Ronit Dinovitzer. 1999. "Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and Prisoners." In Michael Tonry (ed.), *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, vol. 26. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
37. Clear, Todd, Elin Waring and Kristen Scully. 2005. "Communities and Reentry." In Jeremy Travis and Christy Visser (eds.), *Prisoner Reentry and Crime in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 179-208.
38. Illinois Department of Corrections. 2005. Statistical Report.
39. Visser, Christy and Jill Farrell. 2005. *Chicago Communities and Prisoner Reentry*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
40. Kubrin, Charis E. and Eric A. Steward. 2006. "Predicting Who Re-offends: The Neglected Role of Neighborhood Context in Recidivism Studies." *Criminology*, 44 (No. 1, November), 165-197. The impacted neighborhoods include Austin, Humboldt Park, North Lawndale, Englewood, West Englewood and Garfield Park.
41. There is nothing new about this: a 1985 study found that half of former inmates were arrested within 18 months of being released, and one-third were back in prison within 20 months. The longer their prior criminal history the more likely releasees were to commit crimes again, and the more quickly. For recidivism statistics see: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1985. The Compiler, 6 (no. 3, Fall); Nancy Lavigne. A Portrait of Prisoner Reentry in Illinois. April 2003. Urban Institute publications 410662.html.
42. For example, Klick, Jonathan and Alexander Tabarrok. 2005. "Using Terror Alerts to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics*, vol. XLVIII, April. They set the elasticity of burglary with respect to levels of policing at -.30; for auto theft their figure is a high -.86, but they found for Washington DC the effect of changes in levels of policing on violent crime was zero. Levitt's revised estimates after correcting errors in earlier publications are -.435 for violent crime and -.501 for all property crime: see Levitt, Steven D. 2002. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effects of Police on Crime: Reply." *American Economic Review*, 92, 1244-1250. He concluded that between 1991 and 2001 the increasing number of police reduced crime of 5-6 percent across the board; see Levitt, Steven D. 2004. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18 (No. 1, Winter), 163-190. The predicted decline in crime due to changes in levels of policing here is -4.4 percent for violent crime and -5.1 for property crime.
43. These calculations use 1991 city crime rates as the start value, then compute the estimated crime in each subsequent year based on the previous year's percentage change in the number of Chicago police officers plus the elasticity estimates discussed in the text.
44. Kelling, George L., and Coles, Catherine M. 1996. *Fixing broken windows*. N.Y.: Touchstone; Kelling, George L. and William H. Sousa, Jr. 2001. *Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reforms*. New York: The Manhattan Institute.
45. Sampson, R. and Cohen, J. 1988. "Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension." *Law & Society Review*, 22 (1).
46. For a review of innovations in policing during the 1990s and 2000s, see Skogan, Wesley G. and Kathleen Frydl (eds.) 2004. *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

47. For 2003 see: Chicago Tribune, May 1, 2004, "Police Expanding No-Loitering Zones to Curb Gangs"; for 2004 see: Annual Report of the Chicago Police Department, 2004, exhibit 14.

48. Rosenbaum, Dennis and Cody Stephens. 2005. Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago: Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department. Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. For earlier initiatives see Skogan, Wesley G. and Steiner, Lynn. 2004. Community Policing in Chicago, Year Ten. Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. A description of "CompStat Chicago style can be found in chapter 3 of Skogan, Wesley G. 2006. Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities. New York: Oxford University Press.

49. Instead, they focus on New York, and usually without actually doing any research on crime trends there they pontificate about whether or not the welter of activities taking place in that huge city had an impact on crime. Somehow, that is seen as disposing of the question of police effectiveness.

50. Skogan, Wesley G. and Kathleen Frydl (eds.). 2004. Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

51. This story has been in many places; see Blumstein, Alfred. 2000. Disaggregating the Violence Trends. In Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman (eds.), The Crime Drop in America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 13-44; Fagan, Jeffrey and Deanna L. Wilkinson. 1998. "Guns, Youth Violence, and Social Identity in Inner Cities." Crime and Justice: An Annual Review. For a statistical descriptions of the story see Cork, Daniel. 1999. "Examining Space-Time Interaction in City-Level Homicide Data: Crack Markets and the Diffusion of Guns Among Youth." Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 15 (4), 379-406; Grogger, J. and Michael Willis. "The Emergence of Crack Cocaine and the Rise in Urban Crime Rates." Review of Economics and Statistics, November 2000. The part of the story explaining the diffusion of guns and increases in gun homicide in Chicago has empirical support, but the best study does not speak to events subsequent to the supposed decline in crack markets; see Elisabeth Griffiths and Jorge M. Chavez. 2004. "Communities, Street Guns and Homicide Trajectories in Chicago, 1980-1995: Merging Methods for Examining Homicide Trends Across Space and Time. Criminology, 42 (No. 4), 941-978.

52. Appendix Table 1-1 of 2000 Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring: Annual Report. National Institute of Justice, 2003.

53. Sherman, Lawrence W. 1990. "Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence." In Michael H. Tonry and Norval Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Vol. 12, 1-48.

54. See studies cited in Weatherburn, Don, Jiuzhao Hua and Steve Moffatt. 2006. "How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The Incapacitation Effect of Prison on Burglary." New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Crime and Justice Bulletin, 93 (January).

55. In Chicago, other measures of the extent of drug markets (including calls to 911 by the public and the findings of survey interviews) point to neighborhoods where drug arrests are also concentrated. Skogan, Wesley G. 2003. Crime Drop in Chicago. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the European Society of Criminology, Helsinki (available on request from the author).

56. These data were extracted from the Chicago Police Department's CHRIS database, using offense codes associated with drug incidents of various types.

57. Emergency room data can be found on the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) web site, which is maintained by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), Office of the Surgeon General. Thanks to Elizabeth H. Crane of SAMHSA's DAWN unit for data filling in missing years in the time series. 2004 marked the last year of "Old DAWN," and more recent data are fundamentally incompatible with years prior to

2005.

58. Drug Abuse Warning Network. October 2002. The DAWN Report: Major Drugs of Abuse in ED Visits, 2001 Update

59. DAWN also monitored drug-related deaths between 1994 and 2002. Deaths linked to cocaine were relatively infrequent in 1994, and they declined scarcely at all 1994-1996. Between 1994 and 2002 the number of cocaine related deaths rose by 30 percent. Between 1994 and 2000, heroin-linked deaths rose by 32 percent, before dropping again 2001-2002.

60. Data from annual reports of the Chicago Police Department. Between 1993 and 1998 these reports combine Hispanic and non-Hispanic white arrestees, with a separate column indicating the number of Hispanic arrestees. An estimate of the number of non-Hispanic whites was made by subtracting out the Hispanic total. During the late 1990s the reports differentiated between "black Hispanic" and "white Hispanic" arrestees, and there were very few of the former; justifying subtracting all Hispanics out of the white column for that six-year period. Prior to 1993 there was no separate designation for Hispanics, so for 1991 and 1992 I used the 1993 Hispanic-to-Non-Hispanic white ratio to produce estimates of the number of Hispanic arrestees from arrest totals for whites. Data on the age of arrestees was drawn from the same reports; the age-21 and age-25 cutting points referred to in this report were imposed by their age categories. For a discussion of drug arrest trends by race see: Jane Addams Hull House Association. 2003. *Minding the Gap: An Assessment of Racial Disparity in Metropolitan Chicago*.

61. Skogan, Wesley G. 1995. "Crime and the American States," in Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob and Robert Albritton (eds.) *Politics in the American States*. Boston: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown, 2nd Ed; Arthur J. Lurigio. 2004. *Disproportionate Incarceration of African Americans for Drug Offenses in the U.S.* Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Research Bulletin, Vol. 2 (No. 10, January); Loury, Alden K. 2002. *Black Offenders Face Stiffest Drug Sentences*. Chicago Reporter (January).

62. Cook, Philip J. and Jens Ludwig. 2000. "Gun Violence: The Real Costs." New York: Oxford University Press.

63. Cook, Philip J. and Jens Ludwig. 2000. "Gun Violence: The Real Costs." New York: Oxford University Press.

64. Wintemute, Garen. 2000. "Guns and Gun Violence." In Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman (eds.), *The Crime Drop in America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 45-96 (quote is page 54).

65. For homicide details see the Chicago Police Department's annual Murder Analysis. Over this period the percentage of murders involving a gun rose, at the same time that the proportion of both murder offenders and murder victims who had a criminal arrest record grew steadily. It also became more difficult to solve these murders, due to their more purposive and (drug) business-related nature. Over the 1991-2004 period, homicide clearances dropped from 72 percent to 52 percent (and were claimed to be as high as 96 percent in 1964, and 90 percent in 1970). The percentage of victims and offenders with previous criminal records, and the percentage of homicides involving a firearm, rose by about ten percentage points. Between 1990 and 2001, the average homicide offender had been arrested 8 times, and the average homicide victim 8.3 times (Carolyn Rebecca Block, cited in the Chicago Tribune, November 27, 2002). Over time more victims have been found dead in public places and fewer in private locations such as residences. All of this forms a pattern consistent a national trend of large declines in non-gang, non-drug homicides, compared to gang and drug-business killings.

66. Coughlin, Brenda C. and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh. 2003. "The Urban Street Gang After 1970." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 29, 41-64; Hagedorn, John. 1998. "Post-Industrial Gang Violence," In *Crime and Justice: Volume 24. Youth Violence*, edited by Michael Tonry and Mark H. Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press..

67. Olson, David E., Brendan Dooley and Candice M. Kane. 2004. "The relationship between gang membership and inmate recidivism." Research Bulletin, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Vol. 2, No. 12 May.

68. Decker, Scott H, Tim Bynum and Deborah Weisel. 1998. "A Tale of Two Cities: Gangs as Organized Crime Groups." *Justice Quarterly*, 15 (No. 3, September), 395-425; Venkatesh, Sudhir Alladi and Steven D. Levitt. 2000. "'Are We a Family or a Business?' History and Disjuncture in the Urban American Street Gang. *Theory and Society*, 29 (No. 4, August), 427-462.
69. Chicago Tribune December 11, 2003.
70. Block, Carolyn R. and Richard Block. 1993. *Street Gang Crime in Chicago*. Washington, D. C.: National Institute of Justice, U. S. Department of Justice; Block, Carolyn R., Antigone Christakos, Ayad Jacob and Roger Przybylski. *Research Bulletin: 1996 Street Gangs and Crime: Patterns and Trends in Chicago*. Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority.
71. These homicide data were supplied by the Research and Development Unit of the Chicago Police Department. Data on gang roles in other crimes could be found in the department's CHRIS database until 1999, when detectives stopped loading them into the system. Gang data were missing for six months in 1993, so that year is not included in this discussion.
72. The role of social networks in facilitating gang violence is spelled out in Papachristos, Andrew V. 2005. *Murder Markets: Network Contagion and the Social Order of Gang Homicide*. Unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago. He describes patterns of within-gang and between-gang activity.
73. Morenoff, Jeffrey, Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen Raudenbush. "Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence." *Criminology* 2001, 40: 213-230; Sampson, Robert J. 2004. "Neighbourhood and Community." *New Economy*, 106-113.
74. Sampson, Robert J., Raudenbush, Stephen W. and Earls, Felton. 1997. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy." *Science*, 277: 918-924; Morenoff, Jeffrey, Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen Raudenbush. "Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence." *Criminology* 2001, 40: 213-230. In their 1995 Chicago survey, the top quartile in terms of collective efficacy is 53 percent white, while the bottom quartile 56 percent African-American.
75. The size of Chicago's non-Hispanic white population declined by 13 percent between 1990 and 2000.
76. Putnam, Robert D. 1993. "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Community Life." *The American Prospect* 35-42. Critics include Ladd, Everett C. 1996. "The Data Just Don't Show the Erosion of American's Social Capital." *The Public Perspective* 1: 5-6; and Paxton, Pamela. 1999. "Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment." *American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (No.1, July), 88-127. For a critical and sensible review of this controversy see Durlauf, Steven N. 2002. "Bowling Alone: A Review Essay." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 47 (No. 3, March), 259-273.
77. Skogan, Wesley G. 2006. *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapters 4-6 examine beat meetings and problem solving in detail.
78. Skogan, Wesley G. 2006. *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*. New York: Oxford University Press.
79. Skogan, Wesley G. 2006. *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 9 details trends in confidence in the police.
80. This is a comparison of the 1995 PHDCN survey (questions 12E and 25, weighted for citywide estimation) and the 2003 CAPS evaluation survey (also weighted, to adjust for household side and telephone access). See note #73.

81. Data aggregated from surveys is copious enough only to characterize selected police beats. In addition, the 1995 PHDCN survey and the 2003 CAPS evaluation survey used to benchmark changes in community factors differed in sample and questionnaire design. The link between beat meeting involvement and declining crime always threatens to be spurious. Attendance at beat meetings is driven by concern about crime, and crime rates still remain highest in the African-American areas where they have been declining the most, even when controlling for 1991 levels of crime. Because both race and crime are strongly correlated with almost every important feature of American life, opportunities for misinterpreting spurious correlations are very frequent in this field. For more on these findings see: Skogan, Wesley G. 2003. *Crime Drop in Chicago*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the European Society of Criminology, Helsinki (available on request from the author).
82. "Five Questions for Susan Popkin." The Urban Institute, 2005. www.urban.org/toolkit/fivequestions/SPopkin.cfm.
83. Susan J. Popkin, Victoria E. Gwiasda, Larry Buron, Lynn M. Olson and Dennis P. Rosenbaum. 2000. *The Hidden War: Crime and the Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago*. Rutgers University Press.
84. Kelly, Kimbriell. 2005. "Rising Values." *The Chicago Reporter*, July/August.
85. In 2005, the CHA's biggest crime problems were concentrated in five developments that were left standing, to serve as housing of last resort for residents who were moved from everywhere else: Dearborn Homes, Ickes Homes, Altgeld Gardens, LeClaire Courts and the Wells mid-rises.
86. This chronology of school security policies was gleaned from many editions of *Catalyst*, a bimonthly magazine sponsored by the Community Renewal Society that is devoted to covering educational policy in Chicago and Illinois, and from a list of school initiatives compiled by its editor, Linda Lenz.
87. For a review see: Parker, Robert Nash and Randi S. Cartmill. 1998. "Alcohol and Homicide in the United States 1934-1995 – Or One Reason Why U. S. Rates of Violence May be Going Down." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 88 (No. 4), 1369-1398. Nationally, per capita beer consumption peaked about 1976, and has stayed about level since. Spirits consumption has plummeted since 1968, while wine consumption per capita has been fairly level since the mid-1980s. Parker finds a two-year time lag in the relationship between levels of alcohol and homicide.
88. Johnson, Bruce, Andrew Golub and Eloise Dunlap. 2000. "The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs, Drug Markets, and Violence in Inner-City New York. In Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman (Eds.), *The Crime Drop in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 164-206.
89. The claim is that changes in abortion policy beginning in the 1970s reduced the number of "unwanted" children in succeeding generations, and that the remainder were less likely to offend. Research in this area has grown very murky with the discovery of serious computational errors in the study that originally identified a strong effect of there being fewer unwanted children on crime rates a generation later. Statistical critics think the claim was dead wrong; I never thought it squared with data on the generation entering the high-risk age category in the early 1990s, which was in worse social and economic shape than previous cohorts and showed precious little evidence of the presumed benefits of having been "wanted." The original study is Donohue, John J. III and Steven D. Levitt. 2001. "The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 66 (2), 379-420; the rejoinder is Christopher Foote and Christopher Goetz. 2005. "Testing Economic Hypotheses with State-Level Data: A Comment on Donohue and Levitt." *Federal Reserve Bank of Boston*. All of this is entertainingly summarized in a full-page article in *The Economist* ("Oops-onomics"), December 3, 2005, p. 75.
90. Skogan, Wesley G. 2006. *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 3 describes crime recording by Chicago police during the "bad old days" of the 1980s.

91. Skogan, Wesley G. 2006. *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*. New York: Oxford University Press.
92. Skogan, Wesley G. 2006. *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapters 7-9 examine relations between the city's new immigrant population and the police.
93. The building permit data were secured from the City of Chicago by the Metro Chicago Information Center. Federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data were also assembled by MCIC. Thanks to D. Garth Taylor and Melissa Kraus Schwarz for their assistance. The data series do not all start and stop in exactly the same years.
94. Skogan, Wesley G. 2006. *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 8 describes trends in crime and fear of crime.
95. Schwartz, Amy, Scott Susin and Ioan Voicu. 2003. Has Falling Crime Driven New York City's Real Estate Boom? *Journal of Housing Research*, 14 (No. 1), 101-135.
96. Papachristos, Andrew V., Tracey L. Meares and Jeffrey Fagan. 2005. "Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe neighborhoods in Chicago." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Toronto.
97. Liedka, Raymond V., Anne Morrison Piehl and Bert Useem. 2006. "The Crime-Control Effects of Incarceration: Does Scale Matter?" *Criminology & Public Policy*, 5 (No. 2, May), 245-276. See also James P. Lynch and William J. Sabol. 1997. *Did Getting Tough on Crime Pay?* Crime Policy Report No. 1. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
98. Donohue, John J. 2005. "Fighting Crime: An Economist's View." *Milkin Institute Review*, First Quarter, 47-58.
99. Rosenbaum, Dennis and Cody Stephens. 2005. *Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago: Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department*. Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority.
100. This are the figures for 2003, the most recent year available. Illinois Department of Corrections. *Financial Impact Statement for 2003*.
101. Here I adopted Donohue and Siegelman's well considered annual cost figure and adjusted it to 2005 dollars using the BLS urban consumers price index for the Chicago area. Donohue, John J. and Peter Siegelman. 1998. "Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime." *Journal of Legal Studies*, 27 (January), 1-43.
102. Donohue, John J. 2005. "Fighting Crime: An Economist's View." *Milkin Institute Review*, First Quarter, 47-58. For a discussion by Donohue of the data behind this view see "Understanding the Time Path of Crime." *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, 88 (No. 4), 1423-1452.
103. For a review of an impressive collection of cost-effective programs that work, see: Mihalic, Sharon, Abigail Fagan, Katherine Irwin, Diane Ballard, and Delbert Elliott. 2004. *Blueprints for Violence Prevention*. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NCJ 204274).