

# FORT WORTH'S COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: A CASE STUDY

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**BOTEC Analysis**  
C O R P O R A T I O N

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## Overview

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Fort Worth's Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP), which began with a 2.4 million-dollar grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, sought to expand the city's community policing and community mobilization plans into three new police districts. Over the past decade, the Fort Worth Police Department has been recognized as a leader in these areas by: (1) decentralizing its organization and introducing new police roles consistent with community policing principles; (2) creating new partnerships with the citizenry that include opportunities for input, mobilization, and service; and, (3) helping to coordinate and fund preventive social services for at-risk youth and known offenders. CCP funding has facilitated the implementation and expansion of these plans.

Fort Worth's CCP initiative includes several key features: decentralized Neighborhood Policing Districts; a special Neighborhood Police Officer in every beat whose time is dedicated to addressing the "root causes" of neighborhood problems and to working with community residents; opportunities for citizen participation in anti-crime surveillance through a popular Citizen's-on-Patrol program; opportunities for citizen input into neighborhood problem-solving through Community Advisory Committees; and, unique social service programs that could serve as models for other cities. These preventive services target youths involved in gangs, young offenders facing adjudication, drug offenders, and spouse batterers with the common goal of reducing their chances of re-offending. As our society begins to witness the limits and prohibitive costs of incarceration, such rehabilitative interventions are receiving increased attention.

This case study of Fort Worth's CCP program was written as a result of site visits made to various CCP programs and interviews with CCP participants between January, 1996 and December, 1996. It also incorporates data from BOTEC's CCP Coalition Survey and Community Policing Survey, as well as information contained in federal and local documents and reports. Follow-up phone calls were made during December, 1997 and January, 1998, to key participants in order to write the epilogue.

## Background Context

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### City Profile

Fort Worth, a city with a population of 448,000, is part of the sprawling Dallas-Arlington-Fort Worth “megaplex” that spans several huge counties. The city’s downtown high-rise office and government buildings stand in stark contrast to the low-rise character of the remainder of the city, and the exceedingly flat typography of the North Texas plain. Unlike many, this spread-out city continues to grow; between 1980 and 1990, Fort Worth’s population went up by 63,000 persons. In the 1990 Census, the city’s population was about 25 percent African-American, 22 percent Hispanic, and 50 percent non-Hispanic whites. Approximately 20 percent of the population (which also includes Asians and Native Americans) spoke a language other than English at home. About 20 percent of the population had at least some college education, and 72 percent had graduated from high school. Fort Worth is not known as an affluent town: in 1990, 15 percent of its rental property stood vacant, and the median value of owner-occupied homes was \$59,900. Unemployment stood at 8.1 percent, and the city’s 1989 per capita income was \$13,000. More than one-fifth of the city’s families were headed by women, and more than one-third of these lived below the poverty line.

### Crime Trends

Like some large cities, Fort Worth experienced a roller-coaster crime rate during the 1980s and 1990s. An inspection of the city’s official crime statistics indicates that there was a peak in 1986 and 1987, followed by a substantial decline in crime during the remainder of the 1980s. This decline was followed by a renewed jump in the crime rate which brought the count in most categories to record new highs in 1991 and 1992. As *USA Today* put it, the city then “was literally bleeding. Violent crime had earned the community ... the dishonor of having the worst major crime rate of any big city in the country” (October 14, 1996).

Crime rates then began to drop again. Between 1991 and 1995, the recorded rate of murder in the city dropped 45 percent. Robbery was down by 43 percent over that period, auto theft by 64 percent, and burglary by 57 percent. Rape was down 26 percent between 1991 and 1995, and 44 percent since 1986. From its high in 1987, burglary declined by 67 percent.

These were large decreases. In the same article, *USA Today* attributed the decline in Fort Worth’s crime rate to “... the familiar stew of more cash for more cops, and more community involvement.” The local media, and many of

the people we interviewed in Fort Worth, attributed the decline to more specific programs, including those reviewed in this report: the city's community policing program, its extensive role for volunteer citizen patrols, and the new tax resources made available to the police.

### Unified Crime Report Data

Ft. Worth		1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Crime	Population	424,449	432,542	432,305	432,889	430,831	447,619	457,171	465,262	463,373	472,288	460,321
Murder*	Raw	128	200	135	97	113	160	195	153	133	132	108
	per 100,000	30.16	46.24	31.23	22.41	26.23	35.74	42.65	32.88	28.70	27.95	23.46
Forcible Rape	Raw	483	559	476	489	454	432	442	525	507	413	332
	per 100,000	113.79	129.24	110.11	112.96	105.38	96.51	96.68	112.84	109.42	87.45	72.12
Robbery	Raw	2620	3373	3270	3115	2525	2801	3426	3488	2250	2379	1965
	per 100,000	617.27	779.81	756.41	719.58	586.08	625.76	749.39	749.69	485.57	503.72	426.88
Aggravated Assault	Raw	3121	3738	3810	3625	3576	4463	4851	5226	3589	3111	2939
	per 100,000	735.31	864.19	881.32	837.40	830.02	997.05	1061.09	1123.24	774.54	658.71	638.47
Burglary	Raw	15873	19257	20567	19106	17216	15298	16878	14304	10505	8295	7334
	per 100,000	3739.67	4452.05	4757.52	4413.60	3996.00	3417.64	3691.84	3074.40	2267.07	1756.34	1593.24
Larceny-Theft	Raw	30877	35334	38492	38473	34680	34710	38383	32128	26310	23712	22148
	per 100,000	7274.61	8168.92	8903.90	8887.50	8049.56	7754.36	8395.76	6905.36	5677.93	5020.67	4811.43
Motor Vehicle Theft	Raw	5756	9554	10813	9357	8974	9206	13470	9940	6007	5358	4861
	per 100,000	1356.11	2208.80	2501.24	2161.52	2082.95	2056.66	2946.38	2136.43	1296.36	1134.48	1056.00

\*Murder includes non-negligent manslaughter

### Local Government

Fort Worth has a council-manager form of government. The city is administered by a professional city manager's office, and an assistant city manager exercises immediate oversight of the police department. In Fort Worth, mayors historically play whatever role they can craft for themselves. Community policing and CCP were organized during the tenure of a past Mayor, who, in 1985, was influential in selecting the current Chief of Police—a veteran of the Los Angeles Police Department. Before his arrival the police department was reportedly “a mess, with no morale.” Later, the Mayor led a drive for the creation of a special taxing district to support crime control (see below), but then ran for Congress and a new Mayor was chosen in a special election.

The roots of Fort Worth's community policing program and its CCP efforts can be found in the city's extremely positive experience with the Weed & Seed program. The Mayor and the executive director of Fort Worth's Citizens Crime Commission first heard of Weed & Seed at a conference in 1991. Although they were told it was too late to apply, a concerted effort by the Fort Worth political community got their proposal accepted and funded. This grant proposal is one of several efforts when the city and county's political leaders successfully coalesced around law enforcement matters. All of the initial funding went to the police department, and was used to create the first decentralized police district in the Weed & Seed target area.

The Weed & Seed target area was composed of three Fort Worth neighborhoods covering about 15 square miles and included 44,000 residents.

Although considered “inner city neighborhoods” by Texas standards, this relatively low population density (less than half, for example, of a typical Chicago neighborhood) is another characteristic of Fort Worth’s style of life. The initial, 1992, “weeding” component of the program focused on intensive patrolling and crackdowns on street drug dealing. The program also featured Fort Worth’s first neighborhood police station, the assignment of special Neighborhood Police Officers to specific beats, a community-based newsletter, an AmeriCorps-staffed Safe Haven in a local elementary school, and a community advisory committee to work with the district’s commander. The district station shared space with a special job-referral service and other civilian programs, and the city focused its civic improvement funds on the area. These Weed & Seed projects were later replicated throughout the entire city with funding support (in part) from CCP. Many people we talked with underscored the importance of this district as a “test-bed” for future community policing efforts in Fort Worth.

Before CCP, there was little history of inter-agency cooperation in Fort Worth outside City Hall. The city of Fort Worth does not dominate Tarrant County, which also includes the sprawling city of Arlington and a large number of suburbs. Prior to CCP, there had been little political motivation for policy interaction between the city and county. The city is served by all or part of 14 separate school districts, each with its own elected board and tax rate. Although Tarrant county funds were used to support special police teams for high schools and middle schools in the city, the police department found it difficult to negotiate separate arrangements with the various school districts. They perceived the schools to be “very eight to four (o’clock) oriented,” which made it, “hard to use their facilities.” CCP served as a catalyst for growing inter-jurisdictional cooperation during the period of our research, in particular with the agencies involved in Tarrant County’s new comprehensive criminal justice planning process.

## **Police**

Fort Worth’s transition to community policing came relatively early in this national movement, beginning as early as 1985 with the arrival of a new police chief. In response to community concern about crime, the Chief began to hold community forums to discuss police and safety issues, and these proved to be popular and politically visible. To improve responsiveness to local concerns, the department reorganized in 1986 to create four geographically-based police divisions, each under the command of a captain. Before that time, policing in Fort Worth had been directed from the downtown headquarters. The chief’s “territorial command concept” was the first move toward decentralizing the department and placing accountability in the hands of on-the-spot managers.

The 1993 national survey of police agencies by the Police Foundation, and BOTEC's 1995 survey (using similar questions) found Fort Worth heavily involved in community policing activities. Most notably, the agency was quite decentralized. Patrol operations were directed from a number of neighborhood police stations and the lieutenants who directed them worked with considerable administrative and budgetary autonomy. Detectives and other specialized units were primarily organized at the level of four Divisions, each of which was led by a captain who has 24-hour responsibility for his area.

The next major change in the city's police department was the formation of its "Code Blue" program in 1991. At that time, the department had 925 sworn officers, and the City Council was struggling to address the service needs of the public within the city's narrow tax base. As noted above, that year Fort Worth had one of the highest reported crime rates in the nation, and there was a great deal of political pressure to respond somehow to the crime problem. A large number of organizations mobilized behind the chief's first steps. Under the Code Blue rubric, the Council found funds to: 1) rehire 22 retired officers to staff administrative positions in the department in order to free police officers for field activity; 2) create a Victim Assistance Office; 3) hire 44 new police officers who would staff a new Neighborhood Policing Officer (NPO) unit in each of the four Field Operations Divisions, 4) provide twelve additional officers for the department's Gang Detail; 5) provide management and leadership training for police supervisors; and, 6) create and staff a civilian patrol program, called Citizens on Patrol. Code Blue currently serves as the umbrella concept for a collection of other programs as well, including a Citizens Police Academy, Weed & Seed, and other initiatives.

The introduction of Neighborhood Policing Officers was an innovative move toward greater community policing and problem solving. These officers, dedicated to neighborhood problem solving, were each initially assigned to a defined area larger than a beat, and one of their jobs was to work in close concert with an active civilian patrol program sponsored by the department. The only problem for the Fort Worth Police Department was not having enough Neighborhood Policing officers and Citizens-on-Patrol groups to meet the needs of every neighborhood in the city.

In sum, the Fort Worth Police Department had made substantial reforms in the decade leading up to the introduction of CCP program, and had a clear vision of the changes that were needed. Essentially, the CCP funds, along with support from COPS and Weed and Seed, allowed the department to accelerate its implementation plan and expand the number of Neighborhood Policing Districts, Neighborhood Policing Officers, and Citizens on Patrol to reach more neighborhoods throughout the city.

## **Community**

Community participation in crime prevention and control evolved over the past decade in Fort Worth. The Chief introduced the concept of community forums in 1985 and has continued these meetings ever since. At these gatherings, which are attended by the Chief and other police officials, citizens have the opportunity to air their concerns about neighborhood problems, policing responses, and other issues. Although these forums are designed more for reactive venting of feelings than for joint long-term problem-solving, they nevertheless represent an important outlet for the community and regular contact with the Chief. More recently, with support from CCP and Weed-and-Seed funds, the department created structured opportunities for citizens to have input into the planning and problem-solving activities. The creation of civilian advisory committees served this purpose (see subheading Community Advisory Committees).

As noted above, in 1991, the police department was instrumental in creating Citizens on Patrol (COP)—groups of volunteer citizens who patrol specific neighborhoods and report suspicious or criminal activity to the police. COP members work closely with Neighborhood Patrol Officers and beat officers in their neighborhood. Again, by 1995, the problem was simply one of locating sufficient resources to expand the program to all Fort Worth neighborhoods with appropriate staffing, training, and equipment.

## CCP Planning and Organization

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Fort Worth was one of sixteen sites invited by the Bureau of Justice Assistance to apply for both planning and implementation funding to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to combat crime. As stated in BJA's *Fact Sheet on the Comprehensive Communities Program*, "(t)he two defining principles of the CCP are (1) that communities must take a leadership role in developing partnerships to combat crime and violence, and (2) that State and local jurisdictions must establish truly coordinated and multi-disciplinary approaches to address crime and violence-related problems, as well as the conditions which foster them."<sup>1</sup> Each site was mandated to include jurisdiction-wide community policing and community mobilization prevention initiatives in their strategy. In addition, sites were asked to create programming, based on the area's needs, in the areas of youth and gangs, community prosecution and diversion, drug courts with diversion to treatment, and community-based alternatives to incarceration.

The Comprehensive Communities Program was implemented in two phases. Under Phase I, the invited jurisdictions submitted an application for approximately \$50,000 of planning funds to support the design and development of a comprehensive strategy. All proposals for Phase I funding were due April 29, 1994. Most of the sites were notified within a month that they were awarded funding for Phase I. During this planning phase, technical assistance in the form of workshops and meetings were offered to the sites. During July, 1994, representatives from each site were mandated to attend a two-day Phase II (Implementation Phase) Application Development Workshop. All Phase II applications were due to BJA on August 15, 1994.

The chart on the following page presents a timeline detailing the administrative history of Fort Worth's CCP program. It documents the grant planning period, budgeting stages, and CCP project staffing changes.


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<sup>1</sup> Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Fact Sheet Comprehensive Communities Program*, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994.


## Fort Worth Timeline

**1994**
**1995**
**1996**
**1997**


### Planning Grant




### First Year Grant



### Second Year Grant



### Other Important Dates



## The Planning Process

The CCP proposal was written by the police department's grant writer. He coordinated the planning process, which was formally chaired by the Assistant City Manager who oversees the police. Like many other sites, Fort Worth planned to incorporate established agencies and existing service programs into the non-police parts of the proposal and to use policing funds to advance the long-term plans of the department.

A great deal of preparatory work for the grant proposal had been completed for the city's five Weed-and-Seed applications. The grant-writing process was expedited because the city had on file recent "memoranda of understanding" with a long list of public and non-profit organizations. The city had recently held a series of public hearings surrounding their Weed & Seed proposal. While the grant manager insisted that Fort Worth did not need to conduct a new needs assessment for CCP, the city did hold 16 community meetings to "validate" that its plan still met community needs. At every meeting the question was, "Are these still the top issues in your community?" Individuals involved in writing the CCP grant proposal felt that the planning process in Fort Worth was far ahead of other cities because they had built a solid base of community support and had conducted careful needs assessment.

From the city's point of view, the program development process was an extremely trying one. Fort Worth officials were convinced that Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) staff did not have a complete understanding of "what it takes to run a city." They were maddened by the federal government's insistence that they could not include patrol cars in their budget, and that they should include a focus on foot patrol in their program. They felt this did not reflect the reality of policing in parts of the country where beats can be measured in square miles, not square blocks. They repeatedly asked that government officials come to Fort Worth and look at the districts they were creating, but to no avail. They were bombarded by virtually identical paperwork and reporting requests from different parts of the funding agency, and could not understand why staffers in Washington could not talk to each other and share their own paperwork. Given the city's uncertain fiscal future, they wanted to spend CCP funds for overtime, rather than make new civil service hires. Fort Worth staff felt they could not get any useful technical assistance and could not understand why they were not simply given a budget to hire the specific help that they needed. Fort Worth was fortunate in being able to support many efforts that were not allowable through BJA by tapping other budgets that they maintain from different funding sources.

## **CCP Administrative Structure**

Fort Worth's administrative structure for the program is quite simple. The relatively few components of the program outside of the police department operate on the basis of contracts with the City of Fort Worth. These contracts were negotiated during the planning process and funds were released almost immediately upon receipt of the city's award letter from BJA. The contractors reported quarterly to the police department's Chief Planner, who, in turn submitted quarterly reports to BJA. Another planning staff member began to serve as the day-to-day CCP Coordinator in 1996. Within each contracting agency, staff members were clearly identified as CCP liaisons with the police department.

At a strategic level, CCP is guided by a formal steering committee co-chaired by the Mayor and the US Attorney for the Northern District of Texas. Other members include the City Manager, the Chief of Police, the county's District Attorney, and several civic leaders. Their formal purpose is to review and guide the implementation and operation of the city's neighborhood policing districts. The committee oversees both CCP activities and the city's Weed & Seed program. It receives input from a Citywide Community Advisory Committee (CAC), which is comprised of representatives from each of the twelve district Community Advisory Committees.

At the operational level, community policing and community mobilization activities are carried out within the twelve Neighborhood Policing Districts. Neighborhood Policing Officers, under the direction of the District Commander, and with input from the local Community Advisory Committee (CAC), work closely with beat officers, detectives, gang officers, and members of Citizens-on-Patrol to identify and address local problems.

## **CCP Strategy**

Fort Worth's overall approach to CCP can be characterized as a three-pronged strategy: (1) enhancing neighborhood-based problem-solving and crime prevention by changing the structure and function of the police service delivery system; (2) developing crime-fighting partnerships with local citizens as well as creating new opportunities for citizen input into police operations; and, (3) supporting an array of preventive social services which focus on at-risk youth and known offenders. The first strategy was operationalized by further decentralizing the police organization so that geographically-based services and problem-solving were possible in more neighborhoods. This move involved the expansion of Neighborhood Police Officers who (in contrast to beat officers) were devoted to problem-solving at the neighborhood level. The second strategy was operationalized by expanding and supporting the Citizen's on Patrol program, which was a decentralized surveillance operation by local volunteers. In addition, the expansion of the Community

Advisory Committees to each of the new police districts and the introduction of leadership training programs provided avenues for citizen input and empowerment. Finally, the third strategy was operationalized by having the police department serve as the financial conduit for the provision of CCP funding to local social service agencies. These agencies have successfully implemented programs that target youths at risk of joining gangs, young offenders facing adjudication, drug offenders, and spouse batterers.

Behind this multi-pronged program strategy were funding decisions which may ultimately shape the nature and duration of these initiatives. Fort Worth's funding plan reflected the politics of taxing and spending in the city. Texas has no income tax and relies heavily on the sales tax to sustain the state's activities. As a result, local jurisdictions are not authorized to add a significant increment to the sales tax, and are forced to depend on the property tax. As mentioned, Fort Worth is not an affluent town. Most homes are exceedingly modest, and as a result, the city imposes one of the highest property tax levies in the state in order to generate sufficient revenue to sustain service levels. There is intense pressure on the City Council to keep the property tax rate from increasing any further, yet the city's administrators cannot foresee a way of increasing funding for the police department within the existing tax base.

As a result, Fort Worth has aggressively looked elsewhere to find funding to sustain reasonable levels of general police service, as well as to support new community policing efforts. Fort Worth currently relies on four income streams to support policing: its general fund, CCP, the Crime Control and Prevention District (described below), the Weed & Seed program, and COPS grants. One of the consequences of this funding strategy is that CCP as a program has more local visibility than most of the sites we have visited. Because city and department managers want continually to remind the voters of the importance of each of these income streams, virtually every printed district map and those we saw on display at public meetings includes a legend indicating the funding base for each district. The three CCP districts (1, 8, and 12), the three Crime Control and Prevention District districts (4, 7, and 10), the two Weed & Seed districts (2 and 6) and the four general fund districts (3, 5, 9, and 11) were prominently differentiated. Police officers at every level seemed thoroughly aware of the funding base for their district, and how it impacted their work.

The city's property-tax-based general fund supports centralized police activities and four of the city's twelve police districts. This budget currently totals \$70,000,000 per year. In addition, the department has had about \$1.8 million in Local Law Enforcement Block Grant funds to spend on policing.

CCP funds partially supported three more districts. CCP paid the salaries of the districts' sergeants, lieutenants, and clerk-typists, and officer overtime. The CCP budget also included funds to further train Neighborhood Police

Officers (see below) in crime prevention, problem solving, dispute resolution, and group facilitation. The CCP budget for policing was \$999,999. The city anticipates that the Crime Control District will fund the CCP-supported districts in the future.

Weed & Seed funded the creation of the first two new police districts. As noted above, Fort Worth's Weed & Seed experience was remarkably positive, and the city anticipates securing at least five years of high-level funding from that program. Their fifth-year proposal would generate \$300,000 for the police department. Recently, Weed & Seed funds have been used almost exclusively to support community policing and intensive enforcement projects, but the last year's budget provided \$100,000 for officer overtime and \$200,000 for the city's Safe Haven program and community mobilization efforts by the Tarrant County Citizen's Crime Commission.

Three more police districts are supported by Fort Worth's Crime Control and Prevention District. This special taxing district was approved by the voters in March, 1995, when they authorized the addition of five cents to the state sales tax for a five-year period. The group that spearheaded the campaign for the authorization of the Crime Control and Prevention District, headed by the Mayor, formulated a proposed two-year budget for the program. A required part of the process of creating a Crime Control District, the budget gathered support from the voters by making it clear that all of the funds would be reserved for hiring officers and purchasing equipment. Its proponents pointed to the lack of "overhead" and "administrative fat" in the budget. Since the referendum, a majority of the Crime Control and Prevention District Board's membership has remained committed to that posture, and as a result virtually all of the tax-increment financing that flows from the Crime Control and Prevention District has gone directly to the department. For example, at a budget meeting in June, 1996, originally the Board vetoed spending for building code enforcement, park security, and graffiti removal. All these were eventually approved, however, at a later date. The Crime Control and Prevention District funds also support some costs associated with operating the three CCP districts disallowed by BJA, including cars and radios for officers, rent for some district stations, and office equipment. During its first year (1995), the Crime Control District's fractional sales tax increment produced \$23,000,000 for the department, which expanded their normal budget by nearly one-third.

## CCP Program

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### Implementation of Community Policing

Fort Worth's community policing program evolved over more than a decade. As noted earlier, community forums to discuss police and safety issues began in 1985 and geographically-based reorganization of the command structure was introduced in 1986. The creation of four police divisions, each under the command of a captain, was a major move toward decentralizing the department. Operationally, a captain placed accountability in the hands of on-the-spot managers.

The Fort Worth Police Department has worked to expand its comprehensive "Code Blue" program introduced in 1991, which included hiring civilians for desk positions, hiring additional Neighborhood Policing Officers, and expanding the Citizens-on-Patrol program.

The Citizen's-on-Patrol (COP) group and Fort Worth's Neighborhood Policing Officers are the centerpiece of the CCP package. COP volunteers are trained at the police academy by a field training officer, and are issued a cap, tee-shirt, and windbreaker decorated with the program's logo. Organized by neighborhood, the volunteers work closely with local Neighborhood Policing Officers. Each group chooses its own leader, who in turn is responsible for managing the group's activities and distributing its portable radios. The radios are carried by COP members while they patrol in their own autos. Their cars are identified by large "refrigerator-magnet" decals attached to the doors of the vehicle, which can easily be exchanged from auto-to-auto. The personal radios connect the team with base stations in the police districts, where they can communicate with the 911 center and the NPO serving their area. COP groups are quite active in many parts of the city. COP members often serve on the district's advisory committees (see below), and can be counted on to appear in support of the police at public functions. In June, 1996, the department estimated there were 2,900 COP volunteers active in 112 areas of town. Surveys (see below) indicate that this program is highly visible in Fort Worth, and the police department is inclined to give these citizens significant credit for the large declines in theft, burglary, and auto theft registered in the city since 1992.

The other centerpiece of Fort Worth's program is the department's Neighborhood Police Officers (NPOs). When the program started in 1991, there were 40 NPOs (ten in each division). With support from CCP and other sources, their number grew to 89 at the end of 1996, with the formation of the last decentralized police districts. NPOs serve as Fort Worth's "chief of the beat." They have "24 by 7" responsibility for their beat; they are issued their

own car, beeper, and cell phone, and are expected to respond to events in the beat rather than hew to a fixed work schedule. Most nominally work a standard ten a.m. to six p.m. shift, but they frequently change their schedule to work weekends when residents of their beat are home. Their regular routine is to post a weekly work schedule with their sergeant, and then keep track of deviations from that schedule imposed by events in their beat. Neighborhood Policing Officers receive the three percent salary increment paid to all officers who work the evening shift as further compensation.

Each of the city's four field operations divisions has a sergeant who supervises NPOs in the division's districts, in addition to other duties. But as one of their supervisors put it, NPOs "have to be good self-motivators, and do their own business." They seem to want the job because they like the perks and shift flexibility (but that turns out to be a problem as well), they enjoy working with the public and getting positive feedback about their efforts, and they think that community-oriented work is the future of the department.

NPOs are assigned to specific neighborhoods with the mission of "addressing the root causes of crime." Three "regular" officers, one per shift, are also assigned to specific beats. However, Fort Worth had no system for ensuring beat integrity, and during their tour these officers are dispatched everywhere within reach. Any geographic commitment comes from returning to their beat for unstructured patrol between calls, but many officers do not return. NPOs, on the other hand, are free to do community work because they are disconnected from routinely responding to 911 calls. Those we interviewed monitor their personal radio whenever practical, and told us of many circumstances when they inform the dispatcher that they want to take a particular call. One reported being specifically called two to three times per week for particularly high-priority incidents located on his beat.

Sergeants and district commanders evaluate the performance of NPOs in informal ways: by observing if there are abandoned cars or trash-filled vacant lots on their beat, by listening carefully to citizen's comments and complaints, and by monitoring the activities of the beat's COP groups. One sergeant told us that, "if business operators on the beat aren't getting attention, they are not doing their job."

On the beat, NPOs are involved in diverse kinds of community outreach and problem-solving activities. They told us of organizing weekend neighborhood cleanups, speaking at church and school assemblies, coaching sports teams, enrolling residents in auto theft prevention programs, and working with youths. They identify abandoned cars and drug distribution points. They work closely with their local COP group, informing them of crime patterns, discussing prevention strategies and helping them coordinate the distribution of their radios. Sometimes sergeants and other officers working in the area come to COP beat meetings as well. NPOs work hard at recruiting new COP members. Occasionally they handle warrant arrests. In one area, NPOs are

working in support of an intensive Model Block program that is pouring city funds into upgrading residential buildings in a ten-block area. Their sergeant can authorize them to work out-of-uniform on investigations if necessary.

Recently, other city agencies have begun to request NPO involvement in their programs. NPOs told us that wide-spread popular support emerged for the program as police and citizens began to come together on a regular basis on their beat and at public meetings. In explaining why he liked the job, one NPO lamented a general trend in the department: "we used to take care of our beat, but now we just take care of our calls." He liked being an NPO because it returned to him responsibility for caring for his beat.

Do officers like being NPOs? In the districts we visited there have been more applicants than NPO positions, and officers currently in the role seemed well satisfied with their job. They indicated that most of the officers who had left the position did so because they were promoted. Others stepped down because they were "burned out" by the sometimes long and usually erratic hours demanded by the job, or because their family's needs changed and they had to have shift stability.

Do other officers like NPOs? Only one NPO we interviewed thought that the communication-oriented, discretionary, non-reactive nature of the job undermined the status of the position in the organization. That officer stated that some patrol officers have suggested a new definition for NPO—"Non-Productive Officer"—because they were not doing "real police work." The others we interviewed insisted there was a great deal of support for NPOs, and that other officers understood the difficult work schedule the task demanded. An NPO admitted there was early resentment about the NPOs, but they have made visible strides in solving recurring problems, and they routinely handle jobs many officers do not want to handle. The department argues that NPO efforts to deal with the causes of repeat calls save other officers from having to spend their time repeatedly returning to the same problem or location.

One solution to the threatened isolation of NPOs from the patrol force is communication, and in one district, officers reported that NPO and other beat officers have monthly meetings under the supervision of their sergeant to discuss beat issues. The off-duty officers receive compensatory time off for this meeting. The other districts we visited did not do this, indicating that there is considerable supervisory flexibility in the operation of the districts (one officer put it another way: "some district commanders don't want to work very hard.").

Other notable issues include the absence of training for NPOs. A typical tale of woe: on his first day of work, one officer we interviewed was issued the keys to his beat car and told to go out and do neighborhood-oriented work.

He, like others, managed to find other NPOs with more field experience, and relied heavily on this kind of informal peer instruction while he was getting underway. Commanders hope to arrange an overlap between the assignments of old and new NPOs when possible, so that the new officers can be introduced to the beat and its residents. In early 1997, the department was making plans to send existing NPOs to a crime prevention training program, but a systematic process of introducing new NPOs to the complexity of their work clearly is needed.

NPOs work their beats under the supervision of the twelve district commanders. The three or four districts within each division are supervised by captains, who also control detectives and other special units at that level. The districts themselves are commanded by lieutenants. As outlined above, the first districts were funded by Weed & Seed. When CCP and Crime Control and Prevention District funding arrived to support extension of the concept to other areas of the city, the Chief decided to move directly to districting the entire community. In many cases this involved finding small district station buildings, although a few still run out of the four large Division buildings. One of the first jobs handed to two of the district commanders we interviewed was to find buildings that they could afford (within the budget they were given) to set up as headquarters for their districts. In some districts there are sub-district storefront offices, and the department has recently acquired a few mobile homes to place in high crime areas. Where they exist, NPOs work from the sub-offices, and other officers have keys so that they can use the washroom, phone, and other facilities.

## **Organization for Community Input**

### **Citizens on Patrol**

As noted above, the widespread involvement of Fort Worth residents in the Citizens on Patrol (COP) unit formed in October, 1991, is one of the most striking components of this city's community policing program. Participants receive eight hours of training, followed by 16 hours of "ride-alongs" in their own neighborhood. Each group chooses its own leader, who in turn manages the group's patrol activities. On patrol, they are only "eyes and ears" for the police, they are instructed not to intervene in incidents. They are connected by radio to the department, through which they report incidents they discovered. In one of the districts we visited, a COP group was focusing on auto theft. They got regular briefings on stolen cars from their NPO, constructed their own hot-spot pin maps of the area, kept a special lookout for "chop shops" and illegal car repair operations, and watched for furtive activity in car parks.

COP groups are reportedly active in many parts of the city. COP members often serve on district advisory committees, and turn out in support of the police at public functions. They are typically active in civic associations, and vocal about city government. With the large downturn in crime described above, COPs groups have turned to "quality of life" problems, and have become more aggressive about code enforcement and identifying problems that are the responsibility of other city agencies. Police managers that we discussed the issue with feared that complacency might result from this decline in crime rates, and they speculated about how involvement might be sustained among the most fervent "anti-crime" activists. Over a five-year period, COP has grown dramatically. COP membership increased from 105 persons representing eleven neighborhoods in October, 1991, to 2,900 persons representing 112 neighborhoods in June, 1996. Nevertheless, police officials believe that participation may have peaked.

Another district we visited reported almost 200 civilians had been trained for COP activities during 1996 alone. They work out of an office in the district station where they are equipped with desks, computers, maps, storage facilities, and a radio base station for communicating with their patrols. COP members also work with officers in the station on crime analysis, as did AmeriCorps workers assigned to assist with station house management. They also help identify graffiti sites for clean-up by teams of low-risk jail prisoners and probationers as part of a County program. This district also organized a Business Watch group that disseminated information on commercial crime by fax to businesses in the area. In this district, every patrol officer is required to attend one community meeting in the area they work each month, for which they are paid overtime.

The city's 1996 resident survey found that 73 percent of residents were aware of the COP program. Like most program-recognition studies, it found that home owners, older residents, those with more education, higher income persons, and whites were more likely to be aware of the program. Racial gaps in awareness were not huge, however: 75 percent of whites, 70 percent of African-Americans, and 62 percent of Hispanics knew about the program; the split between home owners (78 percent) and renters (63 percent) was larger.

Among those aware of the program, ten percent said they had participated in some way (about seven percent of those interviewed). The strongest correlate of participation was income. About seven percent of those below \$30,000 per year reported participating, while above \$40,000 per year the figure was about 15 percent. While there was no useful information available on the distribution of COP groups in different city neighborhoods, this survey suggests involvement is likely to be higher in better-off, stable, home-owning parts of town.

## **Community Advisory Committee**

Each district also has a Community Advisory Committee (CAC), made up of a dozen or so local residents and merchants. The chairs of the twelve committees constitute a Citywide Community Advisory Council, and they meet under the auspices of the Chief and City Manager. New district Community Advisory Committees (and most are new) are nominated by the district commander; they in turn solicit names of potential members from their NPOs. At least one member represents each beat within the district, and there are at-large and business representatives as well. They meet monthly and select their own officers. They develop their own agendas, although in diverse areas it is difficult for Community Advisory Committees to arrive at a common one. Beats within districts can vary in how closely residents want to be aligned with the police, as well as the kinds of problems they face. In one district Community Advisory Council members “don’t share enough to do much productive,” and in this area the committee is therefore struggling for a role.

We received details about one district’s Community Advisory Council’s monthly meeting. Some of its members represent specific beats, while others serve as “at large” representatives. The district commander encourages its members to focus on identifying “larger” problems and mobilizing problem-solving resources in the community. The commander tries to select only local activists for his CAC, so recruiting replacement members is difficult. The police Division that encompasses this district employs a part-time community organizer (with the support of a COPS-MORE grant) to help coordinate CACs, COP groups, and other citizen activities. She reports that 300 to 400 residents are active in police activities in the Division. The Division itself holds a weekly community forum at which residents and police can discuss area issues.

Some of the CACs have struggled to find their role. Some of the city’s earliest advisory committees were created without any policies or procedures, and in some cases, this ambiguity led to what city officials felt was an “abuse of authority” on their part. For example, committees created oversight committees, wrote letters to the US Attorney General complaining about police brutality in the name of the committee, directed the expenditure of funds, and engaged in other activities that did not seem appropriate to their purpose. Members of the committees seemed to feel they had ascended to permanent positions. Hence, bylaws were created to establish specific roles for committee members, introduce term limits, and define their powers. The overall impact has been positive. As one agency head reported, “For the most part, Community Advisory Council have made a tremendous difference in the community. It has been a true partnership in the best sense of the word.” But another city official admits that “the citizen committees are just getting started. It is a very slow process. Everyone needs to feel comfortable.”

## **Citizens Crime Commission: Leadership Training and Resources**

The community mobilization component of CCP was designed to enhance the effectiveness of the Community Advisory Committees and other efforts to strengthen community involvement into anti-crime activities. The Tarrant County Citizens Crime Commission, a non-profit organization, supports and coordinates Fort Worth's community mobilization activities.

The Commission managed two mobilization efforts. The Community Leadership Development Seminar began in January, 1996, and completed three cycles of the program that year. The monthly seminar was intended to enhance grass-roots leadership in the community, and thus to build the capacity of neighborhoods to assume responsibility for local problem solving. The Commission's staff met with the police district's Citizen Advisory Committees to identify the issues and skills that needed to be included in the curriculum, and a consultant devised a detailed curriculum. Some of the issues covered by the seminars included meeting management, media relations, "getting your voice heard at city hall," community organizing, conflict resolution, youth issues, inter-personal communication strategies, and leadership skills. By the end of 1996, 45 individuals had "graduated" from the program.

The leadership program appeared to be a sound concept, but participation levels were lower than expected. Furthermore, missing from the audience were the officers considered the best target group, namely, the NPOs assigned to Community Advisory Committees and who were in a position to transfer their knowledge from the classroom to the community. Refinements were made in the program between our first and second site visits, and additional funding is being sought for leadership training.

The second mobilization initiative conducted by the Commission was the development of resource materials for the Citizen Advisory Committees. The Commission developed planning exercises for the groups and a resource binder presenting details about the city and its police districts. The Commission helped the Community Advisory Committees raise and manage their money.

The Commission also organizes, prints, and distributes *Safe City*, the city's official community policing newsletter. It coordinates the production of a special page of news from each district and distributes the final product. District residents are paid a modest fee to act as reporters and translators for the newsletter. The Commission printed 46,200 copies of the first newsletter, and 40,000 of the second. Continued support for the newsletter is also included in the city's application for second-round CCP funding.

## **Organization for Service Delivery**

In Fort Worth's plan, there is no structured link between NPOs and other city service agencies. When NPOs have a service problem (such as getting a vacant lot cleared), they are on their own with a telephone book. Experienced NPOs told us they hope to be successful in finding particular workers in other agencies whom they can rely on ("people with a work ethic like ours," as one put it), but there is no systematic way in which other city agencies can be mobilized to work with NPOs or that those efforts can be supervised and evaluated.

Grassroots community input, however, is organized at different levels. At the police district level, citizen involvement occurs via the Citizens on Patrol program, community forums, and Community Advisory Committees. At the citywide level, participation is structured via the Citywide Community Advisory Council and occasional citywide forums. However, the CACs are strictly advisory in nature and do not involve service activities. Citizens on Patrol is the exception, which works very closely with police personnel.

As the lead grantee agency for the CCP program, the Fort Worth Police Department was responsible for the fiscal management of the funds distributed to various social service agencies (see Appendix A). However, the police department did not coordinate or facilitate the delivery of these services. Each funded agency had its own network of affiliated agencies that existed prior to the CCP program. Nevertheless, the CCP did expand the level of service available to particular target groups. Key services and programs are summarized here:

### **Spousal Abuse: The MENS Program**

The Women's Haven of Tarrant County conducts the Fort Worth's batterer program called "The MENS program" (Men's Education for Nonviolence). The service provides "counseling services for men working to end men's cycle of abuse and family violence." Most men participate because of a court order stemming from the District Attorney's "no drop" policy. The MENS program has several components: screening and assessment of offenders, 24-week educational counseling, support services for victims, training for law enforcement, and networking with other criminal justice agencies. MENS also participates in the bi-monthly meetings of the Domestic Violence Task Force, which discusses key issues in the area.

The MENS program is based on solid research and evaluation in the field of spousal abuse, and the staff at Women's Haven seem well-qualified. MENS employs the "Duluth Model," which is a cognitive and behavioral approach to treating men who batter. It stresses communication skills, anger management, choices, power and control issues, and attitudes toward women and relationships. However, the impact of the MENS program on recidivism

cannot be estimated at this time due to the absence of rigorous evaluation data.

### **Gang Intervention: The Comin' Up Program**

The Comin' Up program, administered by the Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater Fort Worth, was designed to reduce levels of gang violence by establishing truces between gangs, reducing the level of random violence, mediating disputes, and diverting the energies of gang members into other activities. Each site featured a building with recreation facilities and programs. Diverse "interest-based" activities take place during open hours, including sports tournaments, discussion groups (life skills, jobs, conflict resolution), cooking and cosmetology classes, computer classes, parenting programs, movies, karate drills, board games, and "rap" sessions with individual staff members.

A subset of 25 youths at each site were designated "managed cases," and received more intensive attention. Special attention was given to parenting and job skills, and admission to a GED program where appropriate. Job placement, alcohol and drug treatment, and other services were organized to suit the needs of individuals. The program also administered community service programs to which youths could be sentenced to clean parks, streets, and vacant lots around the project sites.

Implementation of the program was slow for a variety of reasons, including the desire to reach "the toughest gang members" and the adverse effects of drug abuse among many program participants. Despite these problems, the Comin' Up program managed to reach a large number of gang members, engage them in constructive activities, and (according to staff) improve their lives. Changes in target area crime rates were certainly consistent with desired program effects. During the first five months of 1995, for example, homicides and sexual assaults were down 83 and 40 percent, respectively, in the target areas and staff felt that these changes were due, in part, to the program. Also, new relationships with the police department were established as a result of the Comin' Up program, overcoming some previous animosity toward gang members. According to staff members, their relationship with the police department is "very good" and the police chief is "very, very supportive."

### **Drug Diversion: The Tarrant County Drug Impact Rehabilitation Enhanced Comprehensive Treatment (DIRECT) Program**

Appended to the county's Drug Impact Court, this diversion program represents the first intergovernmental agreement in the criminal justice arena in Tarrant County. The DIRECT program reviews incoming cases for likely clients, and recommends those that meet specific guidelines to the

District Attorney for diversion to treatment. Most of those entering the CCP part of the program come from the felony branch of the court, and would otherwise be “prison bound.” The DIRECT program subcontracts for treatment components, using agencies that already provided correction and probation services for the county. During the 18-month program, the CCP grant supports psychological exams, urine tests, detoxification services, in- and out-patient treatment, and group therapy.

A recidivism study would be necessary to determine the effectiveness of these interventions. (Program staff are hoping for a rearrest rate no higher than ten percent after one year for those who survive the first three months.) However, the staff are absolutely convinced of the program's merits and are able to cite individual cases whose lives have been turned around since participation in DIRECT. Another program goal is to improve communication with the district judges and persuade them that rehabilitation is the best course of action for many individuals. Although one judge is described as very supportive of DIRECT, the program has a long way to go in order to convince other judges of the program's merit.

### **Community-based Alternatives to Incarceration: The Tarrant County Advocate Program (TCAP)**

A local office of the national Youth Advocacy Program (YAP), which specializes in pre- and post-adjudication services for youthful offenders, administers the Tarrant County Advocate Program (TCAP).

Under CCP, TCAP functioned as an alternative to the secured detention of “charged but not-yet-convicted” young offenders. Rather than being held in detention at the county's youth facility, youths diverted to the program were released to the community. Advocates made frequent home visits and built linkages between the offenders and the community. Their release was approved by a juvenile court judge, and they typically remained under the care of the program for a 20 to 25 day period while they awaited adjudication. This period was referred to as “community-based detention.” During this period, the program tried to quickly establish “community anchors” that could help reduce the risk of recidivism.

The program had several goals: to reduce the length of the incarceration period for young offenders, to reduce their chances of rearrest while they are on release, to ensure their appearance in court, and to reduce their post-adjudication recidivism rate. (TCAP estimated that 88 percent are involved in gangs, and almost all were arrested for violent crimes.)

TCAP staff attended court and recommended that individual youth be diverted to community-based detention. If approved, TCAP assigned an advocate to the case. The advocates were all hired from the community, and lived in their TCAP districts. They were typically recruited from the local

junior college, churches, or via neighborhood newspapers, and underwent extensive training.

The advocates provided an average of 20 hours of direct service contact each week to each offender in the program. Advocates were responsible for getting their charges back into school, or into a special school program. Advocates needed to know what their clients were doing in and out of school, their performance if they had a job, and the dynamics of their family relationships. They monitored their compliance with curfew regulations. Once their client's problems and needs had been identified, advocates referred them to a broad variety of community services. Advocates escorted youths and their parents to court hearings until their case was disposed. They helped families deal with attorneys, and explained to them how the case would be processed. Their services were not uniform, but were tailored to the needs of a particular case.

TCAP staffers were convinced of the cost-effectiveness of their program. In June, 1996, it cost the county \$80 per day to hold youths in detention, while TCAP cost \$32 per day for each offender they serve. In terms of evaluation outcome data, 88 percent of those in the program were not rearrested while they were on release before their trial, and 96 percent showed up for their trial. No comparison group data were available.

## **Network Analysis**

### **Theory and Application**

Network analysis has emerged as a popular analytic strategy for understanding social relations, and is an appropriate tool for shedding light on CCP partnerships. Network analysis has a long history of use in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology (see Scott, 1991), and has now been used in other fields such as political science and education. The network approach assumes that (1) individuals are not isolated but rather function as part of a social system whereby their behavior is influenced by others, and (2) these social systems are structured and organized, and therefore, can be analyzed as predictable patterns of interaction. Thus, network analysis allows us to examine the structural properties of social relations by examining the interactions between individuals actors in a social network. Knoke & Kuklinski, (1982, p. 10) describe the two essential qualities of network analysis as "its capacity to illuminate entire social structures and to comprehend particular elements within the structure."

Recent advances in the theory and techniques of network analysis have been substantial (see Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1993; 1994 for reviews). Despite these advances, the utilization of these techniques and models for the

study of community action and public elites has been limited (see Knoke, 1993).

The Comprehensive Communities Program was designed primarily as a vehicle to facilitate the development of citywide networks and partnerships—collective entities that were hypothesized to improve the odds of preventing urban violence and disorder above and beyond what could be expected from individuals and agencies working independently. In the context of the present study, network analysis is an important strategy for identifying patterns of interaction among those who play key roles in each CCP coalition. These wave one network data provide an empirical look at the relationships and social networks that were taking shape early on in five CCP cities.

### **Boundary Specification**

Specifying the boundaries of the network in advance of data collection is an important part of network analysis. Unlike typical random sampling approaches, limits on the population or the sample must be carefully imposed. Essentially, we adopted a “realist” (Laumann et al., 1982) approach to boundary specification by allowing each CCP site to define their own network.<sup>2</sup> The CCP proposals (prepared by the sites) were used by the research team to identify a preliminary list of potential actors and organizations within the CCP network. These lists were mailed to the CCP project director for review, who then recommended deletions and additions. The realist approach uses the criterion of “mutual relevance” to decide who belongs in a network. Here, the assumption is that individuals and groups are included in the network if they have a mutual interest in the CCP project and some capacity to influence the outcome. Indeed, there is reason to believe that individuals were included in the proposal (or later included in the network) because of their position in particular organizations or projects associated with CCP.

Sampling was not necessary in this study because the network populations were relatively small. Hence, all identified members of each network were included in the data collection effort.

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
<sup>2</sup>The realist approach can be contrasted with the nominalist view. With the latter, network boundaries are determined by the researcher's theoretical framework.

## **Data Collection Methods and Procedures**

The network data in this case study were collected as part of our Coalition Survey. The Coalition Survey was sent to sites from September, 1995 to June, 1996, depending on the site. This network analysis then is a snapshot of the relationships and social networks during the first half of the CCP implementation phase.

To measure CCP-related networks, respondents were given a list of individuals who were believed to be affiliated with the CCP coalition in their respective cities, and then asked how often they have contact with each individual on the list. Possible response options were “daily, weekly, monthly, every few months, never.”

To enhance the network analysis, individual cases were dropped when they did not have sufficient contact with other members of the network. Including persons with rare or occasional contacts in the network would have distorted the results by causing more dense (and therefore less interpretable) clustering of the remaining actors. Hence, after examining the frequency distributions, a decision was made to include only respondents who reported having contact with at least 10% of the total network “at least every few months.” The effects of applying this inclusion criterion are described separately for each site. The analysis strategy can be found in Appendix B.



**Codes:**

BG=Boys' and Girls' Clubs	CM=City Manager's Office	TC=Tarrant Co. Correction Dept.
CA=Community Advisory Com. Chair	MN=MENS Batterer Treatment Prog.	TJ=Tarrant Co. Juvenile Services
CC=Citizen's Crime Commission	PD=Police Dept.	

## **Fort Worth Network Analysis**

Our fieldwork in Fort Worth indicates that CCP did not lead to an extensive network of partnerships between agencies for the purpose of improving and coordinating service delivery. Rather, the Fort Worth Police Department served as the financial manager of the CCP funds. Specifically, the Project Director (also the Police Department's Planner) established and maintained contractual relationships with a number of Tarrant County agencies/organizations that promised to provide services under the CCP grant, including the Citizens Crime Commission, Boys and Girls Clubs, Drug Court, Juvenile Services, and the Corrections Department. The mere creation of these financial arrangements does, however, indicate unprecedented cooperation between the City of Fort Worth and Tarrant County.

Although the Fort Worth model did not require extensive interagency cooperation at the level of service delivery, nevertheless, this network analysis provides an inside look at how these groups elected to interact with one another during the first year of CCP implementation.

Only 23 persons in Fort Worth were identified in the original network survey, and all were included in the network analysis. Individuals in the network reported having contact with at least 17% and as many as 65% of the total network sample (median = 35% of the network). Respondents reported having the most contact with the Chief of Police (65% of the network) and the CCP Project Director (65%), who was also located in the Police Department. Rounding out the top five were the Director of the Crime Commission, her assistant, and the Deputy City Manager (each with 52%). Others with frequent network interaction include the three police commanders responsible for the CCP Neighborhood Policing Districts (48% to 52%).

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis provided the best depiction of the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic was marginally satisfactory (.18), and the  $R^2$  value was moderately strong (.82). The horizontal dimension (x axis) seems to distinguish between police operations on the left side (negative values) and non-police activities on the right (positive values). The vertical dimension (y axis) appears to capture community-based field operations at the top (positive values) and agency-based administration at the bottom (negative values).

Four loose clusters are identified in the chart, but each represents a relatively low-density group. In the lower left quadrant is the "Community Mobilization and Publicity" cluster. This group includes the Police Chief and the Director of CCP (a police department employee) who work with the Tarrant County Crime Commission to publicize CCP and various community

policing initiatives. The Crime Commission is responsible for the community mobilization component of CCP, which includes publishing a citywide newsletter, *Safe City*. This newsletter contains police and community news generated by each of Fort Worth's 12 Neighborhood Policing Districts, as well as a regular letter from the Police Chief. Hence, there is a need for personnel from the Police Department and Crime Commission to communicate on a regular basis to produce the newsletter.

In the upper left quadrant is another small cluster labeled "Neighborhood Policing Operations." This group is defined largely by the presence of three Commanders (Lieutenants) who manage the three Neighborhood Policing Districts created through CCP. It also includes the Director of the Boys and Girls Clubs, who runs several drop-in centers (under the "Comin' Up" program) to help prevent gang violence. The frequency of contact between the Director of Boys and Girls Clubs and the police commanders may reflect negotiations over patrols and security for the evening programs and/or a desire to reach common ground about the handling of police-gang contacts.

The two clusters on the upper and lower left side (described above) are closely linked by their relationships with the Deputy City Manager (to whom the Chief reports) and the Executive Deputy Police Chief. These two individuals are positioned directly between these two clusters and are deeply involved with both the Chief of Police and the Commanders. Indeed, the entire left side of the chart could be viewed, alternatively, as one large cluster concerned with law enforcement and community policing.

In the upper right quadrant, a small cluster is defined as "Community-Based Action and Support." This group includes three community leaders who served as chairs of their local Community Action Committees (CAC). CACs were created by the Police Department to enhance citizen participation in neighborhood anti-crime activities and keep the police informed about citizens' concerns. But near these CAC chairs are two members of the Tarrant County Juvenile Services Department, who work for the Tarrant County Advocate Program (TCAP). This program seeks to divert "charged-but-not-yet-convicted" youth from jail to the community, working with families and agencies to provide "community anchors" that will help prevent recidivism. In their attempt to build linkages between young offenders and the community, TCAP staff interact with CAC leaders. Both are experts on community resources.

In the lower right quadrant are individuals who work primarily on diverting offenders from traditional court sentencing to treatment alternatives (hence, the label "Diversion"), although this is the least coherent cluster. Two of these individuals work for the drug court (DIRECT) within the Tarrant County Corrections Department, seeking to divert drug offenders to an 18-

month treatment program. (The Director of the program is nearby to the southwest.) Another is the Director of the agency that runs the MENS Batterer program, which has an arrangement with the courts to divert abusive partners to a 24-week treatment intervention.

In sum, the findings suggests that the relationship between the City of Fort Worth and Tarrant County involves more than mere contractual and financial arrangements managed by the CCP Project Director. We see some evidence of networking between the Crime Commission and police administrators in Fort Worth to enhance citizen and police awareness of neighborhood policing activities. Also, district commanders appear to work closely with each other and with the Boys and Girls Club to address operational issues at the community level. And the Deputy City Manager is communicating with all neighborhood policing players who participated in this study. (The City Manager is outside any cluster, at the bottom of the network, but this is expected at the program level.) There is some limited evidence of communication and interaction among the service/treatment components of CCP and between them and the Community Advisory Committees. The CAC Chairs, however, are not close in multi-dimensional space to either the Police Department (who created these positions) or the Crime Commission (whose job it is to facilitate CAC meetings). This may indicate that the CACs were not being utilized fully during the first year or that they function in ways not described to us during our site visits.

## Sustainability

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One role for the CCP coordinator has been to help the agencies secure long-term funding for their activities. Appendix A to this report details each of the non-police service components, along with their sustainment plan. Fort Worth's proposal for second-round CCP funding envisioned concentrating that support on two aspects of the project: citizen mobilization and a community-based alternative to incarceration. A little less than half of the requested funds would be used to support a community newsletter, a community resource directory, and leadership training for residents of each of the twelve Neighborhood Police Districts. The remainder would be devoted to mentoring juveniles charged with serious crimes in the Tarrant County court.

Building capacity at the community level is an important part of Fort Worth's agenda. If the proposed training in community leadership skills is successful, citizen involvement may be enhanced in a cost-effective manner.

Beyond the CCP funds, the mechanisms for funding are unique in Fort Worth and make for an uncertain future for non-traditional anti-crime initiatives. Fort Worth will face considerable fiscal distress if the voters do not re-approve the Crime Control and Prevention District tax increment in 1999, which is worth an additional 21 million dollars per year in the police budget. An earlier referendum to create a county-wide anti-crime taxing district failed, suggesting there is cause for concern. The campaign to create a Crime Control and Prevention District for the city of Fort Worth alone took a tough law-and-order stance in order to reassure voters that their tax dollars would not be spent on social programs. This drove the business-oriented Crime Control and Prevention District Board to reject the funding of programs that did not immediately support police operations, including anything remotely associated with the prevention of crime. Police department literature refers to this emphasis as a "nuts & bolts" approach to crime prevention rather than one that supports "more esoteric programs." The "Prevention" part of the District's official title was lost from everyone's vocabulary. While the Board has supported hiring officers and purchasing equipment for Fort Worth's community policing districts, their conservative stance and control of a large fraction of the department's discretionary budget has set clear limits on what programming can be proposed even within the police department.

At our second visit the District Board had changed somewhat in composition. It had approved supporting building code enforcement, special teams of officers for schools, graffiti removal, and other projects that previously would have been rejected. The police department anticipates that the District will provide the bulk of the funding for the police districts created with CCP funds.

However, if the five-year vote to make the tax permanent fails, the future will look very bleak again in 1999. As one city official stated, "we'll have to wait until the crime rate goes through the ceiling before the public is willing to do it again." In the meantime, the key issue in the minds of Fort Worth leaders is how to sustain citizen involvement in the prevention of crime and establish public safety mechanisms that will survive any loss of funding.

## Interim Summary

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The Fort Worth Comprehensive Communities Program reaches a variety of criminal justice agencies, not-for-profit groups, and volunteer citizens in the target communities. The program was built upon what is considered locally to be a successful predecessor initiative—the Department of Justice's Weed and Seed program. Because of the Weed and Seed initiative, a substantial fraction of the CCP planning process and the creation of partnerships was already in place. Although the federal government did not necessarily want the city to replicate the Weed and Seed program, Fort Worth used that program as a base for developing their CCP project.

Under the leadership of a popular veteran police chief, community policing continued to expand in Fort Worth with the aid of CCP and other funding. The process of decentralization of police operations has continued at a rapid pace and now covers the entire city. In addition, the police department is working to maintain and expand citizen involvement in neighborhood patrols and committees. Today, there are twelve Citizen Advisory Committees, one for each Neighborhood Policing District.

CCP funding has played an instrumental role in helping Fort Worth reach the next level of development in the areas of community policing and community mobilization. However, success in the area of coalition-building is less clear. On the one hand, the CCP program, *per se*, did not require ongoing, working partnerships for the purpose of delivering new services or developing new anti-crime initiatives. Essentially, the police department managed the CCP funds and maintained a fiscal relationship with totally separate program components. On the other hand, one could argue that CCP created unprecedented contacts (however limited) between the police department and other agencies such as the Citizens Crime Commission, Boys and Girls' Club, Women's Haven, Tarrant County Juvenile Services, Tarrant County Drug Courts, etc. Furthermore, these contacts have engendered positive attitudes that will benefit the city and the police department in the future. Indeed, as one example, Fort Worth's CCP project probably can be credited with cementing a new partnership between the city and the county. Before the CCP initiative, the two scarcely interacted despite being located together in the city's downtown; now there appears to be more communication between the courts, the prosecutor, and the police.

## Obstacles and Challenges

The Fort Worth Police Department, despite great strides in community policing, must continue the battle against the status quo that is fought in every progressive police agency in the country. In this case, working to

eliminate tensions and negative perceptions between Neighborhood Police Officers and regular beat officers will be an on-going struggle. Nevertheless, Fort Worth has demonstrated the benefits of creating police roles dedicated to solving neighborhood problems—a move that has been criticized by community policing experts in other cities. Our observations in Fort Worth indicate a key ingredient for achieving internal cohesion is to have a lieutenant in charge who is committed to the overall philosophy and who insists on cooperation and communication between all police personnel.

Initial resistance to the program by the association representing city police officers has faded in light of its longevity and the commitment of the political community to it. Fort Worth's community policing program enjoys widespread political support—support that enabled the department to expand its operations at a time when the city faced severe financial constraints.

A 1996 citywide survey of almost 1,500 Fort Worth residents asked them to rate the overall performance of the police department. More than three-quarters rated their performance as good or excellent, and only four percent as poor. As in many cities, older respondents were more favorable toward the police, as were those with more education. There were substantial divisions among the races on this question: 84 percent of whites, but only 71 percent of Hispanics and 62 percent of African-Americans thought the police were doing a good or excellent job. Unsurprisingly, among people who had contact with the police during the previous year, older, more-educated, and white residents were the most positive about that experience.

In the area of community mobilization, there are still challenges ahead. The Citizens on Patrol (COP) force has grown rapidly in recent years to more than 2,900 active volunteers in 112 neighborhoods, but as crime rates continue to decline, police administrators are quite concerned about public apathy. To maintain a large COP force, the police department will need to enhance methods of communication with residents and provide additional incentives for participation. Prior research suggests that expanding the COP agenda beyond surveillance patrols to other issues facing neighborhoods is one important way to maintain residents' interest and involvement.

Training and skill-building for both citizens and police is one area where there is considerable room for expansion in Fort Worth. Citizens on Patrol have received solid training, but citizens who volunteer for Community Advisory Committees have received little, if any, training in leadership skills. Hopefully, this situation will be corrected when the Community Leadership Program is redefined and reimplemented. Also, if community policing is expected to reach a new level, then officers will need serious training in problem solving, community mobilization, coalition-building, and other related topics. Ideally, Fort Worth will identify funding for these training objectives and require officers to participate, despite the current demands of state-mandated training.

As in many cities, some community members were initially upset that so much of the CCP funding went to the police department, especially when other agencies and groups were being asked to participate as partners in a joint process. However, like Fort Worth's Weed & Seed program, a great deal of "seeding" was evident in this project as well. The police department's share of CCP funds went to support its popular community policing effort, a point made repeatedly and widely understood in Fort Worth. The remainder went to a few visible and well-organized programs aimed at teenage gangs, spouse batterers, juveniles in trouble with the law, and drug addicts—all visible and politically-popular clienteles.

The success of these CCP service components is difficult to estimate, but anecdotal evidence is encouraging. Certainly, the program activities have been implemented with integrity. Estimating their effects on the target groups would require controlled evaluation studies. Aside from the difficulties of documenting successes, some programs face political challenges because of the nature of their clientele. Securing funds to hire gang members, for example, is no easy task in a politically conservative jurisdiction, and standards for success are set proportionately higher. Nevertheless, we were impressed with the level of planning, skill, and effort committed to these interventions. Many of Fort Worth's program components are based on solid theory and practice, and could serve as models for other cities.

## **An Epilogue to Fort Worth's CCP Case Study**

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### **New Developments and Issues in CCP**

Fort Worth's Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) continues to expand and flourish as an integral part of their city-wide and county-wide strategy to reduce crime, drug abuse, and gang activity. We learned that Fort Worth pursued a three-pronged approach to CCP: 1) enhanced neighborhood-based problem solving by police personnel; 2) the development of crime-fighting partnerships with local citizens and the creation of new opportunities for citizen input into police operations; and 3) the introduction of new preventive social services which focus on at-risk youth and known offenders.

Our follow-up research in February of 1998 indicates that CCP in Fort Worth has expanded over time and become more solidly rooted in the participating agencies and in the community. Specifically, all of the original components of CCP continue to thrive, mature, and expand. Moreover, the partnerships between the Fort Worth Police Department and outside service agencies have continued to grow. These developments are summarized below for each general strategy.

### **Changes in Policing**

As noted in the case study, CCP was very instrumental in facilitating the transition to decentralized police districts (NPDs). After the initial Weed & Seed funding of two NPDs, CCP funding supported the expansion of the NPD concept to five districts, thus moving from a relatively small experiment to a substantial test of neighborhood-based policing. This paved the way for the eventual funding of citywide implementation of NPDs with local money. Today, NPDs define all twelve police districts, and the funding for these additional services is provided entirely by the Crime Control and Prevention District (CCPD), a special county fund supported by a 5 cent sales tax. As one insider put it, "the CCP-funded districts were used effectively as a carrot to obtain CCPD funding citywide".

Local police services and citizen involvement in policing continue to improve under this decentralization plan. First, the number of NPO officers has reached 89 — one for each beat in the city. CCP grants helped to make this possible, followed by COPS funding for more positions. Today, however, all 89 positions are funded by the Crime Control and Prevention District. In addition, all NPOs are scheduled to receive special training in community

policing and problem solving. This new training initiative is possible because of CCP funding, and includes a train-the-trainers component so that the education process can continue within the Fort Worth Police Department. Second, the role of the Community Advisory Committee in each NPD has taken on increased importance (see below). Thus, citizen participation in local, neighborhood-level policing has been enhanced.

### **Community Involvement**

CCP helped to expand the Citizens-on-Patrol program, expand the Community Advisory Committees in each new police district, and fund the leadership training programs. Each of these initiatives provided a vehicle for citizen input and empowerment with respect to crime prevention and control. Citizens-on-Patrol continues to work effectively as a patrol program for neighborhood residents. New Community Advisory Committees (12) have been created to match the citywide implementation of the NPD concept, and these groups have grown in importance. Recently, the Chief of Police held a meeting with the lieutenants in charge of each NPD to ask for a report on the status of their Community Advisory Committees. He underscored the importance of this mechanism for community involvement. In some districts, the committee was functioning very well, but in others, they were not a priority. As a result of this accountability meeting, lieutenants are now planning to “double their efforts” and “beef up” their advisory committees.

Overall, Community Advisory Committees continue to improve, and one reason is Fort Worth's investment in the CCP-funded Community Leadership Development seminar. This leadership training program, organized by Tarrant County Citizens Crime Commission, has been revised and refined since our case study report. It now provides a valuable training ground and referral mechanism for persons who later volunteer to sit on the Community Advisory Committees. Unlike many citizen police academies (which often cater to white collar and business leaders), this seminar focuses on building grassroots leadership among the working class members of the community. The program has graduated four classes and has grown sufficiently to have its own alumni association. These individuals are deeply involved in the Advisory Committees and provide a growing cadre of citizens who are concerned about public safety in Fort Worth and are willing to get involved.

The Tarrant County Citizens Crime Commission continues to organize, print, and distribute *Safe City*, the city's official community policing newsletter. It includes a special page of news from each police district, so interested residents and police personnel can stay abreast of events happening locally and in other parts of the city. In a sense, the newsletter creates a healthy

competition between police districts. The City is currently exploring new funding sources for this newsletter.

### **Preventive Social Service Programs**

To the credit of Fort Worth, all of the social service programs started or enhanced under CCP are still in operation and going strong. Here is a brief summary:

- (1) The MENS program (Men's Education for Nonviolence -- counseling for men who batter) continues to operate from the offices of The Women's Haven of Tarrant County. The program is now funded under a grant from the State of Texas and its referral network continues to expand.
- (2) The gang prevention program, Comin' Up, administered by the Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater Fort Worth, remains a strong force against gang violence. During the period of CCP funding, Comin' Up was able to secure partial support from the local block grant program. This year, the entire program is funded through local block grant monies. As one local expert reports, "the program is thriving." According to police sources, juvenile gang violence is down 23% in Fort Worth over the past year, and down 40% since the start of the Comin' Up program. Drive-by shootings are down 85% since the inception of the program.
- (3) The Tarrant County Drug Impact Rehabilitation Enhanced Comprehensive Treatment (DIRECT) Program, a diversion to treatment initiative, continues to function as an appendage to the County's Drug Impact Court. Given that courts are created by the legislature in Texas, the program is run by a "visiting judge" who is retired from practice and court is held at night. Despite not having the status of being an official "court" the program has been sustained because it provides value services. Over 200 offenders have successfully completed the program and we are told that graduates have lower recidivism rates than nonparticipants. Fort Worth is planning a conference on juvenile drug treatment that will hopefully lead to additional enhancements to the DIRECT program.
- (4) In light of its success with DIRECT, Fort Worth is currently developing a juvenile drug diversion program with funding from CCP and the Law Enforcement Block Grant program. The juvenile judge and associate judge have agreed to participate and set aside time for these juvenile drug cases if a minor change in the law can be introduced. Judges from the adult court have agreed to

volunteer their time to help out. Fort Worth will convene a network of treatment providers in the social service, government, and drug treatment areas to work out a plan to service these juvenile drug offenders.

- (5) The Tarrant County Advocate Program (TCAP), administered by a local office of the national Youth Advocacy Program, is an alternative to the secured detection of "charged but not-yet-convicted" young offenders. The TCAP program continues to function and expand beyond the CCP period. Today, TCAP is fully funded by Tarrant County. Police sources tell us that the program has been successful at reducing the post-adjudication recidivism rate among participants.

## **Synergistic Effects of CCP**

The synergistic effects of CCP in Fort Worth have been observed between agencies and in specific programmatic outcomes. The creation of a strategic steering committee is a fine example. Several federal grants, including CCP and Weed and Seed, required the creation of formal oversight committees. To avoid the problem of creating three or four different committees, Fort Worth decided to create one group that would be responsible for all major public safety projects in the region. The Neighborhood Policy Steering Committee that was created for this purpose is co-chaired by the Mayor of Fort Worth and the US Attorney for the Northern District of Texas. Interestingly enough, this group has emerged as an important decision-making body and has produced cooperative initiatives beyond its original mission. In addition, the composition of the committee continues to expand to include community leaders, minority representation, and a representative from the governor's office.

The MENS batterer program is another good example of the synergy that resulted from agencies working together under CCP. The initial CCP grant created a relationship between the FWPD and the Women's Haven of Tarrant County. When the State legislature decided to allow non-profit organizations to apply for grants from the Criminal Justice Planning Fund (previously restricted to law enforcement agencies), the FWPD brought this fact to the attention of the Women's Haven, and worked with them to write a grant proposal that would continue the MENS program. Their proposal was successful (for approx. \$185,000), and under the guidelines of the Criminal Justice Planning Fund, continuation grants are possible up to five years. Furthermore, because the FWPD was successful in receiving a COPS domestic violence grant, police personnel are now a major source of referrals to the MENS program. (Previously, referrals came largely from the District

Attorney's Office). Again, because of the linkage that was created initially under CCP, the cooperation between these two agencies continues to flourish.

The CCP focus on juvenile drug cases provides another illustration of the expanded benefits of this initiative. As a direct result of CCP and Weed and Seed funding, Fort Worth hosted a mini-conference on juvenile drug courts. Criminal Justice Associates, a CCP TA provider, worked with the FWPD to invite other cities that currently have working drug courts for juveniles to explore the issues and share information. As a result of this conference, the FWPD and the County court are in the process of creating a model juvenile drug court that is based on the best available knowledge and experience in the field. Social Service agencies will be coordinating treatment services and helping to expand treatment dollars and facilities.

Another synergistic effect of CCP comes from the introduction of NPDs and the services that are likely to follow from this decentralization. Fort Worth is currently promoting "wellness prevention" in the public health arena, including health risk assessment at the neighborhood level. Working with the health department, the FWPD has secured funding to remodel their NPDs to provide on-site office space for public health nurses. Each NPD will have its own nurse that will be available to local residents. NPDs also provide a home for the Citizens on Patrol program, and will soon provide space to housing code inspectors. The number of neighborhood-based services continues to expand as an indirect result of the CCP-funded decentralization effort.

Finally, the effects of CCP on community grassroots activity should be noted. The Community Advisory Committees are a direct product of CCP funding and at the district level, police and community leaders are beginning to see the fruits of their investment. The Advisory Committee in NPD 5, for example, noticed that their crime statistics were "too high" relative to some other districts. A subcommittee investigated the matter to learn that a particular gas station was a "hot spot" for drive-off offenders. They encouraged the owner to introduce a pre-pay policy to correct the problem, but he refused. Consequently, they picketed his station, informing customers and neighbors that he was not interested in preventing crime in the community. He quickly complied with their request and started a pre-pay policy.

## **Sustainment of CCP**

As should be apparent from the above descriptions, plans have been implemented to financially support and expand all components of the CCP model in Fort Worth. The FWPD has worked individually with the social

service agencies involved to line up funding to continue their CCP-supported activity. In addition, FWPD has successfully introduced a plan to finance all 12 Neighborhood Policing Districts and all 89 Neighborhood Policing Officers under a local county fund. To bring more substance and permanence to this decentralization/community policing plan, the FWPD has also arranged training for all NPOs and has introduced NPD-level accountability for the vitality of Community Advisory Committees. In essence, the future of CCP strategies looks very promising in Fort Worth. As one police source noted, "You couldn't pull them out now if you wanted to."

## **Final Conclusions About CCP**

The orchestrated coordination of federal grants from Weed and Seed, COPS, and CCP initiatives proved to be a highly successful strategy for strengthening and institutionalizing the comprehensive strategy underway in Fort Worth. Each grant was able to build upon and supplement the previous one, thus providing continued support for the City's community-oriented model of crime prevention and control. Furthermore, this federal support helped to demonstrate the utility of innovative (experimental) programs to skeptical policy makers and thus provided the justification for sustained funding. Today, for example, all 12 of the NPDs are funded by the Crime Control and Prevention District — something that would not have happened, according to local experts, if CCP did not provide funding for the initial expansion of this decentralization plan. In addition, the formal mechanisms that exist for community involvement in community policing are a direct result of CCP.

The interesting story behind CCP is the discovery of synergistic effects that occurred when new processes and mechanisms were created for communication between and within agencies. We have highlighted several examples in Fort Worth.

The Fort Worth story is interesting for another reason. This epilogue is important for what we learned about the ongoing relationship between the FWPD and the other agencies in this partnership — insight that was not previously available to us. Initially, we described these relationship in strictly financial terms, viewing the FWPD as a money manager with a "hands off" management style. We now see the FWPD as a very caring partner that works hard to ensure the future funding of its partners because of a serious commitment to the prevention services being offered. In addition, we have gained a deeper respect, perhaps because of the level of success achieved, for the "hands off" approach to management at this site. As the CCP Project Director describes, "We let it (CCP) grow at its own pace." FWPD's decentralized, bottom-up approach to planning seems at times

distant and lacking management direction, but this arrangement has some clear advantages over sites where battles for control and ownership of the project are salient.

## Appendix A: Program Descriptions

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The program descriptions below provide additional details about funding levels, sustainment plans, and program operations not presented in the body of the report. However, some portion of this information can also be found in the report narrative.

### *Community Mobilization Initiative \$162,000*

The Tarrant County Citizens Crime Commission, a non-profit organization with an operating budget of \$200,000 to 250,000 per year, conducted Fort Worth's community mobilization efforts.

The Commission managed two mobilization efforts. The Community Leadership Development Seminar began in January, 1996, and completed three cycles of the program that year. The monthly seminar was intended to enhance grass-roots leadership in the community, and thus to build the capacity of neighborhoods to assume responsibility for local problem solving. The Commission's staff met with the police district's Citizen Advisory Committees to identify the issues and skills that needed to be included in the curriculum, and a consultant devised a detailed curriculum. Some of the issues covered by the seminars included meeting management, media relations, "getting your voice heard at city hall," community organizing, conflict resolution, youth issues, inter-personal communication strategies, and leadership skills. About 35 "hard core" members regularly attended sessions. By the end of 1996, 45 individuals had "graduated" from the program.

The leadership program appeared to its planners be a sound idea, but implementation fell short of expectations. Sustained participation did not meet projected levels, and from the organizer's point of view the police department often did not send the "right" officers (i.e. NPOs who were assigned to Community Advisory Council and who could transfer their knowledge from the classroom to the community). Police, on the other hand, replied that their NPOs and advisory board members were already very busy and involved, and that it was more important to identify and involve new participants. Refinements were made in the program between our first and second site visits, and other changes have been made in the program. New NPOs are to be involved, and a special effort will be made to involve members of the advisory councils for the city's public housing developments. The Tarrant County Crime Commission hopes to sustain the program by soliciting "scholarships" from the business community to support program participation. In addition, leadership training was included in the city's application for second-round CCP funding.

The second mobilization initiative conducted by the Commission was the development of resource materials for the Citizen Advisory Committees. The Commission developed planning exercises for the groups and a resource binder presenting details about the city and its police districts. The Commission helped the Community Advisory Committees raise and manage their money.

The Commission also organizes, prints, and distributes *Safe City*, the city's official community policing newsletter. It coordinates the production of a special page of news from each district and distributes the final product. District residents are paid a modest fee to act as reporters and translators for the newsletter. The Commission printed 46,200 copies of the first newsletter, and 40,000 of the second. These are mailed to selected lists and distributed door-to-door by the districts. Continued support for the newsletter is also included in the city's application for second-round CCP funding

#### *Youth & Gangs AmeriCorps Project \$60,000*

The Tarrant County Citizens Crime Commission also conducted this project. CCP provided support for the administrative staff that coordinates an AmeriCorps project designed to educate the public about gangs and violence, teach violence reduction, create peer mediation programs, conduct dispute resolution sessions, and facilitate community service projects.

The program typically involved 17 AmeriCorps volunteers, who were funded through the Department of Justice. At the time of our first visit they were all young women. They worked 1,700 hours over a nine to twelve month period in exchange for a college scholarship of \$4,725, a \$150 per week living stipend, and full job benefits. They were placed in the police department, Boys & Girls Clubs, schools, safe havens, and other non-profit agencies. They wore AmeriCorps uniforms while at work. At the time of our first visit, they worked at five different sites. In the police department, they did paperwork for Neighborhood Policing Officers, cleaned up graffiti, represented the Citizens Crime Commission at public events, passed out flyers and newsletters, and generated turnout for public meetings. They were to become involved in neighborhood needs assessments and assisting senior citizens. At first, the police department supervisors were reluctant to accept the AmeriCorps volunteers, but over time, they warmed to the volunteers and learned to utilize their assistance. In most settings (with one exception), the volunteers were accepted and well-utilized, according to the Citizens Crime Commission.

As of December, 1996, the Crime Commission had applied for direct funding of the program, and plan to sustain it in this way. They anticipate supporting 30 volunteers and two staff members in this way.

*Batterer Treatment Program \$162,000*

The Women's Haven of Tarrant County conducts the Fort Worth's batterer program called "The MENS program" (Men's Education for Nonviolence). The service provides "counseling services for men working to end men's cycle of abuse and family violence." The Women's Haven has been dealing with domestic violence issues since 1976, providing a shelter and victim counseling for women. In 1991, they added a batterer counseling program for men involved in abusive intimate relationships.

About 80 percent of the participants in MENS were involved in the program as a result of a court order. In 1992, the Tarrant County District Attorney adopted a "no drop" policy for domestic violence cases. Coupled with a new "pro-arrest" policy on the part of the Fort Worth police, this resulted in a large increase in domestic violence cases in the Tarrant County criminal justice system. The District Attorney made diversion to an approved batterer intervention program available as an alternative to jail or a stiff fine for misdemeanor battery cases. Defendants plead guilty, and participate in a program while on probation.

MENS was one of the programs that met treatment standards established by the State of Texas. According to the 1995 standards developed by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the Texas Council on Family Violence, the minimum duration of a battering intervention program should be 36 hours over a minimum of 18 weeks, not including orientation sessions. MENS was a 48 hour program lasting 24 weeks. The fee for participation was \$340, which covered approximately 50 percent of the true cost of the program. (Other programs charge between \$200 and \$400.) In addition, MENS made provisions for indigent clients, and as a result relied heavily on federal, state, United Way, and CCP funding. CCP paid 60 percent of the salary of four program counselors, and some supplies and conference travel for program staff. MENS served a total of 750 to 800 clients per year, mostly misdemeanor cases. While the offenders represented all socioeconomic and racial groups, the highest socioeconomic-status offenders often found other options available to them.

The MENS program has several components: screening and assessment of offenders, 24-week educational counseling, support services for victims, training for law enforcement, and networking with other criminal justice agencies. The screening process involves reviewing individual cases to determine their appropriateness for the program. Batterers with extreme mental health problems (e.g. suicidal, disruptive behavior, generalized violence) or substance abuse problems may not be appropriate. Screening can also insure some degree of success with treatment, although state guidelines indicate that persons with severe problems should be referred to other agencies for treatment.

The MENS treatment program is group-based. There are eight to ten men per group, and MENS frequently operates twelve such groups. The groups meet for a four-hour orientation and 24 two-hour sessions spread over a six month period. Groups are conducted in English and Spanish, and run by male-female counseling teams with masters degree-level training. Each English-speaking group typically included one or two African-Americans and one or two Hispanics.

MENS employed the “Duluth Model,” which is a cognitive and behavioral approach to treating men who batter. It stressed communication skills, anger management, choices, power and control issues, and attitudes toward women and relationships. Unlike programs that focus heavily on anger control and skill deficits, the Duluth model encourages the offenders to focus on *why* they are choosing abusive behavior, and why they hold negative attitudes toward women. The need for power and control is given considerable attention, as are ways these men can learn to “let go of it.” Power and control tactics include using coercion and threats, intimidation, emotional abuse, isolation, minimizing-denying-blaming, using the children, using economic abuse, and using male privilege. The structured curriculum encourages the offenders to “dissect their past abusive situations” and to “reevaluate their relationship and beliefs about women,” according to one group facilitator. The objective is to move from tactics of power and control to a relationship based on nonviolence. Key components of a nonviolent relationship include negotiation and fairness, non-threatening behavior, respect, trust and support, honesty and accountability, shared responsibility, and economic partnership.

The support services for victims included telephone interviews to determine how they were coping in the aftermath of their abusive relationship. MENS staff conducted a check-list interview by telephone with the women on at least two occasions—before, during, and/or after their partner’s treatment. These data were used to identify additional service or referral needs for the victims.

When evaluating services for abusive men, it is important to place the program in the larger context of legal and criminal justice processes. MENS staff emphasized that “success” must be looked at in terms of “how it fits into the entire system.” If the larger criminal justice system is not held accountable for putting pressure on the offenders, then the effectiveness of counseling programs will be limited. Without the legal leverage to identify and arrest offenders, mandate attendance in counseling programs, and impose sanctions for noncompliance, then much improvement in abusive behavior should not be expected. There is also debate about the adequacy (i.e. intensity and duration) of existing counseling programs. The state of Texas now requires that approved programs provide a minimum of 36 hours of counseling, but the optimum amount is a subject of considerable discus-

sion. Previously, many programs in Texas offered only ten to 15 hours. While the state's new standard is higher than many other states, it is also lower than some (e.g. Massachusetts requires 80 hours). More research is needed to determine the optimum "dosage of treatment" to maximize program effects and minimize costs.

In this larger criminal justice context, MENS goes beyond counseling services to network with other agencies and to provide educational services. These activities include: (1) training law enforcement officers regarding the proper handling of domestic violence calls; (2) teaching a six-week class on men's issues at the "boot camp" correctional facility in Mansfield, Texas; and, (3) participating in the bi-monthly meetings of the Domestic Violence Task Force, which discusses key issues in the area.

The State of Texas sustained the funding of the MENS batterer treatment program, beginning in October, 1996. This support will continue for five years, at a declining level each year.

#### *Gang Intervention Program \$163,000*

The Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater Fort Worth conducts the Comin' Up Program. The goal of the program was to reduce levels of gang violence by establishing truces between gangs, reducing the level of random violence, mediating disputes, and diverting the energies of gang members into other activities. In June, 1996, the program was just beginning its third year. Its first year was supported by seized asset funds, Community Development Block Grant awards, and private foundations, and had a budget of \$580,000. The second year was funded by CCP, Community Development Block Grant, and foundations. The program's CCP funds expired in October, 1996.

The original funding for the program supported project activities at seven sites. The Boys & Girls Clubs requested CCP funding for two additional sites, for a total of \$165,000, and began operation in those areas in February, 1995. Comin' Ups sites were defined by gang turf, and the CCP sites were located in the Rosemont and Riverside areas of Fort Worth. The program cost about \$85,000 per site, per year, for personnel and equipment. Each site was staffed by a coordinator, two part-time youth development specialists, and two part-time outreach workers. The latter typically were former gang members.

The first job of site staff was to recruit gang members for their programs. Gang members were identified through the police, parole and probation departments, the schools, parents, and work on the street. The project's goal was to actively involve 100 youths at each site. Each site featured a building with recreation facilities: two were Boys & Girls Clubs buildings, and seven were park buildings. The buildings were open and staffed seven to eleven p.m. each evening. An electronic wand was used to search everyone who

enters for weapons, and the police gave the sites extra attention at the eleven o'clock closing period. Diverse "interest-based" activities took place during the open hours. There were sports tournaments, discussion groups (life skills, jobs, conflict resolution), cooking and cosmetology classes, computer classes, parenting programs, movies, karate drills, board games, and rap sessions with individual staff members.

A subset of 25 youths at each site were designated "managed cases," and received more intensive attention. They were particularly in need of parenting and job skills, and perhaps admission to a GED program. GED programs were being offered at six of the program's nine sites. Job placement, alcohol and drug treatment, and other services were organized to suit the needs of individuals. The program also administered community service programs to which youths could be sentenced to clean parks, streets, and vacant lots around the project sites.

Implementation of the program was slow because of these obstacles. In addition, the program sought, for better or worse, to reach the "toughest gang members" for case management. One of the lessons of this effort was that gang members were difficult, if not impossible, to reach if they had a serious drug problem, as many do. The Comin' UP program highlighted the need for more and better drug treatment programs in Fort Worth. At present, this kind of treatment is available only to persons who commit a crime and have a desire to "kick the habit." Despite these early problems, the Comin' Up program managed to reach a large number of gang members, engage them in constructive activities, and hopefully improve their lives. Early outcomes of the program were encouraging, according to the program's staff members. During the first five months of 1995, homicides were down 83 percent and rapes down 40 percent in the target areas, and they attribute this drop in part to the program. Also, new relationships with the police department were established as a result of this program, overcoming some previous animosity about gang members. According to staff members, their relationship with the police department was "very good" and the police chief was "very, very supportive."

The Boys & Girls Clubs director reported monthly and quarterly to the CCP Coordinator. The Clubs received their entire award at the start date of their contract. Detailed project calendars were available that indicated the activities that took place at each site each day of every month. The director hoped to sustain the program with City Council funding. Seized asset funds could be used for longer than one year, and Community Development Block Grant funds were no longer available.

The sustainability of this program was an issue even during our first site visit. At that time, continued support from the City Council seemed to depend upon overcoming political opposition to hiring former or current gang members, and on the program's ability to show evidence of success. The

program director learned to talk about hiring “outreach workers” rather than “gang members.” Despite some evidence of success, the obstacles to implementation have been substantial. First, there were complaints from other community groups who questioned why the Boys and Girls Club (rather than themselves) should be funded to work with gangs (five of nine communities complained to their City Council member). Then there was the problem of finding and keeping good employees. This staffing problem was a considerable challenge given the personal problems facing the target group. When first introduced, the program was viewed with suspicion and distrust by local gang members. Once some were enticed to experiment with the program, there was considerable pressure on them to be a “good” employee or be terminated. The program was “under the microscope” of conservative politicians to demonstrate that participants, contrary to expectation, are productive and law-abiding citizens. A high rate of turnover not only reflected poorly on the individual gang members involved, but unfortunately, “lead people to question the integrity of the organization.” In sum, “we really got beat up with this program from all sides—the community, city government, and the gangs themselves.”

As of December, 1996, most of the program seemed likely to continue for another year. City Law Enforcement Block Grant funds were being used to support Comin' Up activities at eight sites; in fact, this program was receiving one-half of those funds. During 1997, the city will evaluate the Comin' Up program, and conduct an audit of its operations, in anticipation of seeking continued funding from other sources.

#### *Drug Diversion Program \$200,000*

The Tarrant County Drug Impact Rehabilitation Enhanced Comprehensive Treatment (DIRECT) Program was a diversion project aimed at drug users. It was appended to the county's Drug Impact Court, which has been in operation since 1991, and was created to expedite the prosecution of serious narcotics cases.

Tarrant County was approached about this program by the CCP Coordinator. CCP required that a certain percentage of its awards go to drug treatment, and Tarrant County conducts drug prosecutions for the region. Tarrant County had already begun to organize a treatment component for its Drug Impact Court, knowing that there was substantial state funding for such programs. DIRECT began operation with state funding in September, 1995. After meeting with BJA staffers and learning that CCP funds were to be used for offenders who were otherwise likely to be incarcerated, Tarrant County rewrote its DIRECT program model to make that a clear goal. Then, an Interlocal Agreement was signed between Tarrant County and the City of Fort Worth, on the basis of a detailed budget drawn up by the project's director based on a projected case flow. This process was cumbersome,

involving the city and county's lawyers, the City Manager, and the County Judge. The effort is noteworthy because this was the first intergovernmental agreement in the criminal justice arena in Tarrant County. On June 1, 1996, Tarrant County invoiced the city through the CCP Coordinator for the entire \$200,000. At our first visit, no CCP funds had been spent. The relatively slow start of this program was attributed to the need to coordinate the efforts of the state-funded misdemeanor diversion portion of the project, the CCP-funded felony diversion effort, and the development of the treatment alternatives.

The program involves both misdemeanor and felony cases. To participate in the program, defendants must: 1) be charged with minor possession; 2) not be involved in drug sales; 3) have no other felony offenses pending, or prior felony violence or drug convictions; and, 4) pass review by the District Attorney's office. The program reviews incoming Drug Impact Court cases for likely clients, and recommends those that meet these guidelines to the District Attorney for diversion to treatment. Most of those entering the CCP part of the program come from the felony branch of the court, and would otherwise be "prison bound."

From June, 1995, to May, 1996, DIRECT had reviewed 252 Drug Court cases. Of those, 119 seemed at first glance to meet the program's criteria and were more carefully reviewed. Of the 119, 81 were recommended to the District Attorney for the program. Of the 81, 52 were accepted, seven rejected, and 22 were "in process" at the time these figures were assembled. These cases were all handled using state funds.

The DIRECT program subcontracts for treatment components, using agencies that already provided correction and probation services for the county. It is an 18 month program. The CCP grant supports psychological exams, urine tests, detoxification services, in-and out-patient treatment, and group therapy.

DIRECT will conduct a 36-month recidivism study at the appropriate time. It will generate monthly reports on CCP-funded case flows. The staff estimates that CCP will support treatment of 120 cases in 1996, of which 96 will remain with the program for three months and 48 will complete the 18-month program. Program staff are hoping for a rearrest rate no higher than ten percent after one year (for those who survive the first three months), but success with recidivism will depend to some extent on the screening process employed. The current supervisor, who makes these decisions, is a "bigger risk taker" than her predecessor, trying to "reach some kids." Thus, with more serious or high-risk cases, the risk of failure has increased. However, the advantage of this program (in theory) is that the threat of prison which hangs over these offenders is a salient incentive to work hard and stay out of trouble. One judge purposely schedules DIRECT group meetings at six p.m.

near the jail dining hall, so that participants can hear the clanging of silverware by inmates.

Aside from statistics about recidivism, one of the goals of this program is to improve communication with the district judges. As a group, "they are not too rehabilitation-oriented." One judge is "really good" and very supportive of DIRECT, but there is much room for progress with judges in general.

As of December, 1996, DIRECT was still expending its CCP funds. The city anticipates that its Law Enforcement Block Grant will pay for treatment, and that the State will fund the program's personnel.

### *Community-Based Alternatives to Incarceration \$225,000*

The Tarrant County Advocate Program (TCAP) was conducted by a local office of the national Youth Advocacy Program (YAP). YAP specialized in pre- and post-adjudication services for youthful offenders. Founded in Fort Worth in 1992, TCAP was employed as a contractor for the Tarrant County Juvenile Services Department. An Assistant City Manager knew of their work, and recommended they be included in Fort Worth's CCP proposal.

Under CCP, TCAP functioned as an alternative to the secured detention of charged but not-yet-convicted young offenders. Rather than being held in detention at the county's youth facility, youths diverted to the program were released to the community. Advocates made frequent home visits and built linkages between the offenders and the community. Their release was approved by a juvenile court judge, and they typically remained under the care of the program for a 20 to 25 day period while they awaited adjudication. This period was referred to as "community-based detention." During this period, the program tried to quickly establish "community anchors" that could help reduce the risk of recidivism. TCAP's clients were 98 percent male, and largely African-American or Hispanic in origin.

In Fort Worth, TCAP was organized into North and South Side offices, each with a director. It also served other parts of Tarrant County. The majority of its programs had state and local funding, and were not funded by CCP. Financially, the City of Fort Worth had an Interlocal Agreement with Tarrant County, which in turn subcontracted to TCAP. CCP funds began to flow to TCAP in June, 1995. TCAP billed Tarrant County for the hours of service that they provided, but Tarrant County guaranteed them a certain number of billable hours per month to sustain the program. The county in turn billed Fort Worth on a monthly basis, through the CCP Coordinator.

The program had several goals: to reduce the length of the incarceration period for young offenders, to reduce their chances of rearrest while they are on release, to ensure their appearance in court, and to reduce their post-adjudication recidivism rate. It was an alternative to pre-adjudication

incarceration: everyone involved in the program would otherwise be held in detention because of the seriousness of their offense or their prior record. TCAP estimated that 88 percent are involved in gangs, and almost all were arrested for violent crimes.

In terms of case flow, TCAP was activated by the Tarrant County Juvenile Services Department when qualified prospects were delivered to them by the Fort Worth police. Staff members meet with the child and family (if possible, on the same day) at the juvenile facility, often jointly with a probation officer. They conducted an intake interview and needs assessment, and (if qualified) reviewed for the family the terms under which the child could be released.

TCAP staff then went to court and recommended the youth's diversion to community-based detention. If approved, TCAP assigned an advocate to the case. The advocates were all hired from the community, and lived in their TCAP districts. They were typically recruited from the local junior college, churches, or via neighborhood newspapers, and underwent extensive training. They were paid an hourly rate for either full-time or part-time work, but only for hours during which they were in actual contact with the offender or his family. TCAP had about 45 employees on call.

The advocates provided an average of 20 hours of direct service contact each week to each offender in the program. Advocates were responsible for getting their charges back into school, or into a special school program. Advocates needed to know what their clients were doing in and out of school, their performance if they had a job, and the dynamics of their family relationships. They monitored their compliance with curfew regulations. Once their client's problems and needs had been identified, advocates referred them to a broad variety of community services. Advocates escorted youths and their parents to court hearings until their case was disposed. They helped families deal with attorneys, and explained to them how the case would be processed. Their services were not uniform, but were tailored to the needs of a particular case. If school was the primary problem for a particular client, then the advocate spent most of his or her time at school. If the family or home environment was the problem, then this setting received more attention. As one advocate said, "We will do whatever it takes for each family."

Tarrant County provided a number of post-adjudication services for non-incarcerated offenders, among them TCAP referrals who are not detained. TCAP provided a number of those services, and perhaps 50 percent of CCP-supported clients were referred back to them for later treatment.

TCAP staffers were convinced of the cost-effectiveness of their program. In June, 1996, it cost the county \$80 per day to hold youths in detention, while TCAP cost \$32 per day for each offender they serve. In terms of evaluation outcome data, 88 percent of those in the program were not rearrested while

they were on release, and 96 percent showed up for their trial. No comparison group data were available.

In total, TCAP provided advocates for 73 youths under their CCP grant, which is now completed. Their CCP funding officially came to a close in June, 1996. However, a change in the way in which the juvenile court processed these cases shortened the period of time that these youths were under TCAP supervision. This reduced the cost of the program, so Fort Worth used the unexpended funds to prolong the life of the program. TCAP will also receive support from the city's second-year CCP funding to add a work-force mentoring component to their program. The city is confident that Tarrant County will sustain TCAP's pre-adjudication efforts, and that the State will sustain the work force mentoring project after CCP concludes.

## Appendix B: Network Analysis Strategy

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Distances among the targets were measured using a structural equivalence approach (cf. Lorrain & White, 1971), which overcomes some of the shortcomings of the conventional graph theory. Following the lead of Heinz and Manikas (1992), distances among the targets were measured by determining the overlap of acquaintances for any two actors, defined here as “the degree to which the persons who are in contact with each of them are the same people (p. 840).” The main benefit of this structural equivalence approach is that it circumvents the problem of missing data and allows us to compare patterns of contact for individuals who are not interviewed. This is only possible because our sample includes a sufficient number of respondents who know both individual targets. The alternative approach (i.e. the graphic theoretic approach, which measures similarity by counting the number of links in the communication network to get from person A to X) would require the collection of data from all people in the chain.

Multidimensional scaling was used to analyze our network data. As Scott (1991, p. 151) observes, “The mathematical approach termed ‘multidimensional scaling’ embodies all the advantages of the conventional sociogram and its extensions (such as circle diagrams), but results in something much closer to a ‘map’ of the space in which the network is embedded. This is a very important advance.” For the present analysis, we have used the non-metric multi-dimensional scaling technique called “smallest space analysis,” which uses asymmetrical adjacency matrix of similarities and dissimilarities among the targets. (See Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Scott, 1991 for a discussion of advantages over metric MDS). The data have been recoded to binary form, so that 0 indicates person X has had no prior contact with person Y and 1 indicates that X and Y have had some contact, i.e. at least “every few months.” The non-metric MDS program is able to produce a matrix of Euclidean distances (based on rank orders) which is used to create a metric scatter plot. These plots are displayed as the two-dimensional figures below.

The output of MDS is a spatial display of points, where each point represents a target person in the network. The configuration of points should inform us about the pattern of affiliations and contacts in the network. The smaller the distance between two points, the greater the similarity between these two individuals with respect to their social contacts. The location of person X in multidimensional space is determined both by X’s own social connections and by the connections of those who have chosen X as an affiliate. The MDS analyses were performed using SPSS Windows 6.1.

Technically, the data could be analyzed at either the individual or organizational level and each approach has some advantages. At this time, we have decided to analyze the results at the individual level, primarily because of some highly visible individuals who played central roles in the conceptualization and implementation of CCP programs. Still, we are able to connect individuals to organizations, and tend to view them as representatives of the organizations with which they are affiliated. We are likely to use organizations as the unit of analysis for a planned longitudinal analysis because of the attrition problem in network and panel data.

To determine the appropriate number of dimensions for the data, a series of analyses were performed and a “stress” statistic was calculated for each solution. In MDS, stress is the most widely used goodness-of-fit measure for dimensionality, with smaller values indicating that the solution is a better fit to the data (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).<sup>3</sup> By plotting the stress values for solutions with up to four dimensions, it became apparent that the “elbow” point (i.e. where any additional increase in the number of dimensions fails to yield sizeable reductions in stress) occurs at two dimensions. This pattern was evident at all five sites, and hence, we elected to use a two-dimensional solution across the board. Beyond relative stress levels there is the issue of absolute stress values. Stress values ranged from 18 to 20 percent, with one exception (25%). These values are considered acceptable in the literature, although figures above 20 percent suggest a weak fit (see Kruskal, 1964; Scott, 1991).

The data were analyzed, presented, and interpreted separately for each CCP site. Statistics reported include stress values calculated from Kruskal's Stress Formula 1 and the squared correlation ( $R^2$ ). The  $R^2$  value indicates the proportion of variance of the disparity matrix data that is accounted for by their corresponding distances.

After calculating the solution and mapping a multidimensional configuration, the final step is interpretation. This involves assigning meaning to the dimensions and providing some explanation for the observed arrangement of points in space. In other words, what do the clusters of points mean and how should they be interpreted? As Scott notes (1991, p. 166), “...this process of

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<sup>3</sup>Technically, stress is defined as “the square root of a normalized ‘residual sum of squares.’” Dimensionality is defined as “the number of coordinate axes, that is, the number of coordinate values used to locate a point in the space.” (Kruskal & Wish, 1978, p. 48-49).

interpretation is a creative and imaginative act on the part of the researcher. It is not something that can be produced by a computer alone.”

## **Limitations and Cautions**

We should be cautious not to over-interpret or draw causal inferences about the observed networks for several reasons. First, these analyses and graphic presentations provide a one-time snapshot of interactions between individuals early in the CCP project. Consequently, these data will not allow us to tease out any pre-existing relationships and networks that may be operating. Thus, whether these networks are CCP-induced or reflect pre-existing relationships is unknown. A longitudinal look at these networks is currently in progress to see how these linkages change during the course of the CCP funding. Combined with careful fieldwork, this should give us a stronger assessment of CCP's contribution. Second, these analyses are limited to interactions between individuals, which may or may not reflect the nature and extent of partnerships between agencies. To capture interagency contacts, our unit of analysis for the longitudinal analysis will be the organization/agency rather than the individual (This analysis strategy also avoids the individual-level attrition problem that is always present in longitudinal data). Finally, the present analysis is limited by the nature of the original sample. Who ends up in the sample can have a large influence on the outcome of network analysis. While we are satisfied that this problem has been minimized by allowing sites to self-define a comprehensive list of CCP participants, nevertheless, we suspect that some individuals and groups have been overlooked at each site. Generally speaking, one might characterize this network analysis as a study of “elites” — in this case, community, city and agency leaders. Networks that may exist among street-level employees and community volunteers are under-represented (although not completely absent) from this analysis.

Despite these limitations, network analysis provides an important empirical tool for examining the nature and extent of community-based partnerships and coalitions. While it is easy to talk about “interagency cooperation” in grant proposals or in personal interviews, it is not so easy to create the illusion of a network (for the benefit of researchers and others) when members of that network are asked, individually, about their frequency of interaction with one another. The results here suggest that the number and density of networks varies by site and that resultant patterns of contact are generally consistent with our field observations.

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